THE CAPTURE OF BERNAFAY WOOD, AND THE BATTLES FOR TRONES WOOD
JULY 1916
After leaving the Ploegsteert area the Division was concentrated
in billets near Bomy, where D.H.Q. were established. The men were
in the best of spirits, and training and recreation were carried
on with vigour and keenness, while the glory of the summer and the
genial weather raised the usual hopes that the year would see the
end of the war. The Division had recaptured all the enthusiasm that
had animated it on landing in France, and in addition it had behind
it a year’s experience of warfare. The sojourn near Bomy was shorter
than had been expected, and the design of the G.O.C. to hold a horse
show on the 13th and a Divisional Field Day on the 14th June had
to be abandoned. This cancellation of the horse show was a huge
disappointment; every unit had taken extensive trouble to prove that
it had the best turned out transport in the Division, but the men
were able at least to console themselves with the knowledge that
their transport and horses were in first-rate condition.
Orders were received by the Division on the 11th that it was to
join the XIII. Corps,[34] commanded by Lieut.-General Sir W. H.
Congreve, V.C., and that the move was to take place by rail on the
16th. These, however, were followed by instructions commanding the
Division to move on the 13th, and on that date the entrainment of
units was commenced. Two days later the Division was concentrated
near Vaux-en-Amienois where D.H.Q. were established.
It was obvious to the dullest man that the Division was intended to
take part in some business more enterprising than the mere holding of
a section of trenches. The whole hinterland behind the trenches was a
hive of industry and traffic. Swarms of troops from every part of the
kingdom were to be seen in every village; at night the roads groaned
with the passage of guns of all sizes and of transport carrying
every conceivable variety of material, and the whole countryside
was covered with dumps containing R.E. material, bombs, shells, and
stores of all kinds. Hospitals and aerodromes formed additional
villages in the district. The back areas of the Somme in the summer
of 1916 were the busiest centres of activity in the whole world. It
was a wonderful exhibition of the resources of the British Empire,
and a visible proof of the diligence with which workers at home had
applied themselves to the manufacture of munitions of war. It was not
a feverish bustle that one witnessed, but a steady and systematic
application of labour; every movement was directed by an organisation
that was not surpassed by any other nation in the war. The whole of
the work performed by Britain in its administrative arrangements has
probably never been appreciated at its full value. It had a most
heartening effect on all who saw it, and gave the men an inspiring
confidence in the determination and ability of the Allies to achieve
a complete victory.
All this industry and all these preparations were the obvious prelude
to a great battle, and on the 15th June the Division received from
the Corps instructions for the attack that was to be made. The XIII
Corps was on the right flank of the British army, and its plan was
to assault with two divisions, the Thirtieth on the right and the
Eighteenth on the left, with the Ninth Division in reserve.
A feeling of optimism buoyed up both civilians and soldiers, though
the events of 1915 had completely shattered the sanguine expectations
aroused by the victory of the Marne. The Russians had been driven
from Poland and had suffered a smashing defeat, from which they
never fully recovered, though a censored press had represented the
rout rather as a Russian triumph than as a German victory. That
disaster, which was falsely believed in this country to harden the
purpose of the great Slav Power, caused Russians to interpret the
comparative inactivity of the Western Powers as a selfish neglect
of her interests, and to detest the Government that had callously
thrown into the slaughter men without arms or equipment. The brutal
incompetence of the Russian bureaucracy was revealed in all its
nakedness, and inspired the loathing and contempt that led eventually
to its downfall. The tale of disaster did not end here; for Von
Mackensen, assisted by the crafty and calculating treachery of
Bulgaria, drove the Serbs from their country and all but secured
Greece in the Teutonic net. The Salonica expedition, though it failed
to render any service to Serbia, prevented Greece from joining the
enemy. In the East, British prestige suffered two damaging shocks;
the Dardanelles project ended in failure, and the Mesopotamian
expedition, after a promising beginning, resulted in the surrender of
a British force at Kut in April 1916.
The only offset against these misfortunes was the entry of Italy into
the war in May 1915, but from the first her armies were employed
solely on exclusively Italian interests. The offensive against
Trieste, even if successful, could not have exerted a decisive
influence on the course of the war, nor did it prevent Austria from
using the larger portion of her forces in the East against Russia.
Nevertheless a general feeling prevailed that our misfortunes
had been due more to bad luck than to bad management, and on the
principle that the dawn succeeds the darkest hour, 1916 was expected
to prove as glorious as 1915 had been disappointing. More men were
now in the field, and the supply of high explosives, which some
thought to be more important than generalship, had been greatly
increased. The poster of the most blatant of British weeklies, with
the glaring inscription, “1916. Thank God!” accurately reflected the
mind of the average man.
Thus the time seemed ripe for an action by the British forces on
a big scale. The great German offensive against Verdun in April
had been watched with feverish interest both in this country and
in France. The first five days of that assault brought the enemy
within measurable distance of his objective. It was feared that
the famous fortress would fall into his hands, and hasty critics
denounced the supine inactivity of the British armies. But at that
time the preparations of Sir Douglas Haig were not completed, and a
premature counter-attack would only have served the interests of the
enemy. As it turned out, the defenders of Verdun, under the masterly
generalship of Pétain, worked out their own salvation. The German
thrust was stopped, but even at the end of June large forces still
menaced the fortress, and it was necessary that the British forces,
stronger and better prepared than they had ever been, should do
something to take the strain off their gallant ally.
Events in other theatres of war seemed also to call for immediate
action. The attack by the Austrians in the Trentino in May threatened
such serious consequences for Italy, that Russia, which appeared to
have recovered from her defeat, was compelled to launch her offensive
in the month of June. The brilliant successes of General Brussilov
brought immediate relief to the armies of Italy, though they did
not lessen the German pressure on Verdun. It was, therefore, sound
policy to strike at the enemy, not merely to relieve Verdun, but also
to assist our Allies in the other theatres of war by preventing the
enemy from transferring troops from the West to other fronts.
The other object of the British Commander-in-Chief[35] was to wear
down the strength of the enemy by a steady offensive. The choice of
the battlefield was governed by the fact that the British armies were
not sufficiently numerous to take the offensive on a large scale
without the co-operation of the French, and the district selected was
therefore in Picardy, where the two armies joined.
Picardy was one of the most delightful spots in France. Here there
were none of the grimy coal-pits and slag-heaps that had figured so
prominently in the Battle of Loos. This was the agricultural part
of France, with wide open and rolling country, in which there was
hardly a fence to be seen. The numerous small villages that broke
the fields seldom contained more than a few hundred inhabitants.
On the battle front the prominent feature was the extensive ridge
running from Thiepval to Combles, with alternate spurs and valleys
thrown out to the south-west. This ridge, which afforded the enemy
magnificent observation over the British trenches and hinterland, was
the main watershed of the high ground that stretched from the valley
of the Somme in a north-easterly direction to the low-lying ground
between Lens and Cambrai. Beyond this were the plains of Douai. On
the western side the slopes, steep and rugged, were a formidable
obstacle, but towards the north-east, the ridge fell in a gradual
slope, rising again to a gentle ridge on the farther side of Bapaume.
Beyond this second ridge, which was about a hundred feet lower than
the main one, the country, broad and undulating, offered no great
difficulty to an army that had won its way to it. But stiff fighting
would be necessary to reach this, because these ridges formed the
buttress that shielded the great railway centres of Cambrai and
Douai. A feature of the terrain, especially in the south, was the
large number of woods thick with summer foliage and carpeted with a
dense undergrowth that made progress, except by means of the small
paths running through them, all but impossible. These woods played an
important part in the battle.
The main object of Sir Douglas Haig is indicated by his description
of the Somme campaign as the “wearing-out battle.” It is more
commonly referred to as the policy of attrition, and under that name
has been subjected to a good deal of criticism. But there is no
question that the policy was based upon sound military principles
that could not be neglected. The basis of good generalship is to wear
down the enemy, force him to absorb his reserves and then smash
him with fresh troops, and the Somme was intended to carry out this
programme as far as possible.
The method adopted by Sir Douglas Haig to achieve his object was the
result of the experience of Loos. On that occasion the Allies had
grasped at more than they were able to hold, so it was now decided to
carry on the advance by limited stages in order that the infantry,
without being unduly exhausted and still within the supporting range
of their artillery, would be able without great difficulty to parry
the hostile counter-stroke. It was expected that a methodical advance
on these lines, always adequately supported by powerful and efficient
artillery, would eat into the enemy’s strength and at the same time
be carried out at a light cost.
“What we have, we hold” might be said to be the keynote of the
limited objective method. It was solid and substantial rather than
brilliant and inspiring, and it had certain defects which became
clear in the course of the battle. It encouraged the infantry to
depend so completely upon the artillery, that the tendency of the
former was to lack confidence when unassisted by the latter. This led
to a decline of initiative, which was further emphasised by the very
fact that the objective was limited. Though the troops were exhorted
to lose no opportunities of exploiting success, it was only natural
for them to consider that they had done all that was wanted when they
had accomplished the definite task assigned to them. Undoubtedly many
opportunities were lost, as the Germans noted with thankfulness, and
places, which we could have had for the mere trouble of walking up to
them, fell into our hands later only after desperate and sanguinary
fighting.
Moreover, after the first shock, the element of surprise was lost,
as the terrain once selected was fixed, and the enemy was able to
fathom our plans and arrange his defence accordingly. The periods
between the stages of our advance gave him valuable time in which to
reorganise his forces and strengthen his fortifications. With the
enemy’s moral high and his forces well trained and disciplined, the
cost of progress was bound in any case to be heavy; but with the
limited objective system, it was probably heavier than it would have
been under a more flexible and elastic one. It is possible, too, that
the method of proceeding by slow stages caused us to miss the chance
of dealing a paralysing blow.
Prudence is a virtue in military matters as in other things, but
excess of prudence is not without danger, especially in the case of
coalitions. The exaggerated caution of Marshal Daun in the Seven
Years’ War is both an example and a warning. If at that time the
continuance of the Austrian coalition could have been guaranteed,
Daun’s tactics would have led to the humiliation and probable
dismemberment of Prussia; but before they had time to work their
effect, the defection of Russia ruined all the hopes of Austria.
The general tendency is for coalitions to be weakened rather than
strengthened by time, and this should be taken into consideration
even in military affairs.
It can easily be seen that the task of Sir Douglas Haig was not
a light one, and two substantial reasons weighed him strongly to
the side of caution; he was conscious that his margin of numerical
superiority[36] was small, and he had a suspicion[37] that his armies
had not yet developed the efficiency essential for the carrying out
of a campaign with far distant objectives.
On the eve of the battle the attitude of the Germans was one of
assured confidence. From the high ground they occupied to the south
of Arras they could not fail to detect the signs of an imminent
offensive, and though the preliminary bombardment, which commenced on
the 25th June, was supplemented by artillery demonstrations at Ypres
and Arras, they had realised that the great attack would take place
in the Somme, and in this district their defences were the strongest
on the whole battle front. For eighteen months there had been no
operation of any magnitude in the sector, and the enemy was given
time to make his defences as perfect as they could be made. The front
line trenches were protected with broad belts of wire entanglements,
which had to be swept away before the attackers could come to grips
with the defenders, and numerous and elaborate dug-outs had been
constructed to protect the garrison during a bombardment. Most of
these shelters went down into the earth for at least thirty feet,
and some were so strong that even the most powerful shell could not
penetrate them. While such shelters are excellent for protection,
they have special dangers of their own. To one in a deep dug-out
the noise of a bombardment overhead has a peculiarly sinister and
terrifying sound; even a shell that bursts a hundred yards away seems
to fall at his door. In such a case a man who thinks more of his own
skin than of his duty is loth to leave his refuge, and there were
many instances during the battle of enemy garrisons being trapped
in their dug-outs before they had time to man their parapets. The
Germans had also erected skilfully concealed machine-gun posts,
strengthened by concrete, and they had several similarly protected
posts for snipers. It was therefore with good reason that the Germans
believed their positions to be impregnable.
As the time for battle drew near, the Division was moved closer to
the front line, and on the 23rd it was concentrated near Corbie,
where D.H.Q. were established. All the sappers and pioneers were
busy on roads and dumps. Numerous conferences in connection with the
battle were held by the G.O.C. On the next day the Ninth moved to
Etinehem, and on the 27th to Grovetown, a city of dumps.
The Division was not to take part in the first day of battle, but
it was instructed to be ready to do so when called upon. The A.
& Q. Staff worked continuously to supply the men with all that
was necessary for the fight. Two hundred rounds of S.A.A. per man
were carried, except in the case of signallers, orderlies, and
Lewis Gunners. The establishment of Lewis Guns per battalion had
been doubled, each company having two and for the carriage of
these weapons hand-carts had been issued, but they were of little
use except in fine weather and on good roads. It was decided by
G.H.Q. that each battalion should have a nucleus of officers for
reorganisation; 20 were to go into the battle, and the remainder,
including the second in command, was to be left at the First Line
Transport. To simplify reorganisation during the engagement, each
company wore shoulder bands of a distinctive colour.[38] For the
carriage of stores, such as Stokes shells, machine-gun ammunition,
R.E. Stores, and tools, parties were formed in each brigade from its
several units.
The most scrupulous care was given to the question of
communications. These form the nerve system of the military body, and
if they do not work properly the whole machine is thrown out of gear,
and delay in the transmission of messages may lead to the chance of
a victory being missed. Communications had not been good at Loos,
but the development and extension of the functions of the aeroplane
opened up a new and more rapid means of communication. Men were to
carry flares, which when lit on the objective would indicate to an
observer from the air the general line reached by the troops, and
special machines, known as contact aeroplanes and distinguished by
streamers, were allotted the task of maintaining communication with
the infantry. Should it be impossible to light the flares on account
of damp or other causes, the men were to indicate their position by
flashing mirrors. In addition, a code of signals was arranged between
a battalion H.Q. and the aeroplanes, the messages from the battalion
being signalled by means of ground signalling sheets. Further, to
allow observers in the rear to distinguish our men from the enemy,
each man wore on his back a square of yellow cloth or metal disc,
which was attached to the flap of the haversack.
An enormous advantage possessed by the British on the eve of the
offensive was the command of the air. At no time during the war
were the signs of our air superiority so obvious to the infantry
as in the summer of 1916. The passage of an enemy plane over our
lines was then an event. The Germans were virtually confined to the
observation they secured from their possession of the higher ground,
and even the extra observation they got by means of their balloons
was denied them. On the first day of the preliminary bombardment our
planes crossed the German lines and swooped down on their balloons,
which disappeared in wisps of flame as they were hit. The enemy was
practically blinded.
The assault was to be made on the 29th June. To prevent the date
being conveyed to the enemy this was known and spoken of as “Z” day,
and the days prior to the battle were designated by the corresponding
letters of the alphabet. Thus the 25th June, on which date the
preliminary bombardment commenced, was “V” day. During the last week
of June the weather was bad, and zero was wisely postponed until
the 1st July. Thick ribbons of mist floated over the landscape and
rendered the work of the Flying Corps exceptionally difficult. Until
the 27th June there were frequent and heavy showers of rain, and
Grovetown became a sea of mud, but on the following day the sun shone
from a cloudless sky, and a typical French summer day ushered in the
greatest battle fought in history up to that time.
The bombardment that fell on the German lines was of an intensity far
exceeding that at Loos, and to the distant observer their positions
seemed to be shot into the air. The bursts of our shells resembled
the smoke from an endless row of factory chimneys, stretching north
and south, and through the fountains of smoke one could see sods
of earth and fragments of timber leaping upwards. For six days the
ground throbbed under the unceasing cannonade, and the nights,
gleaming with the flashes of thousands of guns, were almost as bright
as the days. In this bombardment the guns of the Ninth Division
contributed their share, for they were in action with the artillery
of the Eighteenth and Thirtieth Divisions. During all this period the
enemy’s artillery was extraordinarily quiet, as if reserving itself
for the final attack.
On the 30th June the dispositions of the XIII. Corps were as
follows: North of the Péronne road lay the infantry of the Thirtieth
and Eighteenth Divisions assembled ready for the attack next morning.
The battle H.Q. of the Ninth Division were at Grovetown, in which
were also concentrated two companies of the 9th Seaforths and the
South African Brigade, which had attached to it the 64th Field
Coy. R.E., and the 28th Machine-Gun Company. The 27th Brigade,
supplemented by the 90th R.E. and “C” Company of the 9th Seaforths
was in Billon Valley, Copse Valley, and Trigger Wood Valley. The 26th
Brigade, with the 63rd R.E. and “A” Company of the 9th Seaforths, was
in Grovetown and Celestins Wood. The Corps Cavalry Regiment, the 19th
Motor Machine-Gun Battery, and a Corps Cyclist Battalion were also
under the orders of the Division, the first being at Grovetown and
the latter two at Vaux.
On the morning of the 1st July the frenzied intensity of the
bombardment heralded the moment of attack, and at 7.30 A.M. the
British troops left their trenches and advanced on the German
lines. For the Ninth, lying in reserve, the day was one of feverish
suspense. Messages received showed that matters were going well on
the front of the XIII. Corps, but it was rumoured that a serious
check had been experienced farther north. By nightfall the position
was fairly definitely known. In front of Thiepval, Beaumont Hamel,
and Serre, our advance had been completely checked, but farther south
the attack had met with a success that exceeded expectations. The
objectives of the Thirtieth and Eighteenth Divisions, Montauban and
the spur on which it stood, had been captured without much difficulty
and with slight loss.
On the evening of the 1st July the 27th Brigade placed two
battalions, the 12th Royal Scots and the 6th K.O.S.B., at the
disposal of the Eighteenth Division for working and digging. The
enemy’s artillery, now active, heavily shelled the garrisons of
the captured positions, and on the 2nd July the Ninth Division was
instructed to relieve the 90th Brigade (Thirtieth Division), which
was holding Montauban. This task was entrusted to the 27th Brigade,
and the South African Brigade was ordered to occupy the positions
held by the former as soon as they were vacated. The relief began
at 10 P.M., but owing to the congestion of the trenches and the
unfamiliarity of the guides with the captured positions, it was not
completed until 3 A.M. on the 3rd July. The 11th Royal Scots held the
east and the 9th Scottish Rifles the west of Montauban, with the 6th
K.O.S.B. and the 12th Royal Scots in support and reserve; their task
was to consolidate and strengthen the defences of the village. The
90th Brigade had reported that the Germans were occupying Montauban
Alley from the point where it was cut by the road from the village
to Bazentin-le-Grand. This was too near for safety, and at 5 A.M.
bombing parties from the 11th Royal Scots and 9th Scottish Rifles
worked their way along the trench as far as Triangle Post, which
they garrisoned. During the day this position was consolidated, new
trenches were sited and commenced, and dumps were formed. All day the
village and trenches held by the brigade were incessantly shelled.
At 3 P.M. on the same afternoon the brigade was ordered by the
Thirtieth Division to capture and consolidate Bernafay Wood, about
500 yards east and north-east of Montauban. Between the British
positions and the German second line system at Longueval and Delville
Wood lay the two densely-foliaged woods known as Bernafay and Trones.
These had to be cleared before the attack could be resumed, and,
but for the check imposed by the limited objective, would in all
probability have fallen to our troops on the first day. Brig.-General
Scrase-Dickins arranged for the operation to be carried out by the
6th K.O.S.B. on the right, and the 12th Royal Scots on the left. The
attacking battalions formed up, each on a company front, in Chimney
Trench and the falling ground to the south-west of it. “B” Company
of the 12th Royal Scots was to clear Montauban Alley from Triangle
Post to the north-west corner of the wood. After a ten-minutes’
bombardment the battalions attacked at 9 P.M., and the whole wood, as
well as the trench between it and Triangle Post, was captured after
a feeble resistance. Four field-guns and one machine-gun were taken
by the 12th Royal Scots, and one machine-gun by the 6th K.O.S.B.,
while about 12 of the enemy were killed and 7 taken prisoners. The
assailants had the greatest difficulty in maintaining direction owing
to the darkness and the dense undergrowth of the wood, consequently,
when its eastern margin was reached, there was some confusion of
units, and the consolidation of positions previously selected was
delayed. After the capture of Bernafay, the K.O.S.B. held the
southern and eastern sides of the perimeter, and the 12th Royal Scots
the remaining post.
The wood had been an easy place to take; it proved a costly one
to hold. At 6 A.M. on the 4th July a violent hostile bombardment
opened, and continued for six hours. The shelling was particularly
severe in the portion of the wood lying south of the railway line,
and the majority of the K.O.S.B. in this area had to be withdrawn
farther within the wood. The work of consolidation was totally
interrupted, and casualties were heavy, the K.O.S.B. losing over
150 killed and wounded. By noon, however, all our original positions
were reoccupied, and the work of consolidation was carried on
with vigour. “D” Company of the 12th Royal Scots, under Lieut. H.
Crowden, constructed a keep in the centre of the wood, a highly
creditable piece of work, because it was no light task to dig in a
soil through which tentacles of undergrowth ran in all directions.
Every day Bernafay Wood and Montauban were plastered with shells
from the enemy’s artillery. The ploughed-up village became a heap
of brick-dust and rubble, and the wood, which before its capture
had been so thick that the rays of the sun could not penetrate it,
became so thinned-out that one could see through it from end to
end. During one of these bombardments the battalion H.Q. of the
K.O.S.B. were hit; the Adjutant, Lieutenant Wright, was killed, and
Lieut.-Colonel Connell had a very narrow escape. On the 5th July the
garrison was reduced by the withdrawal of a company of the K.O.S.B.
to Oxford Copse, and a company of the “Rifles” was also moved back
from Montauban Alley to the same place. The lines between brigade
and battalions were often broken by shell-fire, and the work of the
linesmen in repairing and maintaining them deserved the highest
praise.
On the night of the 4th/5th July the remainder of the Thirtieth
Division was relieved by the Ninth. The South Africans took over
from the 89th Brigade in the Glatz sector, and the Highland Brigade
moved up to the positions vacated by the South Africans. The Ninth
was now the right flank division of the British Army. The 1st and
4th Regiments of the South Africans held the line from the junction
with the French to Briqueterie Trench on the east of Montauban,
with the 3rd and 2nd Regiments in support and reserve respectively.
It was still necessary for the British to clear the pear-shaped
wood of Trones. The first attack was carried out on the 8th July
by the Thirtieth Division, and from that date till the 14th the
wood was the scene of a bitter conflict, in which it changed hands
repeatedly. Trones was a particularly difficult place to take, as it
was commanded from Longueval and from the Maltz Horn Ridge. Every
possible assistance was rendered by the Ninth Division. On the night
of the 6th/7th, the 27th Brigade sent out a patrol, which established
a post in Longueval Alley only 300 yards from Trones Wood, while on
the morning of the attack the artillery pounded the southern fringe
of Longueval and the neighbouring trenches, and the 12th Royal Scots
from Bernafay Wood covered the left flank of the Thirtieth Division
with machine-gun fire. During this operation a plucky exploit was
performed by Private J. Stevenson of the 12th Royal Scots. Having
located a German sniper, he engaged him with his Lewis Gun; he
advanced across the open, and having fired off all his ammunition
sat down and cleaned his rifle until more could be obtained. He was
wounded in both arms, but nevertheless when one of his comrades was
hit, he went about 600 yards to bring up a stretcher for him. The
Thirtieth Division took Trones Wood, but by the end of the day had
lost it all to a hostile counter-attack, except the south-west corner
and Maltz Horn Trench.
On the night of the 8th July the 27th Brigade was relieved, and moved
down to its old position in Billon Valley. The Third Division on
the left took over the portion of Montauban Alley lying to the west
of the Montauban-Longueval road; the Highland Brigade occupied the
trenches in front of Montauban, and the South Africans Bernafay Wood
with their 4th Regiment. The 6th K.O.S.B., who had held the worst
shelled portion of the wood, lost in five days 16 officers and 300
other ranks.
The attack on Trones was resumed at 3 A.M. next morning, but at the
end of the day the position was exactly as it had been on the 8th.
The 90th Brigade, which made the assault, was sadly battered, and a
company of the 4th Regiment of the South Africans moved up at 9 P.M.
to the south-west corner of the wood to its support. In addition
a platoon from the same battalion reinforced the garrison of the
Briqueterie, and the 3rd Regiment was ordered to be ready to support
the 90th Brigade at ten minutes’ notice. The attack was continued
on the 10th without any gain, the Germans recapturing what they had
lost by a well-timed counter-attack. On the same date the advanced
post held by the Ninth in Longueval Alley was supported by the
establishment of several intermediate posts. The sanguinary assaults
on Trones Wood had no better fortune on the 11th, an attempt of a
South African detachment to aid the Thirtieth Division by bombing up
Longueval Alley to the apex of the wood being checked by machine-gun
fire. During the counter-barrage of the enemy Lieut.-Colonel Jones of
the 4th Regiment South Africans was killed, and the command of the
battalion was taken over by Major D. M. MacLeod.
The unsatisfactory result of the fighting in Trones Wood affected
disastrously the plans of the Corps for an attack on the enemy’s
second system of defences. Every day gained by the enemy added to his
strength. On the 7th July the Division had received instructions for
operations to be undertaken against Longueval and Delville Wood on
the 10th, but the original scheme presupposed the capture of Trones
Wood, consequently the date had to be postponed and the arrangements
modified. The task of the XIII. Corps was probably the toughest on
the whole front. It was to secure the ridge running from Waterlot
Farm to Bazentin-le-Grand, and the key of this ridge, Longueval and
Delville Wood, fell to the lot of the Ninth. The flanks of its attack
were to be protected on the left by the Third Division and on the
right by the Eighteenth, which was to clear Trones Wood. The great
difficulty lay in the fact that the position of the XIII. Corps was
already a salient, and that success would intensify it. The ground,
moreover, was vital to the enemy, and he held it with seasoned
troops.[39] The operation was of first-rate importance, since the
possession of the high ground near Longueval was the pivot of Sir
Douglas Haig’s immediate plans; it facilitated an attack on High Wood
in the north, and it was an essential preliminary to an advance on
Ginchy and Guillemont.
General Furse had foreseen the task that he would be called upon to
perform. From Bernafay Wood the ground rose up to the height on which
stood Longueval. The southern position of the village stood open to
the view, but the northern part, intersected by numerous orchards,
baffled scrutiny by disappearing into the shelter of Delville Wood.
Longueval lay along three roads whose junctions formed the centre
or main square of the village. From this point one road ran north
to meet the path midway between High Wood and Flers; the second[40]
ran south-west, skirting the western margin of Bernafay Wood; and
the third led in a south-easterly direction into Guillemont. The
northern road was marked on our maps as North Street. From the square
a street branched off westwards towards Bazentin-le-Grand, which
was known as Clarges Street; on the eastern side where it ran into
a grassy ride, practically bisecting Delville Wood, it was named
Princes Street. Parallel to Clarges Street, and about 300 yards north
of it, lay Duke Street. These, bounded on the west by Pont Street and
on the east by Piccadilly, formed a rectangle. Between Piccadilly
and North Street clustered the orchards of Longueval. The enemy’s
front trenches ran along the south of the village, and then turned
off towards the south-east, past Waterlot Farm along the western
outskirts of Guillemont. His rear defences lay in the hamlet and
beyond the northern perimeter of the wood.
Ever since the Ninth Division had been in the line, the whole area
in front of the German trenches had been constantly patrolled.
The brigadiers had been warned of what was to take place, and the
whole Division was ready for the battle, so that when the final
instructions were issued by the Corps on the 12th July only details
required attention.
At 3.30 P.M. on the same afternoon the G.O.C. met his brigadiers and
explained his plans. The attack was to be carried out by the 26th
Brigade on the right, and the 27th on the left, and for each there
were three objectives. The first for both was the capture of the
enemy’s front and support trenches near Longueval. The second task of
the Highlanders was to secure the village south of the line Clarges
Street-Princes Street, and the western edge of Delville Wood south
of Princes Street; that of the 27th Brigade to take the greater part
of Longueval lying north of Clarges Street. Then the 26th, in order
to safeguard the right flank, was to secure the German system of
defences between the village and Waterlot Farm inclusive, while the
27th was to clear the northern outskirts of Longueval and the western
margin of Delville Wood adjoining that portion of the village. If
these objectives were taken easily, both brigades were to go on and
occupy the whole of the wood.
It was realised that the Germans were expecting an attack. To keep
them in uncertainty as to the exact time of the onslaught, their
lines were heavily shelled every morning by the artillery, and to
gain the full advantage of surprise, what was virtually a night
attack was planned. The British Army might be unimaginative and
unenterprising in strategy, but it was bold and audacious in the
use of tactical expedients. A night attack demands the most careful
arrangements by the Staff and a high standard of discipline on the
part of the troops engaged. Zero was 3.25 A.M. on the morning of the
14th July. This early hour made the question of assembly one of more
than ordinary difficulty, but the G.O.C. had his scheme prepared.
The ground in front of our lines had been thoroughly reconnoitred
by patrols, and during the night a strong line of scouts was to go
up the crest of the rise in front of the enemy’s trenches. These
men were to be supported by Lewis Gun detachments, and the exposed
right wing was to be protected against an attack from Trones Wood
by a chain of posts, which the Highland Brigade was to establish
in 9·2-inch shell-holes, previously made for this purpose by the
artillery along the crest line of the spur running from Longueval
to Bernafay Wood. Under cover of this force the attacking brigades
were to form up their leading battalions in their waves of attack on
the south-west slopes of the plateau. The whole assembly was to be
completed half an hour before zero.
On receipt of their instructions Brig.-General Ritchie and
Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins arranged their dispositions. The
former decided to attack with the Black Watch and Argylls in front,
the Seaforths in support, and three companies of the Camerons in
reserve. The Black Watch and the Argylls were to be on a two-company
front, each company being in open column of platoons with 70 yards
between platoons. Thus each battalion was to be in eight waves. The
supporting battalion had the same formation, and the fourth company
of the Camerons was to carry[41] for the brigade. Two sections of the
26th Machine-Gun Company were to follow the 7th Seaforths, the rest
of the company being in brigade reserve. One section of the L.T.M.B.
was to follow the two attacking battalions, the remainder being under
the control of the brigade. The Black Watch and the Argylls were to
secure the first and second objectives, and the Seaforths the third.
Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins had the 11th Royal Scots and the 9th
Scottish Rifles in front, and the 12th Royal Scots in support. The
6th K.O.S.B. carried for the brigade. Both attacking battalions had
four companies in the front line, each company being in column of
platoons with the requisite 70 yards’ distance between platoons; thus
each battalion was in four waves. The supporting battalion was in the
same formation. Two Vickers machine-guns were to accompany each of
the leading battalions, one section followed the 12th Royal Scots,
and two sections were in brigade reserve. The first objective was to
be taken by the leading battalions, the second by the 12th and 11th
Royal Scots, and the third by the 12th Royal Scots.
The reliefs necessitated by these arrangements were carried out
on the night of the 12th/13th. The 55th Brigade of the Eighteenth
Division relieved the South African Brigade in the portion of
Bernafay Wood lying south of the Carnoy-Guillemont railway. The 27th
relieved the 76th Brigade of the Third Division in Montauban Alley
from the Montauban-Longueval road to the Montauban-Bazentin-le-Grand
road (exclusive). On the right of the Ninth the Thirtieth Division
was relieved by the Eighteenth.
The artillery arrangements employed for the attack on Longueval
had exceptional interest; for they were destined to give the Ninth
a distinctive place among the divisions of the British Army.
Brig.-General Tudor’s main problem was created by Delville Wood. As
our experience of Bernafay had already demonstrated, shrapnel shells,
by hitting the branches and trunks of trees burst prematurely, and
were as dangerous to our own infantry as to the enemy. The C.R.A.
now resolved to carry out a plan that he had long borne in mind. The
artillery bombardment preparatory for the attack was to commence five
minutes before zero; the customary shrapnel was used, but after three
minutes H.E. shell only. This was a notable change from the ordinary
method. The H.E. had delay action, so that even if a tree was hit by
it the shell would complete its trajectory before bursting.
In another respect, the Ninth resolved to adopt a method commonly
used by the French and already employed by several British
divisions, on the 1st July. Up to this battle all the attacks of the
British Army had been preceded by a violent preliminary bombardment,
and before the infantry advanced the artillery lifted well behind the
enemy’s trenches. The device known as the “creeping barrage”[42] was
a logical development in the work of the artillery, since successive
lines of defence had to be accounted for. The gunners were to support
the infantry throughout the advance by shelling each successive
portion of the enemy’s line just in front of the oncoming troops.
This would give the Germans less time to have their machine-guns
ready and would enable the attackers to get to grips with them before
their guns could be brought into action. For the attack on the 14th
July, the rate of the barrage was to be 50 yards every one and a half
minutes, and sheltered by this advancing wall of fire the infantry
were to carry on the assault.
The full artillery programme consisted of eight separate
barrages.[43] The first five continued from five minutes before
zero until two hours after it, by which time the whole of Longueval
was expected to be in our hands. All this time the defences round
Waterlot Farm were to be kept under fire, and the attack on the farm
was to be made under cover of the sixth barrage, which was to open
two hours after zero. The remaining barrages were intended to cover
the assault on Delville Wood.