THE SALIENT AND “PLUG STREET”
OCTOBER 1915 TO MAY 1916
It was a sadly battered Division that concentrated near Bethune.
Caked in mud, unshaven, and unkempt, with tunics tattered and filthy
after three days of continuous exposure, the men showed none of the
“spick and span” appearance that it is the pride and custom of the
British soldier to present. But they were in high spirits and full
of confidence, and their exploits were rewarded with a flattering
message[22] from General Gough, the Commander of the I. Corps.
The losses[23] of the Division had been exceptionally heavy, and
most serious were the casualties amongst the senior officers. The
divisional commander had been killed, and out of the 12 infantry
C.Os. only 4 remained; grave losses also occurred amongst majors and
captains.[24] There is no factor more useful in the difficult task of
reorganisation than the experienced control of senior officers; but
this work in most of the battalions had to be undertaken by second
lieutenants with little experience, and no automatic knowledge of how
things should be done.
The Division was most fortunate in its new Commander. Major-General
W. T. Furse, C.B., D.S.O., was an officer of proved ability, energy,
and imagination. Under his vigorous direction reorganisation was
rapidly completed, and deficiencies in stores and equipment were made
up. He thoroughly understood that a division was a unit and not a
mere congeries of battalions, batteries, and field companies, and he
realised that the battle from which the Ninth had recently emerged
offered a grand opportunity for fostering and stimulating _esprit
de corps_. “The Ninth (Scottish) Division” soon became a name in
which every soldier in it took an intense and jealous pride; each
man believed that he belonged to the best unit in the best division
in the best army in the world. Such a spirit is not to be despised;
it inspires a corporate heroism that is greater than the bravery of
any individual, and even the meanest is roused to triumph over his
natural timidity rather than allow the glory of his division to be
tarnished. No man took a more conspicuous part in building up and
encouraging this spirit than General Furse.
[Illustration: LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR W. T. FURSE, K.C.B., D.S.O.
[_J. Russell & Sons._]
For most of the battalions new leaders had to be found. The only
C.Os. who remained with the Division were Lieut.-Colonel Cameron of
Lochiel of the Camerons, Lieut.-Colonel Loch of the 12th Royal Scots,
Lieut.-Colonel Northey of the 9th Scottish Rifles, and Lieut.-Colonel
Fergusson of the 11th H.L.I. During the next few months the following
Commanders were appointed:—
26TH BRIGADE.
_8th Black Watch_—
Lieut.-Colonel G. B. Duff of the Camerons, from the end of
December 1915 to March 1916.
Major Sir George Abercromby, from March 1916 to April 1916.
Lieut.-Colonel G. W. E. Gordon, from 9th April to 20th September
1916.
_7th Seaforth Highlanders_—
Major C. P. M. Burn, from 5th October to 16th December 1915.
Lieut.-Colonel F. J. Marshall, from 16th December 1915 to 15th
April 1916.
Lieut.-Colonel J. Kennedy, D.S.O., from 2nd May to 5th August
1916.
_8th Gordon Highlanders_—
Lieut.-Colonel A. D. Greenhill-Gardyne, from 27th October 1915 to
March 1916.
27TH BRIGADE.
Brig.-General W. H. Walshe, to 17th March 1916.
Brig.-General G. F. Trotter, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O., to May 1916.
_11th Royal Scots_—
Lieut.-Colonel W. D. Croft, from 4th December 1915.
_6th Royal Scots Fusiliers_—
Major J. H. Dutton, D.S.O., to 8th January 1916.
Lieut.-Colonel The Right Hon. Winston Churchill, to May 1916.
_10th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders_—
Lieut.-Colonel H. Pelham Burn, D.S.O., from 10th December 1915 to
April 1916.
28TH BRIGADE.
_6th King’s Own Scottish Borderers_—
Lieut.-Colonel J. C. W. Connell, D.S.O., from 4th December 1915.
_10th Highland Light Infantry_—
Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Stuart, D.S.O., to 6th January 1916.
Lieut.-Colonel Grahame, D.S.O., from 6th January 1916.
_11th Highland Light Infantry_—
Lieut.-Colonel R. F. Forbes, January to May 1916.
In the Sappers, Lieut.-Colonel Livingstone had been wounded, and
the new C.R.E. was Lieut.-Colonel Carpenter.
The Division had barely time to scrape off the mud before it was
ordered on the 29th September to proceed north to join the V. Corps
in the Salient.[25] The move was carried through partly by route
march and partly by rail. On the 3rd October, D.H.Q. were established
at Hooggraaf, about two miles south of Poperinghe, and on the morning
of the 5th the 26th and 27th Brigades relieved the Seventeenth
Division in the trenches near Hill 60. The line taken over by the
Ninth lay south of Zillebeke, and extended from north of Hill 60 to
a point south of the Ypres-Comines Canal near Oosthoek. The enemy’s
line ran along the higher ground, and the distance between the
British and the German trenches varied from 25 to 400 yards. The
salient feature on our front was The Bluff, which rose steeply from
the ground on the north side of the Canal and completely dominated
the sector.
During the three months that the Division remained in the salient it
passed a time of almost unmitigated gloom and discomfort. As the
days shortened and winter came on, hardly a day passed without rain,
and mud was lord and sovereign over all. It seemed to suck away a
man’s vitality and enthusiasm, and even a short march involved an
expenditure of physical energy out of all proportion to the distance
traversed. The whole of Flanders, engulfed in mud, had the aspect
of an enormous swamp; and the leaden skies, in a sombre rain-grey
monotint, were in harmony with the drab-coloured earth. Even the
roads were ankle-deep in glutinous mud, and the constant traffic
was often checked by stoppages caused by particularly bad parts.
Thus the passage of the infantry to and from the trenches was like a
feverish nightmare; for the men had to march about ten miles through
clinging mire along roads choked with transport, and often shelled.
The rest huts at Dickebusch and Canada Huts were dismal and repellent
shelters; they were swept by draughts, and through their leaky roofs
the rain dripped down on the disconsolate inmates. The area round
them was one vast sea of mud, where it was impossible for a unit to
carry out any training worth the name. Without constant training
there is a tendency for discipline to be relaxed, and a man who is
allowed to loll about as he pleases is apt to lose all smartness
in himself and pride in his unit. As far as possible, everything
was done to maintain strict discipline, and the A. & Q. department
worked its hardest to secure baths for the men and clean changes of
clothing, but in spite of this the rest huts were more demoralising
than the front line, where the strictest trench discipline was upheld
and where there was constant work to do.
This period was notable as the reign of the second lieutenant. For
over a month every company in the 26th Brigade was commanded by one;
and this was the case with most of the other battalions. At first
this undoubtedly rendered the task of General Furse more difficult,
since youth and gallantry do not form a complete substitute for
knowledge and experience; but the apprenticeship and training in
responsibility, which these months brought to the young officers,
supplied him with a large body of keen, confident, and efficient
leaders who were later to demonstrate their value at the Battle of
the Somme.
The divisional commander was quick to make the most of his
opportunities, and he resolved to fortify youth and keenness with
knowledge and practice. On the 7th November he opened the Ninth
Division School at Poperinghe, which served a double purpose in
promoting training and in encouraging _esprit de corps_. By this
means not only did the officers gain a real knowledge of their
manifold duties, which it was impossible for them to acquire amongst
the swamps at Dickebusch and Canada Huts, but also the company
officers of one unit were brought into contact with those of other
units, and thus mutual understanding and sympathy were created.
The first commandant of the school was Lieut.-Colonel Loch who was
assisted by Captain Drew, the adjutant of the 5th Camerons, and the
instruction was both theoretical and practical. It is impossible to
over-estimate the value of this school in increasing the efficiency
of the Division.
Certainly the safest and in many ways the most desirable place during
these winter months was the front line system. A battalion spent four
days in the front line trenches, four days in support, and four in
rest at Dickebusch or Canada Huts. The support positions had most of
the discomfort without any of the safety[26] of the front line; they
had little protection and were frequently shelled, many casualties
being suffered. The most perilous spot on the route to the front line
was Ypres. No man of British blood could walk through it without
feeling a deep thrill of awe and reverence as he gazed on the ruins
of the beautiful town, the name of which will ever be associated
with the most heroic and imperishable feat of British valour and
endurance. But it was no place to linger in; it formed a nexus of
roads, and virtually the whole of the traffic between the trenches
and the back areas had to pass through it. Hence it was constantly
shelled by the enemy, and any body of men that succeeded in passing
through it without loss was extremely fortunate. After the toilsome
march, the trenches seemed a veritable haven of refuge. They were in
fact partly trenches and partly breastworks; for it was impossible to
dig to any depth, since water was quickly reached, and the parapets
had to be raised high above the level of the ground to protect the
men from enemy bullets. The high parapets made the line unpleasantly
conspicuous, for they formed an easy mark for the enemy’s trench
mortars and artillery, which had numerous posts for observation.
Between October and December the Division was gradually shifted from
the south to the east of Zillebeke. The line taken over from the
Seventeenth Division was held until the night of the 15th October,
when the 27th Brigade on the right was relieved by the 72nd Brigade
of the Twenty-fourth Division. On the day preceding the relief the
Argylls had a tragic mishap. At 4 A.M. on the 15th the Germans
exploded a mine about 25 yards in front of a trench not far from
The Bluff. The explosion was very violent, and although the front
trenches had been cleared in view of the known existence of hostile
mines on this part of the line, heavy casualties were suffered in the
support and communication trenches, 15 being killed and 50 wounded.
On the same morning at 1.30 A.M. the enemy blew a small mine just
outside the trenches held by the Camerons, who had 5 killed and
wounded. During the night of the 16th/17th October the 28th Brigade
took over the part of the line held by the 7th Brigade on the left of
the 26th; this brought the northern limit of the Division to a point
just east of Armagh Wood. A further rearrangement took place on the
nights of the 8th/9th and 9th/10th November when the 27th Brigade
took over the front line trenches east of Sanctuary Wood, which at
that time still presented the appearance of a wood and was full of
thick undergrowth.
These alterations brought changes in position without any in
conditions, for all along the front the trenches were in a very bad
state and could be maintained in tolerable order only by constant
labour. After a shower of rain (and it always seemed to rain in
the salient), there was the common story of dug-outs collapsed and
parapets fallen in. At the best of times the trenches were ankle-deep
in water; pumps were used, but they effected only a temporary
improvement, because there was no place to which the water could
be drained. Long thigh gum-boots were issued to the men, and these
helped to keep their feet dry, though they could not make them warm.
In spite of whale-oil and anti-frostbite grease, it is not surprising
that many were evacuated to hospital suffering from trench feet. Want
of sleep, perpetual cold, filth, and wet were the ordinary features
of life; notwithstanding the coats of goatskin that were issued it
was impossible for the men to keep warm. During a man’s short spell
of sleep his feet became numb, and he was forced to get out of his
shelter and stamp in order to restore circulation; and when he was
awake he had to squelch about continually in mud, which plastered
everything up to his head.
The sappers and pioneers did their utmost to improve matters, but as
regards getting rid of the water their efforts were as the labours
of Sisyphus. They revetted the trenches, made dug-outs, improved
and kept in repair a light railway, which was used for bringing up
rations and engineering materials, but more could have been done if
the infantry had co-operated whole-heartedly with the sappers. The
latter were a comparatively small body of skilled men, and they were
supplied with working-parties from the infantry. The infantryman,
however, believed that he was doing not his own job but the sapper’s,
and he did as little as possible unless there was someone standing
over him. This was the attitude not merely of N.C.Os. and privates,
but of many officers, and in this respect there was a striking
contrast to the German Army, where the private was taught to realise
that in working under a sapper he was working for himself. It would
have been well if the British soldier had been taught the same lesson
from the beginning of his training. As it was, the work accomplished
by an infantry party depended largely upon the infantry officer who
was in charge of it, and too often he considered it the proper thing
to let his men do as little as possible.
The position held by the Division from near The Bluff north of the
Canal to Sanctuary Wood was about 5000 yards in length, which was
a long line for a weak[27] division to hold. Most of the units
were still far below strength, and when parties left the front
line to bring up rations, the trenches appeared deserted. The line
was commanded by the enemy along the entire front, and, lying in a
salient, it was shelled from all sides. Any movement east of Ypres
was impossible except after dark, and one dared not show a head in
Zillebeke during the day. At some points the lines were so close
that they could not be safely shelled except by trench mortars. At
one part on the front of the 27th Brigade, where the trenches were
only about 20 yards apart, the enemy occupied a position known as
the “Birdcage.” It was a wooden framework with wire netting and
a trap-door in the top. Whenever he was peevish, he opened the
trap-door and heaved out a bomb, shutting the door after him. This
contrivance was hit by a trench mortar on the 23rd November, but the
Germans at once repaired it; however, it was blown to atoms five days
later by a mine. The enemy had more guns and more ammunition, but a
resolute effort was made by General Furse to dispute his artillery
superiority by means of a “Retaliation Tariff.”[28] Whenever the
enemy bombarded a part of our lines he was subjected to a bombardment
of greater severity; this encouraged the infantry and stimulated the
gunners, but failed to silence the Germans. Occasional bombardments
also took place at such times as the enemy was suspected to be
involved in a relief.
Even more than the shelling the men disliked the constant mining that
was being carried on along the front. In this, as in artillery,
the Germans were the masters, though our tunnellers, with a view to
cheering the infantry, declared that they controlled the situation.
Except for the Argylls no serious casualties were suffered from
mining, but the men in the front system of trenches lived in a
constant state of suspense. This was reflected in the reports of
sentries, and never a day passed without someone saying that he
heard “subterranean noises, probably enemy mining.”[29] Undoubtedly
our miners had an anxious and harassing time. On the night of the
30th November, having heard noises, they sent out a listening post,
which came upon some mine cases and broke into a hostile gallery. The
tunnelling subaltern and one of his corporals entered it, and though
they met some Germans succeeded in firing a charge and destroying the
gallery.
Under the most dismal and depressing conditions the work of the
A.S.C. and transport was beyond all praise. This was probably the
most trying period in the whole war for them, yet in spite of
casualties and delays caused by mud and bad roads, they never failed
to deliver the rations. Every night they had to run the gauntlet
through Ypres, fully conscious that a torrent of shells might descend
upon them at any moment. The wear and tear on wagons and limbers was
enormous, and numerous losses were suffered both in personnel and
horses. Throughout the winter the excellence and regularity of the
rations did more than anything to keep the men in good heart.
Before the Division was relieved from the salient an important change
was made throughout the whole Army as regards machine-guns. Prior to
the war the importance of machine-gun fire had not been realised by
our Army, and consequently we neither had enough of them nor knew
how to make the best tactical use of those we had. The type employed
was the Vickers, of which two, and later four, were issued to each
battalion, but the gun was a heavy weapon for infantry to handle, and
required a high standard of special training. Since 1915 a new and
lighter machine-gun, the Lewis, was being introduced; it was more
easily carried, and it was possible for an average man to master it
after a fortnight’s instruction. Moreover, it was cooled by air and
could be fired from a very light mounting; indeed an expert could
fire it without any mounting at all. It was an admirable weapon for
infantry, and when issued there was no need for battalions to have
their own Vickers Guns. In fact the advantage of using the latter
under brigade control had been apparent even before the Battle
of Loos, and all brigades in the Division had appointed brigade
machine-gun officers. At Loos, all the infantry battalions had at
least two Lewis Guns and some had four, but on the 30th November
the establishment was fixed at four per battalion, that is, one
per company. On the same date the Vickers Gun detachments were
formed into machine-gun companies, one company being attached to
each brigade, and each company consisted of four sections, with two
machine-guns per section.[30]
On the 7th December, the welcome news was received that the Ninth was
to be relieved by the Fiftieth Division before the end of the month.
The tidings were greeted with unfeigned joy. Though the men had
borne the mud and discomfort with wonderful stoicism, they loathed
the salient and were glad to leave it.[31] It was undoubtedly the
worst and most disagreeable spell of trench life that the Division
experienced during the war. Even after the troops had been heavily
punished in the Battle of the Somme, many of the men declared that
they would rather go through another such battle than return to the
salient under the conditions that prevailed in the winter of 1915.
The first to leave were the divisional mounted troops, who departed
for the II. Corps’ area on the 12th December. But before the last
battalions were relieved on the 20th, they experienced a new alarm.
Ever since we had entered the salient there were rumours that the
enemy intended to make a gas attack, and on the 14th December
information was received from the Corps that the Germans were
preparing one on the front of the Second Army. Next day, therefore,
the artillery proceeded to pound their front parapets in case they
should have installed cylinders. During the small hours of the 19th
our whole front was subjected to an exceptionally heavy bombardment,
and it was clear that the long threatened gas attack was at last
being delivered. Clouds of gas drifted as far back as D.H.Q.,
but the enemy did not follow up with an infantry attack, for the
artillery were ready and proceeded to shell the adversary’s trenches
without delay. The main enemy effort was made to the north of the
Division, but in no case did he find the defenders unprepared. As
if disappointed at the frustration of his designs, he shelled the
whole divisional area with vindictive violence throughout the 19th
and the 20th, and several casualties were caused among the outgoing
and incoming battalions. On the 20th the whole of the Division was
relieved except the artillery, the last of which departed on the 22nd.
From the 20th December 1915 till the 26th January 1916, the Division
enjoyed a welcome and needed respite from trench warfare, and General
Furse made the most of the time to bring it up to concert-pitch.
After a long term in the line, when there are few opportunities for
training, a man is inclined to become slack; further, trench life is
bad for the feet, and several route marches are necessary to bring
the men into good condition. The Division, except the artillery, was
now in billets round Merris, where D.H.Q. were established. The land
was pleasant and undulating, and was covered with numerous cosy and
cheery farms, a striking contrast to the mud flats of Flanders. The
artillery were stationed at the Artillery Training Camp at Watten,
where they underwent a vigorous course.
Cleanliness was the first essential; excellent baths were available
and also clean clothing. Then followed smartening-up drill, and
each brigade was inspected in turn by the Corps Commander in route
marching. It was now that the Ninth began to reap the fruits of the
Divisional School that had been established at Poperinghe. General
Furse held frequent conferences with his brigadiers and battalion
commanders, in order to ensure that the training should be carried
out on useful and uniform lines. A high average standard was aimed
at in bombing and in rifle shooting and when the men returned to
the line their bearing, efficiency, and moral left little to be
desired. Yet the time was not all spent in work, the average amount
of training being about five hours per day. Football matches were
played daily, and the Divisional Band and the Concert Party—“The
Thistles”—provided a welcome entertainment during the evenings.
The type of football played was, of course, Association. There was
one thrilling Rugby match between the officers of the 28th Brigade
and those of the 26th, and a stirring game ended in a draw. It was
during this period of rest and training that the Right Hon. Winston
Churchill arrived to take over the Command of the 6th Royal Scots
Fusiliers at the beginning of January 1916.
On its next visit to the trenches, the Division experienced one of
its most enjoyable times in France. On the 24th January 1916, it
commenced the relief of the Twenty-fifth Division in the Ploegsteert
area, and this was completed by the 31st. D.H.Q. were established
at Nieppe, but were transferred on the 13th February to Steenwerck
on account of shelling. The front trenches lay east of Ploegsteert
Wood; they were in comparatively good condition and reliefs could
be carried out in daylight. There were excellent billets for the
battalions and brigades in reserve, where a considerable amount of
training could be carried on. In order that battalions should always
occupy the same trenches, and so learn everything about them, the
28th Brigade held always one part of the line, while the 27th and
26th relieved each other in the same trenches. Six days “in” and six
days “out” was the rule for each unit.
From the end of January till the end of May 1916, the Ninth held
the same line, which was one of the most pleasant areas along the
British front. There was constant work to be done, but the results
of labour were soon apparent. The trenches were firmly revetted,
numerous fire-steps were built, and the communication trenches were
kept in good order. In addition, many dug-outs were made and several
concrete emplacements for machine-guns constructed, and on leaving
the area both sappers and infantry could claim that they had handed
over model trenches.
The advent of spring and the peaceful aspect of the cultivated
country combined to render everyone cheerful. In this sector the
astonishing hardihood of the old French farmers was seen at its best.
They used to plough fields almost up to the front line. When shelled,
they unharnessed the horses and went back to their farms without
accelerating their pace in the slightest, but as soon as the firing
ceased, they calmly resumed ploughing as if nothing out of the way
had occurred. Ploegsteert Wood itself was a charming spot. As the
days lengthened and spring advanced, the wood presented an arcadian
appearance. April was a halcyon month. The very huts nestling among
the trees, bourgeoning into a beautiful foliage, seemed to fit in
with the brightness of their surroundings, and the songs of thousands
of birds made one feel at times that the war had ceased to be.
[Illustration: “LAWRENCE FARM”
(From a sketch by the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill of his Battalion
Head-quarters)]
Life was not altogether a picnic, however. The wood itself was
intermittently shelled by the enemy, and the trenches were
occasionally subjected to heavy bombardments. The worst experience
fell to the 11th Royal Scots. Near their trenches the German position
protruded in a salient, which was known to our men as the “Birdcage,”
on account of the tangle of wire with which it was protected. Mining
operations were undertaken against this salient, and the infantry
supplied large working-parties for the purpose. But the enemy must
have discovered that there was a mine, and he determined to destroy
it. On the evening of the 13th May the position held by the Royal
Scots was violently shelled and trench mortared, and shortly after,
the Germans came over in three parties of 20 each. Some of them
succeeded in entering our trenches, but the Royal Scots, though dazed
by the severity of the bombardment, put up a splendid resistance.
Captain Henry with a small party made an immediate counter-attack,
and after a lively scuffle expelled the enemy. The Royal Scots
losses, due mainly to the hostile barrage, were 16 killed, 61
wounded, and 8 missing. The Germans, who were the 104th Saxons,
left 10 corpses in our trenches, and had failed in their attempt to
destroy the mine-shaft.
General Furse strove to foster the offensive spirit throughout the
Division, so sections were known as “fighting” sections, to impress
upon each man that his principal duty was to fight. He exhorted all
the battalions to make “No-Man’s Land” “Ninth Division Land,” and
the men did their utmost to carry out his instructions. Every night
the area in front of the battalions in the line was actively and
persistently patrolled. But this was not enough for the G.O.C.; he
wanted the men to secure prisoners; “Corpses are more important than
acres” was his constant injunction. Though the raids engineered in
this sector were not successful, the experience gained helped later
to make it one of the finest raiding divisions in the Army; it was
learning to walk, and was learning rapidly. All ranks realised and
never forgot that on taking over trenches it was not their job to sit
still and wait for things to happen, but to devise enterprises to
worry the enemy as much as possible. The Ninth was never happy until
it felt that it had established ascendency over the enemy opposite it.
With this intention, a minor operation was undertaken by the “Rifles”
on the 1st March. The scheme was carried out at 11 P.M. A small
party went out with Bangalore torpedoes,[32] which they placed in
the enemy’s wire and exploded. Then dummies, which had been fixed in
“No-Man’s Land,” were worked by string from the front trenches so as
to present the appearance of troops moving forward. At the same time,
the enemy’s lines were raked by rifle and machine-gun fire, trench
mortars and rifle-grenades, and by shells from the artillery. Only
two casualties were suffered by the “Rifles,” and as it was probable
that the Germans manned their parapets on hearing the explosion
and seeing the dummies moving, it is likely that their losses were
much heavier. A more ambitious raiding scheme was attempted by
the Argylls on the night of the 25th/26th March. At 1.52 A.M. two
Bangalore torpedoes were placed under the enemy’s wire, and a party
of 2 officers and 30 men left the trenches ready to enter the German
line after the explosion had cleared a gap. The torpedoes were fired
at 2 A.M., but the raiding party slightly lost direction and missed
the gap. The failure was really due to inexperience and insufficient
preparations.
If the Division was disappointed with the result of its raids, it
had every reason to be pleased with its success in sniping. When it
first took over the line, the German snipers held the upper hand.
But the sniping officers in each battalion vied with one another in
ingenious devices to gain the advantage over the enemy, and before
the Division left the sector our snipers were distinctly on top. In
every intelligence report from the front line battalions several
hits were claimed by the snipers. It was while in this area that the
machine-gun companies commenced the practice of indirect fire.[33]
This was carried out nightly, in order to sweep the roads and places
which the Germans were likely to use at night. Here, too, air fights
came to be of frequent occurrence, and excited the greatest interest
among the men. One day a hostile plane received a direct hit through
the engine and crashed down in our lines; there cannot have been
many occasions during the war when an anti-aircraft gun was so
conspicuously successful.
The favourite amusement of the artillery was firing at German
observation posts. At Les Ecluses a tall factory chimney that
overlooked our lines was the chief target, but for a long time defied
our gunners, and the German observers had become so confident that
they were seen one morning shaking dust out of a carpet or something
of that nature over the top of the stalk. This was very exasperating,
but our gunners had the best of it when the observation post was
knocked out by the third round of a 12-inch Howitzer, which landed at
the base of the chimney.
Hitherto the headgear worn by the men was the Balmoral. It had a
touch of the picturesque, but it offered no protection against
shrapnel. The steel helmet now made its appearance; it was much
heavier, and at first required some knack to balance it properly. For
a time the men wore it only on compulsion and preferred to use it
as a washing basin or a soup bowl, but it became more popular when
its manifold advantages in protecting the head, not only from shell
splinters but from knocks against overhead traverses and the woodwork
of dug-outs, were realised. In the course of a few months a man came
to regard the steel helmet as one of his best friends.
A few changes in command took place during this period.
Lieut.-Colonel Pelham Burn was transferred to the Gordons, and his
place in the Argylls was taken by Lieut.-Colonel W. J. B. Tweedie.
Lieut.-Colonel Loch, C.M.G., was promoted to a brigade in the
Fifty-sixth Division, and he was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel H. L.
Budge. Lieut.-Colonel Cameron of Lochiel, whose health had broken
down, had to give up the command of the Camerons to Lieut.-Colonel
Duff. The most important change was in the artillery. On 1st February
1916 Brig.-General H. H. Tudor, C.M.G., succeeded Brig.-General E. H.
Armitage, C.B., in the command of the Divisional Artillery. He was
destined to influence profoundly the work of the Division by his use
of the guns.
In April 1916 three batteries, D/50, D/51, and D/52, were taken away
from their own brigades and formed into the 53rd Brigade R.F.A.,
which was composed entirely of 18-pounders. Thus, in the spring of
1916, the Ninth Divisional Artillery consisted of the 50th, 51st, and
52nd Brigades, each with three 18-pounder batteries and one Howitzer
battery, and the 53rd with three 18-pounder batteries. All batteries
were on a four-gun basis. About May the Brigade Ammunition Columns
of the 50th, 51st, and 52nd Brigades were broken up or absorbed into
the Divisional Ammunition Column, so that the reorganised D.A.C.
consisted of No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3 sections, and “B” echelon. In
addition, the organisation of trench mortars was placed on a more
satisfactory basis. The weapon to be used by the infantry was the
Stokes Mortar, a mobile and easily managed gun with an ingenious,
quick-firing device, which enabled it to fire 30 shells a minute.
The shell was a particularly deadly one, and made a most menacing
and terrifying sound on explosion. In each brigade, Stokes Mortar
Batteries were organised from personnel drawn from each battalion
with the purpose—thoroughly attained—of encouraging the entity and
_esprit_ of the brigade. Heavier mortars than the Stokes were to
be worked by the artillery, and on the 8th March 1916 the 9th T.M.
Brigade, of three batteries, was formed. Before this date there had
been one T.M. Battery, called the 41st T.M.B., manned by men from
the R.G.A. and from the Seaforth Pioneers. At first the brigade had
three types of mortar, the 1½-inch, 2-inch, and 3·7-inch, but, after
a few months, only the 2-inch mortar was used. In April 1916 a heavy
mortar, the 9·45-inch, popularly known as “The Flying Pig,” was
introduced, and the V/9 Heavy Trench Mortar Battery was formed to
work it.
The period of rest and training, the comparatively pleasant interlude
of trench life, and the resourceful and vigorous control of General
Furse all combined to make the whole Division a happy family. Each
man in it swore by “The Ninth”; and this was the finest tribute to
the efficiency of the G.O.C.’s leadership. It was, therefore, with
consternation that the news was received on the 16th March that
the brigades were to be reorganised. The inherent clannishness of
the Scot revolted at the idea of friends being taken away and of
strangers coming in. But the reorganisation was made necessary,
not by the malicious indifference of G.H.Q., but by the dearth of
recruits. Scotland had raised more service battalions than it was
possible to find drafts for under the voluntary system, and it was
necessary to amalgamate several of them. The battalions marked
out by G.H.Q. to leave the Division by the 6th May were the 8th
Gordons, the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers, and the 10th and 11th H.L.I.
The arrangement also meant the break-up of the 28th Brigade. This
was intensely disliked, but it was recognised as inevitable. The
knowledge that these old friends were leaving to join the famous
Fifteenth Scottish Division helped to reconcile the Ninth to the
change. On the 4th May it was announced that the mounted troops were
also to be withdrawn. To take the place of the Gordons in the 26th
Brigade, the Argylls were transferred from the 27th; the 6th K.O.S.B.
and the 9th Scottish Rifles replaced the Royal Scots Fusiliers,
and the Argylls in the 27th Brigade. The South African Brigade had
its own Field Ambulance, and the 29th Field Ambulance consequently
left the Division. Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins was retained by an
accident, which deprived the 27th Brigade of Brig.-General G. F.
Trotter who fell from his horse and broke his arm.
[Illustration: PLOEGSTEERT WOOD]
The place of the 28th was filled by the South African Brigade, most
of whose members had already seen service in Egypt. Nothing much
was known about them in the Division except that they were the pick
of South Africa, and that was saying a great deal. The brigade
was commanded by Brig.-General H. T. Lukin, C.M.G., D.S.O., and
consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th South African battalions; the
last-named, being the South African Scottish, wore the kilt of the
Atholl tartan. They were commanded respectively by Lieut.-Colonel
F. G. Dawson, C.M.G., Lieut.-Colonel W. E. C. Tanner, C.M.G.,
Lieut.-Colonel E. F. Thackeray, C.M.G., and Lieut.-Colonel F.
A. Jones, C.M.G., D.S.O. Brig.-General Lukin reported at D.H.Q. on
the 22nd April, and on the following day the 2nd and 3rd battalions
joined the Division. On the 29th the whole brigade was inspected
by Sir Douglas Haig, near Steenwerck. Its appearance was very
impressive, and even the most fastidious critic was bound to admit
that the South Africans were an exceptionally fine body of men. From
the 6th May they took over the trenches lately occupied by the 28th
Brigade, and the men rapidly became acquainted with the conditions
of warfare on the Western Front. From the first it was apparent
that their standard of discipline was very high, and their critical
Scottish comrades realised that the Division had been greatly
honoured in having such a doughty brigade attached to it.
The stay of the Division near Ploegsteert soon drew to a close. On
the 20th May instructions were received from the Corps that it was
to be relieved by the Forty-first Division before the 1st June. The
relief was commenced on the 27th May, and completed on the 30th. Thus
ended a most agreeable experience of trench duty, and all who have
survived since that date will ever cherish happy recollections of
Ploegsteert Wood.