LONGUEVAL AND DELVILLE WOOD
JULY 1916
Not the least anxious part of the forthcoming battle was the assembly
of the troops during the night of the 13th/14th July, for it was an
audacious enterprise to form up in the darkness a large body of men
within easy distance of the German lines, since the least suspicion
of the manœuvre by the enemy was bound to lead to a dreadful
catastrophe. The deepest silence was essential, and the operation
was partly cloaked by the artillery, which throughout the night
bombarded the village and the wood. The assembly was a great triumph
of organisation for the Staff of the two brigades, and a proof of the
high discipline of the men. The arrangements of the brigades differed
slightly, but were equally successful in their results.
The 26th Brigade assembled on the northern slopes of Caterpillar
Valley, with its left resting on the path leading from Montauban to
Longueval. After the covering party, consisting of four platoons
with two Lewis Guns, had taken post on the crest of the plateau, the
brigade major, Major Drew, with the adjutants of the Black Watch and
Argylls and forty markers, went out to mark off the ground. The plan
was to work from the left of each battalion. The left markers of
the Black Watch moved up the Bernafay-Longueval road, and the left
of the Argylls up the Montauban-Longueval path. Sixteen markers
of the former, commencing from the rear, were posted in pairs at
70 yards’ distance along the first of these roads. When this was
accomplished, the front couple had reached a point about 500 yards
from the enemy’s front line. As each pair was posted, one man moved
off at right angles with a tape about 150 yards long, and thus fixed
the right of his wave or platoon. In the same fashion those of the
Argylls were placed in position. Then at 12.25 A.M. the battalions,
by companies in single file, moved out to line up on the markers,
and as each platoon reached its left marker it wheeled to the right
and fixed bayonets. The assembly of the brigade was effected without
sound or hitch by 3 A.M. While the markers were being posted there
was considerable shelling of the assembly area, but fortunately it
died down before the arrival of the battalions. Owing to shelling,
however, and sniping from Trones Wood it was found necessary slightly
to contract the right of the Black Watch.
[Illustration: DELVILLE WOOD]
The assembly area of the 27th Brigade was on the immediate left of
that of the 26th. About 10 P.M. the platoon that formed the covering
party pushed forward to the northern slopes of Caterpillar Valley,
and an hour later Major Teacher, the brigade major, with one officer
and two N.C.Os. of the 90th Field Coy. R.E. moved out to place the
tapes for the battalions. In this case the plan was to work from the
centre. On a compass-bearing, previously taken by Major Teacher,
the first tape, 50 yards long, was laid, and others were placed in
prolongation of the first. When completed the centre tape extended to
a distance of 1000 yards, the work having taken forty-five minutes.
Then the front tape was laid off at right angles, the flanks of each
battalion being thus fixed. This was checked by an officer from
each of the attacking battalions, who paced for 1000 yards along the
roads that marked the flanks of the brigade. When the tapes were in
position, the right and left markers for each unit were posted.
The battalions assembled in the southern portion of the valley at
12.30 A.M., each being in mass, in single rank, on a front of 225
yards. At 1.45 A.M. the 11th Royal Scots moved along the centre tape
to their final position, and were followed by the 9th Scottish Rifles
and the 12th Royal Scots. Though there was intermittent shelling,
there were only five casualties, but these included Lieut.-Colonel H.
L. Budge of the 12th Royal Scots, who was killed by a shell fragment
as his battalion was passing through the west side of Montauban;
the command of the battalion was then taken over by Captain J. E.
MacPherson. The assembly was completed at 2.45 A.M.
The Division, by the satisfactory conclusion of this difficult
operation deserved all the high praise[44] that it received from the
G.O.C. and General Congreve.
At 3.20 A.M., when the light was just sufficient for one to
distinguish friend from foe, the first barrage opened, and the
leading waves moved as close to it as they could safely go. Five
minutes later, on the hour of zero, the whole line moved forward to
the attack.
On the right, Brig.-General Ritchie’s men made on the whole very
satisfactory progress. Most trouble was experienced by the Black
Watch, whose right company encountered a stubborn resistance from a
machine-gun nest on the south-east corner of Longueval. This post was
covered by the fire of two field-guns in the south-west corner of
Delville Wood, which were later withdrawn, and owing to the confined
space in which they had to manœuvre the Black Watch were unable to
get to grips with the garrison of the post, which held out until late
in the afternoon. With this exception the objectives allotted to the
battalion were taken by 10 A.M. At one time the leading men took up a
position along Buchanan Street, a ride branching off Princes Street
at right angles to the south of the wood, but this line could not be
maintained as the left flank was in the air. At noon the line held by
the battalion ran from the main square of the village north of the
church and then south-east to within 100 yards of the west corner of
South Street, the path skirting the southern edge of Delville Wood.
Patrols were immediately pushed forward, but during the afternoon
stiff resistance was experienced, and the patrols became standing
picquets on the edge of the wood.
The Argylls, on the left of the Black Watch, met with complete
success. The leading companies kept close to the barrage, leaving the
supporting companies to clear the enemy’s front trenches. The 11th
Royal Scots on the left being delayed by uncut wire, “C” Company of
the Argylls in left support came to their assistance by bombing to
the north. This company killed at least 100 of the foe, and drove
others along the front of the 27th Brigade. In this lively action a
machine-gun was captured, a well-aimed bomb accounting for the whole
team. The other companies of the Argylls in their impetuous eagerness
ran into our barrage and suffered some casualties. Then until the
barrage lifted the men lay down in shell-holes, while a piper played
the regimental march. When the advance was resumed Clarges Street
was reached without much resistance, and the battalion, having
cleared the houses on the west side of the main street, commenced to
consolidate.
Waterlot Farm and its defences had still to be taken before the job
of the brigade was accomplished.
The left brigade was equally successful in securing its first
objective. The first task, the capture of the enemy’s front defences,
was straightforward. Unfortunately on the front of the 11th Royal
Scots delay was caused by wire, and gaps were cut by hand with very
great difficulty, owing to machine-gun fire; but the battalion’s
Lewis Guns rendered great service by keeping down the enemy’s fire,
while a platoon of “A” Company, finding a gap in the right flank,
went through and bombed down the opposite trenches. Lieut.-Colonel
Croft’s men rapidly effected the capture of this objective, though
they had much stern fighting, and a party of 63 Germans was rounded
up and taken prisoner by 2nd Lieuts. Turner and Fleming after a
combined bombing attack, in which the battalion Lewis Guns, skilfully
handled by Lieut. Winchester, played a noteworthy part.
Lieut.-Colonel Fulton[45] with the “Rifles” had an easier passage.
The proffered resistance was rapidly overcome, and a company of
the battalion, by bombing along the German trenches to the north,
assisted the progress of the right battalion of the Third Division,
which had been stopped by uncut wire. Many of the enemy were killed,
and 80 were captured.
Thus by 4.15 A.M. the brigade had gained the whole of the first
objective, but the second phase was more complicated. The 11th Royal
Scots, which had been the right battalion, at this point became the
left, and were to take Duke Street from its junction with Piccadilly
to its junction with Pont Street. The 12th Royal Scots passed through
the 11th on the first objective, and, wheeling to the east, advanced
against the village. The death of Lieut.-Colonel Budge proved a great
misfortune; for the task of the battalion, to secure Longueval from
the corner of Duke Street and Piccadilly to a point on Princes Street
on the fringe of Delville Wood, was one of extraordinary difficulty.
The left battalion made good progress, and dug in on a line south
of Duke Street; but the right battalion, coming under very heavy
machine-gun fire and accurate sniping from a post in the orchards and
from Piccadilly, was compelled to dig in on a line facing east, with
its right flank on Clarges Street in touch with the Argylls, and its
left in touch with the right of the 11th Royal Scots.
Thus the advance of the 27th Brigade was brought to a standstill
before the second objective had been reached.
At first the working of the communications between D.H.Q. and the
leading infantry was all that could be desired. In spite of the
incessant shelling, messages came in quickly, and General Furse
was able to keep in close touch with his attacking brigades. Thus,
on learning that the 11th Royal Scots and the right battalion of
the Third Division had been checked by undamaged wire, he sent out
directions for the 26th Brigade to assist the 27th, which in turn
was to help the Third Division. As a consequence, the advance was
maintained practically without a halt. At 5.50 A.M. the G.O.C.
learned that Brig.-General Ritchie’s brigade had secured its first
two objectives, and an hour later that the left brigade had captured
everything except the north of Longueval. When at 6.29 A.M. he was
informed that the whole of the village was held by the 27th Brigade,
he had every reason to be jubilant.
Unfortunately the information was inaccurate, as a message at 7.20
A.M. made clear. General Furse knew that the check to the 12th Royal
Scots was a most serious matter. The possession of the Longueval
plateau was the key to the operations against High Wood in the north,
and if the village was not taken, the plans of Sir Douglas Haig would
be thrown out of gear. Moreover, it was from Longueval that the
attack on Delville Wood was to be launched; without it the operation
would be more intricate. The crisis demanded decisive action, and
the G.O.C. placed the 1st South African Regiment under the orders
of Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins, who was instructed to make every
effort to clear the village. General Furse was also keenly concerned
about Waterlot Farm, which had yet to be taken by the Highland
Brigade, since its capture was the necessary preliminary to an attack
on Guillemont. Realising that the 26th and 27th Brigades had been
heavily punished, he warned Brig.-General Lukin that his brigade
would be required to take Delville Wood.
When the advance of the 12th Royal Scots was checked, 2nd Lieut. A.
Noble, now the most senior officer on the spot, held a conference
of the surviving officers. It was decided to make another attempt
with two companies, and they moved forward at 7 A.M., but did not
get beyond Piccadilly. At 8.30 A.M. another effort was made by the
battalion from the line of Clarges Street. Three sections with a
Lewis Gun tried to force their way up North Street by rushing from
house to house, but, after progressing fifty yards, they were brought
to a halt by machine-gun fire and withdrew to the shelter of a
barricade, which had been erected at the junction of North Street and
Clarges Street.
At 8.48 A.M. Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins received orders from
General Furse. These were that the village was to be bombarded,
and that the brigade was to make another attack at 10.30 A.M. But
the communications in front were not so satisfactory, and, owing
to the delay in the transmission of instructions, the attack was
not launched until 11 A.M. To supplement the artillery, Stokes Guns
bombarded the orchard area, concentrating on suspected machine-gun
posts, but the assault from the line of Clarges Street was again
defeated.
It was clear that the northern part of Longueval could not be
cleared by a casual or haphazard attack. The enclosed nature of the
oblong of orchards made it difficult to locate the enemy’s posts
with certainty, and the artillery were handicapped by the want of
a post from which to observe the fire. The problem was in fact
more intricate than was realised at the time. The battering that
the village had received from our guns had only been sufficient to
convert it into a stronghold of immense strength. Amidst the jagged
and tumbled masonry the defenders had numerous well-protected corners
from which they could fire without being detected, and the oblong
was full of shelters where the garrison could take refuge from the
fire of field-guns. The whole area needed to be pulverised by heavy
shells, as General Furse soon realised. Against infantry alone the
place was virtually impregnable, since the scope for manœuvring was
limited and all approaches were swept by the fire of the defenders.
Such was the task that Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins was asked to
accomplish.
The 1st South African Infantry bore the brunt of the next attack.
Lieut.-Colonel Dawson’s men had moved up to the line of Clarges
Street through heavy shell-fire without a casualty. From noon till 2
P.M. the northern part of the village was bombarded, but, as it was
believed that isolated parties of the 12th Royal Scots were in the
village, the shelling was directed chiefly on the wood to the east of
it. Then followed a great deal of confused fighting in which, by the
nature of the ground, the South Africans were split into a number of
detached groups. Such reports as reached Brigade H.Q. were so vague
that it was impossible to act upon them, and it was not till 10.44
P.M. that the position of the South Africans was known. At that time
one company was in Piccadilly, immediately south of Duke Street;
another was trying to work round from Piccadilly to North Street;
a third was in reserve at the south-east corner of the village;
and nothing certain was known of the remaining company, which was
believed to be on the east side of North Street. That night at 10.50
P.M. Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins urged Lieut.-Colonel Dawson not to
relax his efforts and to endeavour to clear the whole of the village
before dawn, in order that the attack on Delville Wood might be
delivered from it.
While the left brigade was engaged in sanguinary conflicts among
the orchards of Longueval, the Highland Brigade was endeavouring
to capture Waterlot Farm. This work had been allotted to the 7th
Seaforths, who were in Montauban Alley when the battle commenced.
As Lieut.-Colonel Kennedy expected the enemy’s counter-barrage to
fall on Montauban Alley, he arranged that his men should follow as
close as possible behind the Black Watch in order to escape it, and
thus the whole battalion avoided the shelling except one platoon,
which suffered severely. Advancing on the heels of the Black Watch
the leading company entered the German front line and passed along
behind the wire in a north-easterly direction. The next two companies
consolidated the enemy’s front line and a support line, while the
fourth followed in support of the leading company. The Seaforths,
finding the Black Watch held up by the machine-gun post at the
south-east corner of Longueval, attempted to outflank it by working
along Dover Street and Down Street on the south of the village, but
they were stopped by hostile fire from Waterlot Farm. In spite of
repeated efforts the post held out, for the ground was all in favour
of the defenders.
At 2 P.M. Brig.-General Ritchie ordered the Camerons to move up
from Montauban. They were to assist in clearing the village,
co-operate in the assault on the post that was holding up the Black
Watch and Seaforths, and push on to Waterlot Farm. Under drenching
shell-fire the Camerons marched up by companies to the village, the
outskirts of which they reached at 4 P.M. Before dark one company
cleared the houses just north of Clarges Street and a building
immediately north of Princes Street, known as the Hospice; another
company, in co-operation with the Black Watch and Seaforths, at
last accounted for the post on the south-east of the village, which
fell to a converging attack, the garrison being bayoneted and three
machine-guns being captured. A third company and a company of
Seaforths then pressed on towards Waterlot Farm, and in spite of
severe machine-gun fire and accurate sniping a good deal of progress
was made. The main body took up a position just west of the farm,
while a party of the Seaforths advanced down Longueval Alley until
they came in touch with the Eighteenth Division, which had done great
work that day by capturing the whole of Trones Wood.
After a day of strenuous fighting, in which many losses had been
sustained, the Division had just failed to win complete success.
The enemy still held the north of Longueval and Waterlot Farm, and
Delville Wood still remained to be taken. At midnight the position
was as follows: The Argylls held all the south and south-west of
Longueval, with lines established in Clarges Street, Sloane Street,
and the old German front line from the Windmill to Pall Mall; the
Black Watch were in a semicircle round the north-east corner of the
central square, and occupied also a line 300 yards long, parallel
to and 50 yards south of Princes Street; three companies of the
Seaforths held the old German front line on the right of the Argylls;
the remaining company and three companies of the Camerons were in
Longueval Alley as far as Trones Wood, just west of Waterlot Farm.
On the left the 12th Royal Scots were consolidating along the line
of Piccadilly, the 11th Royal Scots occupied Duke Street up to Pont
Street, and the 9th Scottish Rifles were in the old German support
line on the left of the 11th Royal Scots. The 6th K.O.S.B. had not
been involved in the fighting, but their work in carrying up stores
of all kinds under continuous shell-fire had been of the greatest
value.
That evening the G.O.C. met his brigadiers in Montauban, and
discussed with them the operations to be carried out on the following
day. The 27th Brigade was to continue its attack on Longueval, and
the 26th on Waterlot Farm. Delville Wood was to be assaulted by the
South African Brigade under cover of a creeping H.E. barrage. This
attack was arranged for 5 A.M., and, should the 27th fail to secure
the village during the night, was to be delivered from the south-west.
Delville Wood, in the shape of a rough pentagonal, overshadowed the
village of Longueval. It was divided into a northern and southern
portion by the grassy ride known as Princes Street. From this ride
towards the north, and at right angles to it, ran auxiliary paths
named Strand, Regent Street, and Bond Street; in the opposite
direction similar pathways, Buchanan Street, Campbell Street, and
King Street, led to the southern margin. About 200 yards south of
Princes Street and parallel to it was the ride called Rotten Row.
The execution of the attack was entrusted by Brig.-General Lukin to
Lieut.-Colonel Tanner. The forces available were the 2nd and 3rd and
two companies of the 4th South African Infantry. Of the remainder
of the brigade the 1st Regiment was involved in the fighting in
Longueval, and two companies of the 4th were to assist the 26th
Brigade against Waterlot Farm.
The assailants moved up from Montauban before dawn. Patrols having
reported the enemy to be still in possession of the village, the
South Africans assembled in a trench on the south-west corner of
Delville. All the wood south of Princes Street was cleared in two
hours, the only strong resistance coming from isolated snipers. In
the eastern portion 138 prisoners, including 3 officers, and one
machine-gun were captured, but the most difficult part remained to
be accomplished. Owing to the situation in Longueval, Lieut.-Colonel
Tanner decided to clear the northern portion from the east as far as
the Strand, and this work was entrusted to three companies of the
2nd South African Infantry. The resistance was surprisingly weak,
the garrison having been thinned-out on account of the shelling to
which the wood was persistently subjected. The chief obstacle was the
wood itself. The profligate undergrowth and the tangle of trees and
branches brought down by our artillery-fire rendered the laborious
work of penetrating it most exhausting. When at length the perspiring
and breathless South Africans reached the margin, the enemy’s
artillery opened a fierce bombardment on the whole place, and rifle
and machine-gun fire prevented progress beyond the perimeter.
Shortly after 2 P.M. that afternoon Lieut.-Colonel Tanner was able
to report that he had taken the whole of Delville Wood except the
north-west corner. The problem now was how to hold our gains. In
ordinary circumstances small posts with machine-guns would have
been the least costly and the most effective method; for Bernafay
had shown that for large bodies of men a wood is only a death-trap.
But it was impossible to do this. The wood was 159 acres in extent,
and part of it was held by the enemy. Moreover, the Germans were
exceptionally well situated for a counter-attack. They were able
to direct an accurate fire on the wood from their batteries in the
north, east, and south-east; their trenches lay round its perimeter
and commanded all its approaches; and the possession of Longueval
ensured them a covered approach whenever they chose to deliver their
stroke. Under these circumstances a strong garrison and constant
vigilance were essential.
After the posts were established along the perimeter, the most urgent
matter was the provision of shelter for the troops. A plentiful
supply of tools had been carried up by the South Africans, and it
was impressed upon the men that notwithstanding their weariness
there could be no rest until trenches had been dug. But they had
grasped the situation; it was only too obvious that their lives
depended upon the speed with which they could dig themselves in.
But the spendthrift undergrowth and tangled roots that crawled
profusely in the soil of Delville Wood were hard to cut, and while
the men toiled they were harried unceasingly by shell and machine-gun
fire. An attempt to wire the edge of the wood was frustrated by a
counter-attack, which men of the 10th Bavarian Division delivered
against the north-east corner about 3 P.M. This attack was easily
repulsed by rifle-fire, but the situation was critical, and between
12.45 P.M. and 1.15 P.M. reports from the 26th Brigade and the 52nd
Brigade R.F.A. having stated that the Germans were massing on the
north-west of the wood, the artillery put a protective barrage round
it. In spite of this the foe made persistent attempts to drive the
South Africans from the perimeter, but all attacks were defeated
with loss by the 2nd South African Infantry, and by 4.40 P.M. the
enemy drew off. The heavy casualty list of the South Africans was due
mainly to shell-fire.
General Furse gave instructions that the utmost efforts should be
made to strengthen the defences during the night, and a company
of the Seaforths (Pioneers) was sent up to wire the wood. In a
remarkably short time numerous trenches were dug by the garrison,
for a man works with a will when his life is at stake. Arrangements
were also made to send up large supplies of stores and ammunition.
Six and a half companies were posted round the perimeter with three
in support. The western portion of Princes Street was held by a half
company of the 2nd South African Infantry, and two companies of the
1st formed a defensive flank on the side of the village. The H.Q.
of Lieut.-Colonel Tanner were at the junction of Princes Street and
Buchanan Street.
Meanwhile Longueval defied all assaults. Throughout the night of the
14th/15th the 1st South African Infantry had been engaged in a grim
house-to-house combat without making headway, and the 12th Royal
Scots were called on to make another attack. After a preliminary
bombardment of the oblong by the artillery and the Stokes mortars,
they moved forward at 8 A.M., when a desperate and plucky effort was
made to clear the village. For a time progress was made, and word
reached D.H.Q. that the whole of the village was in our hands. The
report was wrong. Two sections of the Royal Scots worked up North
Street, moving from house to house, each of which was secured only
after a stern bombing fight. Small garrisons were left in three
houses, and the party reached more than midway to Duke Street. At
the same time another section tried to penetrate the orchards from
the west, but failed to get beyond Piccadilly. The first party on
venturing into the open was subjected to heavy fire from concealed
machine-guns and compelled to retire to the shelter of the houses;
even the posts that had been established in the houses could not
be maintained, for the garrisons were shelled out and forced to
withdraw. If doggedness and grit could have won Longueval, the 12th
Royal Scots would have had it. Undaunted by their previous reverses,
they made another attack in the evening at 7.30. Three sections
advanced from Clarges Street, but could not get beyond 50 yards; two
other sections pressing on up North Street found the enemy alert and
strongly reinforced, and were forced back to the point from which
they had started, after inflicting severe losses by Lewis Gun fire.
The men, utterly exhausted, could do no more.
On the 15th encouraging progress was made by the 26th Brigade,
though it failed to secure Waterlot Farm. As soon as day broke,
parties of the Seaforths and Camerons dashed forward and succeeded in
establishing themselves in enemy trenches to the east of the farm;
but, before they were able to consolidate these positions, they were
compelled to withdraw to the northern end of Longueval Alley, owing
to intense shelling from both our own and the enemy’s artillery. As
the brigade had suffered many casualties and was holding a widely
extended line, reinforcements consisting of two companies of the
4th South African Infantry were sent to its assistance. With the
support of these two companies, two platoons of the Camerons again
attacked the farm and reached the trenches to the east of it before
noon. The captured trenches were then taken over by the South
Africans, who commenced to consolidate, but were driven out by the
concentrated artillery-fire of the enemy. As we could not occupy the
farm, we determined to prevent the Germans gaining access to it,
and machine-guns were posted by the 26th Brigade and by the South
Africans in Delville Wood so as to command all its approaches.
Thus at the close of the 15th the task of the Division had not
been completed. Continuous fighting, involving serious losses,
had resulted in the capture of all Delville Wood except the
north-west corner. The men not actually engaged in fighting were
busy consolidating positions and erecting strong points and keeps
in the southern portion of Longueval, and all work had to be done
under accurate and galling artillery-fire. The position occupied by
the Division was peculiarly exposed to the enemy’s artillery; it
formed an elbow beyond the British line and was open to fire from the
north, south, and east. On the night of the 15th there was a marked
increase in the enemy’s shelling; a hurricane of fire swept Delville
Wood, and a fierce bombardment was concentrated on the southern and
south-western portions of Longueval. In addition, hostile artillery
searched the whole region from our front line to the back areas,
causing trouble to our batteries and seriously interrupting the work
of the transport and of carrying parties.
Each moment as it passed increased the difficulty of the task still
to be accomplished by the Division. It was now very weak, not only
on account of its casualties, but through exhaustion, strain, and
exposure. General Furse had not a fresh battalion under his command.
On the other hand, the foe was gaining in strength, and he was known
to be bringing up other troops. But an attitude of passive defence
was impossible; there was no security in our position until the
Germans had been driven out of every part of Longueval and Delville
Wood. These two places formed part and parcel of the same problem;
with the clearing of the village, the enemy could not maintain
his position in the north-west corner of the wood, and as soon as
the whole of Delville was in our hands, the garrison of northern
Longueval would be exposed to an attack from three sides.
But neither operation was easy of accomplishment. What the G.O.C.
wanted—time—he could not have. The fighting of the last two days had
clearly shown that the northern defences of the village could not be
rushed. The surest and most economical method of clearing Longueval
was to bombard it with heavy artillery before the infantry advanced,
and this had been suggested on the 15th. The heavy artillery,
however, was not under the control of the G.O.C., and the insistence
of the Corps and Army Commanders on the need for securing the hamlet
without delay prevented the suggestion being carried into effect.
Consequently, General Furse resolved to make use of the ground that
he had gained in Delville Wood, and he ordered a combined attack on
the village and north-west corner of the wood to be made by the 27th
and South African Brigades. The latter, after completing the capture
of the northern perimeter was to press westwards to North Street,
where it should join hands with the former, which was to advance
north and east. This attack was to take place at 10 A.M. on the 16th,
after a preliminary bombardment by the 2-inch trench mortars, which
had been sent up to Longueval on the night of the 14th/15th.
The assaulting forces consisted of two companies of the 1st South
African Infantry and two of the 11th Royal Scots. The assault
was made from the line of Princes Street-Clarges Street, and was
wholly repulsed. It was notable, nevertheless, for several acts of
outstanding gallantry. During the South African attack, a bombing
party attempted to rush an enemy post about 40 yards from our
trenches. The assailants were beaten back, and the officer in command
fell wounded between the two lines. Then Private W. F. Faulds
with two comrades, ignoring the hail of bullets from the enemy’s
machine-guns, left our trench and rescued the officer. Almost by a
miracle the party got back unscathed, except one man who was severely
wounded. Faulds, who received a V.C., performed a similar feat two
days later, when he went out for a wounded man, picked him up, and
carried him to a dressing-station under a fire so intense that it was
believed to be impossible to bring in the wounded. Equally shining as
an example of heroism was the work of 2nd Lieut. Turner and C.S.M.
Allwright of the 11th Royal Scots. Both crept out to some wounded
men, dressed them under a withering fire, and crawled in with the
wounded on their backs. Though desultory fighting went on in the
village all day, its only effect was to add to the length of our
casualty list.
On the 16th July the 26th Brigade was occupied chiefly in
consolidating and strengthening its defences and in establishing
posts on the west of Waterlot Farm. Bombers and snipers crept close
up to the farm and kept the garrison continually on the alert. Though
it was held by their own snipers, the Germans persistently shelled it
throughout the day. During the night the Seaforths were relieved in
Longueval Alley by the Eighteenth Division.
The South Africans in Delville Wood had been woefully reduced by
the furious bombardment to which they had been subjected, and in
consequence the work of consolidation could not be carried on as far
as safety demanded. During the 16th the firing on the wood continued,
and considerable trouble was experienced from bold enemy snipers
who had remained concealed amongst the shrubbery and undergrowth,
but these were accounted for later in the day. The most worrying
feature of the situation was the extent of the gaps between the posts
round the perimeter, and the task of a runner in carrying messages
along the line was nerve-racking and perilous. The garrison was
reinforced by a company of the 4th Regiment, which was sent to the
east and north-east of the wood. All the officers and men showed very
obvious traces of strain and fatigue, and Brig.-General Lukin asked
the G.O.C. if his men could be relieved. There were no troops in the
Division who were not exhausted, but General Furse promised that when
the whole of the village and the wood had been captured, the South
Africans in the southern portion of Delville Wood would be relieved
by the 26th Brigade.
With regard to Longueval, he decided that it must be pounded into
dust before another attack was made, so he asked the Corps to
arrange for the fire of heavy guns, controlled by observation, to
be concentrated on the northern part of the village. The original
intention was to commence the bombardment at 4 A.M. on the 17th July.
But this scheme was frustrated by peremptory orders from General
Rawlinson, directing that the village had to be cleared at all costs
before dawn. Urgent orders were sent to Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins
on the night of the 16th for the 6th K.O.S.B. and two companies
of the 11th Royal Scots, supported by two companies of the 1st
South African Infantry, to attack Longueval at 2 A.M. He was also
instructed to withdraw his men from the front trenches to allow the
oblong to be shelled by the heavy guns. This bombardment was to
begin at 11 P.M. on the 16th, but had to be postponed until 12.30
A.M. on the 17th, owing to the difficulty and delay in withdrawing
our infantry to a safe distance. In spite of the greatest gallantry,
the attack was beaten off. The whole virtue of the project was
lost when the heavy bombardment lasted only for an hour and was
unobserved. This was the last effort of the 27th Brigade to capture
Longueval. During the night, the 6th K.O.S.B. and 11th Royal Scots
were withdrawn to Talus Boise, the “Rifles,” who had been relieved
on the night of the 15th by the 8th Brigade (Third Division), taking
over the trenches of the latter.
At 9 A.M. on the 17th, Waterlot Farm was at length captured by
the 26th Brigade. After a preliminary bombardment by artillery,
the Camerons, supported by two companies of the 4th South African
Infantry, rushed the farm, slaughtered the garrison, and proceeded to
consolidate the buildings.
At the end of the day the whole Division was completely worn
out. The nights were even more trying than the days on account
of the intensity of the German shelling, and the strain on the
South Africans, who were certain to receive the first shock of a
counter-attack, was particularly severe. During the evening of the
17th July, Lieut.-Colonel Tanner was wounded, and the command of
the garrison passed to Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray. That night General
Furse decided to relieve the South Africans in the northern part of
Delville, but both brigades requested the relief to be postponed on
hearing of the operation against Longueval, which was to be carried
out by the 76th Brigade of the Third Division on the morning of
the 18th. During the hours of darkness, in addition to their usual
artillery-fire, the Germans poured thousands of gas shells into the
battery positions and back areas. A determined counter-stroke was
delivered against Delville Wood from the north-west, and the enemy
penetrated as far as Buchanan Street and Princes Street before he
was driven back with heavy loss. Other assaults were made on the
perimeter, but all were repulsed.
Longueval was attacked at 3.45 A.M. on 18th July by the 76th Brigade.
At first, rapid progress was made, and shortly after 8 A.M. a report
was received from the Third Division stating that it had captured
all its objectives. A company of the Seaforths and a company of the
Camerons co-operated with the Third Division in clearing houses in
the north of the village. The enemy however still clung tenaciously
to some of his posts; when parties of the 26th and 27th Brigades
moved up to consolidate strong points in Longueval, they were stopped
by machine-gun fire from German pockets.
The day was destined to be the most critical of the battle. At 8
A.M. the enemy opened a tremendous bombardment on Delville Wood and
the village with guns of all calibres, and until 7 P.M. there was no
diminution of the cannonade, which was probably the heaviest that the
Division ever experienced. The whole earth vibrated and trembled from
the impact of thousands of “crumps.” All communications were broken
down, and for a long time General Furse was ignorant of what was
happening. Officers of his staff, particularly Major MacNamara, took
great risks in going up to Longueval to ascertain the situation, but
no definite information as to the fate of the South Africans could
be gathered. About 2 P.M. the shelling increased in fury. Our front
trenches were obliterated, whole sections of their occupants were
annihilated, and the Germans launched a terrific attack. For this
supreme effort they had brought up picked troops, consisting of the
7th and 8th Divisions of the famous Magdeburg Corps,[46] commanded by
Sixt von Armin.
After 2 P.M. the S.O.S. signal was seen in the wood and the village,
and some of our men were noticed dribbling back from these places.
Practically all the South Africans on the perimeter had perished,
and the few survivors, stupefied by the ferocity of the shelling,
fell back on Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray’s H.Q. in Princes Street. At 3
P.M. waves of Germans poured through the wood and the northern part
of Longueval, but now seizing their opportunity our machine-gunners
took heavy toll of the men in field-grey. Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray’s
troops performed prodigies of valour, and in a sustained and
delirious struggle the heroic defenders baffled every effort of the
foe to break their ranks. In this grisly combat the Germans lost much
valuable time, and when they pressed on, the gallant South Africans
were still holding out.
General Furse was at Montauban when he heard of the counter-attack.
It was not a time for hesitation, and he ordered the Argylls to
advance at once and reoccupy all the ground north and west of Regent
Street that had been evacuated. But the enemy’s barrage along the
line of Clarges Street was so thick that it was impossible to take
the men through it.
Later, at 3.30 in the afternoon, Lieut.-Colonel Dawson received
orders to collect all available men of the 1st and 4th South African
Infantry, and take them up to the Strand and northern boundary of
the wood. With about 160 men he set off on his desperate errand
shortly after 4 P.M. On the way he met some officers, who reported
that the whole of the garrison had been virtually annihilated.
Accordingly he left his men in the old German trenches south-west of
Longueval, and went off to find out how matters stood. Disorganised
parties of men, their nerves sorely jangled by the bombardment,
were streaming southwards through the village. When Lieut.-Colonel
Dawson discovered that some of the South Africans were still holding
out near Buchanan Street, he took his men into the village, and put
them in trenches just north of Dover Street on the right of the 26th
Brigade.
The crisis occurred about 6 P.M. By that time all Longueval north
of Clarges Street was lost except for a few keeps garrisoned by
Highlanders, but the gallant resistance of these posts proved of
the greatest possible value. The enemy held all the wood outside
the area occupied by Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray and his men, and the
line of Buchanan Street which was held by the Camerons. All day the
majority of the troops of the 26th Brigade had sheltered in the
trenches south of Clarges Street from the fiendish shelling. During
the worst spells, when nothing could be heard above the hideous din
of the screaming and crashing shells, the men cowered into the sides
of their trenches; but though wearied and exhausted they were full
of fight, and when a short lull came they peered eagerly over the
parapet hoping for a glimpse of the enemy on whom they might wreak
vengeance for the horror of the bombardment. If any man stood out
from his fellows that day, it was Lieut.-Colonel Gordon of the Black
Watch. By the sheer force of his masterful personality he controlled
the situation. After a brief consultation he and Lieut.-Colonel
Kennedy of the Seaforths decided that the time was ripe for a
counter-attack. A new line had been thrown forward along the railway
that ran from Guillemont into Longueval. Shortly before 6 P.M. this
line was reinforced by every available man from the Highland Brigade,
and the whole pressed forward towards Delville Wood; at the same
time, led by Lieut.-Colonel Duff, the Camerons swept westwards from
Buchanan Street. On clearing the main square, the Highlanders saw the
field-grey ranks of the enemy emerging from the south-west corner
of the wood. For all who took part in that attack this was the most
thrilling moment of the war. For the space of a single second both
sides hesitated, so dramatic was the meeting, and then from the left
of the 26th line came the rousing command, “Forward, boys!” and the
Highlanders surged on like an irresistible wave. The Germans wavered,
fired a few shots, and bolted into the shelter of Delville, refusing
to face a force that was less than a fourth of their own strength.
Carried away by the impetuosity of this magnificent charge, many of
the Highlanders heedlessly followed the enemy far into the thicket,
where many a brave man, marked on the casualty lists as “missing,”
met his fate in a lonely scuffle with the Germans.
It was then that the quality of control and discipline was most
needed. The whole value of the counter-attack would have been lost
if the small force had pressed on into the wood; it would have
been surrounded and cut off by the overwhelming numbers of the
foe. Between them, Lieut.-Colonels Gordon and Kennedy rallied and
reformed the men. Already they were in danger of being outflanked
and a machine-gun, which had been missed during the rush, was taking
heavy toll of their numbers from the rear. The Camerons, whose C.O.,
Lieut.-Colonel Duff, had been severely wounded during the _mêlée_,
fell back on Buchanan Street, and the remainder was brought back to
the line of Clarges Street and a trench to the immediate north of
the Church. This position was firmly held, and a supporting line on
the railway was formed. The attack so carefully planned by the enemy
had been broken, and though the Highlanders had been too few to
recapture Delville Wood, their timely charge had certainly maintained
our grasp on the village.
All this time the South Africans had maintained their position
against prodigious odds at the corner of Princes Street and Buchanan
Street. Lieut.-Colonel Dawson did all that was possible to assist
them; he sent up reinforcements, ammunition, rations, and stores,
and towards midnight he went up to Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray’s H.Q.
Every yard of the mangled wood bore plain traces of the desperate
fighting that it had witnessed. “Devil’s Wood” it was called by our
men, and that was the correct name. The South African H.Q. were
full of wounded, and there were no men available to take them away.
During the evening the remnants of the South Africans took over
Buchanan Street from the Camerons, who were required to reinforce the
Clarges Street line. That night was a trying and anxious time for
Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray; his forces were small in number and were
utterly spent. Three times the Germans came on in force, but were
repulsed with heavy losses.
Our hold on southern Longueval was strengthened during the night by
battalions of the 27th Brigade. After the relief was complete, the
Clarges Street line on the left was held by the 9th Scottish Rifles,
a company of the 18th H.L.I., and a company of the 6th K.O.S.B.;
three companies of the Borderers formed a flank along Pall Mall, and
the 12th Royal Scots occupied the old German front line from Pall
Mall to the west.
By the evening of the 18th July, General Furse had drawn up his plans
for a counter-attack. The force to be employed consisted of the 53rd
Brigade, which had been placed under his command. After 7.30 P.M.,
as it was clear that the Germans occupied all the wood east of
Buchanan Street and north of Princes Street, a barrage was placed
on it east and north of these rides. The 19th Durham Light Infantry
were placed under the orders of Brig.-General Ritchie, and were
instructed to secure the southern portion of the wood at 12.30 A.M.
on the 19th July, but owing to the shelling, the darkness, and the
unfamiliarity of the D.L.I. with the main features of the village,
this operation was postponed until 6.15 in the morning, when the
attack was delivered by the 53rd Brigade under a H.E. barrage. Owing
to delays, the infantry did not begin to advance until 7.30 A.M.,
but they succeeded in clearing the wood south of Princes Street. In
this operation the 53rd was effectively assisted by Lieut.-Colonel
Thackeray’s men, who kept up a destructive fire on the Germans. For
some unknown reason the 53rd Brigade failed to relieve the South
Africans, though it was asked to do so by the 26th Brigade.
This was the last operation directed by General Furse against
Delville Wood, and on the night of the 19th July the relief of the
Division commenced. The remnants of the 26th on relief by the 8th
Brigade (Third Division) withdrew to Carnoy, and next day marched
farther back to the sand-pits near Meaulte. The 27th was relieved by
the 95th Brigade (Fifth Division), and moved first to Talus Boise and
then to the Citadel. On the night of the 18th all the South Africans,
except those under Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray’s command, were withdrawn
to Happy Valley. Not until the evening of the 20th was this valiant
little detachment relieved, when Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray with two
wounded officers and 140 men moved out to Talus Boise, rejoining next
day the fragments of the brigade at Happy Valley. With the exception
of the artillery,[47] the whole of the Division was relieved on the
morning of the 20th July, on which date General Furse handed over the
command of the sector to the G.O.C., Third Division.
The work of all the R.A.M.C. personnel and the regimental
stretcher-bearers during the battle was worthy of the highest
commendation. The conditions, especially from the 14th, were
appalling, perpetual and ghastly shell-fire, an unceasing stream of
wounded, and atrocious roads. In spite of all these difficulties
the casualties were evacuated with wonderful rapidity, while the
heroism and endurance of doctors and stretcher-bearers were almost
beyond belief. Instances of the former squatting in shell-holes and
dressing their patients under a murderous fire were innumerable. But,
indeed, in the work of all men wearing the Red Cross the spirit of
self-sacrifice shone at its brightest. The succouring of the wounded
is an instinct with the British soldier, and there is no case known
in the whole Army of a stretcher-bearer ever shirking his duty. More
than once in the course of the cruel struggle, the shelling was so
intense that it seemed impossible to rescue the wounded, but men
were always ready to risk their lives (and in many cases they lost
them) to bring their comrades in. When all were most exhausted, the
work became most severe. From the 18th July, the arduous labour of
dressing and evacuating the cases was a continuous strain, everyone
working at the highest tension. The wounded who were left behind,
when the Division moved out, it was beyond the power of anyone
to reach; they lay in the area recaptured by the enemy in his
counter-blow.
Throughout the action the work of the Sappers and Pioneers reached
its usual standard; no higher praise than this could be desired.
Apart from assisting the infantry to consolidate the captured
positions and construct strong points, they had to keep roads in
repair. Even in the summer of 1916 the roadways in the Somme area
could scarcely cope with the enormous traffic that passed over them.
For instance, the Maricourt-Montauban road, which was constantly
used, was only fit for horse transport, though twenty tons of road
metal were put on it daily by the Division. In the forward areas, the
imperturbable manner in which Sappers and Pioneers worked under the
heaviest fire aroused the sincere admiration of the infantry; they
seemed to be men without nerves. Their losses were extremely heavy,
a serious matter, as skilled men were not too numerous. The C.R.E.,
Lieut.-Colonel Barnardiston, was wounded on the 17th July and his
place was taken by Major G. R. Hearn of the 64th Field Company.
The ordinary duties of the A.S.C. and the transport were attended
with considerable risk, as the few roads were continually searched
by artillery-fire. Not a night passed without its story of narrow
escapes or of losses suffered. From the moment that the First Line
Transport left its lines with stores and rations, the men knew that
for several hours they had to run the gauntlet. The rugged, weird
beauty of the shell-torn country, lit up fantastically by the gleam
of the belching guns, escaped the eyes of men guiding their limbers
round the edge of shell-holes and listening uneasily for the first
signs of a hostile “strafe.” In spite of the greatest skill in
timing a dash through the worst areas, the transport of most of the
battalions suffered grievously, especially on the nights of the 17th
and 18th. The Argylls were particularly unlucky, for on the latter
date their Quartermaster, Lieut. W. R. Weller, and their Transport
Officer, 2nd Lieut. K. D. Thomson, were killed. Throughout the
whole period, however, no battalion failed to receive its rations
and stores—a very creditable fact, considering the severity of the
fighting.
The attack on Longueval and Delville Wood will rank as one of the
greatest examples of the fine fighting qualities of the Division. The
operation was undertaken against a brave and alert foe, and had for
its object positions that formed the pivot of the enemy’s defensive
system. The element of surprise, that made the capture of Montauban a
comparatively easy matter, was lacking on the 14th July; the Germans
expected an onset and were prepared for it. When all these things are
considered, the marvel is that the Division was able to accomplish
as much as it did. And the full magnitude of the achievement was
probably not realised for some time; for not till more than a month
later were the Germans driven from their last defences in Longueval
and Delville Wood. Where failure was recorded, as in the case of the
attacks on the northern part of the village, the melancholy roll of
the killed and wounded was the monument of the devotion with which
the men had attempted to do more than men could do. Out of a total
of barely 3000, the 27th Brigade lost 81 officers and 2033 men, and
the great majority of the killed and missing, 569 in all, left their
bones in the blood-soaked undergrowth of the orchards of Longueval.
But even more remarkable than the dour resolution, with which the
battle was carried on, was the extraordinary capacity for endurance
displayed by the men in holding on to their gains. In France, the
most difficult part of an attack was not the winning of an objective
but the keeping of it after it was gained. The Germans knew all about
the art of war. Their counter-stroke on the 18th July was admirably
planned and skilfully carried out, and it was made when the Division
was at its weakest. Never did the Ninth rise to greater heights.
Here and there under a hellish bombardment a few dazed men straggled
back, but the great majority of them stood their ground. The defence
of Delville Wood by Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray’s small band rightly
takes its place as one of the classic feats of the war. But though
less well known, the charge of the Highlanders that saved Longueval
when a serious disaster seemed inevitable, is an achievement that
ought to secure a lasting place in our military annals. Not merely
does it illustrate the unflinching courage of the Highlanders of
the 26th Brigade, but it is a brilliant example of the value of a
prompt counter-attack boldly carried out by even a few men against a
resolute and numerous enemy.
Throughout the battle the unflagging support of the artillery had
been of the greatest assistance. The ideas of Brig.-General Tudor
had been triumphantly vindicated by the events of the action, and
the enthusiasm of the infantry for the H.E. barrage was the best
justification of his methods.
In the three weeks’ fighting the Division lost 314 officers and 7303
other ranks. The figures represent about 50 per cent. of its strength
and considerably more than that of the infantry. But it had not
fought in vain; it had retained nearly all that it had captured, and
when it was withdrawn from the battle, it had established its name as
one of the hardest fighting divisions in France.
For its work it was generously commended by General Sir H.
Rawlinson.[48] But most of all the men cherished the tribute of
their own leader, General Furse, on 21st July:—“The Ninth Division
is being withdrawn from the battle line. It has played a conspicuous
and honourable part in one of the greatest battles in the world’s
history. We may all of us with justice be proud of having served in
the Division during the past three weeks.
“From the bottom of my heart I want to thank you all—officers,
N.C.Os. and men, for all you have done during these weeks of
strenuous fighting.
“The demands made on all branches of the Division have been great,
and right well have they been answered.
“The infantry, Highlanders, Lowlanders, and South Africans, have as
usual had to bear the most continuous strain. To sustain appalling
and continuous shell-fire, to try to dig for themselves trenches
amongst the fallen trees and through the roots of Bernafay and
Delville Woods, to suffer heavy casualties amongst their comrades and
friends, to go on day and night for a week or more without any relief
and with only snatches of disturbed sleep, to bear all the time the
stern responsibility of being the guardians of the very pivot of
the Commander-in-Chief’s manœuvre, and to maintain throughout, as
they have done, an uncomplaining resolution, a cheerful bearing—for
all this, we who have had other work to do offer the infantry our
wholehearted admiration and thanks.
“And the infantry, I am sure, will be the first to recognise the
continuous assistance they have received from the artillery, who have
been working at the highest pressure day and night since the 24th
June, and are still in the line, as also from the Engineers and from
the Pioneers, whose skilful help has always been at hand.
“Equally deserving our gratitude are the Surgeons and their untiring
assistants, including the Chaplains, for the care they have given
to the wounded without thought for their own safety; and none of us
will easily forget all the difficulties overcome by the Supply and
Transport Services.
“Lastly, I would thank the brigadiers and their staffs—and the
various members of my own staff—for their zealous and efficient work,
which has had so much to say to the successes we have gained. Nor do
I forget the Signal Service—that invaluable and hard-worked channel
of orders and reports.
“We shall miss with lasting regret the many comrades and friends we
have lost, but they with you, thank God, have won fresh honours for
the Ninth Division and success for our arms.”
When the Division left the battle line it was only the skeleton of
what it had been on the 1st July, but as the enemy had employed no
fewer than three first-rate divisions against it, one may assume[49]
that his losses had been more numerous. This seemed to indicate that
the intentions of Sir Douglas Haig were being fulfilled. Episodes
such as the costly fighting in Longueval were inevitable in a
battle of this magnitude, but in this case more might have been
achieved with a greater economy of lives had it not been for the
anxiety of the Fourth Army to prevent the programme of the British
Commander-in-Chief being affected by delay. Its insistence on the
necessity of securing Longueval at once did not allow General Furse
a free hand to deal with the situation, and as it turned out, the
attempt to rush matters was a spendthrift policy, and actually
resulted in losing instead of saving time.
With the opening of the Battle of the Somme there was a noticeable
change in the attitude of the men. They now realised the full
seriousness and gravity of the business that they had undertaken, and
they no longer entered into battle with the exuberant optimism that
had filled the men at Loos with the belief that they could sweep away
the defences of Germany at one blow. Their confidence was unshaken
and their belief in ultimate victory assured, but if the Somme became
for the enemy a Gehenna, it was also a supreme trial and test for the
soldiers of the British Empire.