BATTLE OF LOOS[11]
25TH TO 28TH SEPTEMBER 1915
The terrain, which was the scene of the Division’s first battle,
included the feature of greatest tactical importance on the front of
the British attack. The general advantage of ground and observation
was held by the enemy. East of Vermelles a railway, which ran
north-east to join up with the railway connecting Bethune and La
Bassée, screened the country west of it from German observation,
except from their highest posts at Fosse 8 and the Tower Bridge at
Loos, which overlooked the British lines except right down in the
Vermelles valley. East of the railway the country was very open and
the only trees were those that fringed the Hulluch road; the whole
country bore a close resemblance to Salisbury Plain, or the moors
of Linlithgow, with mine-heads and slag-heaps dotted about. East of
Vermelles, the country ran nearly flat to a slight but important
crest, then falling to a shallow dip where the trenches faced each
other, rose again through the German trenches to another crest about
700 yards west of Cité St Elie. This crest concealed the second line
of the enemy from ground observation.
[Illustration: LOOS]
The main front lines of the British and the enemy were about
500 yards apart and between them jutted out in a south-west
direction from the northern part of the German front line the maze
of trenches and fortifications known as the Hohenzollern Redoubt.
Direct communication between the Redoubt and the main line, which
was here known as Dump Trench and Fosse Trench, was secured by two
communication trenches, named North Face and South Face, running
from north-east to south-west. Two trenches, Big Willie and Little
Willie, running respectively east and north, protected the flanks
of the Redoubt. But the chief features of the enemy’s defences were
Fosse 8 and the Dump—an accumulation of débris, which is a familiar
sight in all mining areas—and from these points the enemy could look
right up the valley that was the scene of the British attack. Of
equal importance was the Double Crassier on the extreme right which,
with the Fosse and the Dump, formed the key of the whole tactical
position, and until they were captured and held, guns could not be
brought up to give close support to the infantry in any advance
beyond the first system of trenches. If nothing more was secured, the
operation would amply justify itself.
On the 21st September the preliminary bombardment commenced at 7
A.M., and in reply the German artillery fired little beyond their
usual. At noon on the same day, the first of the feint attacks was
made, when the 26th Brigade opposite the Hohenzollern Redoubt opened
two minutes’ rapid fire with rifles and machine-guns on Big and
Little Willie. In addition, the men did all that was possible to make
the foe believe that an attack on the Redoubt was imminent; bayonets
were shown over the parapet, dummies were moved about, the men
shouted, and pipes and bugles sounded the charge. This demonstration
caused the Germans[12] to man their parapet, and as our artillery
deluged their front trenches with shrapnel five minutes after noon,
it was believed[13] that heavy losses had been inflicted on the
garrison. During the third and fourth days of the bombardment, the
reply of the German artillery became more rapid and intense. When
on the 23rd an operation, similar to that carried out by the 26th
Brigade two days previously, was made by the 28th Brigade against
Little Willie and Madagascar Trench, it was noticed that the enemy
heavily shelled our reserve trenches. At night infantry patrols were
sent out to ascertain the effect of our artillery-fire on the German
wire, and their reports showed that numerous gaps had been made, but
unfortunately on the front of the 28th Brigade patrols failed to
examine the enemy’s wire.[14] This was largely due to the desire to
save the men from being exposed to our own artillery-fire; but the
omission had lamentable consequences. Not till the small hours of the
25th was the hour of zero communicated to the battalions. As the wind
was favourable, the main operation was to be undertaken. Zero was
fixed for 5.50 A.M., and forty minutes after zero the infantry were
to leave the trenches.
At 5.50 A.M. our artillery opened, and gas and smoke were discharged
along the whole front. The scene had a terrible grandeur, and the
combination of gun-fire, gas, and smoke produced a wonderful effect
of mingled whites, greys, yellows, and browns.
On the left of the Division, Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins arranged
to attack with the 6th K.O.S.B. on the right and the 10th H.L.I.
on the left. These were supported respectively by the 11th H.L.I.
and the 9th Scottish Rifles, and they held the front line till
the evening before the 25th, when their places were taken by
the attacking battalions; the 63rd Field Coy. R.E. and “D” Coy.
9th Seaforths also took up their assembly positions that night.
Unfortunately the arrangements of the brigade were upset at the last
moment by the Second Division taking over a portion of its line, the
28th Brigade being left with only one communication trench for the
passage of troops and for “up” and “down” traffic. Ten minutes after
the crash of our guns had announced the hour of zero, the German
counter-bombardment fell on the front and communication trenches; the
supporting companies and battalions, which were moving up from the
rear trenches to the front, suffered serious losses, which included
Lieut.-Colonel H. D. N. Maclean, D.S.O., and his adjutant, Captain
Keith of the 6th K.O.S.B.
At 6.30 A.M. the 6th K.O.S.B. and 10th H.L.I. left our front line
and advanced in three lines against the German trenches. On the
right, the leading companies of the K.O.S.B., now commanded by Major
Hosley, pressed forward, at first without suffering very severely.
Major Hosley was wounded on the parapet but refused to go back, and
insisted on leading his battalion forward. The wind unfortunately
was fitful and was not strong enough to carry on the gas, so the
leading companies lay down until it had moved on. As soon as the two
supporting companies crossed our front parapet, they came under a
withering rifle and machine-gun fire, but in spite of many casualties
they continued to push on and became mingled with the leading
companies. More conspicuous now than the crash of the guns was the
menacing and ominous “rat-tat” of the enemy machine-guns, and when
the K.O.S.B. resumed their advance, officers and men were mown down
by a terrible fire, to which they could not reply. Nevertheless the
survivors pressed on with magnificent determination, but the German
wire was found to be virtually intact. In front of the enemy’s line
was a covered trench crammed with stakes and barbed wire and as soon
as the foremost men stepped on the top covering, they fell through
and became entangled amongst the wire. The air teemed with bullets,
and the survivors, impotent to advance but too stubborn to retreat,
had very heavy losses. The battalion was now leaderless. Of the 19
officers who went into action, 12 were killed and 7 wounded, and as
a consequence the brigade received no news from the battalion during
the morning. It is believed that a few men, favoured by incredible
luck, forced their way into the German front trench, but being
unsupported they eventually fell back and reached our original front
line during the night.
The 10th H.L.I. on the left of the brigade had no better fortune. As
the wind was too weak to carry the gas forward from our trenches,
many of the men were suffering from the effects of it when they
left the front line. At the very start the ranks of the battalion
were thinned by a storm of shell, rifle and machine-gun fire, a
considerable number being killed and wounded on the parapet. With
fine courage the men pushed on but were unable to penetrate the
enemy’s wire, which had been scarcely damaged. Before vicious
machine-gun fire from Madagascar Trench, Railway Work, and Mad
Point, the attack melted away, and most of the survivors struggled
back to the trenches from which they had set out, none having
broken through the German wire. The losses in officers and men were
exceptionally severe; Lieut.-Colonel Grahame was gassed and his
adjutant killed. As the whole signalling staff of Battalion H.Q.
had been knocked out by a shell, Brigade H.Q. were without definite
news of the disaster until noon, when Major H. C. Stuart reported in
person.
In war, no news invariably means bad news, and consequently during
the early hours of the attack suspense and anxiety reigned at Brigade
H.Q. The gloomy forebodings with which the absence of information had
filled the minds of Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins and his staff were
deepened by a message, received from the 9th Scottish Rifles at 8.15
A.M., that the 10th H.L.I. were asking for reinforcements. As it was
also known at 7.50 A.M. that the attack of the Second Division on the
left had failed, there was no longer any reason to doubt that the
brigade had experienced a serious check. Anxiety about the situation
on the front of the 28th Brigade had an unsettling effect on the
plans of the Division. The 26th on the right had in the meantime
made good progress, but General Thesiger hesitated to support it
with the full strength of the 27th until he had definite information
concerning his left brigade. At 9.10 A.M., however, the Division
learned from a telephone message that the attack of the 28th Brigade
had been repulsed.
Since this check exposed the 26th Brigade to the chance of a
counter-attack from the north, the left brigade was ordered to launch
another attack, and after a thirty minutes’ artillery bombardment the
11th H.L.I. on the right and the 9th Scottish Rifles on the left
advanced against the enemy’s lines at 12.15 P.M. But the bombardment
was not sufficiently heavy to demolish the German strong points, and
the only effect of the hopeless gallantry of the “Rifles” and the
H.L.I. was greatly to increase the enormous losses of the brigade.
The attack was swept away by the enemy’s rifle and machine-gun fire.
As the result of these two attacks the 28th Brigade had lost about
two-thirds of its effective strength and the great majority of its
officers had been killed or wounded. It was now unfit for further
action and was withdrawn to its original line, which it was barely
strong enough to hold effectively.
The primary cause of the repulse was the failure of the artillery
to cut the enemy’s wire. During the preliminary bombardment that
wire ought to have been examined nightly by patrols, and the neglect
to do so was a cardinal blunder for which the brigade had to pay a
heavy price. The extravagant hopes entertained of the power of gas to
demoralise the enemy had been rudely shattered; it was a hindrance
and not a help, and its baneful effects were confined to our own
men. In face of uncut wire and the enemy’s intact defences the
attack could be no more than a forlorn hope, although with well-nigh
incredible courage the men did all that men could do to achieve the
impossible. It was a failure, but one that shed lustre on the men
that failed.
The second attack was an offence against a well-understood military
principle that was too often neglected in the warfare in France.
When men have failed in an attack, it is generally futile to send
other men to make another attack in the same way; it encourages the
defenders and doubles the losses of the assailants. The hope of
smashing, by an artillery bombardment of thirty minutes, defences
that had remained intact after four days’ bombardment, betrayed an
almost unbelievable optimism. The most feasible way was to send a
part of the 27th Brigade to follow behind the 26th, and attack the
enemy in Madagascar Trench from the south. But if no units of the
27th Brigade were available, it would have been wiser to send round
some of the 11th H.L.I. and 9th Scottish Rifles to the Dump, from
which point they could have assaulted the German positions from flank
and rear. Persistence in a frontal attack showed a serious lack of
flexibility in the Higher Command in making use of the resources of
the Division.
On the front of the right brigade, Brig.-General Ritchie decided to
attack with the 7th Seaforths on the right and the 5th Camerons on
the left; these were supported respectively by the 8th Gordons and
8th Black Watch. The task of the leading battalions was to secure
the first objective, which included the Hohenzollern Redoubt, the
German main trench beyond it, and Fosse 8 with the Three Cabarets and
the Corons de Pekin. When this was accomplished the Gordons and the
Black Watch were to pass through, and, swinging in a south-easterly
direction, capture the second objective. The assembly of the brigade
and the units attached, the 90th R.E., “B” Coy. 9th Seaforths, and
the trench mortar batteries, was completed on the evening of the 24th
without a hitch, the two assaulting battalions being in position in
the front and support trenches, and the support battalions in the
reserve trenches.
The period prior to an attack is always a trying time, and the men
welcomed the crash of guns that announced the hour of zero. At the
same moment the gas and smoke were discharged, and the 2-inch trench
mortars smothered Big Willie and the South Face of the Hohenzollern
Redoubt with phosphorous smoke-balls.
At 6.29 A.M. the assaulting battalions jumped out of their
trenches, and were marshalled for the assault in front of our own
wire, screened by the smoke from the candles. This had the effect
of steadying the men and allowed the advance to be made without
confusion or disorder.
Between Fosse 8 and the Redoubt there was a hog-back ridge;
the Seaforths and the Camerons advanced south and north of it
respectively. At the very beginning the former lost touch with the
latter, who were delayed for ten minutes by gas hanging in the front
trenches. The Seaforths made straight for the Hohenzollern Redoubt,
suffering considerable losses from rifle and machine-gun fire from
the right flank, and captured the southern portion of it after a
brisk fight, in which a good many officers were killed or wounded.
Then the battalion bombed its way up the communication trenches
to the German main trench, and without waiting for the Camerons,
pushed forward past Fosse 8, clearing all the miners’ cottages and
seizing the Three Cabarets. At this point the battalion, after being
reorganised, lined the Corons Trench immediately east of Fosse 8
about 7.30 A.M. A few of the men slightly lost direction and wandered
up the trench that led from the Corons to the ridge in front of Cité
St Elie and Haisnes. The battalion had accomplished its job in very
fine style and in good time.
On their left the Camerons had a ghastly experience. When, after
a ten minutes’ wait to allow the gas to pass on, the men began to
advance, they were shot down by a galling fire from the left, the
first two lines of the battalion being almost annihilated. To cross
that fatal field was a task that even the stoutest of men might have
shirked without shame. But the Camerons were inspired by a compelling
sense of duty, and undeterred by the fear or spectacle of death, they
made of danger the spring-board of a leaping hardihood. With superb
heroism they pressed doggedly through the fatal zone, where lay the
greater part of the battalion. Nothing but death could stop such men.
After capturing the Redoubt they moved on to Fosse 8 and, having made
their way through the miners’ cottages, halted at the north edge of
the Corons de Pekin about 7.45 A.M. The Camerons had reached their
objective, but at a terrible cost; of the 800 men and 20 officers
who crossed our line, only 2 officers and 70 men were left. It was
a thrilling feat of arms, which men of the 5th Camerons will ever
remember, and the very story of which served to inspire future drafts
with the courage of the glorious dead.
Thus by 8 A.M. the Seaforths and Camerons had established themselves
on the east of Fosse 8, and the men began to consolidate their
positions. But there was a gap between the battalions, and the troops
were heavily shelled from the Cemetery that lay south of Auchy.
Meantime the supporting battalions were advancing rapidly. At 6.30
A.M. the Gordons and Black Watch moved up from their positions in
the reserve line to the front trenches. They crossed our parapet at
7 A.M., and with praiseworthy steadiness pressed through the hostile
barrage, which was falling on our front line. The Black Watch lost
greatly through heavy machine-gun fire from the north, their gallant
C.O., Lieut.-Colonel Lord Sempill, being badly wounded. The Gordons,
on reaching the Redoubt, took prisoner a number of Germans who had
concealed themselves in shelter when the Seaforths passed over. At
Dump Trench the Black Watch had a sharp fight with some of the enemy,
who had been overlooked by the Camerons, and captured a number of
prisoners. On their right a party of the Gordons bombed down to the
Window in the German main trench, in order to clear the front for the
Seventh Division.
After passing the main trench the bulk of the Black Watch, instead
of swinging to the south-east, pushed on through the Corons and came
into line between the Seaforths and Camerons beyond the miners’
cottages. The remainder of the battalion, roughly about a company,
went on with the Gordons, who at 7.40 A.M. moved down Fosse Trench
and then diverted their attack in an easterly direction on Cité St
Elie and Haisnes. They carried and went over Fosse Alley and reached
Pekin Trench a few hundred yards short of Haisnes soon after 8 A.M.,
but they had lost many of their number and could go no farther. The
enemy’s resistance was far from being broken and the advance had been
made under continuous shell and machine-gun fire. Haisnes was at that
time lightly held and would have fallen to fresh troops, but by the
time the leading ranks of the 27th Brigade arrived the village had
been strongly reinforced.
Farther west and to the left rear of the Gordons, the Black Watch and
the Seaforths made an attempt to advance towards Pekin Alley, but
a German battery, situated about 1000 yards east of the Cabarets,
and flanked by machine-guns, inflicted considerable casualties and
pinned the men down to their trenches. This ill-starred effort cost
the Seaforths their leader, Lieut.-Colonel Gaisford being killed.
The situation of the 26th Brigade was not a happy one. It was
clear, as the ordeal of the Camerons and Black Watch had foreboded,
that the attack of the 28th Brigade had failed. It was necessary
to consolidate the line in front of Fosse 8, and to safeguard the
left flank; but under the continuous and accurate shell-fire of the
enemy, it was practically impossible to accomplish any work. The
trenches were in an appalling mess, having been terribly smashed by
our artillery; Corons Alley was particularly bad, since the enemy had
flooded it before retiring. About 9.30 A.M. the brigade received some
welcome artillery support, when the battery commanded by Major C. W.
W. McLean moved into position south-west of the Fosse and opened fire
on the Cemetery, Cemetery Alley, and Lone Farm in turn.
At 9 A.M. the position of the 26th Brigade was as follows: the
Seaforths, Black Watch, and Camerons held the trenches east of Fosse
8 from Fosse Alley to the north end of the Corons de Pekin, and
to guard the left flank, a small party was posted at the Railway
crossing. Additional protection was afforded by the machine-guns
of the Camerons, which were posted at Little Willie, and commanded
the ground on the left of the brigade. The enemy was in strength in
Pekin Alley, Cemetery Alley, Lone Farm, and Madagascar Trench. About
600 yards to the right front, the remnants of the Gordons and some
Black Watch were established in Pekin Trench, not far from Haisnes.
Unsupported on either flank, and exposed to a murderous fire, the
position of this garrison was most precarious, and could only be
maintained with the help of the 27th Brigade.
On the evening of the 24th September, the battalions of the 27th
Brigade were assembled in reserve trenches. From this position to
the front line there were two routes, by the communication trenches
termed Railway Alley and Fountain Alley. Previous reconnaissance
had shown that the time required to reach the front line by these
routes was 1 and 1½ hours respectively, and the move of the brigade
was arranged to enable it to reach the front trenches as soon as they
were vacated by the 26th Brigade. But all the previous plans made
for the regulation of traffic in the communication trenches broke
down during the action, and the men of the 27th found their advance
checked by carrying parties, stragglers, and returning wounded.
The average progress seemed to be about 30 yards every 20 minutes,
and there were many long halts. Not only were the men exhausted by
this tedious and tiring passage, but they suffered heavily from the
enemy’s shell-fire. It would have kept the men fresher, and would
probably have saved casualties, if the battalions had moved out of
the trenches and advanced across the open.
The first battalion to cross the front line was the 12th Royal
Scots. It should have been followed by the 11th Royal Scots, but
this battalion was seriously delayed in the trenches, and the 10th
Argylls were the second battalion to pass the line. The order of
battalions, however, as arranged by the brigade, was restored during
the advance, the Argylls halting to allow the 11th Royal Scots to get
into their proper position. Under orders from General Thesiger, the
6th Royal Scots Fusiliers were kept back in the front trenches owing
to the failure of the 28th Brigade. On entering “No-Man’s Land,”
the 27th Brigade came under intense rifle and machine-gun fire from
Cité St Elie, and from north-east of the Fosse. About 11 A.M. the
11th and 12th Royal Scots passed through the Gordons and advanced on
Haisnes, but they were scourged by terrific rifle and machine-gun
fire, and could make progress only by short, sharp rushes. A few
men penetrated into the outskirts of the village, but they could
not maintain their position, and were forced to withdraw. Till the
evening, the survivors of the Royal Scots lay out in the open about
300 yards east of Pekin Trench, and in the afternoon the situation
of the Royal Scots and men of the Seventh Division on their right
became intolerable. They were numbed by cold and rain and suffered
grievously from the enfilade-fire which the enemy directed on them
from Haisnes, so at 4 P.M. the men were withdrawn to the line of
Pekin Trench on the right of the Gordons.
The Argylls, who followed close behind the Royal Scots, established
themselves in Fosse Alley. Observing that the left flank of the men
in Pekin Trench was exposed, they sent forward a company to protect
it, but it was held up by unbroken barbed wire, and, after the
company commander had been shot down while trying to cut it, the
remainder fell back on Fosse Alley. Haisnes was now strongly held by
the enemy, and there was little chance of taking it without strong
artillery support. Brig.-General Bruce received orders at 3.30 P.M.
to secure the village, and, leaving instructions for the 6th Royal
Scots Fusiliers to follow on, he left Central Boyau and went forward
to Fosse Alley to reconnoitre the position. As both Haisnes and Cité
St Elie were strongly garrisoned by the enemy, and as his brigade
had been very heavily punished, he considered that an attack[15] on
Haisnes was out of the question. The decision was sound. Even if the
village had been captured, the strength of the Division would have
been too dissipated to offer any chance of effective defence against
a resolute attack.
The presence of Brig.-General Bruce steadied the garrison of Pekin
Trench, and under his direction two companies of the Royal Scots
Fusiliers were sent forward to support the Royal Scots by occupying
the trench on their left. The position at Pekin Trench, however,
needed more reinforcements than Brig.-General Bruce had at his
command in order to make it secure, and the small garrison had a very
bad time. The men were exposed to a continuous and merciless fire,
and the trenches were full of dead, dying, and wounded. To add to
their misery rain fell heavily, the rifles became clogged with mud
and could not be fired, and the fuse-lighters of the Bethune bombs
were so damp that it was impossible to ignite them.
The initiative now rested with the enemy,[16] whose numbers were
being hourly augmented, and numerous bombing attacks were made on
the garrison. Against the most desperate odds a brilliant defence
was made. “C” Company of the Gordons, under Captain J. E. Adamson,
beat off three powerful and determined attacks from the railway
and the village; but with diminishing numbers and want of food,
water, ammunition and bombs, it was not possible for it to hold
on indefinitely. The great majority of the officers were dead or
wounded, and most of the bombers had become casualties. The men could
do no more, and during the late afternoon and evening the Gordons
retired to Fosse Alley, but here their right flank was attacked by
German bombers from Cité St Elie, and they were compelled to fall
back on our front line.
The position of the Royal Scots in Pekin Trench became untenable when
the Gordons were forced back, and the longer they held on the more
dangerous became the situation; for both flanks were exposed, and the
enemy was becoming more confident and aggressive. The Germans with
abundance of bombs made numerous attacks against the Royal Scots, so
to avoid being surrounded, the garrison fell back to Fosse Alley in
the evening. After organising the remnants of his brigade along Fosse
Alley and satisfying himself that it was in touch with the Seventh
Division on the right, Brig.-General Bruce established his H.Q. in
the Quarries. This was an unfortunate choice, for though he was now
in close touch with the Seventh Division he was too far away for
General Thesiger to get quickly into communication with him.
Meantime the main body of the 26th Brigade maintained its position.
In spite of rain and a deluge of shells, the sappers of the 90th
Coy. R.E., assisted by infantry and pioneers, rapidly improved the
trenches and made them stronger for defence. The behaviour of the
men was beyond all praise; their dogged endurance and marvellous
cheerfulness raised them above the misery of their surroundings. The
sappers were always ready to lend a hand to the infantry whenever the
enemy counter-attacked, and when the shelling became too severe for
any work to be done, they gave invaluable aid by manning the trenches
on the flanks of the infantry. More effective artillery support was
now available for the harassed brigade. At 10.30 A.M. No. 7 Mountain
Battery R.G.A. came into action near Fosse 8 and engaged targets near
the Railway and Les Briques; while the whole of the 52nd Brigade
R.F.A. and one Howitzer battery under the command of Lieut.-Colonel
Perreaux, were in action south-west of the Dump by 4.30 P.M.
When darkness fell on the field of battle, the situation of the
Division was as follows: Though the 28th Brigade had been bloodily
repulsed, the 26th had captured and was holding the Dump and Fosse
8. The bulk of the brigade held a line east of the Fosse, and this
line was extended to the south by the 27th Brigade, which held Fosse
Alley and was in touch with the Seventh Division on the right. The
task now before the Division was to convert the captured trenches
into strong defensive positions and to link them up with our original
front line. But the enemy was bent on preventing any work being done,
and the difficulties were enormous, owing partly to scarcity of
tools and material, and partly to the downpour of shells. In spite
of these drawbacks and the constant counter-attacks that frequently
interrupted digging, the trenches were considerably strengthened
and were protected by wire placed 50 yards in front of them by the
sappers and the infantry. Equally emulous in toil and heroism were
the pioneers of “B” Coy. 9th Seaforth Highlanders, who laboured hard
to complete the two communication trenches from the front line to the
Hohenzollern Redoubt. This task was not finished until the forenoon
of the 26th, for the men had frequently to drop their tools and drive
back bombing parties of Germans who were working up Little Willie.
The achievement of the 9th Seaforths was a shining example of pluck
and endurance, and they were as notable for their fighting as for the
value and quality of their work.
Counter-attack is the soul of defence, and it was clear that the
Germans were preparing to make a big effort to regain Fosse 8 and the
Dump. The issue of the battle hung on the fate of these two places,
and all that could be done was done to strengthen our hold on them.
But the enemy knew the whole ground thoroughly and having no longer
fear of attack farther north, could draw largely on his reserves to
make a strong thrust. The defenders were weary and exhausted, and the
Corps decided to relieve the 26th Brigade by fresh troops from the
73rd Brigade of the Twenty-fourth Division.
Accordingly in the evening of the 25th the leading troops of the
73rd Brigade, under their own brigadier who received his orders from
General Thesiger, arrived in the neighbourhood of the Fosse. The
relief was carried out like any ordinary one, and the defence of
the Fosse was taken over by three battalions. The Sussex Regiment
held from the junction of Slag and Fosse Alleys to the north end
of the Fosse, and this line was continued by the Royal Fusiliers,
who held from the left of the Sussex Regiment through the Corons.
The Northamptons, whose task it was to protect the left flank,
held a line from the north end of the Fosse along Corons Alley and
thence down the North Face of the Redoubt. The relief was a lengthy
business, owing partly to the guides being uncertain of their
position in the dark, and partly to the fact that this was the first
acquaintance of the 73rd Brigade with trenches, and it was not till
the early hours of the 26th that the last men of the Highland Brigade
were relieved. Just after the Sussex Regiment had taken over the
trenches from the Seaforths and Black Watch, the enemy made a strong
counter-attack and gained a footing in the line, but on learning what
had happened, the Highlanders at once turned back and delivering a
resolute bayonet charge drove the enemy out. After being relieved,
the remnants of the 26th Brigade returned to our original front line
trenches, where they were reorganised. The six batteries of R.F.A.,
which, under Lieut.-Colonel Perreaux had rendered invaluable support
to the 26th Brigade, were withdrawn during the night, as their
exposed position, when daylight came, would have meant annihilation.
The difficulty of defending the Fosse was increased by the withdrawal
of the 27th Brigade during the evening. It is fairly certain that
the brigade could not have been in close touch[17] with the Seventh
Division, for the Germans, making good use of their knowledge of the
ground, penetrated during the night between the Ninth and Seventh
Divisions and attacked and captured the Quarries from the rear. To
the Seventh Division this attack came as a complete surprise, and
amongst the prisoners was Brig.-General Bruce, while Captain Buchan,
his brigade major, was killed. This untoward event exposed the right
flank of the garrison in Fosse Alley, and enemy bombers, forcing
their way up the trench from the south, compelled the 27th Brigade,
now commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Loch, to withdraw to its original
front line trenches.
The task entrusted to the 73rd Brigade was one of great
responsibility. For seasoned troops, the holding of the Fosse was not
a very difficult matter. It commanded a field of fire for at least
500 yards, and there were not many trenches to block against enemy
bombers. But the 73rd was composed of raw troops—they had recently
arrived from England, and, moreover, they were exhausted by their
long march from near St Omer. The enemy’s pressure was maintained
chiefly by means of bombing attacks, but none of the men of the 73rd
Brigade had ever thrown a bomb; few knew how to use one, and all felt
an exaggerated respect for a weapon about which they knew so little.
Moreover, they carried only 120 rounds of ammunition per man, and
they were short of food, water, and tools. These deficiencies could
not readily be repaired, for it was hazardous and difficult to carry
up supplies to those in the front line through the shell-swept zone
between the Hohenzollern Redoubt and the Fosse. The most urgent task
of the brigade was to protect the right flank of the Fosse, and two
companies of the Middlesex Regiment were sent to hold Big Willie and
Slag Alley.
At 6 o’clock on the morning of the 26th all three brigades of the
Division were in our original front line trenches, and Fosse 8 and
the Hohenzollern Redoubt were garrisoned by the 73rd Brigade. During
the night our artillery maintained a constant fire on Madagascar and
Les Briques Trenches, and on Cemetery Alley and Pekin Alley, and
efforts were made to strengthen the defences of Fosse 8, and open up
communications. The 63rd R.E. with great difficulty dug a trench from
the front of the left brigade to the corner of Little Willie; it was
completed by the 27th, and was held by bombers of the H.L.I.
The chief cause of anxiety to General Thesiger was the gap between
the 73rd Brigade and the Seventh Division. At 9.45 A.M., therefore,
he ordered the 27th Brigade to reoccupy and hold Dump Trench, and
this was done in the afternoon of the 26th. As our command of the
right flank, however, was threatened by the Germans occupying the
Quarries, it was decided to drive them out. The Seventh Division was
to assault the Quarries, and the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers, who were
placed under the orders of the 73rd Brigade for the purpose, were to
co-operate by bombing down Fosse Alley. This operation was eventually
arranged for 4.30 P.M. Meantime, the 73rd had been severely
punished, but though it became slightly unsteady under the ceaseless
shell-fire, it clung to its position during the whole of the 26th.
Our attack on the Quarries was repulsed, the Seventh Division gaining
only a foothold in the south-east corner. The 6th Royal Scots
Fusiliers made their way along Fosse Alley without opposition, but
it was too risky to press on until the Seventh Division had captured
the Quarries. Another attack was ordered by the Corps, when the Ninth
Division was to secure Fosse Alley and join up with the Seventh
Division at the Quarries. The operation, which was carried out at
2.30 A.M. on the 27th, was unsuccessful, for although the Royal Scots
Fusiliers, supported by the Argylls in Fosse Alley, reached Point 45,
the Seventh Division failed to overcome the resistance of the Germans
in the Quarries.
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THESIGER, C.B., C.M.G.
[_Maull & Fox._]
The unsteadiness of the 73rd Brigade on the
afternoon of the 26th was a source of great uneasiness
to General Thesiger and his staff, and at 5.30 A.M. he
moved up to the Fosse to ascertain the exact state of
affairs. Early in the morning some of the defenders
of the Fosse began to retire, and a telephone message
from the 26th Brigade, received at 6.15 A.M., stated that
a few men of the 73rd were leaving their positions, and
that support was urgently required. The ordeal had
been too severe for untried troops. During the 26th
they had held the Fosse against many attacks, but the
constant storm of shot and shell to which they were
exposed, and the general misery of their surroundings,
aggravated by the thick drizzle of a grey September
dawn, weakened their power of defence.[18] Before the
German attacks they gave way, and for a time it
seemed that the Hohenzollern Redoubt would be lost
as well as the Fosse. It was here that the gallant
General Thesiger, who had gone forward to reconnoitre
the position in person, was killed. He belonged to a
well-known military family, and, though his career with
the Ninth had been brief, he had proved himself a
sterling and able commander, and his death at the
crisis of the battle was a serious calamity.
The situation was saved by men of the 26th Brigade; 70 of the Black
Watch and 30 Camerons were sent up to the Redoubt about 10 A.M.
This party rallied the remaining defenders, and checked the German
advance after stubborn and prolonged bombing fights. The enemy made
strenuous efforts to reach the Redoubt from Little Willie, and heavy
bombing went on there all day. For his heroic bravery in one of
these encounters, Corporal James Dalgleish Pollock of the Camerons
was awarded the V.C. When the enemy bombers in superior numbers were
storming a way into the Redoubt from Little Willie, Corporal Pollock
jumped out of the trench, and, bombing the Germans from above, forced
them to retreat. For an hour he maintained his position though
exposed to a hail of bullets, and did not retire until he had been
severely wounded.
Reserves were at once sent up to meet the danger, and the divisional
mounted troops were placed under Brig.-General Ritchie. At the same
time, the artillery shelled Madagascar Trench, Mad Point, Cemetery
Alley, and Lone Farm. A brigade of the Twenty-eighth Division was
ordered by the Corps to relieve the 73rd Brigade, which the Corps
still believed to be in possession of the Fosse. Small parties of
the 73rd held their positions in the Fosse up to noon; but, long
before that hour, the enemy had penetrated the defences, and was even
attacking the Redoubt.
On the right of the Division the 27th Brigade maintained its position
in Fosse Alley for a considerable time, and at 5 A.M. an attempt
of the enemy to rush the trench was easily repulsed by rifle and
machine-gun fire. The weak point of the line was on the extreme
right, where it was exposed to a flank attack by the Germans from the
Quarries and Cité St Elie. From 9 A.M. the Royal Scots Fusiliers were
engaged in a continuous and furious bomb fight, and supplies of bombs
were passed to them as quickly as they could be brought from the
dumps. On the left the Argylls sent up a machine-gun[19] to support
the Sussex Regiment of the 73rd Brigade. When the 73rd withdrew
from the Fosse, the position of the garrison in Fosse Alley became
hopeless. The Argylls and the Fusiliers were now attacked not only
from the flanks but from the rear, and it was imperative for them to
withdraw before they were surrounded. It was a model retirement. The
men never wavered or showed any inclination to retreat until ordered
to do so, and their well-directed rapid fire inflicted numerous
casualties on the enemy. Under a devastating hail of bullets they
faced about to stem the hostile advances on the word of command.
Closely followed by the Germans, the Argylls and the Scots Fusiliers
withdrew to Dump Trench, which their pursuers did not venture to
attack. The operation reflected the greatest credit on all concerned.
After Dump Trench was reached, many of the men went back to bring in
their comrades who had been wounded. Lieut.-Colonel Mackenzie of the
Argylls was hit during the retreat, and Private M’Fadyen with great
gallantry went out and brought him in, though previously several men
had been wounded in the same attempt.
When the Corps was informed of the loss of Fosse 8, it ordered the
85th Brigade (Twenty-eighth Division) to advance immediately and
counter-attack across the open. But this brigade was delayed while
coming up, and at 3 P.M. the 26th was ordered to counter-attack the
Fosse at once. All the troops of the brigade had been continuously
engaged, and most of the men were leg-weary and tired out by the
exertions of the last two days. Its total strength now mustered less
than 600 bayonets, and there were few officers left. Nevertheless
a very gallant charge was made over ground pitted by bullets and
shrapnel; the men reached the West Face of the Hohenzollern Redoubt,
but beyond this they could make no further progress. From Mad Point
and Madagascar Trench the approaches to Fosse 8 were swept by rifle
and machine-gun fire under which no man could move and live; and
the enemy’s artillery, posted near Auchy, drenched the Redoubt with
shrapnel. But although the Highlanders failed to capture Fosse 8,
their arrival saved the Hohenzollern, and put new spirit into the
officers and men of the 73rd Brigade. The onslaughts of the enemy
against the Redoubt were definitely checked, and he was driven back
to Fosse 8.
By 8 P.M. the 85th Brigade had arrived. One battalion was in Big
Willie, two companies held the West Face of Hohenzollern, one
battalion was moving up Central Boyau on Little Willie, and one was
still at Vermelles. The remnants of the 26th Brigade and some of
the 27th were holding Hohenzollern with part of the 73rd. Portions
of the 27th were also in Dump Trench and our original front line.
The enemy’s bombardment was still intense, and to avoid casualties
it was decided to withdraw the 73rd Brigade and the 26th and 27th
Brigades of the Ninth Division. At midnight, therefore, the 26th
went back to the old reserve trenches, and the 27th to its old
assembly positions; on the 28th both brigades were drawn back to the
neighbourhood of Bethune. The 28th Brigade, which ever since the 25th
September had been engaged in clearing trenches and burying the dead,
was not relieved until the 29th, on which date it joined the rest of
the Division at Bethune. The artillery, which remained in the line
covering the Twenty-eighth Division until its own artillery arrived,
were relieved on the 1st October. Brig.-General Armitage received
a letter from Major-General Bulfin thanking him for the efficient
support of his batteries.
The active part of the Division in the battle ended on the 27th
September. No battle of the war has excited so much controversy as
Loos; it has been claimed as a victory and deplored as a defeat.
Defeat means not merely the loss of or the failure to secure definite
tactical and strategical gains, but also, and chiefly, the decline
of the men’s moral. This was emphatically not the case with the
men of the Ninth Division. Even the bald narratives of the action
as described in the battalion diaries reveal a note of triumph.
The moral of the troops of the 28th Brigade, even after disaster,
remained unshaken, and many men of the H.L.I. joined in with the
Camerons at the Fosse. The capture of the Dump and Fosse 8 by the
Highland Brigade will rank as one of the finest feats of arms ever
performed by the Division, and the glorious counter-attack on the
27th September was the best evidence that up to the end of the battle
the Highlanders never lost heart. If the work of the 27th Brigade
was less conspicuous, its several battalions had fought with great
courage and tenacity, and the defence of Fosse Alley by the Argylls
and the Scots Fusiliers, besides taking heavy toll of the enemy,
prevented him from using his full strength in an attack on the
Redoubt. When the Division was withdrawn from the conflict it had
solidly established its reputation as a first-rate fighting division.
From the men’s point of view the main thing achieved was that they
had measured themselves against the Germans at their best and had
proved themselves the better men, and this was perhaps the chief
result of the battle for the New Armies. In future actions, the men
always entered into the fray with the consciousness of superiority
that is the fundamental basis of moral. At the same time, it would
be idle to deny that the resistance of the enemy had shown both
gallantry and resource, and the small number of prisoners[20] taken
was a sufficient indication that the foe’s courage had not been
shaken by the preliminary bombardment. The losses of the Germans on
the first day were probably less than ours, as their front defences
were held chiefly by machine-guns, and most of their field-guns[21]
had been withdrawn in time. Their counter-attack was admirably
organised and was carried out with skill and determination, though
it was during this phase of the battle that they suffered their most
serious losses.
The general feeling of the Division, however, was that if there
had been more artillery to support it, and better arrangements to
reinforce it or relieve it with fresh troops, a heavy disaster would
have been inflicted on the enemy. Under the circumstances, it had
accomplished as much as was possible. When the Second Division, which
could not have been expected to get forward without the aid of gas,
was paralysed by the failure of the gas, the attainment of all the
Ninth’s objectives became impossible. Auchy on the left bristled with
machine-guns, housed numerous batteries, and was a position of such
commanding strength that any attempt to advance far beyond the Fosse
became a forlorn hope. How formidable the obstacles were may best be
judged by the inability later of such divisions as the Twenty-eighth,
Guards, and Forty-sixth to make any impression on the hostile
defences.
It was the first action of the Division and it was inevitable that
mistakes should be made, but most of them were venial. Not enough
consideration had been given to the necessity of guarding the rifles
against bad weather, and the Bethune bomb was useless in damp. It
also proved a misfortune to allot a complete company of the R.E.
to each brigade; owing to the failure of the attack on the left,
the 63rd Field Coy. R.E. had no definite task to carry through, and
it was impossible to withdraw it, as it had become involved in the
fighting. The trench mortar teams attached to the 26th Brigade had
a sorry time. The team of the 2-inch mortars were all knocked out,
and though two 1½-inch mortars reached Fosse 8 they could find no
targets, and the two officers in command were killed. These mortars
were too unwieldy to carry forward, and as matters turned out, it
would have been better if they had been used on the left to mask the
fire from the Railway Work with smoke-bombs. It is possible that
if this had been done, the assault of the 28th Brigade would have
succeeded.
Perhaps the most deplorable feature of the battle was the comparative
breakdown of the medical arrangements for the evacuation of the
wounded from the forward areas. Many of them lay out not for hours
but for days, and not a few shocking and pathetic sights were to be
seen between Hohenzollern and Pekin Trench. This was entirely due to
lack of staff. Doctors and regimental stretcher-bearers worked with
the greatest heroism to bring in the wounded, but they were too few,
and many of them were shot down. In a big engagement, especially in
trench warfare, the staff of stretcher-bearers should be enormously
increased if the wounded are to be expeditiously and satisfactorily
evacuated. The importance of this cannot be over-estimated, because
nothing so depresses a man as the fear that if injured he will be
left out to die. The memory of such scenes as were too common at Loos
lingered with the survivors, and remained after other impressions had
become faint.
Most of the battle arrangements were beyond the control of the
Division. The use of gas on its front did more harm than good, and
there is no evidence to show that it affected the enemy in the least.
One of the results of Loos was to give “smoke” a bad name, since
in several cases it had caused a serious loss of direction. This,
however, was not the case with the Ninth Division. The only complaint
of the 26th Brigade was that the wind was hardly strong enough
to carry the smoke ahead. It formed an effective screen for the
infantry, and, in the opinion of the Seaforths, it saved them many
casualties.
Strategically and tactically the results of the battle were
disappointing. The Germans received a severe fright, but their
system of defence, based on mutually supporting strong points
garrisoned mainly by machine-gun crews, answered its purpose by
delaying our advance sufficiently long to enable them to bring up
reserves with which they counter-attacked our troops weary and
spent through the strain of battle. These counter-attacks did not
deprive us of all our gains, but the vexatious effects of our failure
to keep Fosse 8 and the Dump soon became manifest; for the Loos
salient, which had been won in the south, could not be held easily or
economically, since from these points the enemy commanded the only
valley where we could establish satisfactory artillery positions to
support the front line. The employment of new divisions that had not
been given an opportunity of completing their training by a spell of
trench warfare was unfair to the men, and indicated unsound judgment
on the part of the Higher Command. But, indeed, the operation was
on a scale too big for the resources at the disposal of the British
Field-Marshal.
The battle, however, takes rank as one of the most important of
the war. The lessons deduced from it laid down the lines upon
which British tactics and strategy were based until the end
of 1917. Unbalanced optimism gave place to calculated—perhaps
exaggerated—caution; an immediate break-through was given up as
impracticable, and the British forces sought to wear down the enemy
and to achieve victory largely by weight of numbers and artillery.