THE GRAND FLEET AND THE SUBMARINE ALARM
October and November, 1914
‘Silence is the secret of war.’
PRIOR.
The Grand Fleet and the Submarine Alarm—The Harbour
Peril—Anti-Submarine Defences—Unwarranted
Reproaches—Correspondence with Sir John Jellicoe—Telegrams—Sir
David Beatty’s Letter of October 17—Exertions of the
Admiralty—Decisions of November 2—The Loss of the
_Audacious_—Suppression of the News—The Hard Days of October and
November, 1914—Public and Political Unrest—‘What _is_ the Navy
doing?’—Retirement of Prince Louis of Battenberg—The Return of
Lord Fisher—Fisher and Wilson—Rear-Admiral Oliver becomes Chief of
the Staff—The New Admiralty War Group—The Perpetual Clock—The Port
and Starboard Lights.
All the anxieties recorded in the last chapter faded before our
preoccupations about the Fleet. Indeed, the alarums and excursions on
the Belgian Coast were at times almost a relief compared to the stress
of our prime responsibilities. Everything depended upon the Fleet, and
during these same months of October and November the Fleet was
disquieted about the very foundations of its being. There lay the mighty
ships; every man, from stoker to Admiral, was ready to die at his duty
at any moment; no personal or individual fear found foothold. Still, at
the summit from which we watched, one could feel a new and heart-shaking
sensation. The Grand Fleet was uneasy. She could not find a
resting-place except at sea. Conceive it, the _ne plus ultra_, the one
ultimate sanction of our existence, the supreme engine which no one had
dared to brave, whose authority encircled the globe—no longer sure of
itself. The idea had got round—‘_the German submarines were coming after
them into the harbours_.’
On the South Coast no one would have minded. You could go inside the
Portland breakwater and literally shut the door. On the East Coast no
such absolutely sealed harbour existed. But Scapa was believed to be
protected by its currents from submarine attack. Destroyers no doubt
could attack it—if they cared to run the very serious risk of the long
daylight passage, to and fro, across the North Sea: but no one, we had
believed, could take a submarine _submerged_ through the intricate and
swirling channels. Now, all of a sudden, the Grand Fleet began to see
submarines in Scapa Flow. Two or three times the alarm was raised. The
climax came on October 17. Guns were fired, destroyers thrashed the
waters, and the whole gigantic Armada put to sea in haste and dudgeon.
Of course there never was a German submarine in Scapa. None during the
whole war achieved the terrors of the passage. One was destroyed in the
outer approaches towards the end of November in circumstances which
remained a mystery to the enemy. At the very end of the war in November,
1918, after the mutiny of the German fleet, a German submarine manned
entirely by officers seeking to save their honour, perished in a final
desperate effort. Thus none ever penetrated the lair of the Grand Fleet.
But nevertheless the mere apprehension of submarines attacking the
sleeping ships on which all else reposed, was sufficient in the winter
of 1914 to destroy that sense of security which every Fleet demands when
in its own war harbours.
Up till the end of September, 1914, no one seriously contemplated
hostile submarines in time of war entering the war harbours of either
side and attacking the ships at anchor. To achieve this the submarine
would have to face all the immense difficulties of making its way up an
estuary or inlet amid shoal water and intricate navigation, submerged
all the time and with only an occasional glimpse through the periscope;
secondly while doing this, to avoid all the patrolling craft which for
many miles kept watch and ward on the approaches; thirdly, to brave the
unknown and unknowable terrors of mines and obstructions of all sorts,
with which it must be assumed the channels would become increasingly
infested. It was thought that these deterrents would prove effectual.
Looking back on the events in the light of after-knowledge, we can see
now that this assumption was correct. There is no recorded instance of a
German submarine having penetrated into any British war harbour. The
British submarine service was certainly not inferior in enterprise to
the Germans, and from the very first hours of the War our boats were in
the Heligoland Bight; but no British submarine officer attempted
actually to penetrate a German war harbour or run actually into the
mouths of the Elbe, the Jade, the Weser or the Ems. The nearest
approaches to such an enterprise were the numerous passages of the
Dardanelles made by the British submarines, beginning at the end of
December with the heroic exploits of Commander Holbrook. For these feats
the submarines were able to start only a few miles from the mouth of the
Dardanelles and, diving along a very deep channel over two miles wide,
succeeded again and again in entering the Sea of Marmora. This was not
comparable to penetrating a British war harbour or river-mouth; and it
did not occur until experience of the war capabilities of submarines had
much increased.
During August and September the Admiralty made most strenuous efforts to
increase the protection of our bases in Scotland and upon the East Coast
by mounting guns, by posting guardships, by placing obstructions, by
preparing booms, by laying torpedo nets. But the danger against which
these defences were designed in those months, was primarily not the
submarine, but a regular attack by enemy destroyers on the fleet or
squadrons at anchor, or, secondly, a raid by cruisers upon bases in the
temporary absence of the fleet. It was not until the middle or end of
September that increasing knowledge and evidences of the power of the
largest submarines under war conditions, fostered the idea that the
German submarines might actually enter our northern war harbours at the
Forth, at Cromarty, and at Scapa Flow. Once this idea took root, it
became a grave preoccupation. Precautions taken against a rush of
torpedo boats, were clearly insufficient to stop a vessel which might
dive under booms and past protecting guns.
Reproach has been levelled at the Admiralty for not having accurately
measured this danger before the war and taken proper precautions against
it. It would have been very difficult, even had the danger been
foreseen, to find out under peace conditions what actually would or
would not stop a submarine. No one in peace time could have ordered a
submarine crew to run such awful risks. It would have been a matter of
enormous expense to create a vast system of booms with deep nets and
other obstructions for the defence of all our northern harbours. I
should have had the very greatest difficulty in coming to the Cabinet
and Parliament with such a demand during 1913 and 1914. Not only was
every penny of naval expenditure challenged, but this particular
expenditure would have been clearly of a most alarmist character, would
have been taken to indicate the imminence of war, and would have been
stigmatised as a provocation to the only Power to whom it could have
relation. Still, if the Sea Lords and the Naval Staff had recommended
solidly and as a matter of prime importance the provision of these great
obstructive works in the Humber, at the Forth, at Cromarty, and at
Scapa, it would have been my duty to go forward. But no such
recommendation was made to me or pressed upon me by the naval experts in
the years preceding the War, no doubt for the reasons which I have
described, namely that they did not think the danger had yet assumed a
sufficiently practical form to justify such extraordinary measures. It
certainly does not lie with anyone who was a member of the then Board of
Admiralty to level such reproaches.
Sir John Jellicoe’s book, although no doubt not intended for such a
purpose, has been made a foundation for several reflections upon our
pre-war arrangements in this respect. He recounts the dangers to which
his Fleet was subjected; but had he, either as Controller or Second Sea
Lord, foreseen these dangers, he would of course have warned his
colleagues and his chief. It is clear therefore that if the Admiralty is
to be criticised in this respect, it would be unfair to cite him as an
authority.
Moreover, this submarine danger was one which did not in fact
materialise at the outbreak of war. Six months later the position was
different. The enterprise and the skill of submarine commanders had
greatly grown, and all sorts of possibilities never previously envisaged
came successively into view. But by that time the submarines had to face
a very different set of obstructions. By the time they were convinced of
the possibility, the possibility had disappeared.
It seemed real enough, however, in the month of October, 1914. The booms
and obstructions which were everywhere being improvised were not
complete or only partially in position, while the danger had begun to
take full shape in the minds both of the Fleet and of the Admiralty.
There was nothing to be done but to await the completion of the booms
and obstructions, and meanwhile to keep the Fleet as far as possible out
of harm’s way. It really only felt safe when it was at sea. There,
steaming in the broad waters, the Grand Fleet was herself again: but
this involved a great strain on officers, men and machinery and a large
consumption of fuel.
On September 30 Sir John Jellicoe wrote to me on the general Fleet
position. He pointed out that Germany had got a lead over us in oversea
submarines, that we always expected that the preliminary stages of a
modern naval war would be a battle of the small craft, and that the
question of keeping heavy ships out of the North Sea altogether, until
the small craft menace had been reduced, had been frequently discussed.
He thought it suicidal to forego our advantageous position in big ships
by risking them in waters infested by submarines. He was of opinion that
the submarine had a very limited sphere of action, could not hurt our
oversea commerce (at that time this was true), nor could they help their
own ships to get in. He proposed therefore to use the Battle Fleet far
to the North, spread to intercept trade. We had not nearly sufficient
cruisers to form the double line that was really necessary to stop all
ships during the short days and long nights. It was perfectly easy, he
said, to run through the line at night, as its approximate positions
soon got known and could not be much varied. But with the Battle Fleet
helping in waters free from the submarine danger, one could make much
more certain. This, however, entailed giving up the idea of southerly
Battle Fleet movements. He suggested that the French submarines as well
as our own should be employed on the probable paths of the German
submarines. He emphasised the importance of fitting a number of our
trawlers with wireless installations. He desired me to show this letter
to the First Sea Lord and to know whether we were in agreement with his
views, whether steps would be taken to establish a trawler patrol, and
whether the idea of utilising the Grand Fleet effectively to shut up the
Northern entrance to the North Sea was approved. He concluded by urging
the hastening of the submarine defences for Scapa.
In reply I wrote, on the day of my return from Antwerp:—
_October 8, 1914._
I am in full agreement with your letter. No change in principle is
required in the naval policy to which we have steadily adhered since
1911. The main point is to secure the safety of the British Fleet
during the long and indefinite period of waiting for a general action.
The phase in which raids up to 10,000 or 20,000 men were dangerous or
would have had an object has passed. A very considerable, though no
doubt incomplete, watch over the Heligoland debouches is being
maintained by our oversea submarines. It is not necessary, as manœuvre
experience had suggested, to traverse the waters of the North Sea with
the Battle Fleet with any degree of frequency. Such movements should
only be undertaken for some definite, grave and primary purpose.
Occasional sweeps by cruisers in different directions, and avoiding
anything like routine patrolling, are all that is necessary in present
circumstances. In order to secure the greatest amount of rest and
security for the Fleet, and the maintenance of the highest efficiency
both of the steaming and fighting of its ships, you are justified in
using occasional anchorages even more remote than Scapa and Loch Ewe;
but on this you should make proposals officially. You need not fear
that by these withdrawals you will miss a chance of bringing the
German Battle Fleet to action. If that ever comes out it will be with
some definite tactical object—for instance, to cover the landing of an
invading force, to break the line of blockade to the northward in
order to let loose battle-cruisers on to the trade routes, or simply
for the purpose of obtaining a naval decision by fighting a battle. In
the first two of these cases you would have the time to come round and
meet or intercept them before their operation was completed; in the
third instance, their wishes would be the same as yours.
The Committee of Imperial Defence have again considered the question
of invasion in the light of the experience of the first two months of
the war. The War Office have pointed out that although no troops can
be spared by Germany in the present active state of the land war on
all frontiers, it is possible that in the winter a deadlock may arise
in both the Eastern and Western theatres, when the Germans might find
it possible or useful to create a diversion by attempting to throw a
regular invading army across the North Sea. In the Admiralty opinion
the difficulties of such a task have been in no wise diminished by
anything we have learnt since the war began. We think it is useless to
discuss such matters in general terms, and we are sure that a detailed
study of a concrete plan of landing, say, 150,000 men will prove fatal
to such ideas. In this connection it must be remembered that the war
has shown the absolute reliance of the Germans upon their artillery,
without which they would cease to be formidable. The landing of great
quantities of artillery and the maintenance of an ammunition supply,
are operations which, even if every other part of the enemy’s plan had
succeeded, could not be maintained without giving ample time for the
intervention of your Fleet in decisive force. Further, if the Germans
could spare 150,000 of their best troops for the invasion of England
during a deadlock, a similar number would be released from our side,
and it is obvious that even pushing this argument to its most extreme
conclusion, we could transport our men back across the Channel with
the command of the sea much more swiftly and surely than the Germans
could bring theirs across the much wider distances of the North Sea in
the face of a greatly superior naval force. All that would have
resulted from the success of this most perilous operation on the part
of Germany, would be to transfer the fighting of a certain number of
Army Corps from the Continent to the British islands, under
circumstances unfavourable in the extreme to the Germans, and
favourable in every way to our troops; with the certainty that the
Germans could not be reinforced, while we could be reinforced to
almost any extent, and that unless the Germans were immediately
successful before their ammunition was expended, the whole force to
the last man must be killed or made prisoners of war. I therefore see
no reason why this contingency, any more than that of raids, should
force the Battle Fleet to keep a station of danger during the winter
months. The power of the superior Fleet is exerted with equal effect
over the longer distances, and in fact pervades all the waters of the
world.
With regard to anchorages you have only to make your proposals and we
will do our best to equip with anti-submarine nets, lights, and guns
the places which you may wish to use. It is of importance that these
should be varied, absolute safety lying much more in the uncertainty
attending the movements of the Grand Fleet than in any passive or
fixed defence of any particular place. We must not be led into
frittering away resources by keeping half a dozen anchorages in a
state of semi-defence, and so far as possible we must organise a
movable defence of guardships, trawlers, patrolling yachts,
minesweepers, destroyers with towing charges, and seaplanes, which can
move while the Fleet is at sea and prepare the new resting-place for
its reception.
The employment of a portion or occasionally of the whole of the Battle
Fleet, to supplement the Northern Blockade from time to time is a
matter on which you must be the judge. A large part of your time must
necessarily be spent cruising at sea, and this being so the cruising
should be made as useful as possible. Here, again, anything in the
nature of routine or regular stations would be dangerous, and would,
after a while, draw upon you, even in remote northern waters, the
danger of submarine attack.
The enemy in my judgment pursues a wise policy in declining battle. By
remaining in harbour he secures for Germany the command of the Baltic,
with all that that implies, both in threatening the Russian flank and
protecting the German Coast, and in drawing supplies from Sweden and
Norway. This is an immense advantage to the Germans, and is the best
use to which in present circumstances they can turn their Fleet. It is
to secure the eventual command of the Baltic that British naval
operations must tend. I have already pointed out, in the papers which
I showed you, the three alternative conditions[76] [the defeat of the
German Fleet: the breaking of the Kiel Canal: or the effective
blocking in of the Heligoland Bight] under which this would be
possible, and I hope that proceeding on the assumption that one of
these conditions exist you will make a study of the actual method by
which the entrance to the Baltic could be effected when the time
arrives.
These general conclusions governed our policy during the next few
months. But as October wore on our anxieties were steadily aggravated.
The tension grew. Telegrams and letters tell their own tale.
_October 15._
_First Lord to Sir John Jellicoe._
Personal. You are invited to give your opinion secretly on every
aspect of the Naval situation at home and abroad and we welcome warmly
any scheme you may put forward.
Your proposals about mining are being attentively considered.
The general aspect of the war is grim.
The Russian pressure is not what we expected, and another avalanche of
[German] reinforcements is approaching the western theatre.
On October 17 Sir John Jellicoe telegraphed that a German submarine had
been reported entering Scapa at 5 p.m. the previous day. Although he
thought the report false, he took the whole Fleet to sea forthwith. He
appealed urgently for submarine obstructions as he had ‘no safe base at
present, and the only way to coal ships is to shift the coaling
anchorages constantly which seriously dislocates the organisation of
supply.’ On the 18th he stated that Scapa Flow could not be used till
the Submarine Defence was placed. On the 19th he asked the Admiralty
whether he should risk the submarine menace at Scapa Flow or move the
Fleet to remote bases on the west coast of Scotland or Ireland ‘more
than 300 miles from the Pentland Firth.’ He added, ‘It cannot be stated
with absolute certainty that submarines were inside Scapa Flow, although
Captain D, 4th Destroyer Flotilla, is positive H.M.S. _Swift_ was fired
at inside. I am of opinion that it is not difficult to get inside at
slack water.’
Another very serious warning reached me almost simultaneously:—
_Sir David Beatty to First Lord._
H.M.S. _Lion_,
_October 17, 1914_.
(Private.)
I take the opportunity of an officer going to London in charge of
signal books, to write you of what goes on. I have written you before,
or rather to Hood for you. I think it is right that you should know
how things generally affect the Fleet. I trust that you will take this
as it is written, in fact I know you will, as being written with only
one idea of service to the country. I write as I do because I know
that the plain truth at times such as these is the only thing worth
hearing, and because you are the one and only man who can save the
situation. Even at such times, official documents, requisitions and
demands, are of little value; they are met at once I admit, but
without understanding the time value of all that lies behind them.
At present we feel that we are working up for a catastrophe of a very
large character. The feeling is gradually possessing the Fleet that
all is not right somewhere. The menace of mines and submarines is
proving larger every day, and adequate means to meet or combat them
are not forthcoming, and we are gradually being pushed out of the
North Sea, and off our own particular perch. How does this arise? By
the very apparent fact that we have no Base where we can with _any_
degree of safety lie for coaling, replenishing, and refitting and
repairing, after two and a half months of war. This spells trouble. It
is a perfectly simple and easy matter to equip Scapa Flow, Cromarty,
and Rosyth, so that vessels can lie there undisturbed to do all they
want, and for as long as they want, provided material and men are
forthcoming. The one place that has put up any kind of defence against
the submarine is Cromarty, and that is because at Cromarty there
happens to be a _man_ who grapples with things as they are, i.e.,
Commander Munro,[77] and because they have trained artillerymen to man
their guns. That was one of the best day’s work you ever did when you
insisted on taking the defences there in hand. At Rosyth it appeared
to me in September when there, that to deny access to submarines and
destroyers was a fairly simple task; it was an awkward place to get
into, but when once in, it ought to be, and could be, very easily made
a safe asylum for vessels in need of rest, repair, fuel, etc. At
Scapa, something has been done towards blocking the many entrances,
but that is all. I am sure that all the brain and intellect at the
Admiralty could devise a scheme or method of defence which would make
the anchorage practically safe, and which could be done in a
fortnight. No _seaman_ can dispute that these three bases could have
been made _absolutely_ safe from submarine attack during the two and a
half months that the war has been in progress. As it is, we have been
lulled into a sense of false security, because we have not been
attacked before; but I can assure you that it has literally been
recognised by all that it was only a question of time when we should
have this sense rudely shattered....
The situation as it is, we have no place to lay our heads. We are at
Loch Na Keal, Isle of Mull. My picket boats are at the entrance, the
nets are out and the men are at the guns, waiting for coal which has
run low, but ready to move at a moment’s notice. Other squadrons are
in the same plight. We have been running now hard since 28th July;
small defects are creeping up which we haven’t time to take in hand.
Forty-eight hours is our spell in harbour with steam ready to move at
four hours’ notice, coaling on an average 1,400 tons a time; night
defence stations. The men can stand it, but the machine can’t, and we
must have a place where we can stop for from four or five days every
now and then to give the engineers a chance. Such a place does not
exist, so the question arises, how long can we go on, for I fear very
much, not for long, as the need for small repairs is becoming
insistent.
The remedy is to fix upon a base and make it impervious to submarine
attack; as I have pointed out I am firmly convinced this can be
done....
You might be told that this idea of making the entrances secure is
chimerical. This is not so; and I will guarantee that if the Fleet was
instructed to defend the entrances to the ports named, and was
provided with the material, they could and would devise not one but
several methods which would satisfy most requirements, and which would
keep out submarines. If the Fleet cannot spare the time and labour,
turn it over to Commander Munro and give him a free hand and what
labour he requires, and he will do it in a fortnight.
I think you know me well enough to know that I do not shout without
cause. The Fleet’s tail is still well over the back. We hate running
away from our base and the effect is appreciable. We are not enjoying
ourselves. But the morale is high and confidence higher. I would not
write thus if I did not know that you with your quick grasp of detail
and imagination would make something out of it.
Meanwhile, however, the Admiralty, particularly the First and Fourth Sea
Lords, had been labouring since the end of September to devise and make
the necessary protective structures. By dint of extraordinary exertions
the first instalment of these was already approaching completion, and on
October 20 Prince Louis was in a position to telegraph to the
Commander-in-Chief:—
The defences for Scapa will leave Dockyards on 24th October.
In the meantime Admiralty approve Battle Squadrons remaining on the
West Coast and if you prefer they can proceed as far as Berehaven.
In order to prevent being dogged by submarines a false course should
be steered until a sufficient offing is made.
Battle-Cruisers and Cruisers will have to remain north to cover exits
from North Sea. Cromarty appears to be a safe base for some of them.
_October 23_, 2 a.m.
_Admiralty to Sir John Jellicoe._
From First Lord.
Private and Personal. Every effort will be made to secure you rest and
safety in Scapa and adjacent anchorages. Net defence hastened utmost,
will be strengthened by successive lines earliest. If you desire,
Cabinet will I think agree declare area 30 miles east Kinnaird Head to
30 miles north Shetlands and down to 30 miles South of Hebrides
prohibited to all ships not specially licensed by Admiralty or you.
All vessels whatever Flag should be dealt with in this area as you
desire.
I wish to make absolute sanctuary for you there. I also propose
proclaiming all Scotland north of Caledonian Canal including all
Islands and Inverness prohibited area; you can do what you think
necessary for safety of Fleet.
Use your powers under Defence of Realm Act and ask for anything you
want in men, money or material. You must have a safe resting place:
tell me how I can help you.
Sir John Jellicoe replied with suggestions for closing certain areas,
and for the placing of obstructions and contact mines.
_October 24, 1914._
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Third Sea Lord.
Fourth Sea Lord.
Naval Secretary.
Every nerve must be strained to reconcile the Fleet to Scapa.
Successive lines of submarine defences should be prepared, reinforced
by Electric Contact mines as proposed by the Commander-in-Chief.
Nothing should stand in the way of the equipment of this anchorage
with every possible means of security. The First Lord and the First
Sea Lord will receive a report of progress every third day until the
work is completed and the Commander-in-Chief satisfied.
W. S. C.
On receipt of Sir John Jellicoe’s memorandum I convened all the
authorities and after prolonged discussion issued the following
directions, which since they show the variety of problems affecting the
Grand Fleet at this juncture may be printed _in extenso_ for those
interested in details:—
DECISIONS OF NOVEMBER 2, 1914.[78]
Secretary and all concerned.
1. The Fourth Sea Lord will give directions for 48 trawlers armed with
guns, and 3 yachts fitted with guns and wireless, to be collected from
the various trawler patrols and placed at the disposal of the
Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet. These trawlers, etc., are to be at
Scapa Flow, reporting to Admiral Colville there, by the 5th November.
2. Third Sea Lord will report what rafts and barges there are which
could be fitted with torpedo nets to afford protection to ships from
submarine attack, and when they can be ready.
3. Chief of the Staff will direct the Admiral of Patrols to provide 12
additional destroyers from the patrol flotillas to repair at once to
Scapa Flow and join the Flag of the Commander-in-Chief.
4. Twelve armed merchant cruisers of small size have been ordered to
strengthen the Northern patrol. It is necessary that these should join
the Grand Fleet within a week, and any circumstances likely to cause
delay must be immediately brought to notice of First Sea Lord.
5. The Naval Secretary and the Secretary have informed the
Commander-in-Chief of his powers under the Defence of the Realm Act,
when the area to the north of the Caledonian Canal, including all
islands and the town of Inverness, has been proclaimed a prohibited
area within the meaning of the Act. The Secretary will draft a letter
forthwith to the War Office, asking for the proclamation as from the
3rd November, of the whole of this area.
6. The warning as to the closing of the North Sea, issued to-night by
the Admiralty, is to be studied by departments concerned. The
Additional Civil Lord should deal with questions arising out of it
affecting trade and fishery interests in this country. Captain Webb
should consider its working from the point of view of commerce; he
will also consider what additional measures must be taken to increase
the Examination Service on account of the increased traffic in the
Channel which will result from the warning, consulting Chief of the
Staff as may be necessary for military security. The Additional Civil
Lord should also deal with the subject from the point of view of
existing arrangements as to contraband.
7. The War Office should be asked immediately to develop for the Navy
a system of lookouts on commanding points around the coast in the
prohibited area in the North of Scotland and on the islands, connected
as far as possible by telephone, in order that the movements of
suspicious vessels, and also intelligence collected from the land, may
be constantly reported. Admiral Coast Guards and Reserves will
co-operate.
8. The censorship of postal and telegraph offices in the prohibited
area, and the exclusion of all alien-born postal servants, and the
services of a sufficient detective force at points used by the Fleet,
must be undertaken forthwith. Secretary will propose the necessary
measures in consultation with the War and Home Offices.
10. Fourth Sea Lord and Naval Secretary will take the necessary steps
to provide, with the minimum delay, heavy booms for Scapa and Loch
Ewe, as asked for by the Commander-in-Chief.
11. The Assistant Director of Torpedoes will arrange to send lines of
Electric Contact mines during the next 10 days to Scapa Flow, to be
disposed of under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet.
12. A bi-weekly report is to be made to the First Lord and First Sea
Lord of the actual progress to date of all works now under
construction for the protection of harbours against submarine and
torpedo attack, and all unexpected circumstances which tend to delay
the work are to be reported as they occur.
13. The Chief of the Staff will report on the general question of
adding to the number of mines in our minefield.
14. A second light cruiser squadron for the patrol of the North Sea is
approved. It will be formed by dividing the existing light cruiser
squadron and adding _Sapphire_ and _Blanche_ from the 3rd Battle
Squadron. The Chief of the Staff to make detailed proposals. Naval
Secretary to propose a Commodore.
15. Eight light-draught, seaworthy vessels for fleet sweepers have
been taken up and should be completed with all speed.
16. The Director of the Air Division should, in consultation with the
Commander-in-Chief, establish an additional temporary seaplane station
at some convenient point on the Scottish coast facing the Hebrides,
for the better patrol and reconnaissance of that area.
17. A general order should be issued to the Fleet that no cruiser or
larger vessel is to stop for the purpose of boarding or challenging
any merchant ship. This work is to be invariably performed by
auxiliary merchant cruisers, torpedo craft, and trawlers. Cruisers and
larger vessels, wishing to turn back merchant ships, should fire a
shot across their bows and make signals.
18. The Chief of the Staff should draft the necessary order to the
patrolling lines of cruisers to turn back merchant ships, from the 5th
November onwards, from the danger area. The orders should be submitted
before being sent.
19. The reconstitution of the battle-cruisers into two squadrons:—
(1) _Tiger_, _Princess Royal_, _Lion_;
(2) _New Zealand_, _Inflexible_, _Invincible_; is authorised.
22. Sir John Jellicoe’s proposal in regard to the entry of defended
ports and the unsuitability of the proposed arrangements are to be
reported on by the War Staff, and submitted to the Board for adoption.
24. Third Sea Lord and Fourth Sea Lord should report whether it is
possible to postpone the lining of destroyers during the next two
months, as Commander-in-Chief states that they cannot be spared from
duty.
25. The Assistant Director of Torpedoes will report upon the need of
establishing W.T. stations at St. Kilda and the other places in
question. Only small installations are required.
26. The docking of ships at Home ports and partial refit, one at a
time, may be permitted, beginning from the end of this month.
27. A report should be furnished on the state of the 3rd Battle
Squadron repair ship.
28. Steps are to be taken to increase the pumping power of the _Orion_
class and later types by adding a bilge suction to the main
circulating pumps. A report should be furnished by Third Sea Lord as
to what this involves in time and money.
W. S. C.
* * * * *
The Commander-in-Chief, in accordance with the Admiralty authorisation,
withdrew at the end of October to the north coast of Ireland for a few
days’ rest and gunnery practice. By extraordinary ill-luck, the arrival
of the Fleet off Loch Swilly coincided with the visit of a German
minelayer to those waters. The minelayer had no idea of catching the
Fleet or that British warships would be in those waters. Her objective
was the Liverpool trade route, but the shot aimed at a crow brought down
an eagle.
On October 27th Prince Louis hurried into my room with the grave news
that the _Audacious_ had been struck by mine or torpedo North of Loch
Swilly, and that it was feared she was sinking. In the afternoon the
Commander-in-Chief telegraphed urging that every endeavour should be
made to keep the event from being published; and that night, in
reporting that the _Audacious_ had sunk, he repeated his hope that the
loss could be kept secret. I saw great difficulties in this but promised
to bring the matter before the Cabinet. Meanwhile I telegraphed to the
Commander-in-Chief, October 28th, 12.30 a.m.:—
‘I am sure you will not be at all discouraged by _Audacious_ episode.
We have been very fortunate to come through three months of war
without the loss of a capital ship. I expected three or four by this
time, and it is due to your unfailing vigilance and skill that all has
gone so well. The Army too has held its own along the whole line,
though with at least 14,000 killed and wounded. Quite soon the
harbours will be made comfortable for you. Mind you ask for all you
want.’
Measured by military standards, the _Audacious_ was the first serious
loss we had sustained. She was one of those vital units in which we
never were at that time more than six or seven to the good, and upon
which all strategic calculations were based both by friend and foe. When
I brought the question of keeping her loss secret before the Cabinet,
there was a considerable division of opinion. It was urged that public
confidence would be destroyed if it were thought that we were concealing
losses, that it was bound to leak out almost immediately, and that the
Germans probably knew already. To this I replied that there was no
reason why the Germans should not be left to collect their own
information for themselves, that the moment they knew the _Audacious_
was sunk they would proclaim it, and that then we could quite easily
explain to the public why it was we had preserved secrecy. I cited the
effective concealment by Japan of the loss of the battleship _Yashima_
off Port Arthur in 1904. If Sir John French had lost an Army Corps,
every effort would be made to conceal it from the enemy. Why then should
the Navy be denied a similar freedom? Lord Kitchener strongly supported
me; and our views were eventually accepted by the Cabinet.
The Press were asked by the Admiralty to abstain from making any
reference to the event. Some newspapers complied with an ill grace. It
was represented that hundreds of people knew already, including all the
passengers of the liner _Olympic_ which had passed the sinking vessel;
that German spies in England would certainly convey the news to Germany
in a few days, and that, anyhow, long accounts of the sinking with
actual photographs, would be despatched by the next mail to the United
States, whence the news would be immediately telegraphed to Germany. We,
however, remained obdurate, watching the German Press very carefully for
the slightest indication that they knew. Meanwhile it was thought clever
by certain newspapers to write articles and paragraphs in which the word
‘audacious’ was frequently introduced, while I was much blamed. I found
it necessary to issue a secret appeal, which, aided by the loyal efforts
of the Newspaper Press committee, certainly had some effect. In the
upshot it took more than five weeks before the German Admiralty learned
that the _Audacious_ had been sunk, and even then they were by no means
convinced that they were not the victims of rumour.
Says Admiral Scheer:—
The English succeeded in keeping secret for a considerable time the
loss of this great battleship, a loss which was a substantial success
for our efforts at equalisation.... The behaviour of the English was
inspired at all points by consideration for what would serve their
military purpose.... In the case of the _Audacious_ we can but approve
the English attitude of not revealing a weakness to the enemy, because
accurate information about the other side’s strength has a decisive
effect on the decisions taken.’
* * * * *
I do not remember any period when the weight of the War seemed to press
more heavily on me than these months of October and November, 1914. In
August one was expecting the great sea battle and the first great
battles on land; but our course was obvious, and, when taken, we had
only to wait for decisions. All September was dominated by the victory
of the Marne. But in October and November the beast was at us again. The
sense of grappling with and being overpowered by a monster of appalling
and apparently inexhaustible strength on land, and a whole array of
constant, gnawing anxieties about the safety of the Fleet from submarine
attack at sea and in its harbours, oppressed my mind. Not an hour passed
without the possibility of some disaster or other in some part of the
world. Not a day without the necessity of running risks.
My own position was already to some extent impaired. The loss of the
three cruisers had been freely attributed to my personal interference. I
was accused of having overridden the advice of the Sea Lords and of
having wantonly sent the squadron to its doom. Antwerp became a cause of
fierce reproach. One might almost have thought I had brought about the
fall of the city by my meddling. The employment of such untrained men as
the Naval Brigades was generally censured. The internment in Holland of
three of their battalions was spoken of as a great disaster entirely due
to my inexcusable folly. One unhappy phrase—true enough in thought—about
‘Digging rats out of holes,’ which had slipped from my tongue in a weary
speech at Liverpool, was fastened upon and pilloried. These were the
only subjects with which my name was connected in the newspapers. My
work at the Admiralty—such as it was—was hidden from the public. No
Parliamentary attack gave me an opportunity of defending myself. In
spite of being accustomed to years of abuse, I could not but feel the
adverse and hostile currents that flowed about me. One began to perceive
that they might easily lead to a practical result. Luckily there was not
much time for such reflections.
The Admiralty had entered upon the War with commanding claims on public
confidence. The coincidence of the test mobilisation with the European
crisis, was generally attributed to profound design. The falsification
one after another of the gloomy predictions that we should be taken
unawares, that the German commerce destroyers would scour the seas, and
that our own shipping, trade and food would be endangered, was
recognised with widespread relief. The safe transportation of the Army
to France and the successful action in the Heligoland Bight were
acclaimed as fine achievements. But with the first few incidents of
misfortune a different note prevailed in circles which were vocal. The
loss of the three cruisers marked a turning-point in the attitude of
those who in the evil times of war are able to monopolise the expression
of public opinion. As the expectation of an imminent great sea battle
faded, the complaint began to be heard, ‘What is the Navy doing?’ It was
perhaps inevitable that there should be a sense of disappointment as
week succeeded week and the tremendous engine of British naval power
seemed to be neither seen nor heard. There was a general opinion that we
should have begun by attacking and destroying the German Fleet. Vain to
point to the ceaseless stream of troops and supplies to France, or to
the world-wide trade of Britain proceeding almost without hindrance.
Impossible, in the hearing of the enemy, to explain the intricate
movement of reinforcements or expeditions escorted across every ocean
from every part of the Empire, or to unfold the reasons which rendered
it impossible to bring the German Fleet to battle. There, was our little
Army fighting for its life, and playing to British eyes almost as large
a part as that of France; and meanwhile our great Navy—the strongest in
the world—lay apparently in an inertia diversified only by occasional
mishap.
Eaten bread is soon forgotten. Dangers which are warded off by effective
precautions and foresight are never even remembered. Thus it happened
that the Admiralty was inconsiderately judged in this opening phase. To
me, who saw the perils against which we had prepared and over which we
had triumphed, and who felt a sense of profound thankfulness for the
past and absolute confidence for the future, these manifestations of
discontent seemed due only to lack of understanding and to impatience
pardonable in the general stress of the times. But they were none the
less disquieting. Nor was it easy to deal with them. The questions could
not be argued out in public or in Parliament. No formal indictment was
ever preferred; nor could one have been fully answered without injury to
national interests. We had to endure all this carping in silence. A
certain proportion of losses at sea was inevitable month by month; and
in each case it was easy to assert that some one had blundered. In most
cases, indeed, this was true. With a thousand ships upon the sea and a
thousand hazards, real or potential, every day to menace them, accidents
and mistakes were bound to happen. How many were made, for which no
forfeit was claimed by Fortune! There was never an hour when risks
against which no provision could be made were not being run by scores of
vessels, or when problems of novelty and difficulty were not being set
to sea captains, scarcely any of whom had ever been tried in war. Was it
wonderful that we fell occasionally into error, or even into loss?
‘Another naval disaster. Five hundred men drowned. What are the
Admiralty doing?’ While all the time the armies reeled about in the
confusion of the mighty battles, and scores of thousands were sent,
often needlessly or mistakenly, to their deaths: while all the time
every British operation of war and trade on the seas proceeded without
appreciable hindrance.
This censorious mood produced a serious development in the case of
Prince Louis. In the first flush of our successful mobilisation and
entry upon the War, no comment had been made upon his parentage. But now
the gossip of the clubs and of the streets began to produce a stream of
letters, signed and anonymous, protesting in every variety of method and
often in violent terms against one of Teutonic birth filling the vital
position of First Sea Lord. This was cruel; but it was not unnatural,
and I saw with anxiety and distress the growth of very widespread
misgiving. I gathered also from occasional remarks which he made that
this atmosphere was becoming apparent to the First Sea Lord. He was thus
coming to be placed in the invidious position of having to take great
responsibilities and risks day by day without that support in public
confidence to which he was absolutely entitled, and with the certainty
that accidents would occur from time to time. I was therefore not
surprised when, towards the end of October, Prince Louis asked to be
relieved of his burden. The uncomplaining dignity with which he made
this sacrifice and accepted self-effacement as a requital for the great
and faithful service he had rendered to the British nation and to the
Royal Navy was worthy of a sailor and a Prince. The correspondence which
passed between us has already been made public, but is here inserted for
completeness.[79] I had now to look for a successor, and my mind had
already turned in one direction and in one direction alone.
Lord Fisher used to come occasionally to the Admiralty, and I watched
him narrowly to judge his physical strength and mental alertness. There
seemed no doubt about either. On one occasion, when inveighing against
some one whom he thought obstructive, he became so convulsed with fury
that it seemed that every nerve and bloodvessel in his body would be
ruptured. However, they stood the strain magnificently, and he left me
with the impression of a terrific engine of mental and physical power
burning and throbbing in that aged frame. I was never in the least
afraid of working with him, and I thought I knew him so well, and had
held an equal relationship and superior constitutional authority so
long, that we could come through any difficulty together. I therefore
sounded him in conversation without committing myself, and soon saw that
he was fiercely eager to lay his grasp on power, and was strongly
inspired with the sense of a message to deliver and a mission to
perform. I therefore determined to act without delay. I sought the Prime
Minister and submitted to him the arguments which led me to the
conclusion that Fisher should return, and that I could work with no one
else. I also spoke of Sir Arthur Wilson as his principal coadjutor. I
was well aware that there would be strong, natural and legitimate,
opposition in many quarters to Fisher’s appointment, but having formed
my own conviction I was determined not to remain at the Admiralty unless
I could do justice to it. So in the end, for good or for ill, I had my
way.
_October 30._
_First Lord to Sir John Jellicoe._
Prince Louis has resigned on grounds of parentage, to my deep regret.
The King has approved Lord Fisher as First Sea Lord. He will assume
office to-morrow afternoon. I expect Sir Arthur Wilson will be
associated with Admiralty for special duties. Loss of _Audacious_ has
nothing to do with these events. There will be no change in Naval War
policy as set out in your war orders. Please telegraph whether you
think Grand Fleet could prudently take four or five days’ rest in
Portland Harbour.
_October 30._
_Sir John Jellicoe to First Lord._
Secret and personal.
I have made present base secure against submarine attack and think it
better to remain here than to go to Portland.
I propose to send out our squadrons one at a time next week to fire at
rocks off coast of Ireland, as target practice is very necessary and
towing targets is difficult in present weather and possibly unsafe.
The decision to recall Lord Fisher to the Admiralty was very important.
He was, as has been here contended, the most distinguished British Naval
officer since Nelson. The originality of his mind and the spontaneity of
his nature freed him from conventionalities of all kinds. His genius was
deep and true. Above all, he was in harmony with the vast size of
events. Like them, he was built upon a titanic scale.
But he was seventy-four years of age. As in a great castle which has
long contended with time, the mighty central mass of the Donjon towered
up intact and seemingly everlasting. But the outworks and the
battlements had fallen away, and its imperious ruler dwelt only in the
special apartments and corridors with which he had a lifelong
familiarity. Had he and his comrade, Sir Arthur Wilson, been born ten
years later, the British naval direction at the outbreak of the Great
War would have reached its highest state of perfection, both at the
Admiralty and afloat. The new figures which the struggle was
producing—Beatty, Keyes, Tyrwhitt—had not yet attained the authority
which would have made them acceptable to the Navy in the highest
situations. Fisher and Wilson had outlived their contemporaries and
towered above the naval generation which had followed them. It was to
these two great old men and weather-beaten sea-dogs, who for more than
half a century had braved the battle and the breeze, and were Captains
afloat when I was in my cradle, that the professional conduct of the
naval war was now to be confided.
It was clear, however, to me, who knew both these Admirals-of-the-Fleet
quite well and had had many opportunities in the previous three years of
hearing and reading their views, that the day-to-day organisation of our
Staff machinery would have to be altered. This necessitated a change in
the Chief of the War Staff. In Admiral Sturdee the Navy had a sea
officer of keen intelligence and great practical ability—a man who could
handle and fight his ship or his squadron with the utmost skill and
resolution. But he was not a man with whom Lord Fisher could have worked
satisfactorily at the supreme executive centre. Happily, there was no
difficulty in agreeing upon his successor.
Since Antwerp, Admiral Oliver had been my Naval Secretary. During the
year before the War he had been Director of Naval Intelligence. In this
capacity I had had to rely continually upon him, as upon Captain Thomas
Jackson before him, for all the facts and figures upon which the
controversy about British and German naval strength depended. His
accuracy in detail and power of continuous and tenacious mental toil
were extraordinary. He combined with capacious knowledge an unusual
precision of mind and clarity of statement. His credentials as a sea
officer were unimpeachable. He had been Navigating Commander to Sir
Arthur Wilson, and every one in the Navy knew the story of how in the
1901 Naval manœuvres these two had taken the Channel Fleet from off
Rathlin’s Island at the North of Ireland through the Irish Channel to
the Scillies in thick mist without sighting land or lights, and without
being inclined to make a single remark to each other. On the third day
the mist lifting suddenly revealed the Scilly Islands to the astonished
Fleet, which had already dropped anchor in the roads.
I was very glad when Lord Fisher proposed to me that he should be made
Chief of the Staff, and when he offered also to give me in exchange, for
my Private Office, his own personal assistant, Commodore de Bartolomé.
Everything thus started fair. We reformed the War Group, which met at
least once each day, as follows: First Lord, First Sea Lord, Sir Arthur
Wilson, Admiral Oliver and Commodore de Bartolomé (the last named
representing the younger school of sea officers), together with the
invaluable Secretary, Sir Graham Greene. Sir Henry Jackson was also
frequently summoned, but not so continuously as to impose an accountable
responsibility upon him.
Lord Fisher’s age and the great strain to which he was now to be
subjected made it necessary for him to lead a very careful life. He
usually retired to rest shortly after 8 o’clock, awaking refreshed
between four and five, or even earlier. In these morning hours he gave
his greatest effort, transacting an immense quantity of business,
writing innumerable letters and forming his resolutions for the day.
Indeed, his methods corresponded closely to the maxims of the poet
Blake: ‘Think in the morning; act in the noon; eat in the evening; sleep
in the night.’ But I never heard him use this quotation. As the
afternoon approached the formidable energy of the morning gradually
declined, and with the shades of night the old Admiral’s giant strength
was often visibly exhausted. Still, judged from the point of view of
physical and mental vigour alone, it was a wonderful effort, and one
which filled me, who watched him so closely, with admiration and, I will
add, reassurance.
I altered my routine somewhat to fit in with that of the First Sea Lord.
I slept usually an hour later in the morning, being called at eight
instead of seven, and I slept again, if possible, for an hour after
luncheon. This enabled me to work continuously till one or two in the
morning without feeling in any way fatigued. We thus constituted an
almost unsleeping watch throughout the day and night. In fact, as Fisher
put it, ‘very nearly a perpetual clock.’ Telegrams came in at the
Admiralty at all hours of the day and night, and there was scarcely an
hour when an immediate decision could not be given, if necessary, by one
or the other of us always awake.
This arrangement was also convenient from the point of view of business.
The First Lord completed everything with which he was concerned before
going to bed, and three hours later the First Sea Lord addressed himself
to the whole budget, and I, awaking at eight, received his dawn output.
I had not previously seen the pulse of the Admiralty beat so strong and
regular.
We made the agreement between ourselves that neither of us should take
any important action without consulting the other, unless previous
accord had been reached. To this agreement we both scrupulously adhered.
We had thus formed, for the first time, an overwhelmingly strong control
and central authority over the whole course of the naval war, and were
in a position to make our will prevail throughout the fleets and all
branches of the naval administration, as well as to hold our own against
all outside interference. I had for a long time been accustomed to write
my minutes in red ink. Fisher habitually used a green pencil. To quote
his words, ‘it was the port and starboard lights.’ As long as the port
and starboard lights shone together, all went well. We had established a
combination which, while it remained unbroken, could not have been
overthrown by intrigue at home or the foe on the sea.