WITH FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY
November and December, 1914
‘... that pale, that white-faced shore,
whose foot spurns back the ocean’s roaring tides
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
That water-walled bulwark, still secure
And confident from foreign purposes.’
KING JOHN. Act II, Sc. 1.
German Dreadnoughts off Yarmouth—What does it mean—Anticlimax—Inroads
upon the Grand Fleet—The Drain of Refits—Sir John Jellicoe’s
Protests—Admiralty and Commander-in-Chief—The Dreadnought
Margin—The Third Battle Squadron to Rosyth—The Admiralty Insist on
their view—The Destroyer Distribution—A Real Difficulty—A Wearing
Discussion—The actual Facts of Relative Strength—British Readiness
to Accept Battle—The Attempted Seaplane Raid on Cuxhaven—The Grand
Fleet sweeps South—The Invasion Alarm—Moon and Tides—Further
Intervention on the Belgian Coast—Immense Relief of the Falklands
Victory—Lord Fisher’s View—Correspondence between us—Lord Fisher
and Admiral Sturdee—Admiral Oliver’s foresight—Growing Power of
the Fleet—New Construction—Submarines—Fisher’s Great Impulse—The
Battle Cruisers _Repulse_ and _Renown_—Monitors—The Great
Programme—Full Speed Ahead.
Lord Fisher had barely taken up his duties in the Admiralty, when an
incident occurred which seemed to indicate the ending of the period of
German inactivity in the North Sea which had succeeded the action of
August 28 in the Heligoland Bight. Early in the morning of November 3,
the unusual signal was made to the Admiralty that several German
battle-cruisers or battleships had been sighted off Gorleston on the
Norfolk coast by the mine-sweeping gunboat _Halcyon_ and that she was
engaged with them. Almost immediately afterwards heavy shells were
reported to be bursting in the water and on the beach near Yarmouth. The
First Sea Lord and I reached the War Room from our bedrooms in a few
minutes. The question was, What did it mean? It seemed quite certain
that German battle cruisers would not be sent to throw shells at an open
town like Yarmouth. Obviously this was a demonstration to divert the
British Fleet from something else which was going to happen—was already
perhaps happening. Was it a German raid into the Channel, or a serious
attempt by the German Navy to intervene upon the Belgian coast while the
land battle was still raging? Was it a descent on the British coast at
Sunderland or Blyth? We had no means of judging. The last thing it
seemed possible to believe was that first-class units of the German
Fleet would have been sent across the North Sea simply in order to
disturb the fisher-folk of Yarmouth. By other signals our destroyers,
_Leopard_ and _Lively_, who were patrolling in the neighbourhood of
Yarmouth, also reported that they were engaged, and added that they were
proceeding to attack the enemy. Where were our main forces? The
Commander-in-Chief was for the first time in the war at the Admiralty,
whither he had been summoned to confer with the new First Sea Lord. The
Grand Fleet was at Lough Swilly in the North of Ireland. The 3rd Battle
Squadron was steaming through the Irish Channel. No part of the Grand
Fleet was nearer than Beatty and his battle cruisers: and these were as
far off as Cromarty. Whatever happened, we could not fight a general
action with our main Fleet till late on the following day. Meanwhile the
Harwich striking force, the Dover flotillas, Admiral Hood’s forces off
the Belgian coast and Admiral Burney’s Channel Fleet must do the best
they could. If the German demonstration off Yarmouth was the prelude or
concomitant to a serious attempt to break into the Channel, the very
greatest naval events would follow. The contingency, as the reader is
aware, had always been faced, and we were well aware that we should have
to wait for our revenge till the next day. Meanwhile there was nothing
to be done but to put all the fleets and flotillas on guard and in
motion with the double object of resisting to the utmost a German attack
to the southward and intercepting as speedily as possible from the North
the return of the enemy. Several hours of tension passed; and then
gradually it became clear that the German battle cruisers were returning
home at full speed, and that nothing else was apparently happening; and
the incredible conclusion forced itself upon us that the German
Admiralty had had no other purpose in hand than this silly demonstration
off Yarmouth beach.
This anticlimax was fatiguing. The experience of bracing ourselves to
the most tremendous events, and then finding nothing happen, was one
which we were compelled more than once to undergo at the Admiralty.
* * * * *
The new First Sea Lord was even more sure of the superiority of the
British line of battle over the enemy than I was, and in this his views
contrasted very sharply with those of the Commander-in-Chief. In full
agreement with Sir Arthur Wilson, he proposed on his assumption of
office to bring the Third Battle Squadron (the _King Edwards_) down to
Portland to increase our security against a German incursion into the
Channel; and he moved the Fifth Battle Squadron (the _Formidables_) with
the two _Lord Nelsons_ to Sheerness to provide battleship support for
the Harwich Striking Force, and to give an additional security against
raid or invasion. These movements were no sooner determined than news of
the Battle of Coronel was received (November 4), and we were forced to
make far more serious inroads upon Sir John Jellicoe’s command. The
battle cruisers _Inflexible_ and _Invincible_ were sent as described to
the Falklands: and Lord Fisher, as we have seen, demanded the _Princess
Royal_ for the Atlantic.
This last order produced continuous protests from Sir John Jellicoe, and
led to an interchange of telegrams and letters in which the
Commander-in-Chief dwelt upon every aspect of his dangers and weakness
and the Admiralty, while insisting on their decision, endeavoured to
reassure and placate him.
Our Dreadnought margin in home waters at the outbreak of war had been
just sufficient. Every ship was ready and in good order. We did not feel
that we could spare one. But after the first two months we were
compelled to send ships one at a time from each Battle Squadron down to
their home ports on the South Coast for refit. A regular system of
refits, as was foreseen, had to be instituted. This involved the
permanent absence of two or three of the most important vessels from the
Grand Fleet. The enemy, on the other hand, lying in his main base, could
always in theory be credited with having all his ships available at his
selected moment for battle. Before, however, the drain of refits came
upon us we had succeeded in reinforcing the Fleet by five fine ships, so
that we began the war at our maximum possible strength and always,
except for the briefest intervals, held or improved on that number.
The requirements of the Commander-in-Chief were, however, hard to meet.
The strategy on which we were all agreed, involved keeping the Grand
Fleet in distant northern waters and required very large forces of
destroyers and other light craft for its local security, and for its
service in battle. On the other hand, while no properly defended war
harbour had yet been created capable of holding the entire fleet,
various other bases had to be effectively guarded and patrolled, for
which separate flotillas must be supplied. If at any time from any
cause, two or three ships were absent from the Grand Fleet for a week or
two, the Commander-in-Chief drew severe comparisons between the German
Fleet and his own. He was a master of this kind of argument. From his
own side he deducted any ship which had any defect, however temporary,
however small—even defects which would not have prevented her from
taking her place in the line in an emergency. He sometimes also deducted
two or three of the most powerful battleships in the world which had
newly joined his command because they were not trained up to the full
level of efficiency of the others; and these were absolutely blotted out
as if they were of no value whatever.[90] He next proceeded to deal with
the enemy. He always credited them with several ships more than we now
know they had, or were then thought likely to have. In October, 1914, he
gave credence to a suggestion that the four German Dreadnoughts of the
_König_ class had been completely re-armed with 14–inch guns. In 1915
the size of these guns had advanced to 15–inch. I was on both occasions
compelled to set up expert committees to demolish these baseless
suppositions. Unable to deny that the British line of battle could fire
a broadside double in weight to that of the Germans, he developed a
skilful argument to prove that this advantage was more than counteracted
by other disadvantages arising from the superior displacement of
contemporary German ships. He dwelt on this even at a period when his
fleet had been reinforced by seven or eight additional units of enormous
power without any corresponding accession to the enemy’s strength.
One must admit, nevertheless, that the withdrawal of the _Princess
Royal_ inflicted a very serious injury upon the Battle Cruiser Squadron,
and that Sir David Beatty might have had to fight an action without any
margin of superiority during her absence. In this matter, however, Lord
Fisher entered the lists in person.
_First Sea Lord to Commander-in-Chief._
Personal.
_November 12, 1914._
I want to make it clear to you what the _Scharnhorst_ Squadron means
as regards our dispositions.
1. We have not heard of them since November 4.
2. They may adopt the following courses:—
(_a_) Go through Panama Canal, smash our West Indian Fleet and
release all the armed German liners from New York—hence the
_Princess Royal_.
(_b_) Go to south-east coast of America and stop our vital food
supplies—hence the two _Invincibles_.
(_c_) Go to the Cape and raid the Army base at Walfish Bay—hence the
_Minotaur_ to reinforce _Albion_.
(_d_) Go to Duala and relieve the Germans, destroying our ships and
military expedition—hence the _Warrior_, _Black Prince_ and
three _Edgar Quinets_.
I hope to send Bartolomé to you to-morrow with information which is
too secret to be written or telegraphed.
The secret information pointed to the possibility of the Germans
endeavouring to slip one or two of their battle cruisers into the
Atlantic to help the return to Germany of the _Scharnhorst_ and
_Gneisenau_ and incidentally to release all their fast liners in New
York. Lord Fisher became vehemently impressed with this idea, and
certainly the period was one of extreme strategic tension when some
enterprise by the enemy seemed especially to be expected.
_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief._
_November 13, 1914._
Since war began you have gained two Dreadnoughts on balance, and will
have by 20th twenty-seven superior units to twenty. We intend
_Princess Royal_ to rejoin you as soon as _Scharnhorst_ is dealt with.
During the next month you should suspend sending ships away for refit,
doing the best you can at Scapa. If notwithstanding the above you feel
the need of reinforcements we should propose to meet you by stationing
the eight _King Edwards_ at Rosyth, where they would be well placed to
join you for general action or to attack an invading force.
This would avoid necessity of stationing cruisers there for the
present.
If you agree the eight _King Edwards_ will be ordered to sail
to-night.
The Commander-in-Chief in reply asserted that the twenty-seven units
quoted included three ships, two of which had never fired a gun and the
third was only partially trained. He deprecated the Third Battle
Squadron being stationed at Rosyth, as without being covered by cruisers
or sea-going destroyers, it would run a great risk from mines and
submarines outside the limits of the port defence. He suggested that it
was preferable to keep them at Cromarty closely adjacent to the main
base where they would be covered by the cruisers of the Grand Fleet and
by the Destroyer Flotilla stationed at Cromarty.
The Admiralty, however, insisted on the Third Battle Squadron being
stationed at Rosyth.
_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief._
_November 16, 1914._
... The importance of preventing the enemy from making a serious
attack on our coast and getting away without being engaged makes it
imperative to have a force nearer the probable points of attack than
either Scapa Flow or Cromarty, which are practically the same distance
off. The coast has been so denuded of destroyers for the sake of
strengthening the force with you (amounting now to seventy-one
destroyers) that there is only a skeleton force of patrol vessels
available on the East Coast, amounting to three Scouts, twenty-three
Destroyers, twelve Torpedo Boats, between the Naze and St. Abbs Head,
a distance of 300 miles. In these circumstances we are reluctantly
compelled to decide on the _King Edwards_ and the Third Cruiser
Squadron going to Rosyth, and you should detach half a flotilla of the
seventy-one destroyers at Scapa Flow to act with them. We are sending
you a carefully compiled table of comparative strength of your Fleet
and the German High Sea Fleet, which makes it clear that without the
Third Battle Squadron you have such a preponderance of gun power that
with equal gunnery efficiency a successful result is ensured....
The Admiralty have in mind the importance of getting back the
_Princess Royal_ as soon as the situation admits. Your proposals as to
mining have been carefully considered, but the work done by our
submarines in the Bight has been of such importance that it is
undesirable to add to their dangers by laying mines whose positions
must be very uncertain. The Germans have no difficulty in sweeping any
channel they wish when they want to bring any of their ships out, and
do so daily. It would be very difficult for us to lay fresh lines in
any channels they sweep on account of the dangers to the mine-layers
from our own mines.
This and preceding telegrams expressed the deliberate views of the First
Sea Lord and Sir Arthur Wilson, and I was in the fullest agreement with
them.[91]
The Commander-in-Chief, however, urged that the 71 destroyers mentioned
by the Admiralty included 10 which were absent refitting, and pointed
out with justice that the 40 destroyers of the Harwich flotillas had
been omitted from those at the disposition of the Admiralty. He asked
particularly for reconsideration of the order to detach half a flotilla
with the Third Battle Squadron. Without these additional 12 destroyers
he stated that the safety of the Dreadnought Battle Fleet was seriously
endangered; a submarine attack on Scapa Flow was quite feasible and ‘as
I am directed to use this base, I trust I shall not be held responsible
for any disaster that may occur.’ He concluded by pointing out that the
relative strength of the High Sea Fleet and the Grand Fleet could not be
decided without reference to the cruiser and destroyer strength of the
two fleets: his comparative weakness in these essentials
counterbalanced, he declared, any battleship superiority he possessed
and made him anxious to be concentrated.
_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief._
_November 17, 1914._
We have carefully reviewed the position and given fullest
consideration to your wishes. We are confident that your fleet with
its cruisers and flotillas is strong enough for the definite task
entrusted to it. In view of the grave needs we have to meet elsewhere
we cannot reinforce you at present, nor alter our dispositions.
The 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers
should proceed to Rosyth as ordered. You have, of course, full
discretion to move your Fleet in any way necessary to provide for its
safety and enable you to meet the enemy, and are not tied to Scapa.
Every effort is being made to accelerate the completion of the
submarine defences.
The destroyer question was one of real difficulty. Although we had more
than double the sea-going strength of the German flotillas, we had so
much to guard, that we could not provide a superior force kept always
intact in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief for a great Fleet action.
‘I know perfectly well,’ wrote Sir John Jellicoe on December 4 to Lord
Fisher, ‘that the First and Third Flotillas [from Harwich] will not join
me in time.’... The Germans, he declared, would have eight flotillas
comprising 88 torpedo boat destroyers, all of which would certainly be
ready at the selected moment. ‘They have five torpedoes each: total 440
torpedoes—_unless I can strike at them first_.’ He himself might, he
claimed, fall as low as 32 or even 28. ‘You know,’ he added, ‘the
difficulty and objections to turning away from the enemy in a Fleet
action: but with such a menace I am bound to do it, unless my own
torpedo boat destroyers can stop or neutralise the movement.’ There was
no doubt that all the Commander-in-Chief’s thought fitted together into
one consistent whole and was the result of profound study and
reflection. Lord Fisher, however, remained obdurate. ‘I think we have to
stand fast,’ he wrote to me, enclosing Sir John Jellicoe’s letter. ‘The
Tyrwhitt mob and our oversea submarines are our sole aggressive force in
the South.’ He proposed however to put one of the Harwich flotillas in
the Humber. ‘We wait your return before action[92]—Humber and Harwich
each 290 miles from Heligoland—but the complete flotilla at the Humber
is very much nearer Jellicoe, and so a salve to him in reply to
enclosed. As A. K. Wilson observed a moment ago, both he and I would
probably have written exactly the same letter as Jellicoe _trying to get
all we could_! Yours till death, F.’
This was a wearing discussion, and no one can blame the
Commander-in-Chief for expressing his anxieties and endeavouring to keep
his command up to the highest strength. I always tried to sustain him in
every possible way. His powerful orderly brain, his exact and
comprehensive knowledge, enabled him to develop and perfect in this
first year of the war the mighty organisation of the Grand Fleet. He
bore with constancy the many troubles and perplexities of the early
months. His fine sailorlike qualities made him always ready night or day
to take his whole gigantic Fleet to sea, and he was never so happy as
when he was at sea. Even when I did not share his outlook, I sympathised
with his trials. The opinions of Lord Fisher at this period upon the
margin of strength required for the Grand Fleet were, as will be seen,
in sharp contrast with those he expressed at a later period during the
operations at the Dardanelles. Personally I always considered our line
of battle amply superior; nor did I believe the Germans would be able to
bring out at a given moment all the 88 torpedo boats with which Sir John
Jellicoe always credited them. We now know the actual forces which the
enemy assembled on December 16 of this same year, on the occasion when
the whole High Sea Fleet made almost the most ambitious sortie into the
North Sea which its history records. There were 13 Dreadnought
battleships and 4 battle cruisers, total 17 Dreadnoughts instead of the
20 which were completed and which the Admiralty counted as available;
and 53 torpedo boats in place of the Commander-in-Chief’s 88. Against
this Sir John Jellicoe had (until refits were reopened at the end of
November) 27 superior units (subject to what he says about them); and as
many of the 71 destroyers as were fit for sea on any given day. The
Germans also took to sea on December 16 a squadron of 8
pre-Dreadnoughts, and against this our Third Battle Squadron, which had
been rightly restored to the Grand Fleet, was a proper and superior
provision. This balance of strength represents the period of our
greatest strain in Home waters and all over the world.
At this, as at all other times, the Admiralty would have welcomed a
general battle. An attack by seaplanes launched from carrying ships upon
the Zeppelin sheds near Cuxhaven, was planned by us for November 22. On
the 20th we telegraphed to Sir John Jellicoe:—
‘Our reliable German information and also our telegram No. 338 to you
shows, firstly, concentration of German cruisers, battle cruisers and
battleships in Weser and Elbe; and secondly, disposal of their
submarines to hunt in the Shetlands and English Channel. In these
favourable circumstances the aerial attack on Cuxhaven Zeppelin sheds,
which we had previously planned and considered desirable in itself,
might easily bring on a considerable action in which your battle
cruisers and the Grand Fleet might take part without undue risk from
German submarines.
‘We suggest for your consideration Tyrwhitt and aeroplanes attacking
on Monday at daybreak, with you supporting him from the northward with
whatever force is necessary, if the enemy respond to the challenge.
Further, if it should prove, as some reliable information indicates,
that the enemy is preparing an offensive raid or sortie himself, our
movement would bring on a collision at the outset unexpected and
disconcerting to him.’
The Commander-in-Chief, after some discussion, preferred Tuesday
daybreak for the attack, as the longer notice would enable him to finish
certain repairing work. The Admiralty plans were altered accordingly. We
telegraphed on the 21st:—
‘We consider the present a good occasion for a sweep southward by the
Grand Fleet. The seaplane attack is incidental and subsidiary, though
very desirable in itself. It may bring on an action now that the
German Fleet is concentrated near Wilhelmshaven, and their cruisers
and battle cruisers are active. It will frustrate any offensive
movement they may intend, as reported.... Tuesday, 24th, at 5.30 a.m.,
will be the time.’
No result was, however, achieved. Sir John Jellicoe brought the Battle
Fleet down into the centre of the North Sea about 180 miles from
Heligoland, with the battle-cruisers about 40 miles nearer. But in the
weather prevailing the seaplanes could hardly get off the water; and the
Germans remained unaware of our movements and without any plans of their
own. The episode shows however the underlying confidence of the
Admiralty and of the Commander-in-Chief in the strength of the Grand
Fleet even during this time of strain.
To add to the distractions of this hard month of November, 1914, an
invasion scare took a firm hold of the military and naval authorities.
It was argued by the War Office that the lull on the fighting fronts
would enable the Germans to spare large numbers of good troops—250,000
if necessary—for the invasion of Great Britain. Lord Kitchener directed
all defensive preparations to be made, and Lord Fisher threw himself
into the task with gusto. Although, as the reader is aware, I was
sceptical on this subject, I felt that the precautions were justifiable,
and would at any rate add interest to the life of our coast and Home
defence forces. I therefore allowed myself to succumb to the suppressed
excitement which grew throughout the highest circles, and did my utmost
to aid and speed our preparations. We stationed as described the 3rd
Battle Squadron at the Forth, brought the 2nd Fleet to the Thames,
disposed the old _Majestic_ battleships in the various harbours along
the East Coast, arranged block ships to be sunk, and laid mines to be
exploded, at the proper time in the mouths of our undefended harbours;
while the whole coastal watch, military, aerial and marine, throbbed
with activity. The Army arrangements were complicated by the fact that
some of the divisions which were sufficiently trained to be used to
repel the invaders, had lent their rifles to those that were undergoing
training, and these rifles had to be collected and redistributed as a
part of the procedure prescribed for the supreme emergency. To such
expedients were we reduced! However, the Germans remained absolutely
quiescent; the tides and moon, which for some days before November 20
were exceptionally favourable to nocturnal landings, ceased to present
these conditions, and the sense of some great impending event gradually
faded from our minds.
_Lord Fisher to Mr. Churchill._
_7 a.m., November 21, 1914._
An angel’s sleep! In Heaven from 9 till now!
It WAS kind of you not to wake me with Grey’s credible witness!
Let us entreat and urge Kitchener to send a hundred thousand men AT
ONCE to Flanders, and warn Joffre not to be ‘two divisions too few and
two days too late!’ Kitchener’s balance of 160,000 men will amply
suffice and the ‘Ides of March’ have passed! The waning moon and
dawning tide [dawn high-tide] will not recur till days following
December 10. _Do write to him accordingly, or shall I?_
It has been a splendid ‘dress rehearsal,’ tell him, and very
reassuring—his mass of men and his mobile guns! We MUST press him to
send 100,000 men to Flanders....
On November 20 General Joffre asked for further naval co-operation on
the Belgian coast.
‘General Foch,’ he stated, ‘reports that for some little time the
French or English ships have no longer been participating in the
action of our forces in the neighbourhood of Nieuport. On account of
very violent bombardment by the enemy in this region, it would be
advantageous if the ships could attack the numerous German batteries
established to the east of the mouth of the Yser. I should be glad if
you would notify the Ministry of Marine, and the Admiralty, of this
situation, in order to obtain a more active co-operation on the part
of the squadron between Nieuport and Ostend.’
We were able to send the old battleship _Revenge_, whose guns had been
specially re-mounted for long range fire, and several smaller vessels
under Admiral Hood, and the naval bombardment of the German right was
effectively resumed. ‘The conditions on the coast,’ Hood, however,
reported on the 22nd, ‘are quite different from what they were during
the first few days. To-day there was a heavy fire from guns I could not
locate or damage. No troops are ever visible. The inundation has stopped
their movement.’
To the situation of strain and effort which gripped us during November
came the welcome relief of the victory at the Falklands. Lord Fisher
received it with a moderated satisfaction.
‘We cannot,’ he wrote to me on December 10, ‘but be overjoyed at the
_Monmouth_ and _Good Hope_ being avenged! But let us be
self-restrained—_not too exultant!—till we know details! Perhaps their
guns never reached us!_ (We had so few casualties!) We know THEIR
gunnery was excellent! Their THIRD salvo murdered Cradock! So it may
have been like shooting pheasants: the pheasants not shooting back!
Not too much glory for us, only great satisfaction. Not a battle for a
Poet Laureate! _Let us wait and hear before we crow!_ Then again, it
may be a wonder why the cruisers escaped—if they have escaped—I hope
not, for we had such a preponderating force—such numbers! (_How the
Glasgow must have enjoyed it!_) Anyhow, don’t let us encourage
ourselves in too many joy messages till we know more.’
But I made haste to ascribe to him all the credit that was his due.
_December 10._
This was your show and your luck.
I should only have sent one Greyhound[93] and _Defence_. This would
have done the trick.
But it was a niggling coup. Your _flair_ was quite true. Let us have
some more victories together, and confound all our foes abroad—and
(don’t forget) at home.
This delighted the Admiral, and in his reply (December 11) he threw a
friendly light upon other fields of activity than those with which this
chapter has been concerned.
Your letter _pleasant_! There is another _quite lovely scheme_! _I_ am
to be praised so as to get ‘swelled head’ and think myself ignored by
you, and to be in your shoes! It is all too sweet for words! It is
palpably transparent! I was told of this yesterday! It really _is
curious_ why they so hate you! I think I told you what G—— said, that
though he abhorred me, yet ... I have splendid friends in the Tory
camp!
A cause of difference, however, soon arose between us. The First Sea
Lord was displeased with Sir Doveton Sturdee for not having succeeded in
destroying the German light cruiser _Dresden_ with the rest, and he
searchingly criticised that Admiral’s dispositions after the action. He
wished to leave Admiral Sturdee in South American waters till the
_Dresden_ was hunted down. As it was imperative that the _Invincible_
and _Inflexible_ should come home at once, such a decision would have
entailed transferring Admiral Sturdee’s flag to the _Carnarvon_, and
leaving him with a command scarcely suited to his rank and standing, and
woefully out of harmony with his recent achievement. I was obliged to
veto this proposal, and Lord Fisher was for some time much vexed at my
decision.
The First Sea Lord also made the disquieting suggestion that the Germans
might slip a battle cruiser like the _Derfflinger_ through our blockade
in the long winter nights and fall upon the returning _Invincible_ and
_Inflexible_, who had fired away three-quarters of their ammunition. I
was greatly disturbed at this, and hastened to the Chief of the Staff.
But Admiral Oliver was not often found improvident. He had already
several weeks before sent the battleship _Vengeance_ with a quarter
outfit for both vessels to St. Vincent, where it awaited them.
* * * * *
In spite of their anxieties, November and December were months of
rapidly growing power to the Navy. The variety and scope of Admiralty
business extended continually, and the number of important directions to
be given increased every week. The reader who is further interested
should study in the Appendix the selection of First Lord’s Minutes which
I have thought it worth while to print.[94] From these original
documents, conceived under the pressure of events, a truer idea can be
formed of what was passing than from much description.
In no part of our work did Lord Fisher and I act together in greater
harmony than in the realm of new construction.
The first task of the Admiralty in naval construction on the outbreak of
war was to accelerate the completion of all the warships which were
building in Great Britain, and according to the schemes we had had
prepared before the war, extreme priority was to be assigned to vessels
which could be finished within six months. On this basis we proceeded
during the first three months. When it became clear that the war would
not be ended one way or the other by the first main decisions on land,
and that the sea battle was indefinitely deferred, I extended this
original period, and we adopted the principle ‘Everything that can be
finished in 1915, and nothing that can’t.’
This brought very large numbers of vessels into the accelerated class
and, of course, opened the way for a considerable new construction of
submarines, destroyers and even light cruisers. There had already been
ordered when Lord Fisher arrived at the Admiralty a score of new
destroyers and submarines, in addition to all the pre-war vessels under
accelerated construction.
The yards were therefore full of work, and care was needed not to impede
current construction by new orders. Lord Fisher, however, brought a very
great surge of impulse to this sphere of our activities. It was a moment
when megalomania was a virtue. Some progress had already been made on
two of the British battleships of the programme of 1914–15. The First
Sea Lord at once demanded to make them into battle-cruisers, sacrificing
two more guns in each in order to get the immense speed for which he
thirsted. I agreed to this, although it involved some delay; and the
_Repulse_ and the _Renown_ were redesigned accordingly.
The construction of submarines was more urgent. I was not alarmed about
the immediate position, although all sorts of rumours were afoot.
Naval Intelligence Division.
_November 7, 1914._
With reference to your report of yesterday, apparently attaching
credence to a statement that from 100 to 200 small submarines have
been manufactured secretly in Germany, have you considered how many
trained officers and personnel this important flotilla would require?
What evidence is there at your disposal to show that the Germans have
trained this number of submarine captains and officers? I have always
understood that their flotilla of submarines before the war did not
exceed 27. There is no personnel that requires more careful training
than the submarine personnel. All the experience of our officers shows
that a submarine depends for its effectiveness mainly upon its
captain. The function of the Intelligence Division is not merely to
collect and pass on the Munchausen tales of spies and untrustworthy
agents, but carefully to sift and scrutinise the intelligence they
receive, and in putting it forward to indicate the degree of
probability which attaches to it. It appears to me impossible that any
large addition to the German submarine force can be made for many
months to come. Even if the difficulties of material were overcome
those of personnel would impose an absolute limit. It is very likely
that a few small portable submarines have been prepared for coast
work.
W. S. C.
But the future already contained its menaces. I greeted Fisher on his
arrival with the following minutes, the first two of which were
addressed to his predecessor:—
Secretary.
Third Sea Lord.
_October 13, 1914._
Please state exactly what is the total submarine programme now
sanctioned by the Cabinet or under construction in the various yards.
What measures can be adopted for increasing the number of submarines?
Is it possible to let further contracts for submarines on a fifteen
months’ basis? It is indispensable that the whole possible plant for
submarine construction should be kept at the fullest pressure night
and day.
W. S. C.
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Naval Secretary.
_October 28, 1914._
Please propose without delay the largest possible programme of
submarine boats to be delivered in from 12 to 24 months from the
present time. You should assume for this purpose that you have control
of all sources of manufacture required for submarines, that there is
no objection to using Vickers’ drawings, and that steam engines may be
used to supplement oil engines. You should exert every effort of
ingenuity and organisation to secure the utmost possible delivery. As
soon as your proposals are ready, which should be in the next few
days, they can be considered at a conference of the Sea Lords. The
Cabinet must be satisfied that the absolute maximum output is being
worked to in submarines. We may be sure that Germany is doing this.
Third Sea Lord’s department must therefore act with the utmost vigour,
and not be deterred by the kind of difficulties which hamper action in
time of peace.
W. S. C.
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Third Sea Lord.
_October 30, 1914._
More important than the deliveries of battleships is the acceleration
of light cruisers and submarines. With regard to light cruisers, it
ought not to take more than one year to construct _Castor_,
_Inconstant_, _Cambria_ and _Canterbury_. What is the present position
of these ships? Have they been begun yet? Proposals should be made
which secure their delivery before the end of 1915.
2. Proposals should also be made to accelerate _Royalist_,
_Cleopatra_, _Champion_, and _Carysfort_, _Conquest_, and _Calliope_,
so as to obtain deliveries in February. This will only be possible by
working night and day in three 8–hour shifts on all these vessels,
arranging with other firms not concerned in their construction to lend
the necessary men.
3. All the “M” Class destroyers to be delivered in August, 1915,
should be pushed forward into April and May. There is surely no reason
why this cannot be done. Firms who will undertake to complete their
vessels by this date could be immediately given another order for a
repeat ship, so that there would be no fear of dislocation of their
business. Let me have proposals on this.
4. Submarines F2, F3, G6, G8, G15, G9, G7, G10, to G13, and G1, to G5,
all ought to be delivered before the end of 1915. There is an
extraordinary gap after G4, when for 6 months we do not receive a
single new submarine, and in 12 months we only receive 2. This is
shocking, and must be bridged at all costs.
Pray let me have further proposals after such conferences as may be
necessary with the firms concerned.
W. S. C.
Lord Fisher hurled himself into this business with explosive energy. He
summoned around him all the naval constructors and shipbuilding firms in
Britain, and in four or five glorious days, every minute of which was
pure delight to him, he presented me with schemes for a far greater
construction of submarines, destroyers and small craft than I or any of
my advisers had ever deemed possible. Mr. Schwab was at that time
passing through England on his return to the United States. We invited
him to the Admiralty; and he undertook to build twenty-four
submarines—twelve in Canada and twelve in the United States—the bulk of
which were to be completed in the hitherto incredibly short period of
six months. I arranged a system of heavy bonuses for early delivery.
These large negotiations were completed and the subsequent work was
carried out with wonderful thoroughness and punctuality by the immense
organisation of the Bethlehem Steel Company. One evening, as Lord
Fisher, Mr. Schwab and I sat round the octagonal table in the Admiralty,
after a long discussion on the submarine contracts, we asked Mr. Schwab,
‘Have you got anything else that will be of use to us?’ He thereupon
told us that he had four turrets carrying two 14–inch guns each which
had almost been completed for the Greek battleship _Salamis_ then
building in Germany for Greece. We set our hearts on these; and I had an
idea. The reader will remember the three small monitors building for
Brazil, which although no one could see any use for them at the time, I
had decided to take over at the outbreak of war. The operations on the
Belgian Coast had shown their value. I suggested to Lord Fisher that we
should buy these 14–inch turrets and build monitors to carry them. The
Admiral was delighted with the plan, and in a few hours he was closeted
with his constructors designing the vessels. In all our correspondence
we referred to them as the _Styx_ class.
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
_December 11, 1914._
We ought without delay to order more ‘Styx’ class for heavy inshore
work. There are, for instance, the four reserve 13.5–inch guns of the
_Audacious_, which should certainly be mounted in new monitors. It
should also be possible to draw from the reserve of 15–inch guns, and
to make in a short time 15–inch or 18–inch howitzers. We require now
to make ships which can be built in 6 or 7 months at the outside, and
which can certainly go close in shore and attack the German Fleet in
its harbours. These are special vessels built for a definite war
operation, and we must look to them in default of a general action for
giving us the power of forcing a naval decision at the latest in the
autumn of 1915.
Our thought is proceeding independently on the same lines. I propose,
as a basis of discussion, that in addition to the 4 Schwab monitors,
we prepare 8 more at a cost of not more than £700,000 apiece. These
vessels should be armed either with 13·5–inch or 15–inch guns, two or
four in each as convenient. Or, alternatively, they should be armed
with four 18–inch howitzers in separate cupolas sunk low on their
heavily-armoured turtle backs. They should draw 8 feet at most, and be
propelled entirely by internal combustion at a speed not exceeding 10
knots; no funnels; three or four alternative telescopic masts for fire
observation; strong crinolines 20 feet away all round to make them
immune from mine or torpedo, etc....
W. S. C.
We soon embarked on an extensive scheme of monitor building.
Besides making four monitors to carry the American 14–inch gun turrets,
we took two spare 15–inch gun turrets which had been prepared for two of
the furthest-off new battleships (now converted into battle-cruisers),
and eight 12–inch gun turrets out of four ‘Majestics,’ which we laid up;
and with these and the American guns we armed no less than fourteen
monitors, namely, two with two 15–inch guns, four with two 14–inch guns,
and eight with two 12–inch guns apiece. Lord Fisher then went on and
pulled the 9·2–inch guns out of the old ‘Edgars’ and mounted them in
fourteen small monitors, drawing 6 feet 6 inches of water; and ten
6–inch guns[95] were mounted in still smaller monitors drawing 5 feet 11
inches. We also built later on twelve large river gunboats capable of
being transported by rail for service on the Danube, if we ever got
there, and twelve small river gunboats, or baby monitors, for service on
the Tigris and the Euphrates. The bulk of the large monitors were
constructed in Belfast with extraordinary celerity by Harland & Wolff
and their sturdy ardent men. We also prepared 240 lighters with steel
shields and internal combustion engines for landing troops under fire.
Thus in the autumn of 1914, under various programmes culminating in the
great Fisher impetus, we set on foot the following enormous Fleet, all
due to complete by the end of 1915:—
Battleships and Battle cruisers of the greatest power 7
Light cruisers 12
Destroyers of the largest class and leaders 65
Oversea submarines 40
Coastal submarines 22
Monitors—
Heavy 18
Medium 14
Light 5
Sloops and smaller anti-submarine vessels 107
Motor launches 60
Ex-lighters with internal combustion engines 240
This tremendous new Navy, for it was nothing less, was a providential
aid to the Admiralty when more than two years later the real German
submarine attack began. Its creation on such a scale is one of the
greatest services which the nation has owed to the genius and energy of
Lord Fisher. Probably Fisher in all his long life never had a more
joyous experience than this great effort of new construction. No man
knew better than he how to put war thought into a ship. Shipbuilding had
been the greatest passion of his life. Here were all the yards of
Britain at his disposal and every Treasury barrier broken down.
Of the battle-cruisers _Repulse_ and _Renown_, and still more of the
light battle-cruisers _Courageous_, _Furious_ and _Glorious_, to which I
consented four months later in circumstances which will be narrated in
their place, it must be said that they were an old man’s children.
Although possessing many marvellous qualities never hitherto combined in
a ship of war, they were light in the bone; and the Navy always
considered them wanting in the structural strength and armour which the
new conditions of war more than ever required. None the less, their
parent loved them dearly and always rallied with the utmost vehemence
when any slur was cast upon their qualities.
I presided over all this process in November and December with the
greatest admiration for the First Sea Lord, but with some misgivings on
the score of expense. I was not yet satisfied that the war would be
prolonged beyond 1915, and I did not wish to draw away from the armies
men or material which might be needed in their service. Not until April,
1915, when the failure of Russia as a decisive factor became final, did
I authorise a further extension of view to December 31, 1916, and agree
to plans for additional new construction being made within that limit.
Meanwhile I endeavoured to satisfy Lord Fisher as best I could. I
pointed out to him repeatedly that from some points of view a ship
finished twelve months before the end of the war was worth twelve times
as much as a ship finished one month before its end, and urged
continuously that vessels nearest completion must in no way suffer. He
was, however, very difficult to feed. In a day he would sketch the
design of a capital ship. In a week he would devour a programme and come
back asking for more. A tit-bit like an 18–inch experimental gun which I
suggested he should make, was snapped up the moment it was mentioned. ‘I
will put it in a light cruiser and drive her 40 knots,’ he cried. ‘Hit
how you like, when you like, where you like.’ This was his theme; but
what about his doctrine ‘Armour is vision’? However, I backed him up all
I could. He was far more often right than wrong, and his drive and
life-force made the Admiralty quiver like one of his great ships at its
highest speed.