CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS
October, November and December, 1914
‘Ill fared it then with Roderick Dhu,
That on the field his targe he threw,
Whose brazen studs and tough bull hide
Had Death so often dashed aside.
For train’d abroad his arms to wield
Fitz James’s blade was sword and shield.’
SCOTT, ‘The Lady of the Lake,’ Canto V, XV.
The Mystery of Admiral von Spee—First Threat to South American
Waters—His Apparition at Samoa—His Second Disappearance—Renewed
Threat to South America—Rear-Admiral Cradock Ordered to
Concentrate—The Relative Forces—Importance of the Battleship
_Canopus_—The First Combination against Admiral von
Spee—Rear-Admiral Cradock’s Disquieting Telegram—His Cruise up the
Chilean Coast without the _Canopus_—Certain News of the
Enemy’s Arrival—Admiralty Measures—News of the Action of
Coronel—The Meeting of the Squadrons—The British Attack the
Germans—Destruction of the _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_—Escape of
the _Glasgow_—Reflections upon the Admiralty Examined—An
Explanation of Rear-Admiral Cradock’s Action—The Alternatives Open
to the German Squadron—Second Combination against Admiral von
Spee—Battle-cruisers _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ Ordered to
South America—Arrangements with the Japanese Admiralty—Development
of the Second Combination—British Naval Resources at their Utmost
Strain—_Königsberg_ Blockaded and the _Emden_ Sunk—Relief in the
Indian Ocean—Accelerated Despatch of the Battle-Cruisers—What
Admiral von Spee Found at the Falklands—News of the Battle and of
Victory—The Action—Total Destruction of the German Squadron—End of
the German Cruiser Warfare—End of the Great Strain.
As has already been described, Admiral von Spee, the German
Commander-in-Chief in the Far East, sailed from Tsingtau (Kiaochau),[80]
in the last week of June, with the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, and on
August 5, immediately after the British declaration of war, these two
powerful ships were reported as being near the Solomon Islands. They
were subsequently reported at New Guinea on the 7th August, and coaling
at the Caroline Islands on the 9th. After this they vanished into the
immense Pacific with its innumerable islands, and no one could tell
where they would reappear. As the days succeeded one another and grew
into weeks, our concern on their account extended and multiplied. Taking
the Caroline Islands as the centre, we could draw daily widening
circles, touching ever more numerous points where they might suddenly
spring into action. These circles were varied according as the Germans
were credited with proceeding at most economical speed, at three-quarter
speed, or at full speed; and the speed at which they would be likely to
steam depended upon the nature of the potential objective which in each
case might attract them.
We have seen how the mystery of their whereabouts affected the movements
of the New Zealand and Australian convoys, and what very anxious
decisions were forced upon us. We have seen how the uncertainty brooded
over the little expedition from New Zealand to Samoa: how glad we were
when it arrived safely and seized the island: how prompt we
were—providentially prompt—to snatch every vessel away from the
roadstead of Samoa the moment the troops and stores were landed. When at
length more than five weeks had passed without any sign of their
presence, we took a complete review of the whole situation. All
probabilities now pointed to their going to the Magellan Straits or to
the West Coast of South America. The Australian convoy was now provided
with superior escort. Not a British vessel could be found in the
anchorage at Samoa. The old battleships were already on their way to
guard the convoys in the Indian Ocean. There was nowhere where they
could do so much harm as in the Straits of Magellan. Moreover, we
thought we had indications of German coaling arrangements on the Chilian
coast. There were rumours of a fuelling base in the Magellan Straits,
for which diligent search was being made. There was certainly German
trade still moving along the Western Coast of South America.
Accordingly, on the 14th September, the Admiralty sent the following
telegram to Rear-Admiral Cradock, who commanded on the South American
Station:—
_Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Cradock, H.M.S. “Good Hope.”_
_September 14_, 5.50 p.m.
The Germans are resuming trade on West Coast of South America, and
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ may very probably arrive on that coast
or in Magellan Straits.
Concentrate a squadron strong enough to meet _Scharnhorst_ and
_Gneisenau_, making Falkland Islands your coaling base, and leaving
sufficient force to deal with _Dresden_ and _Karlsruhe_.
_Defence_ is joining you from Mediterranean, and _Canopus_ is now _en
route_ to Abrolhos.[81] You should keep at least one County class and
_Canopus_ with your flagship until _Defence_ joins.
When you have superior force, you should at once search Magellan
Straits with squadron, keeping in readiness to return and cover the
River Plate, or, according to information, search as far as Valparaiso
northwards, destroy the German cruisers, and break up the German
trade.
You should search anchorage in neighbourhood of Egg Harbour and Golfo
Nuevo....[82]
Two days later all uncertainties, and with them our anxieties, vanished,
and news was received that both _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ had
appeared off Samoa on the 14th September. There was nothing for them to
hurt there. The empty roadstead mocked their power. The British flag
flew on shore, and a New Zealand garrison far too strong for any landing
party snarled at them from behind defences. Thus informed of the fate of
their colony, the German cruisers put to sea after firing a few shells
at the Government establishments.
A week later, the 22nd, they were at Papeete, which they bombarded,
destroying half the town and sinking the little French gunboat _Zélée_
which was in harbour. They left the same morning, steering on a
Northerly course. We did not hear of this till the 30th. Then once again
silence descended on the vast recesses of the Pacific.
We could now begin drawing our circles again from the beginning, and at
any rate for several weeks we need not worry about these ships.
Accordingly the Admiralty telegraphed to Admiral _Cradock_, on the 16th
September, telling him the new situation and that he need not now
concentrate his cruisers, but could proceed at once to attack German
trade in the Straits of Magellan and on the Chilian coast.
Nothing more happened for a fortnight. On October 4, wireless signals
from the _Scharnhorst_ were heard by Suva wireless station, and also at
Wellington, New Zealand. From this it appeared that the two vessels were
on the way between the Marquesas Islands and Easter Island. Evidently
the South American plan was in their mind. We passed our information to
Admiral Cradock with the following telegram:—
_Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Cradock. (October 5.)_
It appears from information received that _Gneisenau_ and
_Scharnhorst_ are working across to South America. A _Dresden_ may be
scouting for them. You must be prepared to meet them in company.
_Canopus_ should accompany _Glasgow_, _Monmouth_ and _Otranto_, and
should search and protect trade in combination.
On the 8th (received 12th) Admiral Cradock replied as follows:—
‘Without alarming, respectfully suggest that, in event of the enemy’s
heavy cruisers and others concentrating West Coast of South America,
it is necessary to have a British force on each coast strong enough to
bring them to action.
‘For, otherwise, should the concentrated British force sent from
South-East Coast be evaded in the Pacific, which is not impossible, (?
and) thereby (? get) behind the enemy, the latter could destroy
Falkland, English Bank, and Abrolhos coaling bases in turn with little
to stop them, and with British ships unable to follow up owing to want
of coal, enemy might possibly reach West Indies.’
And on the same day (received 11th) he reported evidences of the
presence of the _Dresden_ in South American waters:—
Following intelligence _re_ _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ has been
received. Evidence found by _Good Hope_ revisiting Orange Bay on 7th
October that _Dresden_ had been there 11th September, and there are
indications that _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ may be joined by
_Nürnberg_, _Dresden_, and _Leipzig_. I intend to concentrate at
Falkland Islands and avoid division of forces. I have ordered
_Canopus_ to proceed there, and _Monmouth_, _Glasgow_, and _Otranto_
not to go farther north than Valparaiso until German cruisers are
located again....
With reference to Admiralty telegram No. 74, does _Defence_ join my
command?
This was an important telegram. It showed a strong probability that the
enemy was concentrating with the intention to fight. In these
circumstances we must clearly concentrate too. I now looked at the Staff
telegram of 5th October, and thought it was not sufficiently explicit on
the vital point, viz., concentration for battle. In order that there
should be no mistake, I wrote across the back of Admiral Cradock’s
telegram received on the 12th October the following minute:—
First Sea Lord.
In these circumstances it would be best for the British ships to keep
within supporting distance of one another, whether in the Straits or
near the Falklands, and to postpone the cruise along the West Coast
until the present uncertainty about _Scharnhorst-Gneisenau_ is cleared
up.
They and not the trade are our quarry for the moment. Above all, we
must not miss them.
W. S. C.
The First Sea Lord the same evening added the word ‘Settled.’
On the 14th October, I discussed the whole situation which was
developing with the First Sea Lord, and in accordance with my usual
practice I sent him a minute after the conversation of what I understood
was decided between us.
First Sea Lord.
I understood from our conversation that the dispositions you proposed
for the South Pacific and South Atlantic were as follows:—
(1) Cradock to concentrate at the Falklands _Canopus_, _Monmouth_,
_Good Hope_ and _Otranto_.
(2) To send _Glasgow_ round to look for _Leipzig_ and attack, and
protect trade on the West Coast of South America as far north as
Valparaiso.
(3) _Defence_ to join _Carnarvon_ in forming a new combat squadron on
the great trade route from Rio.
(4) _Albion_ to join the flag of C.-in-C. Cape for the protection of
the Luderitz Bay expedition.
These arrangements have my full approval.
Will you direct the Chief of the Staff to have a statement prepared
showing the dates by which these dispositions will be completed, and
the earliest date at which _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ could arrive
in the respective spheres.
I presume Admiral Cradock is fully aware of the possibility of
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ arriving on or after the 17th instant in
his neighbourhood; and that if not strong enough to attack, he will do
his utmost to shadow them, pending the arrival of reinforcements.
The following telegram was sent to Admiral Cradock at the same time:—
_Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Cradock, October 14._
Concur in your concentration of _Canopus_, _Good Hope_, _Glasgow_,
_Monmouth_, _Otranto_, for combined operation.
We have ordered Stoddart in _Carnarvon_ to Montevideo as Senior Naval
Officer north of that place.
Have ordered _Defence_ to join _Carnarvon_.
He will also have under his orders _Cornwall_, _Bristol_, _Orama_ and
_Macedonia_.
_Essex_ is to remain in West Indies.
On the 18th Admiral Cradock telegraphed:—
‘I consider it possible that _Karlsruhe_ has been driven West, and is
to join the other five. I trust circumstances will enable me to force
an action, but fear that strategically, owing to _Canopus_, the speed
of my squadron cannot exceed 12 knots.’
Thus it is clear that up to this date the Admiral fully intended to keep
concentrated on the _Canopus_, even though his squadron speed should be
reduced to 12 knots. Officially the _Canopus_ could steam from 16 to 17
knots. Actually in the operations she steamed 15½.
Let us now examine the situation which was developing.[83] The
_Scharnhorst_ and the _Gneisenau_ were drawing near the South Coast of
America. On the way they might be met by the light cruisers _Leipzig_,
_Dresden_ and _Nürnberg_. The squadron which might thus be formed would
be entirely composed of fast modern ships. The two large cruisers were
powerful vessels. They carried each eight 8–inch guns arranged in pairs
on the upper deck, six of which were capable of firing on either beam.
Both ships being on permanent foreign service were fully manned with the
highest class of German crews; and they had in fact only recently
distinguished themselves as among the best shooting ships of the whole
German Navy. Against these two vessels and their attendant light
cruisers, Admiral Cradock had the _Good Hope_ and the _Monmouth_. The
_Good Hope_ was a fine old ship from the Third Fleet with a 9·2–inch gun
at either end and a battery of sixteen 6–inch guns amidships. She had
exceptionally good speed (23 knots) for a vessel of her date. Her crew
consisted mainly of reservists, and though she had good gunlayers she
could not be expected to compare in gunnery efficiency with the best
manned ships either in the British or German Navies. The _Monmouth_ was
one of the numerous County class against which Fisher had so often
inveighed—a large ship with good speed but light armour, and carrying
nothing heavier than a battery of fourteen 6–inch guns, of which nine
could fire on the beam. These two British armoured cruisers had little
chance in an action against the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_. No
gallantry or devotion could make amends for the disparity in strength,
to say nothing of gunnery. If brought to battle only the greatest good
fortune could save them from destruction. It was for this reason that
the moment the Admiralty began to apprehend the possibility of the
arrival of the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ on the South American
station, we sent a capital ship to reinforce Admiral Cradock. Our first
intention had been to send the _Indomitable_ from the Dardanelles, and
at one time she had already reached Gibraltar on her way to South
America when increasing tension with Turkey forced her to return to the
Dardanelles. As we did not conceive ourselves able to spare a single
battle-cruiser from the Grand Fleet at that time, there was nothing for
it but to send an old battleship; and by the end of September the
_Canopus_ was already steaming from Abrolhos rocks through the South
Atlantic.
With the _Canopus_, Admiral Cradock’s squadron was safe. The
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ would never have ventured to come within
decisive range of her four 12–inch guns. To do so would have been to
subject themselves to very serious damage without any prospect of
success. The old battleship, with her heavy armour and artillery, was in
fact a citadel around which all our cruisers in those waters could find
absolute security. It was for this reason that the Admiralty had
telegraphed on 14th September: ‘Keep at least _Canopus_ and one County
class with your flagship’; and again, on the 5th October: ‘_Canopus_
should accompany _Glasgow_, _Monmouth_ and _Otranto_.’ It was for this
reason that I was glad to read Admiral Cradock’s telegram: ‘Have ordered
_Canopus_ to Falkland Islands, where I intend to concentrate and avoid
division of forces,’ on which I minuted: ‘In these circumstances it
would be best for the British ships to keep within supporting distance
of one another, whether in the Straits or near the Falklands’; and it
was for this same reason that the Admiralty telegraphed on the 14th
October: ‘Concur in your concentration of _Good Hope_, _Canopus_,
_Monmouth_, _Glasgow_, _Otranto_ for combined operation....’
It was quite true that the speed of the _Canopus_ was in fact only
fifteen and a half knots, and that as long as our cruisers had to take
her about with them they could not hope to catch the Germans. All the
_Canopus_ could do was to prevent the Germans catching and killing them.
But that would not be the end of the story; it would only be its
beginning. When the Germans reached the South American coast after their
long voyage across the Pacific, they would have to coal and take in
supplies: they were bound to try to find some place where colliers could
meet them, and where they could refit and revictual. The moment they
were located, either by one of our light cruisers or reported from the
shore, the uncertainty of their whereabouts was at an end. We could
instantly concentrate upon them from many quarters. The Japanese
battleship _Hizen_ and cruiser _Idzumo_, with the British light cruiser
_Newcastle_, were moving southward across the Northern Pacific towards
the coast of South America—a force also not capable of catching the
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, but too strong to be attacked by them. On
the East Coast of South America was Rear-Admiral Stoddart’s squadron
with the powerful modern armoured cruiser _Defence_, with two more
County class cruisers, _Carnarvon_ (7·5–inch guns) and _Cornwall_, the
light cruiser _Bristol_, and the armed merchant cruisers _Macedonia_ and
_Orama_. All these ships could be moved by a single order into a common
concentration against the German squadron the moment we knew where they
were; and meanwhile, so long as he kept within supporting distance of
the _Canopus_, Admiral Cradock could have cruised safely up the Chilean
coast, keeping the Germans on the move and always falling back on his
battleship if they attempted to attack him. The _Good Hope_ and
_Monmouth_ steaming together were scarcely inferior in designed speed to
the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, and these last had been long at sea.
Admiral Cradock could, therefore, have kept on observing the Germans,
disturbing them, provoking them and drawing them on to the _Canopus_.
Moreover, in the _Glasgow_ he had a light cruiser which was much
superior in speed to the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, and superior
both in strength and speed to any one of the German light cruisers
concerned.
I cannot therefore accept for the Admiralty any share in the
responsibility for what followed. The first rule of war is to
concentrate superior strength for decisive action and to avoid division
of forces or engaging in detail. The Admiral showed by his telegrams
that he clearly appreciated this. The Admiralty orders explicitly
approved his assertion of these elementary principles. We were not,
therefore, anxious about the safety of Admiral Cradock’s squadron. A
more important and critical situation would arise, if in cruising up the
West Coast of South America with his concentrated force Admiral Cradock
missed the Germans altogether, and if they passed to the southward of
him through the Straits of Magellan or round the Horn, refuelling there
in some secret bay, and so came on to the great trade route from Rio.
Here they would find Admiral Stoddart, whose squadron when concentrated,
though somewhat faster and stronger than the Germans, had not much to
spare in either respect. It was for this reason that I had deprecated in
my minute of the 12th October Admiral Cradock’s movement up the West
Coast and would have been glad to see him remaining near the Straits of
Magellan, where he could either bar the path of the Scharnhorst and the
Gneisenau, or manœuvre to join forces with Admiral Stoddart. However, I
rested content with the decisions conveyed in the Admiralty telegram of
the 14th October, and awaited events.
Suddenly, on the 27th October, there arrived a telegram from Admiral
Cradock which threw me into perplexity:—
_Rear-Admiral Cradock to Admiralty._
_Good Hope._ 26th October, 7 p.m. At sea.
Admiralty telegram received 7th October. With reference to orders to
search for enemy and our great desire for early success, I consider
that owing to slow speed of _Canopus_ it is impossible to find and
destroy enemy’s squadron.
Have therefore ordered _Defence_ to join me after calling for orders
at Montevideo.
Shall employ _Canopus_ on necessary work of convoying colliers.
We were then in the throes of the change in the office of First Sea
Lord, and I was gravely preoccupied with the circumstances and
oppositions attending the appointment of Lord Fisher. But for this fact
I am sure I should have reacted much more violently against the ominous
sentence: ‘Shall employ _Canopus_ on necessary work of convoying
colliers.’ As it was I minuted to the Naval Secretary (Admiral Oliver)
as follows:—
‘This telegram is very obscure, and I do not understand what Admiral
Cradock intends and wishes.’
I was reassured by his reply on the 29th October:—
‘The situation on the West Coast seems safe. If _Gneisenau_ and
_Scharnhorst_ have gone north they will meet eventually _Idzumo_,
_Newcastle_, and _Hizen_ moving south, and will be forced south on
_Glasgow_ and _Monmouth_ who have good speed and can keep touch and
draw them south on to _Good Hope_ and _Canopus_, who should keep
within supporting distance of each other.’
The half fear which had begun to grow in my mind that perhaps the
Admiral would go and fight without the _Canopus_ which I thought was so
improbable that I did not put it on paper, was allayed. It would, of
course, be possible for him to manœuvre forty or fifty miles ahead of
the _Canopus_ and still close her before fighting. To send the _Defence_
to join Admiral Cradock would have left Admiral Stoddart in a hopeless
inferiority. Indeed, in a few hours arrived Admiral Stoddart’s protest
of the 29th October:—
‘I have received orders from Admiral Cradock to send _Defence_ to
Montevideo to coal, obtain charts, and to await further orders.
Submit I may be given two fast cruisers in place of _Defence_, as I do
not consider force at my disposal sufficient....’
The Admiralty Staff had, however, already replied in accordance with all
our decisions:—
_Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Cradock._
(_Sent October 28, 1914_, 6.45 p.m.)
_Defence_ is to remain on East Coast under orders of Stoddart.
This will leave sufficient force on each side in case the hostile
cruisers appear there on the trade routes.
There is no ship available for the Cape Horn vicinity.
Japanese battleship _Hizen_ shortly expected on North American coast;
she will join with Japanese _Idzumo_ and _Newcastle_ and move south
towards Galapagos.
But neither this nor any further message reached Admiral Cradock. He had
taken his own decision. Without waiting for the _Defence_, even if we
had been able to send her, and leaving the Canopus behind to guard the
colliers, he was already steaming up the Chilean coast. But though he
left the inexpugnable _Canopus_ behind because she was too slow, he took
with him the helpless armed merchant cruiser _Otranto_, which was
scarcely any faster. He was thus ill-fitted either to fight or run.
He telegraphed to us from off Vallenar at 4 p.m. on 27th October
(received 1st November, 4.33 a.m.):—
‘Have received your telegram 105. Have seized German mails.
_Monmouth_, _Good Hope_ and _Otranto_ coaling at Vallenar. _Glasgow_
patrolling vicinity of Coronel to intercept German shipping rejoining
flag later on. I intend to proceed northward secretly with squadron
after coaling and to keep out of sight of land. Until further notice
continue telegraphing to Montevideo.’
And at noon on 29th October (received 1st November, 7.40 a.m.):—
‘Until further notice mails for Rear-Admiral Cradock, _Good Hope_,
_Canopus_, _Monmouth_, _Glasgow_, _Otranto_, should be forwarded to
Valparaiso.’
The inclusion of the _Canopus_ in the middle of the latter message
seemed to indicate the Admiral’s intention to work in combination with
the _Canopus_ even if not actually concentrated. These were the last
messages received from him.
On the 30th October Lord Fisher became First Sea Lord. As soon as he
entered the Admiralty I took him to the War Room and went over with him
on the great map the positions and tasks of every vessel in our immense
organisation. It took more than two hours. The critical point was
clearly in South American waters. Speaking of Admiral Cradock’s
position, I said, ‘You don’t suppose he would try to fight them without
the _Canopus_?’ He did not give any decided reply.
Early on the 3rd November we got our first certain news of the Germans.
_Consul-General, Valparaiso, to Admiralty._ (_Sent_ 5.20 p.m., _2nd
November_. _Received_ 3.10 a.m., _3rd November_.)
Master of Chilean merchant vessel reports that on 1st November 1 p.m.
he was stopped by _Nürnberg_ 5 miles off Cape Carranza about 62 miles
north of Talcahuano. Officers remained on board 45 minutes. Two other
German cruisers lay west about 5 and 10 miles respectively. Master
believes one of these was _Scharnhorst_. On 26th October, 1 p.m.
_Leipzig_ called at Mas-a-Fuera having crew 456 and 10 guns, 18 days
out from Galapagos. She was accompanied by another cruiser name
unknown. They bought oxen and left same day. On 29th October unknown
warship was seen in lat. 33 south, long. 74 west, steaming towards
Coquimbo.
Here at last was the vital message for which the Admiralty Staff had
waited so long. Admiral von Spee’s squadron was definitely located on
the West Coast of South America. He had not slipped past Admiral Cradock
round the Horn as had been possible. For the moment Admiral Stoddart was
perfectly safe. With the long peninsula of South America between him and
the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, there was no longer any need for him
to keep the _Defence_. She could join Cradock for what we must hope
would be an early battle. After surveying the new situation we
telegraphed to Admiral Stoddart as follows:—
(_Sent_ 6.20 p.m., _3rd November_.)
_Defence_ to proceed with all possible dispatch to join Admiral
Cradock on West Coast of America. Acknowledge.
This telegram was initialled by Admiral Sturdee, Lord Fisher and myself.
We telegraphed at the same time to the Japanese Admiralty:—
_Scharnhorst_, _Gneisenau_, _Nürnberg_, _Leipzig_, _Dresden_ have been
located near Valparaiso coaling and provisioning. This squadron is
presumably concentrated for some serious operation. We are
concentrating _Glasgow_, _Good Hope_, _Canopus_, _Monmouth_, and
_Defence_ on the S.W. coast of South America, hoping to bring them to
battle.... We hope that the Japanese Admiralty may now find it
possible to move some of their squadrons eastward in order to
intercept the German squadron and prevent its return to Asiatic or
Australian waters.... We indicate our views in order to obtain yours
and to concert common action.
We also telegraphed to Admiral Cradock once more reiterating the
instructions about the _Canopus_:—
(_Sent_ 6.55 p.m., _3rd November_.)
_Defence_ has been ordered to join your flag with all dispatch.
_Glasgow_ should find or keep in touch with the enemy. You should keep
touch with _Glasgow_ concentrating the rest of your squadron including
_Canopus_. It is important you should effect your junction with
_Defence_ at earliest possible moment subject to keeping touch with
_Glasgow_ and enemy. Enemy supposes you at Corcovados Bay.
Acknowledge.
But we were already talking to the void.
When I opened my boxes at 7 o’clock on the morning of November 4, I read
the following telegram:—
_Maclean, Valparaiso, to Admiralty._ (_Sent November 3, 1914_, 6.10
p.m.)
Have just learnt from Chilean Admiral that German Admiral states that
on Sunday at sunset, in thick and wicked weather, his ships met _Good
Hope_, _Glasgow_, _Monmouth_, and _Otranto_. Action was joined, and
_Monmouth_ turned over and sank after about an hour’s fighting.
_Good Hope_, _Glasgow_ and _Otranto_ drew off into darkness.
_Good Hope_ was on fire, an explosion was heard, and she is believed
to have sunk.
_Gneisenau_, _Scharnhorst_ and _Nürnberg_ were among the German ships
engaged.
The story of what had happened, so far as it ever can be known, is now
familiar; it is fully set out in the official history, and need only be
summarised here. Arrived on the Chilean coast, having refuelled at a
lonely island, and hearing that the British light cruiser _Glasgow_ was
at Coronel, Admiral von Spee determined to make an attempt to cut her
off, and with this intention steamed southward on November 1 with his
whole squadron. By good fortune the _Glasgow_ left harbour before it was
too late. Almost at the same moment, Admiral Cradock began his sweep
northward, hoping to catch the _Leipzig_, whose wireless had been heard
repeatedly by the _Glasgow_. He was rejoined by the _Glasgow_ at
half-past two, and the whole squadron proceeded northward abreast about
fifteen miles apart. At about half-past four the smoke of several
vessels was seen to the northward, and in another quarter of an hour the
_Glasgow_ was able to identify the _Scharnhorst_, _Gneisenau_ and a
German light cruiser. The _Canopus_ was nearly 300 miles away. Was there
still time to refuse action? Undoubtedly there was. The _Good Hope_ and
_Monmouth_ had normal speeds of 23 knots and 22·4 respectively and could
certainly steam 21 knots in company that day. The _Glasgow_ could steam
over 25. The _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ had nominal speeds of 23·2
and 23·5; but they had been long in southern seas and out of dock. On
the knowledge he possessed at that moment Admiral Cradock would have
been liberal in allowing them 22 knots. Rough weather would reduce
speeds equally on both sides. Had he turned at once and by standing out
to sea offered a stern chase to the enemy, he could only be overhauled
one knot each hour. When the enemy was sighted by the _Glasgow_ at 4.45,
the nearest armoured ships were about 20 miles apart. There were
scarcely two hours to sundown and less than three to darkness.
But the _Otranto_ was a possible complication. She could only steam 18
knots, and against the head sea during the action she did in fact only
steam 15 knots. As this weak, slow ship had been for some unexplained
reason sent on ahead with the _Glasgow_, she was at the moment of
sighting the enemy only 17 miles distant. Assuming that Admiral von Spee
could steam 22 knots, less 3 for the head sea, i.e. 19, he would
overhaul the _Otranto_ 4 knots an hour. On this he might have brought
her under long-range fire as darkness closed in. To that extent she
reduced the speed of the British squadron and diminished their chances
of safety. This may have weighed with Admiral Cradock.
We now know, of course, that in spite of being cumbered with the
_Otranto_ he could, as it happened, easily and certainly have declined
action had he attempted to do so. At the moment of being sighted,
Admiral von Spee had only steam for 14 knots, and had to light two more
boilers to realise his full speed. Further his ships were dispersed. To
concentrate and gain speed took an hour and a half off the brief
daylight during which the British ships would actually have been
increasing their distance. Moreover, in the chase and battle of the
Falklands the greatest speed ever developed by the _Scharnhorst_ and
_Gneisenau_ did not exceed 20 knots in favourable weather. There is
therefore no doubt he could have got away untouched.
But nothing was farther from the mind of Admiral Cradock. He instantly
decided to attack. As soon as the _Glasgow_ had sighted the enemy, she
had turned back towards the flagship, preceded by the _Monmouth_ and the
_Otranto_ all returning at full speed. But Admiral Cradock at 5.10
ordered the squadron to concentrate, not on his flagship the _Good
Hope_, the farthest ship from the enemy, but on the _Glasgow_, which
though retreating rapidly was still the nearest. At 6.18 he signalled to
the distant _Canopus_: ‘I am now going to attack enemy.’ The decision to
fight sealed his fate, and more than that the fate of the squadron.
To quote the log of the _Glasgow_, ‘The British Squadron turned to port
four points together towards the enemy with a view to closing them and
forcing them to action before sunset, which if successful would have put
them at a great disadvantage owing to the British squadron being between
the enemy and the sun.’ The German Admiral easily evaded this manœuvre
by turning away towards the land and keeping at a range of at least
18,000 yards. Both squadrons were now steaming southward on slightly
converging courses—the British to seaward with the setting sun behind
them, and the Germans nearer the land. And now began the saddest naval
action in the war. Of the officers and men in both the squadrons that
faced each other in these stormy seas so far from home, nine out of ten
were doomed to perish. The British were to die that night: the Germans a
month later. At 7 o’clock the sun sank beneath the horizon, and the
German Admiral, no longer dazzled by its rays, opened fire. The British
ships were silhouetted against the afterglow, while the Germans were
hardly visible against the dark background of the Chilean coast. A
complete reversal of advantage had taken place. The sea was high, and
the main deck 6–inch guns both of the _Monmouth_ and of the _Good Hope_
must have been much affected by the dashing spray. The German batteries,
all mounted in modern fashion on the upper deck, suffered no
corresponding disadvantage from the rough weather. The unequal contest
lasted less than an hour. One of the earliest German salvos probably
disabled the _Good Hope’s_ forward 9·2–inch gun, which was not fired
throughout the action. Both she and the _Monmouth_ were soon on fire.
Darkness came on and the sea increased in violence till the _Good Hope_,
after a great explosion, became only a glowing speck which was presently
extinguished; and the _Monmouth_, absolutely helpless but refusing to
surrender, was destroyed by the _Nürnberg_, and foundered, like her
consort, with her flag still flying. The _Otranto_, an unarmoured
merchantman, quite incapable of taking part in the action, rightly held
her distance and disappeared into the gloom. Only the little _Glasgow_,
which miraculously escaped fatal damage among the heavy salvos,
continued the action until she was left alone in darkness on the stormy
seas. There were no survivors from the two British ships: all perished,
from Admiral to seaman. The Germans had no loss of life.
Quoth the _Glasgow_ in her subsequent report:—
‘... Throughout the engagement the conduct of officers and men was
entirely admirable. Perfect discipline and coolness prevailed under
trying circumstances of receiving considerable volume of fire without
being able to make adequate return. The men behaved exactly as though
at battle practice; there were no signs of wild fire, and when the
target was invisible the gunlayers ceased firing of their own accord.
Spirit of officers and ship’s company of _Glasgow_ is entirely
unimpaired by serious reverse in which they took part, and that the
ship may be quickly restored to a condition in which she can take part
in further operations against the same enemy is the unanimous wish of
us all.’
This as it happened they were not to be denied.
Surveying this tragic episode in the light of after knowledge, the
official historian has blamed the Admiralty on various grounds: first,
for dividing the available force into two inadequate squadrons under
Admiral Cradock and Admiral Stoddart; secondly, for a lack of
explicitness in the wording of the Staff telegrams. I cannot admit that
the first charge is in any way justified. It would, of course, have been
much simpler to have concentrated the squadrons of Admiral Cradock and
Admiral Stoddart in the Straits of Magellan and awaited events. But
until we knew for certain that the German cruisers were coming to South
America, there was a great disadvantage in denuding the main trade route
from Rio of all protection. Suppose we had done this and Admiral von
Spee had remained, as he could easily have done, for many weeks at
Easter Island, or anywhere else in the Pacific, the whole of the Plate
trade would then, for all we knew, have been at the mercy of the
_Karlsruhe_ or of any other German commerce destroyer. At least six
different courses were open to von Spee, and we had, while our resources
were at the fullest strain, to meet every one of them. Suppose for
instance he had gone northward to the Panama Canal and, passing swiftly
through, had entered the West Indies: of what use would be our
concentration in the Straits of Magellan? The reasoning and state of
mind which would have led to such a concentration would have involved a
virtual suspension of our enterprises all over the world. We could not
afford to do that. We decided deliberately in October to carry on our
protection of trade in every theatre in spite of the menace of the
unlocated _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, and to do this by means of
squadrons which, though they would not be homogeneous in speed and
class, were in every case if held together capable of fighting the enemy
with good prospects of success. This was true of the Anglo-Japanese
squadron. It was true of the escort of the Australian convoy. It was
true of Admiral Stoddart. Most of all was it true of Admiral Cradock.
The last word in such an argument was surely spoken by Admiral von Spee.
‘The English,’ he wrote the day after the battle, ‘have here another
ship like the _Monmouth_; and also it seems a battleship of the _Queen_
type, with 12–inch guns. Against this last-named we can hardly do
anything. If they had kept their forces together we should, I suppose,
have got the worst of it.’
So far as the clarity of the Staff telegrams is concerned, no doubt here
and there the wording of naval messages had not been sufficiently
precise, and this fault ran through much of the Naval Staff work in
those early days; but on the main point nothing could have been more
emphatic, nor, indeed, should any emphasis have been needed. It ought
not to be necessary to tell an experienced Admiral to keep concentrated
and not to be brought to action in circumstances of great disadvantage
by superior forces. Still, even this was done, and in telegram after
telegram the importance of not being separated from the _Canopus_,
especially sent him for his protection, was emphasised.
Lastly, the official historian has represented the new decision to
reinforce Cradock by the _Defence_ as a reversal by Lord Fisher of the
mistaken policy hitherto pursued.
‘By the time it (Admiral Cradock’s telegram of 31st) reached the
Admiralty the new Board was installed with Lord Fisher as First Sea
Lord, and one of their first acts was an effort to improve the
precarious position in which Admiral Cradock found himself. The
_Defence_ was immediately ordered to join him.’[84]
This is unjust both to Prince Louis and to Admiral Sturdee. It was not
possible to order the superior concentration until the enemy had been
located, and such concentration would have been ordered by any Board the
moment the uncertainty was cleared up. The official historian would not
have fallen into this error in a work distinguished for its care and
industry, if he had mentioned the telegram from the Consul-General,
Valparaiso, which was received on the morning of the 3rd, or if he had
noticed that although the position in South American waters was known to
Lord Fisher on the 30th October, no fresh dispositions were made or
could be made until the whereabouts of the enemy was clearly
ascertained. Then and not till then could we strip Admiral Stoddart or
inform Admiral Cradock that the _Defence_ was hurrying to join him.
So far as Admiral Cradock is concerned, I cannot do better than repeat
the words which I wrote at the time and which commanded the recorded
assent both of Lord Fisher and of Sir Arthur Wilson.
_Draft of an answer to a Parliamentary question not subsequently put._
SIR,—As I have already said, I did not think it convenient to go into
this matter, but since it is pressed I will state that the _Canopus_
was sent from St. Vincent to join Admiral Cradock’s flag on September
4th, as soon as the possibility of the arrival of the _Scharnhorst_
and _Gneisenau_ on the West Coast of South America could be taken into
account. On October 12th Admiral Cradock telegraphed to the Admiralty
that the indications showed the possibility of _Dresden_, _Leipzig_,
and _Nürnberg_ joining _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_; and that he had
ordered _Canopus_ to Falkland Islands, where he intended to
concentrate and avoid division of forces; and on October 14th the
Admiralty approved specifically by telegram Admiral Cradock’s proposed
concentration of _Good Hope_, _Monmouth_, _Canopus_, _Glasgow_, and
_Otranto_ for combined operations. The squadron thus formed was amply
strong enough to defeat the enemy if attacked by them. It was not fast
enough to force an engagement; but in view of the uncertainty as to
which part of the world the enemy’s squadron would appear in, it was
not possible at that time to provide another strong fast ship at that
particular point.
Admiral Cradock was an experienced and fearless officer, and we are of
opinion that feeling that he could not bring the enemy immediately to
action as long as he kept with the _Canopus_, he decided to attack
them with his fast ships alone, in the belief that even if he himself
were destroyed in the action, he would inflict damage upon them which
in the circumstances would be irreparable, and lead to their certain
subsequent destruction. This was not an unreasonable hope; and though
the Admiralty have no responsibility for Admiral Cradock’s decision
they consider that it was inspired by the highest devotion, and in
harmony with the spirit and traditions of the British Navy.
We had now to meet the new situation. Our combinations, such as they
were, were completely ruptured, and Admiral von Spee, now in temporary
command of South American waters, possessed a wide choice of
alternatives. He might turn back into the Pacific, and repeat the
mystery tactics which had been so baffling to us. He might steam
northward up the West Coast of South America and make for the Panama
Canal. In this case he would run a chance of being brought to battle by
the Anglo-Japanese Squadron which was moving southward. But of course he
might not fall in with them, or, if he did, he could avoid battle owing
to his superior speed. He might come round to the East Coast and
interrupt the main trade route. If he did this he must be prepared to
fight Admiral Stoddart; but this would be a very even and hazardous
combat. Admiral Stoddart had against the two armoured German ships three
armoured ships, of which the _Defence_, a later and a better ship than
either of the Germans, mounted four 9·2–inch and ten 7·5–inch guns, and
was one of our most powerful armoured-cruiser class. Lastly, he might
cross the Atlantic, possibly raiding the Falkland Islands on his way,
and arrive unexpectedly on the South African coast. Here he would find
the Union Government’s expedition against the German colony in full
progress and his arrival would have been most unwelcome. General Botha
and General Smuts, having suppressed the rebellion, were about to resume
in a critical atmosphere their attack upon German South-West Africa, and
a stream of transports would soon be flowing with the expedition and its
supplies from Cape Town to Luderitz Bay. Subsequently or alternatively
to this intrusion, Admiral von Spee might steam up the African coast and
strike at the whole of the shipping of the expedition to the Cameroons,
which was quite without means of defending itself against him.
All these unpleasant possibilities had to be faced by us. We had to
prepare again at each of many points against a sudden blow; and, great
as were our resources, the strain upon them became enormous. The first
step was to restore the situation in South American waters. This would
certainly take a month. My minute of inquiry to the Chief of the Staff,
written an hour after I had read the first news of the disaster, will
show the possibilities which existed. It will be seen that in this grave
need my mind immediately turned to wresting a battle-cruiser from the
Grand Fleet which, joined with the _Defence_, _Carnarvon_, _Cornwall_
and _Kent_, would give Admiral Stoddart an overwhelming superiority.
4/11/14.
Director of Operations Division.
1. How far is it, and how long would it take _Dartmouth_ and
_Weymouth_ to reach Punta Arenas, Rio, or Abrolhos respectively, if
they started this afternoon with all dispatch?
2. How long would it take—
(_a_) KENT to reach Rio and Abrolhos?
(_b_) _Australia_ (1) without, and (2) with _Montcalm_ to reach
Galapagos via Makada Islands, and also _Idzumo_ and _Newcastle_ to
reach them?
(_c_) The Japanese 2nd Southern Squadron to replace _Australia_ at
Fiji?
(_d_) _Defence_, CARNARVON and CORNWALL respectively to reach Punta
Arenas?
(_e_) INVINCIBLE to reach Abrolhos, Rio, Punta Arenas?
(_f_) _Hizen_ and _Asama_ to reach Galapagos or Esquimalt?[85]
W.S.C.
But I found Lord Fisher in a bolder mood. He would take two
battle-cruisers from the Grand Fleet for the South American station.
More than that, and much more questionable, he would take a third—the
_Princess Royal_—for Halifax and later for the West Indies in case von
Spee came through the Panama Canal. There never was any doubt what ought
to be sent. The question was what could be spared. We measured up our
strength in home waters anxiously, observing that the _Tiger_ was about
to join the 1st Battle-Cruiser Squadron, that the new battleships
_Benbow_, _Empress of India_ and _Queen Elizabeth_ were practically
ready. We sent forthwith the following order to the Commander-in-Chief:—
(_November 4, 1914_, 12.40 p.m.)
Order _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ to fill up with coal at once and
proceed to Berehaven with all dispatch. They are urgently needed for
foreign service. Admiral and Flag-Captain _Invincible_ to transfer to
_New Zealand_. Captain _New Zealand_ to _Invincible_. _Tiger_ has been
ordered to join you with all dispatch. Give her necessary orders.
I also telegraphed personally to Sir John Jellicoe as follows:—
(_November 5_, 12.5 a.m.)
From all reports received through German sources, we fear Cradock has
been caught or has engaged with only _Monmouth_ and _Good Hope_
armoured ships against _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_. Probably both
British vessels sunk. Position of _Canopus_ critical and fate of
_Glasgow_ and _Otranto_ uncertain.
Proximity of concentrated German squadron of 5 good ships will
threaten gravely main trade route Rio to London. Essential recover
control.
First Sea Lord requires _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ for this
purpose.
Sturdee goes Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic and Pacific.
Oliver, Chief of Staff. Bartolomé, Naval Secretary.
Apparently we had not at this stage decided finally to send the
_Princess Royal_. Sir John Jellicoe rose to the occasion and parted with
his two battle-cruisers without a word. They were ordered to steam by
the West Coast to Devonport to fit themselves for their southern voyage.
Our plans for the second clutch at von Spee were now conceived as
follows[86]:—
(1) Should he break across the Pacific; he would be dealt with by the
very superior Japanese 1st Southern Squadron, based on Suva to cover
Australia and New Zealand, and composed as follows:—_Kurama_
(battleship), _Tsukuba_ and _Ikoma_ (battle-cruisers), _Chikuma_ and
_Yahagi_ (light cruisers). At Suva also were the _Montcalm_ and
_Encounter_. Another strong Japanese squadron (four ships) was based on
the Caroline Islands.
(2) To meet him, should he proceed up the West Coast of South America,
an Anglo-Japanese Squadron, comprising _Australia_ (from Fiji), _Hizen_,
_Idzumo_, _Newcastle_, was to be formed off the North American Coast.
(3) Should he come round on to the East Coast, _Defence_, _Carnarvon_,
_Cornwall_, _Kent_ were ordered to concentrate off Montevideo, together
with _Canopus_, _Glasgow_ and _Bristol_, and not seek action till joined
by _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_, thereafter sending the _Defence_ to
South Africa.
(4) Should he approach the Cape station, he would be awaited by
_Defence_ and also _Minotaur_ (released from the Australian convoy,
after we knew of von Spee’s arrival in South American waters), together
with the old battleship _Albion_, and _Weymouth_, _Dartmouth_, _Astræa_
and _Hyacinth_, light cruisers: the Union Expedition being postponed for
14 days.
(5) Should he come through the Panama Canal, he would meet the _Princess
Royal_, as well as the _Berwick_ and _Lancaster_, of the West Indian
Squadron, and the French _Conde_.
(6) Cameroons were warned to be ready to take their shipping up the
river beyond his reach.
(7) Should he endeavour to work homewards across the South Atlantic, he
would come into the area of a new squadron under Admiral de Robeck to be
formed near the Cape de Verde Islands, comprising the old battleship
_Vengeance_, the strong armoured cruisers _Warrior_ and _Black Prince_
and the _Donegal_, _Highflyer_, and later _Cumberland_.
Thus to compass the destruction of five warships, only two of which were
armoured, it was necessary to employ nearly thirty, including twenty-one
armoured ships, the most part of superior metal, and this took no
account of the powerful Japanese Squadrons, and of French ships or of
armed merchant cruisers, the last-named effective for scouting.
I telegraphed to the Japanese Admiralty as follows:—
_British Admiralty to Japanese Admiralty._
_November 5, 1914._
In consequence of unsuccessful action off Chili and definite location
of German squadron, we have ordered concentration off Montevideo of
_Defence_, _Kent_, _Carnarvon_ and _Cornwall_. These will be joined
with all dispatch by _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ battle-cruisers
from England, and _Dartmouth_ light cruiser from East Africa, and
remainder of defeated squadron from Chili. This assures the South
Atlantic situation. We now desire assistance of Japan in making
equally thorough arrangements on Pacific side. We propose for your
consideration and friendly advice the following:—_Newcastle_ and
_Idzumo_ to go south in company to San Clemente Island off San Diego,
California, there to meet _Hizen_ from Honolulu. Meanwhile _Asama_
will be able to effect internment or destruction of _Geier_. We also
propose to move _Australia_ battle-cruiser from Fiji to Fanning
Island. By the time these moves are complete, probably by November 17,
we may know more of _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ movements and a
further concentration of _Australia_ and _Asama_ with _Hizen_,
_Idzumo_ and _Newcastle_ will be possible either at San Clemente or
further to the south, further movements depending on the enemy.
We should also like a Japanese squadron to advance to Fiji to take the
place of the _Australia_ and so guard Australia and New Zealand in
case the Germans return.
With regard to the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, it is now known
that _Emden_ is the only enemy ship at large. We therefore hope that
the Japanese squadrons and vessels not involved in the eastward
movement will draw westward into the vicinity of Sumatra and the Dutch
East Indies in order to block every exit and deny every place of
shelter up to the 90th meridian of east longitude.
British Admiralty are combining in Indian waters in search of _Emden_
the following light cruisers:—_Weymouth_, _Gloucester_, _Yarmouth_,
_Melbourne_, _Sydney_, and the armoured cruiser _Hampshire_ and
Russian cruiser _Askold_. These ships will be ready by the middle of
November. Thus by concerted action between the Allied fleets the
_Emden_ should be speedily run down.
_Japanese Admiralty to British Admiralty. November 7, 1914._
Secret and Private.
‘Japanese Admiralty give their consent generally to strategical scheme
proposed and beg to withdraw the proposal of November 6, put forward
through Admiral Oguri to the British War Staff. Measures will be taken
in vicinity of Sumatra and Dutch East Indies as asked. First Southern
Squadron will be dispatched to Fiji, but Japanese Admiralty think that
it may be necessary for them to extend their sphere of operations to
the Marquesas Islands. With reference to the movements of the _Hizen_
and _Asama_, Japanese Admiralty will carry out your wishes as far as
possible, bearing in mind necessity of watching the _Geier_ until her
(? disposition) is settled, but the _Hizen_ will be dispatched at
once.
‘With reference to the _Hizen_, _Asama_ and _Idzumo_, Japanese
Admiralty request British Admiralty to make arrangements necessary for
their supply of coal, etc.’
Meanwhile it had been necessary to provide, as far as possible, for the
safety of the surviving ships of Admiral Cradock’s squadron and to move
the reinforcing ships.
_Admiralty to H.M.S. Kent._
(_November 4, 1914._)
Urgent. Proceed to the Abrolhos Rocks with all dispatch and
communicate via Rio. It is intended you shall join Admiral Stoddart’s
squadron.
_Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Stoddart, Carnarvon._
(_November 4, 1914._)
In view of reported sinking of _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_ by
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ off Coronel, November 1, armoured ships
on S.E. Coast America must concentrate at once. _Carnarvon_,
_Cornwall_ should join _Defence_ off Montevideo. _Canopus_, _Glasgow_,
_Otranto_ have been ordered if possible to join you there. _Kent_ from
Sierra Leone also has been ordered to join your flag via Abrolhos.
Endeavour to get into communication with them. Enemy will most likely
come on to the Rio trade route. Reinforcements will meet you shortly
from England.
Acknowledge.
_From Admiralty to Canopus._
(_November 4, 1914._)
In view of reported sinking of _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_ by
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ on 1st November you should make the best
of your way to join _Defence_ near Montevideo. Keep wide of track to
avoid being brought to action by superior force.
If attacked, however, Admiralty is confident ship will in all
circumstances be fought to the last as imperative to damage enemy
whatever may be consequences.
_Admiralty to ‘Glasgow,’ ‘Otranto’_
(_November 4, 1914._)
You should make the best of your way to join _Defence_ near
Montevideo. Keep wide of track to avoid being brought to action by
superior force.
_Admiralty to Governor, Falkland Islands._
(_November 5, 1914._)
German cruiser raid may take place. All Admiralty colliers should be
concealed in unfrequented harbours. Be ready to destroy supplies
useful to enemy and hide codes effectively on enemy ships being
sighted. Acknowledge.
In a few days we learned that her continuous fast steaming had led to
boiler troubles in the _Canopus_, and we had to direct her to the
Falklands.
_Admiralty to Canopus._
(_November 9, 1914_, 3.10 a.m.)
You are to remain in Stanley Harbour. Moor the ship so that the
entrance is commanded by your guns. Extemporise mines outside
entrance. Send down your topmasts and be prepared for bombardment from
outside the harbour. Stimulate the Governor to organise all local
forces and make determined defence. Arrange observation stations on
shore, by which your fire on ships outside can be directed. Land guns
or use boats’ torpedoes to sink a blocking ship before she reaches the
Narrows. No objection to your grounding ship to obtain a good berth.
Should _Glasgow_ be able to get sufficient start of enemy to avoid
capture, send her on to the River Plate; if not, moor her inside
_Canopus_.
Repair your defects and wait orders.[87]
The strain upon British naval resources in the outer seas, apart from
the main theatre of naval operations, was now at its maximum and may be
partially appreciated from the following approximate enumerations:—
Combination against von Spee, 30 ships.
In search of the _Emden_ and _Königsberg_, 8 ships.
General protection of trade by vessels other than the above, 40 ships.
Convoy duty in the Indian Ocean, 8 ships.
Blockade of the Turco-German fleet at the Dardanelles, 3 ships.
Defence of Egypt, 2 ships.
Miscellaneous minor tasks, 11 ships.
Total, 102 ships of all classes.
We literally could not lay our hands on another vessel of any sort or
kind which could be made to play any useful part. But we were soon to
have relief.
Already on October 30 news had reached us that the _Königsberg_ had been
discovered hiding in the Rufigi River in German East Africa, and it was
instantly possible to mark her down with two ships of equal value and
liberate the others. On November 9 far finer news arrived. The reader
will remember for what purposes the _Sydney_ and _Melbourne_ had been
attached to the great Australian convoy which was now crossing the
Indian Ocean. On the 8th, the _Sydney_, cruising ahead of the convoy,
took in a message from the wireless station at Cocos Island that a
strange ship was entering the Bay. Thereafter, silence from Cocos
Island. Thereupon the large cruiser _Ibuki_ increased her speed,
displayed the war flag of Japan and demanded permission from the British
Officer in command of the convoy to pursue and attack the enemy. But the
convoy could not divest itself of this powerful protection and the
coveted task was accorded to the _Sydney_. At 9 o’clock she sighted the
_Emden_ and the first sea fight in the history of the Australian Navy
began. It could have only one ending. In a hundred minutes the _Emden_
was stranded, a flaming mass of twisted metal, and the whole of the
Indian Ocean was absolutely safe and free.
In consideration of all the harm this ship had done us without offending
against humanity or the laws of sea war as we conceived them, we
telegraphed:—
_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, China._
_November 11, 1914._
‘Captain, officers and crew of _Emden_ appear to be entitled to all
the honours of war. Unless you know of any reason to the contrary,
Captain and officers should be permitted to retain swords
These martial courtesies were, however, churlishly repaid.
The clearance of the Indian Ocean liberated all those vessels which had
been searching for the _Emden_ and the _Königsberg_. Nothing could now
harm the Australian convoy. Most of its escort vanished. The _Emden_ and
the _Königsberg_ were accounted for, and von Spee was on the other side
of the globe. The _Minotaur_ had already been ordered with all speed to
the Cape. All the other vessels went through the Red Sea into the
Mediterranean, where their presence was very welcome in view of the
impending Turkish invasion of Egypt.
Meanwhile the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ had reached Devonport. We
had decided that Admiral Sturdee on vacating the position of chief of
the staff should hoist his flag in the _Invincible_, should take command
on the South American station, and should assume general control of all
the operations against von Spee. We were in the highest impatience to
get him and his ships away. Once vessels fall into dockyard hands, a
hundred needs manifest themselves.
On November 9, when Lord Fisher was in my room, the following message
was put on my table:—
The Admiral Superintendent, Devonport, reports that the earliest
possible date for completion of _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ is
midnight 13th November.
I immediately expressed great discontent with the dockyard delays and
asked, ‘Shall I give him a prog?’ or words to that effect. Fisher took
up the telegram. As soon as he saw it he exclaimed, ‘Friday the 13th.
What a day to choose!’ I then wrote and signed the following order,
which as it was the direct cause of the battle of the Falklands may be
reproduced in facsimile.[88]
The ships sailed accordingly and in the nick of time. They coaled on
November 26 at Abrolhos, where they joined and absorbed Admiral
Stoddart’s squadron (_Carnarvon_, _Cornwall_, _Kent_, _Glasgow_,
_Bristol_ and _Orama_) and despatched _Defence_ to the Cape, and without
ever coming in sight of land or using their wireless they reached Port
Stanley, Falkland Islands, on the night of Dec. 7. Here they found the
_Canopus_ in the lagoon, prepared to defend herself and the colony in
accordance with the Admiralty instructions. They immediately began to
coal.
* * * * *
After his victory at Coronel, Admiral von Spee comported himself with
the dignity of a brave gentleman. He put aside the fervent acclamations
of the German colony of Valparaiso and spoke no word of triumph over the
dead. He was under no delusion as to his own danger. He said of the
flowers which were presented to him, ‘They will do for my funeral.’
Generally, his behaviour would lead us to suppose that the inability of
the Germans to pick up any British survivors was not due to want of
humanity; and this view has been accepted by the British navy.
After a few days at Valparaiso he and his ships vanished again into the
blue. We do not know what were the reasons which led him to raid the
Falkland Islands, nor what his further plans would have been in the
event of success. Presumably he hoped to destroy this unfortified
British coaling base and so make his own position in South American
waters less precarious. At any rate, at noon on December 6 he set off to
the eastward from the Straits of Magellan with his five ships; and about
8 o’clock on December 8 his leading ship (the _Gneisenau_) was in sight
of the main harbour of the Falklands. A few minutes later a terrible
apparition broke upon German eyes. Rising from behind the promontory,
sharply visible in the clear air, were a pair of tripod masts. One
glance was enough. They meant certain death.[89] The day was beautifully
fine and from the tops the horizon extended thirty or forty miles in
every direction. There was no hope for victory. There was no chance of
escape. A month before, another Admiral and his sailors had suffered a
similar experience.
* * * * *
At 5 o’clock that afternoon I was working in my room at the Admiralty
when Admiral Oliver entered with the following telegram. It was from the
Governor of the Falkland Islands and ran as follows:—
‘Admiral Spee arrived at daylight this morning with all his ships and
is now in action with Admiral Sturdee’s whole fleet, _which was
coaling_.’
[Illustration:
Facsimile of Admiralty’s Instructions to the Commander-in-Chief at
Devonport.
]
We had had so many unpleasant surprises that these last words sent a
shiver up my spine. Had we been taken by surprise and, in spite of all
our superiority, mauled, unready, at anchor? ‘Can it mean that?’ I said
to the Chief of the Staff. ‘I hope not,’ was all he said. I could see
that my suggestion, though I hardly meant it seriously, had disquieted
him. Two hours later, however, the door opened again, and this time the
countenance of the stern and sombre Oliver wore something which closely
resembled a grin. ‘It’s all right, sir; they are all at the bottom.’ And
with one exception so they were.
* * * * *
When the leading German ships were sighted far away on the distant
horizon, Admiral Sturdee and his squadron were indeed coaling. From the
intelligence he had received he had convinced himself that the Germans
were at Valparaiso, and he intended to sail the next day in the hopes of
doubling the Horn before the enemy could do so. More than two hours
passed after the enemy first came in sight before he could raise steam
and get under way. The first shots were fired by the 12–inch guns of the
_Canopus_ from her stationary position on the mudbanks of the inner
harbour. The _Gneisenau_ had continued to approach until she saw the
fatal tripods, whereupon she immediately turned round and, followed by
one of her light cruisers, made off at full speed to join her main body.
In a few moments the whole of the German squadron was steaming off in a
westerly direction with all possible speed. At 10 o’clock, the _Kent_,
_Carnarvon_ and _Glasgow_ having already sailed, Admiral Sturdee came
out of the harbour in the _Invincible_, followed by the _Inflexible_ and
_Cornwall_; while the light cruisers, one of whom (the _Bristol_) had
her engines actually opened up, hurried on after as fast as possible.
The whole five ships of the German squadron were now visible, hull down
on the horizon about fifteen miles away. The order was given for general
chase, but later on, having the day before him, the Admiral regulated
the speeds, the battle-cruisers maintaining only about 20 knots. This,
however, was quite sufficient to overhaul the Germans, who after their
long sojourn in the Pacific without docking were not able to steam more
than 18 knots in company. Even so, the _Leipzig_ began to lag behind,
and shortly before 1 o’clock, the _Inflexible_ opened fire upon her at
16,000 yards. Confronted with having his ships devoured one by one, von
Spee took a decision which was certainly in accordance with the best
traditions of the sea. Signalling to his light cruisers to make their
escape to the South American coast, he turned with the _Scharnhorst_ and
_Gneisenau_ to face his pursuers. The action which followed was on the
British side uneventful. The German Admiral endeavoured more than once
to close to ranges at which his powerful secondary armament of 5·9’s
could play their part. The British held off just far enough to make this
fire ineffective and pounded their enemy with their 12–inch guns. At
this long range, however, it took a considerable time and much
ammunition to achieve the destruction of the German cruisers. The
_Scharnhorst_, with the Admiral and all hands, sank at 4.17 p.m., her
last signal to her consort being to save herself. _Gneisenau_ continued
to fight against hopeless odds with the utmost fortitude until 6 o’clock
when, being in a completely disabled condition, she opened her sea-cocks
and vanished, with her flag still flying, beneath the icy waters of the
ocean. The British ships rushing to the spot and lowering every
available boat were able only to save 200 Germans, many of whom died the
next day from the shock of the cold water. When both the _Scharnhorst_
and _Gneisenau_ had sunk, the _Inflexible_ had only thirty and the
_Invincible_ only twenty-two rounds left for each of their 12–inch guns.
[Illustration: CORONEL & THE FALKLANDS showing the second combination
against von Spee. _NOV: 10 to DEC: 10, 1914._]
Meanwhile, the other British cruisers had each selected one of the
flying German light vessels, and a series of chases ensued. The _Kent_
(Captain Allen) overtook and sunk the _Nürnberg_ by an effort of
steaming which surpassed all previous records and even, it is stated,
her designed speed. The _Nürnberg_ refused to surrender, and as she
foundered by the head, the victors could see a group of men on her
uplifted stern waving to the last the German flag. The _Leipzig_ was
finished off by the _Glasgow_ and the _Cornwall_. The _Dresden_ alone
for the time made good her escape. She was hunted down and destroyed
three months later in the roadstead of Mas-a-Fuera.
Thus came to an end the German cruiser warfare in the outer seas. With
the exception of the _Karlsruhe_, of which nothing had been heard for
some time and which we now know was sunk by an internal explosion on
November 4, and the _Dresden_ soon to be hunted down, no German ships of
war remained on any of the oceans of the world. It had taken four months
from the beginning of the war to achieve this result. Its consequences
were far-reaching, and affected simultaneously our position in every
part of the globe. The strain was everywhere relaxed. All our
enterprises, whether of war or commerce, proceeded in every theatre
without the slightest hindrance. Within twenty-four hours orders were
sent to a score of British ships to return to Home Waters. For the first
time we saw ourselves possessed of immense surpluses of ships of certain
classes, of trained men and of naval supplies of all kinds, and were in
a position to use them to the best advantage. The public, though
gratified by the annihilating character of the victory, was quite
unconscious of its immense importance to the whole naval situation.
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS.
SHIPS DIRECTLY INVOLVED.
Approximate Name. Effective Speed: Guns.
Figure of Knots.
Comparative
Power.
BATTLE CRUISERS.
5 INVINCIBLE 24 8–12 inch
----------
----------
----------
----------
----------
5 INFLEXIBLE 24 8–12 inch
----------
----------
----------
----------
----------
BATTLESHIP.
4 CANOPUS 15½ 4–12 inch
------- 12–6 inch
-------
-------
-------
CRUISERS.
3 DEFENCE 22 4–9·2 inch
------- 10–7·5 inch
-------
-------
2½ SCHARNHORST 22 8–8·2 inch
----------- 6–5·9 inch
-----------
------
2½ GNEISENAU 22 8–8·2 inch
--------- 6–5·9 inch
---------
-----
2 GOOD HOPE 21½ 2–9·2 inch
---------- 16–6 inch
----------
1½ CARNARVON 21 4–7·5 inch
--------- 6–6 inch
-----
1 MONMOUTH 21 14–6 inch
--------
1 KENT 21½ 14–6 inch
----
1 CORNWALL 21 14–6 inch
--------
LIGHT CRUISERS.
GLASGOW 24 2–6 inch
10–4 inch
BRISTOL 24 2–6 inch
10–4 inch
LEIPZIG 21 10–4·1 inch
NÜRNBERG 22 10–4·1 inch
DRESDEN 22 10–4·1 inch
ARMED MERCHANT CRUISERS.
MACEDONIA 17
OTRANTO 16 4–4·7 inch
NOTE:—The figures of comparative value are only intended to enable the
reader to follow the account. As broad classifications they are true,
but they can only be taken as approximate.