FIRST EXPERIENCES IN FRANCE
MAY 1915 TO SEPTEMBER 1915
All units had practised entraining, and the move to France was
accomplished without a hitch. The artillery were the first to go,
the advance parties leaving Bordon on 8th May; the infantry brigades
left in order of priority, beginning with the 26th on the 10th May.
Vehicles, animals, and transport crossed from Southampton to Havre,
and the infantry from Folkestone to Boulogne. By the 15th May the
whole Division was concentrated around the pleasant and important
little town of St Omer. It had the distinction of being the first
division of the New Armies to reach France.
After spending two days near St Omer, the Division marched to
billets south of Bailleul, the average march for each unit being 15
miles. G.H.Q. were established at the Château le Nieppe; the 26th
Brigade was at Bailleul; the 27th at Noote Boom; and the 28th at
Outtersteene. Arrangements were quickly made to train the various
branches in trench warfare. All the field artillery brigades, except
half of the 51st R.F.A., were attached to the Sixth Division for
instruction. The 9th Heavy Battery went over to the III. Corps, and
from this moment ceased to be a corporate part of the Division.
Similarly the infantry received their first experiences of trench
duties under the Sixth Division, and spent a spell in the line near
Armentières by brigades at a time. The 27th Brigade moved into the
front line on the evening of the 20th May; it was relieved on the
22nd by the 28th, and it in turn on the 24th by the 26th Brigade,
which remained in the line till the 26th. Sappers were employed
by the III. Corps in improving the second line defences near
Armentières, and the infantry soon realised that they were expected
to be as useful with the shovel as they were with the rifle. On the
27th May the 26th Brigade proceeded to Nieppe and Armentières “under
the tactical orders of the Sixth Division”; this fine phrase simply
meant that the men had to work on trenches and strong points.
Meantime the Division received constant instruction in bombing. When
the opposing trenches lay near each other, it was dangerous for a man
to show himself above the surface, and a method had to be discovered
by which hostile positions could be attacked without the aggressors
having to expose themselves to rifle or machine-gun fire. The only
weapon that could fulfil this purpose was the bomb. In the hands of
determined men it was a useful and valuable weapon, and against a
vigilant and stubborn enemy it was sometimes the only means by which
progress could be made. In 1915 and the early part of 1916 there were
few men on either side who were not pugnacious, but the trouble was
that when troops became stale with months of underground warfare,
the bomb fight tended to result in a stationary conflict, no serious
effort being made to gain any ground. In 1915, however, there was no
staleness, the chief difficulties being the large variety of bombs
and the multiplicity of names that each bomb possessed. Most of them
were worked by a time fuse, but the stick hand-grenade exploded on
percussion and was a weapon probably more dangerous to the thrower
and his comrades than to the enemy. The Mills No. 5 Bomb, which
afterwards became the standard one used by the British Army, was
exploded by a time fuse of five seconds; but more common at that
time was the Bethune Bomb, which was the one chiefly used by the
Division at Loos. With all these varieties the average man could
throw between 20 and 30 yards. For a longer distance, rifle-grenades,
that is bombs fired from rifles, had a range up to about 200 yards.
Heavier bombs could be thrown by trench mortars, of which there were
at first numerous types, and several kinds of catapults were used. An
imposing-looking engine was the West Spring Gun. It could hurl a bomb
about 400 yards, but required eight men to work it, and needed an
enormous emplacement, which a hostile aeroplane would have had little
trouble in spotting. It threw up the bomb a tremendous height into
the air; if a cricket ball were substituted for the bomb, that gun
would form an excellent contrivance for giving cricketers practice
in catching. The trench mortars in use at the time had all the same
defect: they were cumbersome, and could not be quickly brought into
action.
Many hours were devoted to the training of the men in the art of
bomb-throwing, and factories for making bombs were started by the
Sappers. Unfortunately on the 27th May a deplorable accident caused
considerable loss of life. A factory at Nieppe Station was blown up,
and Lieut.-Col. Uniacke, the A.A. and Q.M.G., who was riding past at
the time, was killed. Six officers and 4 men were wounded, and 7 men
killed. Every reasonable precaution had been taken by the Sappers in
charge, and the explosion was probably due to the instability of the
explosive.
While the Division was still near Bailleul, it was visited by Sir
John French who inspected the 27th and 28th Brigades on the 29th May.
Near the end of the month the 26th Brigade received a new Commander,
Brig.-General Grogan[3] returning to England and his place being
taken by Brig.-General A. B. Ritchie, C.M.G., on 30th May. By the
2nd June all detachments had received some slight experience of the
trenches. On the 6th, the Division marched by night to training
grounds near Busnes where D.H.Q. were installed, and till the 25th,
training was carried on vigorously, particular attention being
paid to bombing. On the 16th, speculations on the possibility of
the Ninth taking part in a battle were aroused by it being placed
under readiness to move at two hours’ notice. This order was due
to an unsuccessful engagement carried out by the British Army near
Festubert, but the Division was not required and training continued
without interruption.
On the 26th June orders were received to relieve the Seventh Division
in the line near Festubert, and accordingly the 26th and the 27th
Brigades took over the front line on the nights of the 1st and 2nd
July. The 28th was in reserve. This was the first occasion on which
the Division was responsible for a section of the front line, which
it held east of Festubert until 18th August, and during this period
all ranks became acquainted with the trials of trench warfare.
The advantage of ground was with the enemy. Occupying the ridge east
of Festubert the Germans were able to control their artillery-fire by
direct observation. The weakest point in our line was “The Orchard,”
a sharp salient, which was held at tremendous cost and risk; and it
was here that the Division had most of its casualties, as the enemy
kept it constantly under fire from artillery and trench mortars. Our
artillery could do little at that time to help the infantry. For
every shell that we had the Germans had ten, and each attempt to
retaliate resulted in a fiercer and heavier bombardment. Until our
gunners were supplied with enough material to enable them to compete
with the enemy, the best policy was to refrain from annoying him. The
infantry particularly disliked the feeble efforts at retaliation by
our artillery because they alone felt the consequences. For a similar
reason all trench mortar officers[4] were unpopular. When a mortar
was fired that particular section of trench was drenched by the enemy
with “Minnies.”[5] It was therefore natural for the garrison to treat
trench mortars and their teams with disapproval if not hostility, and
it was usually only by stealth that the T.M. officer was able to fire
at all.
[Illustration: FESTUBERT]
Another part of our line to which the enemy paid considerable
attention was an old trench lying between the front and support
trenches, known as the “Old German Line.” We did not occupy it on
account of its stench and filth, but the Germans believed that we
did, and persistently shelled it. They were encouraged in their
error. A few men were sent to light fires in this trench, and
after they had performed their task they withdrew in haste; for as
soon as the enemy observed the smoke rising, he commenced to shell
vigorously. No one was known voluntarily to enter this trench
except the Prince of Wales, who used to prowl round it in search of
souvenirs. He paid a number of visits[6] to the line while we held
it, and his natural daring must often have caused his escort the
keenest anxiety. It was not safe to go up to the forward saps in
daylight, but His Royal Highness insisted on doing so, and he also
took a photograph of a wounded man who was being carried down from
one of them.
In spite of the immense preponderance that the enemy enjoyed in
artillery, the men found in the life more of interest than of
peril. Patrolling was a new form of enterprise that appealed to
the bolder spirits. 2nd Lieut. Bellamy of the 11th Royal Scots
took over a patrol of three men in broad daylight on the 5th June,
and on reconnoitring found that the enemy had constructed a new
trench. On the 13th June, 2nd Lieut. Murray of the 12th Royal Scots
stalked a German patrol and shot one man; and on the same night
Corporal Morrison of the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers frightened away
a working-party and brought back a _chevaux de frise_. Even the
commonplaces of trench life had at this time the spice of novelty,
but an incident that happened to Sergeant J. M’Hardy, of the
machine-gun section of the 8th Black Watch, was certainly unusual
as well as whimsical. This N.C.O. had just hung up his kilt in the
trenches to dry when the back blast of a shell blew it over the
parapet towards the enemy’s lines. The unfortunate man had to go
kiltless until dusk, when he hopped over and recovered his garment.
On the 8th July, the Divisional area was visited by Lord Kitchener,
who inspected the 26th Brigade, at that time in reserve, and
detachments of the Ninth between Locon and Hinges.
On the 18th August the Division was relieved by the Seventh,
and moved to the training area near Busnes, where D.H.Q. were
established. On the next day it was again visited by Lord Kitchener,
who inspected it in a big field, and he expressed himself as highly
pleased. From this date till the end of the month training was
carried on continuously, and the men were frequently practised in
issuing rapidly from their own trenches and attacking another line.
These manœuvres raised hopes that they would soon be tested in an
important battle.
The whole Division was anxious for a fight. It had now been more than
three months in France, and had become thoroughly acquainted with
the ordinary routine of trench warfare. Life had turned out to be
much less trying than most of the men had imagined, for casualties
had been comparatively few, and there had been no thrills. It was
always unpleasant, of course, when the trenches were pounded, but
these periods were only occasional and seldom of long duration. It
was not the danger, but the drabness of trench life that worried the
men, who found that the outstanding features of this kind of warfare
were hard work and discomfort. The latter however they were compelled
to get rid of as soon as possible, and most of them quickly became
skilled in constructing habitable and cosy dug-outs. The trivial
round was one of constant toil, and cleanliness was insisted on more
as a necessity than as a virtue. The chief strain was due to the
interruption of sleep; for the exigencies of trench duties made it
impossible for anyone to sleep for more than a few hours at a time.
Above all, the men felt that the reputation of the Ninth could not
be solidly established without a battle. They yielded to none in
their admiration of the magnificent feats accomplished by the grand
regiments of the line, which had borne the first shock of the German
hordes; but they were anxious to show that they were both fit and
ready to take their place with the regulars. The fierce test of
action was needed to reveal the worth of the Division, and every man
hoped that it would not be long delayed.
It soon came. When on the 2nd September the Ninth took over from the
First Division the trenches east of Vermelles, the men had reached
the scene of their first battle.
The plan of a large operation had been adumbrated at the beginning of
August, but had it depended on the situation on the Western Front it
is doubtful if any important enterprise would have been attempted.
The costly failure of the joint British and French offensive in
May proved that the Western Allies had not yet accumulated the
preponderance in artillery necessary to secure the superiority of
fire that was essential for success. Both in numbers and in quality
the allied infantry surpassed that of the enemy, but the German
defences were skilfully selected, strongly fortified, and powerfully
supported by artillery.
Events on the Eastern Front, however, rendered it imperative to
create a diversion. The summer was a period of disaster for the
Russian Armies; they had been out-generalled and were retiring
rapidly before the vast German and Austrian forces, which, focussing
on Warsaw, had made those gigantic outflanking movements that had
ended in the capture of that city. It was feared that the fate of
Petrograd hung in the balance. The Western Allies therefore decided
to help the hard-pressed Russians by an attack on a large scale,
which might bring some tangible gains, and would at least compel
Germany to transfer forces to the West and thus weaken her offensive
in the East.
The general scheme drawn up by the High Commands of the Allied Forces
reflected their hopes rather than their expectations. The French
Tenth Army and the I. and IV. Corps of the British Army were to
advance due east in the direction of Valenciennes; at the same time
the French main attack was to be made from Champagne on Maubeuge. If
these enterprises were successful, the victorious forces would join
hands about Valenciennes and Maubeuge, thus cutting off all the enemy
within the salient, Rheims-Royon and Arras.
The plan was too ambitious. The reluctance of the British leaders to
undertake a premature operation was perfectly justified, and when
they committed themselves to an attack, they ought to have limited
themselves to a scheme proportionate to their resources. It is
therefore impossible to condone the reckless optimism that shaped
the plans for the Battle of Loos. They revealed a disposition to
underrate the adversary. The lessons of the German failures at Ypres,
of the battles at Hill 60, and of the Allied offensive in May were
ignored. If an attack had to be made, it should have been confined
to the capture of tactical points within a limited objective. A
break-through was then impossible. The experience of the war and the
resources at the disposal of Sir John French did not justify the
attempt in 1915, and the presumptions of the Higher Command were
shattered by the facts of the battle.
The task of the First Army was to pierce the first and second lines
of the German defences from Haisnes in the north to Hulluch in the
south; then, after capturing Meurchin and Pont à Vendin, to move
rapidly on Carvin, and so protect the left flank of the French Army.
The northern part of the operation was to be carried out by the I.
Corps, the southern part by the IV. Corps. In order to give this
enterprise every chance of success, subsidiary attacks were to be
made on other parts of the British front to prevent the enemy from
reinforcing the main point of attack.
Conscious of its weakness in artillery material, the British Command
hoped to compass the demoralisation of the foe by a discharge of
gas along the front of the principal onslaught. This was the first
occasion on which the British Army used gas,[7] and it was hoped that
its effect would so paralyse the defenders that the assaulting troops
would be able to secure with little resistance the German second line
in spite of the wire that was too far distant for the artillery to
cut.
The task of forming the northern defensive flank[8] of this attack
was entrusted to the Ninth Division, which, after carrying the line
Railway Work—Fosse No. 8—to Haisnes, was to push on to Douvrin.
Similarly, the southern division of the IV. Corps was to form a
defensive flank facing south near Loos. If these flanks were secured
and consolidated, it was expected that the intermediate divisions of
the I. and IV. Corps, supported by the XI., would be able to force
their way between these flanks as far as the Deule Canal, and even
farther if the resistance of the enemy was negligible.
There was a gap between the right of the British forces and the left
of the Tenth French Army. In this area lay the colliery district of
Lens, consisting of masses of miners’ cottages, pits, and slag-heaps,
admirably adapted for an obstinate and protracted defence. During the
French offensive north of Arras in May and June advance had been slow
and losses heavy, owing to the stubborn opposition of the Germans
posted in the villages of Carency, Givenchy, and Souchez. The Lens
area afforded even greater advantages to the defenders, and it was
decided that the French and British forces should work round the
south and north of the town and join hands to the east of it.
An operation of importance involves an enormous amount of hard work
and anxiety for all branches of the Staff, from G.H.Q. down to
brigades. The Staff[9] is the brain of the Army, and its function is
to supply everything—from bombs to operation orders. It consists of
two distinct branches: the A. and Q. branch, which is responsible
for discipline, procuring supplies, and making arrangements for the
comfort of the troops in such matters as billets and baths; and
the G. branch, which is concerned with training and operations.
For success, the best devised plan depends greatly upon the care
with which details are worked out. The actual attack is made by
the infantry. Upon the dash and gallantry of the soldiers and the
initiative and resource of the subordinate commanders, the Higher
Command has to rely for the consummation of its hopes; but the
arduous task of the infantry is considerably eased if the preliminary
preparations are the best possible from the resources at the disposal
of the Staff. Good Staff work consists in eliminating chance and
hazard and in strengthening assurance of success.
The frontage on which the Ninth Division was to assault was 1600
yards. On the 16th August, the G.O.C., Major-General Landon, held
a conference, when the proposed operations were discussed. It was
decided to assault with two brigades, each with two battalions in the
front line, the 26th on the right and the 28th on the left, with the
27th in reserve.
The objectives of the 26th Brigade were, first, the Hohenzollern
Redoubt, Fosse Trench and Dump Trench; and second, a line on the east
side of Fosse 8 through the Three Cabarets to the Corons de Pekin
(first objective). Should this task be accomplished, the brigade was
to go on to the neighbourhood of Pekin Trench (second objective). If
at this stage the line was prolonged to the north by the 28th Brigade
and the Second Division, the 26th and 28th were to advance east on
Douvrin. Should, however, the Second Division fail, these brigades
were to attack Haisnes and form a defensive flank facing north-east.
On the left, the 28th Brigade had first to secure the Railway line
from the Corons de Marons to the junction of Les Briques and Train
Alley (first objective), and then advance to its second objective in
the neighbourhood of Pekin Trench. The further action of the brigade
depended upon the progress of the Second Division.
The 27th Brigade was to be in reserve some 2000 and 2800 yards in
rear of the front line. Its rôle was either to support the attempt
on Fosse 8, or if that was successful, to move on to Haisnes and
Douvrin. Battalion commanders were given a free hand as to the
formations to be adopted, subject to the proviso that each unit was
to be in three lines.
The date of battle, after several postponements, was eventually fixed
for the 25th September.
The task of the Division in its first important engagement was not
an easy one. In the excitement of battle even the best of soldiers
are liable to go astray if they are required to change direction
at any time during the advance. For this reason it is desirable
that objectives should be allotted so that it is possible for the
assailing troops to advance at right angles to their position of
assembly. In the present case the advance in a north-easterly
direction up to the line of the Fosse fulfilled these conditions, but
from this point the Ninth was required to swing east and converge
on a narrower front. Fortunately the difficulties of this operation
were diminished by the presence of such conspicuous landmarks as
the villages of Haisnes, Cité St Elie and Douvrin, but it was
nevertheless an extremely complicated one for an untried division to
undertake.
The Ninth took over the line east of Vermelles on the 2nd September,
and arrangements had to be made at once so that all preparations
would be completed before the battle. The front trenches, as taken
over from the First Division, were too far from the German line to
be suitable for the forward assembly trenches. The First Division
had projected an attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt, and for
that purpose had pushed forward a number of blind saps. Our first
intention was to join up the blinded sap-heads by a parallel, and
open them up just before the onset; but as gas was to be used, the
saps were opened up at once and then joined by new fire trenches.
This was accomplished in one night, each battalion digging 350 yards,
thus bringing our front trenches within 150 yards of the German line.
In addition, a support line was made in the rear, with numerous short
communication trenches running back to the old front line, with the
result that it was possible to accommodate the whole Division in the
trench system.
As it was imperative to regulate the traffic with a view to
preventing congestion on the day of attack, special communication
trenches were prepared for the wounded. For each of the attacking
brigades two communication trenches were allotted, one to be used
for “up” traffic, the other for “down,” and to diminish the chance
of confusion, each was labelled and marked. On the capture of the
enemy front line, these communication trenches were to be connected
with it; and, to save time and labour, blinded saps were run forward
50 yards and more. In all, about 12,000 yards of trenches were dug
before the battle.
The chances of success largely depended upon the ability of the
artillery to demolish the enemy’s defences. Until the moment of
the assault the artillery were under the orders of the Corps.
Unfortunately the heavy guns at the disposal of the Corps were few in
number, there being only twenty 6-inch Howitzers and twelve of higher
calibre.
The infantry attack was to be preceded by a four days’ bombardment.
The 18-pounders had to cut the wire along the enemy’s front. Known
and suspected strong points were to be shelled; and during night,
paths, roads, communication trenches, houses, and all places where
the enemy was likely to collect, were to be kept under fire. In the
work of sweeping approaches, machine-guns were to co-operate with
the artillery. The preliminary bombardment was arranged for the 21st
September, its object being to pulverise the German fortifications
and to demoralise the defenders. Only in this way could the
neutralisation of the hostile rifle and machine-gun fire necessary
for an attack by infantry be secured. In order to keep the Germans
uncertain of the exact time of the assault, two feint attacks were
arranged. At noon on the 21st September, the 26th Brigade was to
induce the garrison of the Hohenzollern Redoubt to man its parapets
by preparations that seemed to indicate an immediate attack;
thereupon the German trenches were to be shelled with shrapnel. A
similar operation against Madagascar Trench was to be undertaken by
the 28th Brigade on the third day of the bombardment.
The orders for the artillery were issued on the 20th September. On
the morning of the battle, first the enemy front line system, then
Pekin Trench, and the Three Cabarets were to be shelled for ten
minutes. In the following ten minutes the artillery-fire was to be
brought back to the front line for five minutes; it was then to move
east and remain for thirty minutes in the vicinity of Pekin Trench
between Haisnes and Cité St Elie. The great proportion of shell used
was shrapnel; H.E. was limited and was used chiefly by the heavy
artillery.
The control of its own artillery reverted to the Division at the
moment of the assault. In order that no opportunity might be lost in
the event of a rapid success, two batteries were earmarked to follow
up the infantry. These were to be taken out of their emplacements
on the night of the 24th, and kept limbered-up ready to advance at
a moment’s notice. Forward positions for these guns and observation
posts were reconnoitred from a study of the map and of the country
from Annequin Fosse; and three roads were prepared and bridged where
they crossed the trenches. Other bridges were to be carried by the
batteries to enable them to cross captured trenches. One brigade
of artillery was affiliated to each of the assaulting infantry
brigades and the remainder was kept under the immediate control of
Brig.-General Armitage.
The effect of machine-guns and trench mortars depends chiefly on the
resource of the team commanders. Each of the infantry battalions
had four machine-guns, while fourteen were distributed in rear
of the front line to co-operate with the artillery. Five minutes
after the commencement of the bombardment, these guns were to open
intensive fire on hostile communication trenches for thirty minutes.
During night they were to play on enemy communication trenches, and
on the wire to prevent the Germans repairing the gaps cut by the
artillery-fire. On the day of the attack they were to open intensive
fire five minutes after the beginning of the bombardment for fifteen
minutes; they were then to fire deliberately for ten minutes,
thereafter resuming intensive fire for other ten.
On the right of the Division an important rôle was assigned to the
trench mortars. Between the Ninth and the Seventh Divisions was an
interval of 200 yards; and to cover this gap 2-inch trench mortars
and 2-inch Stokes mortars were to fire smoke-bombs to prevent the
enemy in Big Willie from enfilading the left of the Seventh. It was
realised that the most formidable task had been allotted to the 26th
Brigade and arrangements were made for one 2-inch mortar, one battery
of 1½-inch mortars, and one Stokes gun to go forward with it.
The discharge of gas formed an essential part of the scheme of the
British Army; and its effects were expected to make up for deficiency
in artillery material.[10] The Germans were known to have safeguards
against gas, but it was hoped that they would be taken by surprise,
and that the fumes would be rolling over their lines before they had
time to don their helmets. At the worst, it was expected that the
discomfort of wearing the helmets would impair the efficiency of
their troops and partly demoralise them.
The gas was to be discharged from cylinders, each weighing from
130 to 160 lbs., and emplacements were made to accommodate twelve
at intervals of 25 yards along the front of the Division. The work
of carrying up and fixing the cylinders in position was a heavy
business. They were brought by train to a siding east of Bethune,
where the road ran alongside the railway, and at night they were
transferred to lorries, each of which carried about thirty. The
lorries were then driven to Cambrai and Vermelles, where they were
met by carrying parties, which conveyed the cylinders to the front
line.
These parties were organised in groups of thirty-six men for every
twelve cylinders, and each group was commanded by an officer.
The work was unpopular as well as arduous, for the men had little
liking for gas and none cared to handle anything connected with it.
The cylinders had to be carried for more than 2000 yards up long
and winding communication trenches, and when the weather was wet
the heavy burden of the men was aggravated by the difficulty of
maintaining their balance on the slippery duckboards. Occasionally
shelled areas had to be traversed, an anxious period for any
party with cylinders. To ease the work as far as possible, the
communication trenches up which the men had to travel were marked by
white arrows, and kept clear of unnecessary traffic. Fortunately the
weather was favourable. If it had been otherwise, this weight could
scarcely have been managed by three men. Altogether 4000 men were
employed in the transference of 1200 cylinders. When these were fixed
in their emplacements the infantry had no further responsibility
concerning them, for they were then under the care of the Special
Gas Company, R.E., which was to discharge the gas on the day of the
assault.
In addition to the cylinders, each emplacement had four triple and
eight single smoke-candles. These were to be lit by the infantry, and
used alternatively with the gas, so that the period of discharge for
smoke and gas would extend to forty minutes, as it was known that
the enemy had, as a protection against gas, oxygen cylinders which
lasted for only thirty minutes. Two minutes before the infantry left
the front line, all gas was to be turned off and the smoke thickened
by means of triple candles to form a screen behind which the infantry
could form up and advance.
One Field Company, R.E., and one company of the 9th Seaforths
(Pioneers) were attached to each brigade for the rapid consolidation
of captured positions, and the digging of new communication
trenches. Thus, the 90th Field Company, R.E. and “B” Company, 9th
Seaforth Highlanders, were attached to the 26th Brigade, the 63rd
R.E. and “D” Company, 9th Seaforth Highlanders, to the 28th, and the
64th R.E. and “C” Company, 9th Seaforth Highlanders, to the 27th.
Supplies of ammunition, stores, and tools were placed at intervals
along the whole front and, as far as possible, these dumps were made
at the junction of the “up traffic” communication trenches, and the
support line. As the bomb was to be the principal weapon of the
infantry after the first stages of the attack, numbers of special
bomb depots were formed. In addition to S.A.A., picks and shovels,
water, medical stores, and rations were placed in the forward dumps.
Medical Aid Posts were arranged at convenient points. In order to
effect the evacuation of the wounded from the forward areas with
the utmost speed, each brigade dug one communication trench for
wounded only. These trenches were wider than the usual communication
trench, the corners being rounded off, so that stretchers could be
carried with comparatively little inconvenience. A loop was made
leading off them, about 2000 yards in rear, and in each loop was a
dressing-station in a dug-out about the size of an ordinary room.
Serious cases were to be brought round the loop, dressed, and then
passed out at the farther end into the communication trench. Walking
cases were expected to go straight on without passing through the
loop.
The maintenance of communication was a most important matter, and
every conceivable means, ranging from the pigeon to the human being,
was to be used. The ordinary connection by telephone was to be
established as far as possible, and visual stations, from which
messages could be transmitted by flag or lamp, were to be set up as
well as pigeon stations. Between the battalion commander and his
company commanders the medium was the runner, the most reliable of
all means of communication. The Division had one wireless set, which
was worked by four men, and this was attached to the 26th Brigade H.Q.
The question of the men’s equipment for battle was important. A heavy
weight would retard progress and exhaust their strength, yet it was
necessary to supply them with sufficient material to consolidate
their gains and to enable them to beat off enemy counter-attacks.
Accordingly packs were dumped, the men going into action with
haversacks only, and each one carrying two empty sand-bags, and all,
except bombers, signallers, and runners, were to be supplied with 200
rounds of ammunition. Owing to the use of gas, the men on the morning
of the attack were to wear their gas helmets like a cap.
All these preparations were satisfactorily accomplished by the
evening of the 24th September. During this period of strain, the
health of Major-General Landon broke down, and on the 8th September
he returned to England and was succeeded by Major-General G. H.
Thesiger, C.B., C.M.G. The G.S.O.I. was Lieut.-Col. S. E. Hollond,
who joined the Division at the beginning of September, and the A.A.
and Q.M.G. was Lieut.-Col. A. A. M’Hardy.