THE CHANNEL PORTS
The Purpose of the Antwerp Effort—The Belgian Army effects its
Retreat—Loss and Gain—Ten Precious Days—Onslaught of the German
Reinforcements—The Struggle for the Channel Ports—Labours of the
Admiralty—Achievements of the Transport Department—Correspondence
with Sir John French—General Joffre requests Naval Support—Admiral
Hood’s Operations on the Belgian Coast—Commodore Tyrwhitt destroys
the German Torpedo Boats—The German Armies reach Salt
Water—Beginning of the Battle of the Yser—The Inshore
Squadron—‘One Flank the Germans cannot turn’—Further
Correspondence with Sir John French—The Crisis of the Battle—The
German Advance Stemmed—Effect of Antwerp on the Main Decision.
The object of prolonging the defence of Antwerp was, as has been
explained, to give time for the French and British Armies to rest their
left upon that fortress and hold the Germans from the seaboard along a
line Antwerp-Ghent-Lille. This depended not only upon the local
operations but on the result of the series of outflanking battles which
marked the race for the sea. A decisive victory gained by the French in
the neighbourhood of Peronne, or by the British beyond Armentières and
towards Lille would have opened all this prospect. High French
authorities have concluded that a more rapid and therefore no doubt more
daring transference of force from the right and centre of the French
front to its left, ‘looking sixty kilometres ahead instead of
twenty-five,’ and generally a more vigorous attempt to outflank the
Germans following immediately upon the victory of the Marne and the
arrest of the armies at the Aisne, might well have shouldered the
Germans not only away from the sea, but even out of a large part of
occupied France. In the event, however, and with the forces employed,
the French and British did not succeed in turning the enemy’s flank. The
battles at Albert, La Bassée and Armentières produced no decisive
result; Peronne and Lille could not be reached and the fighting lines
continued simply to prolong themselves to the north-west. The retention
of Antwerp would have rewarded the victory of the main armies with a
prize of the utmost value. Its extended resistance diminished the
consequences of their failure. Everything at Antwerp had depended on a
victory to the southward. And this victory had been denied.
Nevertheless, as will now be shown, the effort was fruitful in a
remarkable degree.
The fall of Antwerp released the besieging army. A marine division
marched into the city on the 10th.[69] The rest of the German divisions
were already streaming south and west in hot pursuit, and hoped for
interception of the Belgian Army. But a surprise awaited them.
On the night of the 9th the German forces who had crossed the Dendre
river had come in contact with French Fusiliers Marins at Melle and
Meirelbeke, and during the 10th they found themselves in presence of
British regular troops of unknown strength, whose patrols were feeling
their way forward from Ghent to meet them. The 7th Division and the 3rd
Cavalry Division had come upon the scene in accordance with the fourth
condition of the Anglo-Belgian agreement of October 4. The British,
French and Belgian forces from Ghent thus threatened the left flank of
any serious German cutting-off movement northwards to the Dutch
frontier.
Uncertain of the size of the army by which they were confronted, and
mystified by the indefinite possibilities of landings from the sea, the
Germans paused to collect their strength. They knew that the bulk of the
British Army had already left the Aisne. Where was it? Where would it
reappear? What were these British regulars, who stood so confidently in
their path? On the 12th when they considered themselves strong enough to
advance upon Ghent, the whole of the Belgian Field Army had passed the
dangerous points in safety, only one single squadron being intercepted.
Of this complicated operation the victorious Germans became spectators.
Only weak parties of Germans ventured beyond Lokeren during the night of
the 9th–10th to molest the retreat of the Antwerp troops. The 2nd
Belgian Division and two out of the three Naval Brigades came through
intact. But the railway and other arrangements for the rear brigade were
misunderstood, and about two and a half battalions of very tired troops,
who through the miscarriage of an order had lost some hours, were led
across the Dutch frontier in circumstances on which only those who know
their difficulties are entitled to form a judgment.
If the Belgian Field Army had begun its withdrawal on October 3, as
originally intended, it could probably have got safely without aid to
Ghent and beyond. But the fortress troops, numbering many thousands, to
whom it had been throughout resolved to confide the last defence of
Antwerp, must in any case have been driven into surrender to the invader
or internment in Holland once the Field Army had gone. The prolongation
of the defence and the delay in the departure of the Field Army neither
bettered nor worsened their fortunes. They, therefore, do not enter into
any calculation of the loss and gain attendant on the attempted
operation of relief. So far as actual results are concerned, the damage
caused by the bombardment of the city, which was not extensive, and the
internment of two and a half British Naval battalions, on the one hand,
must be weighed against the gain of five days in the resistance and the
influence exercised on subsequent events by the 7th Division and 3rd
Cavalry Division on the other.
At the time the British Government decided to send help to Antwerp the
total German field force in Northern Belgium had been correctly
estimated at four or five divisions. But before the city capitulated and
while the British troops were still at Ghent, there began to manifest
itself that tremendous unexpected development of German force which from
the moment of Antwerp’s fall was launched against the Allied left and
aimed at Calais.
Besides the liberated Siege Army and the troops which had threatened the
Antwerp communications, no fewer than four fresh Army Corps (XXIInd,
XXIIIrd, XXVIth and XXVIIth), newly formed in Germany and concentrating
in Belgium, were already at hand. And in front of this formidable army
there stood from October 10 to October 21 only the wearied Belgians, the
Fusiliers Marins, and the British 3rd Cavalry and 7th Divisions. The
caution of the German advance may perhaps have been induced by their
uncertainty as to the whereabouts and intentions of the British Army,
and their fear that it might be launched against their right from the
sea flank. But, however explained, the fact remains, and to it we owe
the victory of the Yser and Ever-Glorious Ypres.
A simple examination of dates will reveal the magnitude of the peril
which the Allied cause escaped. Antwerp fell twenty-four hours after the
last division of the Belgian Field Army left the city. Had this taken
place on October 3rd or 4th, the city would have surrendered on the 4th
or 5th. No British 4th Corps[70] or Fusiliers Marins would have been at
Ghent to cover the Belgian retreat. But assuming that the Belgian Army
had made this good unaided, the same marches would have carried them
_and their German pursuers_ to the Yser by the 10th. There would have
been nothing at all in front of Ypres. Sir John French could not come
into action north of Armentières till the 15th. His detrainments at St.
Omer, etc., were not completed till the 19th. Sir Douglas Haig with the
1st Corps could not come into line north of Ypres till about the 21st.
Had the German Siege Army been released on the 5th, and followed by
their great reinforcements already available advanced at once nothing
could have saved Dunkirk, and perhaps Calais and Boulogne. The loss of
Dunkirk was certain and that of both Calais and Boulogne probable. Ten
days were wanted, and ten days were won.
* * * * *
We had now without respite to meet the great German drive against the
Channel ports. The six divisions released from the siege of Antwerp, and
the eight new divisions, whose apparition had been so unexpected to the
British and French Staffs, rolled southward in a double-banked wave. The
Belgian Army trooped back in a melancholy procession along the sea-shore
to the Yser. General Rawlinson, with the 7th Division and the 3rd
Cavalry Division, extricating himself skilfully from large German
forces—how great was not then known—and lingering at each point to the
last minute without becoming seriously engaged, found himself by October
15 in the neighbourhood of a place called Ypres.[71] Meanwhile Sir John
French, detraining at St. Omer, and hopefully believing that he was
turning the German right, struck through Armentières towards Lille, and
sent imperative orders to Rawlinson, over whose head the storm was about
to break, to advance in conformity and seize Menin. The French forces
intended for the relief of Antwerp and the beginnings of larger French
reinforcements endeavoured to close the gap between Rawlinson and the
Belgians. The dykes were opened and large inundations began to appear.
In this manner was formed a thin, new, loosely organised, yet continuous
allied front from the neighbourhood of La Bassée to the sea at the mouth
of the Yser; and upon this front, which grew up and fixed itself at
every point in and by the actual collision of hostile forces, was now to
be fought the third great battle in the West.
These events involved the Admiralty at many points. The position of
Rawlinson’s troops in the presence of vastly superior forces was
precarious, and for some days we stood ready to re-embark them. We
laboured to salve everything possible from the Belgian wreck. The Royal
Naval Division must be brought back to refit, reorganise and resume its
interrupted training. The Admiralty details—aeroplanes, armoured trains,
armoured cars, motor omnibus transport, etc.—with which I had been
endeavouring during the previous weeks to conceal our nakedness in the
vital coastal area, could now be merged in the arriving British armies.
It would not have been possible to deal with these
complications—themselves only one subsidiary part of our task—unless
Prince Louis and I, working in complete accord, had had the power to
give orders covering the whole business which were unquestioningly
obeyed. Yet some of the orders which I was forced to give to the
Admiralty Transport Department left me with misgivings that we were
asking more than they could do. Fortunately, a few weeks before, I had
taken the step of appointing in the place of the retired Admiral who
usually directed this cardinal machine the young civilian Assistant
Director of Transports, whose abilities in conference and on paper were
distinguished. Often in these weeks and in the succeeding months I had
to turn to Mr. Graeme Thomson’s department with hard and complex
demands. Never did they fail. October 10 was the climax of their strain.
I cannot do better than quote the minute I wrote at the time:—
10/10/14.
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Director of Transports and others concerned.
1. Between 5,000 and 6,000 men of the R.N. Division are assembling at
Ostend. They will not be ready to embark until to-morrow, the 11th.
The whole of these, including Marines, should sail after dark on the
11th for Dover and proceed to the camp at Deal, all previous orders to
the contrary being cancelled.
2. 1,500 Belgian recruits and volunteers are at Ostend, and are to be
embarked at once for Cherbourg, the French authorities being informed
by telegram.
3. The transportation of the 11,000 Belgian recruits and reservists at
Dunkirk to Cherbourg is to continue without intermission as rapidly as
possible. The Belgians will be rationed by the Admiralty while on
board ship, and the Belgians at Dunkirk will be rationed from the
supplies of the R.N. Division until embarked.
4. All transports are to leave Zeebrugge at once, and all transports,
other than those employed above, which are not accommodated in safe
shelter at Ostend, are to leave in both cases for convenient British
ports.
5. Enough transports to embark the 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry
Division are to be kept in immediate readiness, with steam up, for the
next forty-eight hours, in Ostend, Dunkirk, Dover, and the Thames. It
is unlikely, having regard to the military situation, that any
re-embarkation will be required, but we must be continually prepared
for it, and should an emergency arise, both Zeebrugge and Ostend must
be used, notwithstanding any risks. Flotilla dispositions to be
arranged accordingly. General Rawlinson to be informed that we are
holding these ships in readiness, and that he should communicate
direct with the Admiralty by telephone if at any moment the situation
renders his re-embarkation likely. We are assuming that he could give
us twelve hours’ notice, within which time the transports could be
counted upon.
6. All Marines and R.N. Division details at Dunkirk are to be
re-embarked and brought back via Dover to Deal.
7. Colonel Osmaston’s Marine Artillery are to remain at Dunkirk for
the present.
8. The armoured trains and naval ratings working them, and all
available aeroplanes and armed motor-cars, except those now at Dunkirk
under the command of Commander Samson, are placed under the orders of
General Rawlinson.
9. The three monitors are to be held in readiness, with steam up, to
cover a re-embarkation at Ostend or Zeebrugge, should it become
necessary. General Rawlinson is to be told to telephone or telegraph
if at any time he thinks such naval protection will be required.
10. The Transport Department will provide whatever ships are necessary
to carry the stores, ammunition, and _matériel_ of the Belgian field
army. The transports standing by for the 7th Division and the 3rd
Cavalry Division are a prior claim on our resources. But as there is
no doubt that we can meet the two, the Transport Department is to get
into direct telephonic communication with the Belgian authorities and
arrange forthwith for the beginning of the embarkation of these
stores. For the embarkation of stores, as apart from troops, Zeebrugge
may be used equally with Ostend.
11. 8,000 to 10,000 Belgian wounded are to be evacuated from Ostend to
England as speedily as possible. The Transport Department is to make
proposals and preparations for their movement, while at the same time
the necessary arrangements for their reception in this country are
being concerted by the medical authorities.
12. All motor transports of the R.N. Division, excluding armed and
other motor-cars under Commander Samson actually employed, are to be
collected at Dunkirk under Colonel Dumble, who is to reorganise them
as quickly as possible, and will receive further instructions on that
subject.
W. S. C.
It was with a feeling of relief and of admiration that I saw all these
immense demands smoothly and punctually complied with.
While in Antwerp I had been in constant communication with Sir John
French both through Colonel Bridges and by aeroplane. On October 5 he
had written, ‘Thank you so much for writing so fully and clearly to me
from Antwerp. If the place is to be saved you have saved it by your
prompt action. As a matter of principle I hate putting mobile troops
_inside_ a fortress, but in this case it is very likely that the
_appearance_ of a large force inside the place may have a great moral
effect. But the situation ought to be most carefully watched....’ The
Field Marshal proceeded to complain of the exclusion by Lord Kitchener
of the forces under General Rawlinson from the main British army. What
would happen if and when he joined up with them? Other points of
difference arose between the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of
State. ‘I shall do the best I can,’ the former continued, ‘to bring
relief to the place at the earliest possible moment and am arranging to
concentrate in the North as quickly as circumstances will allow. The
Germans are pushing out their flank defence towards the West and
South-West....’ He expressed a wish that we could meet.
I replied to this on October 11 when the fate of Antwerp was already
decided. Using my old and intimate friendship with the Field Marshal I
laboured as always to smooth the differences between him and Lord
Kitchener.
I consider that Kitchener has been thoroughly loyal to you, and has
done and is doing everything in human power to support you. It would
be disastrous to the cause and ruinous to all if there were any
breakdown in true comradeship between you and Kitchener. Military
staffs always tend to make mischief between principals, and try to set
their caps at each other.
The fall of Antwerp was a great and untimely injury to the Allied
cause. I do not agree with the policy which abandoned it[72]; and I
fear you will now have the army which was before Antwerp to meet
almost immediately. But I care for nothing but the future in war. I
clear my heart of all useless reflections and sterile controversies.
It is vain to look backwards, and I turn my gaze with hope to the
re-entry of the British army into the decisive centre of the struggle
and pray for the victory.
I am arranging the omnibuses and armoured cars for you as quickly as
possible. Rawlinson has got a very good naval armoured train which I
have attached to him, but which you had better take over when he joins
up.
The destruction of the Zeppelin and its shed was a gallant feat of
arms.
Naval affairs at the moment imperatively keep me here—Alas! I hope you
will not allow Joffre to deprive you of Dunkirk as your advanced base
and fortified camp. In view of embarkation facilities Calais or
Boulogne ought to be entrenched too—so that you have both. But we all
feel Dunkirk is the right place, and belongs to you.
The wave of [German] reinforcements from the East, and the slow
development of the Russian pressure, makes the situation rather grim
just now.
I hope greatly to see you soon. Only five hours from your lines!
I earnestly trust the day goes well. But anyhow we will compel the end
to do so.
You will want the big army I expect before your task is finished.
On October 16 General Joffre telegraphed to Lord Kitchener as follows:—
‘Now that the operations extend up to the coast of the North Sea
between Ostend and the advanced defences of Dunkirk, it would be
important for the two Allied Navies to participate in these operations
by supporting our left wing and acting with long-range guns on the
German right wing. The Commander of the Naval Forces would then act in
concert with General Foch through the Governor of Dunkirk.’
This duty we instantly accepted.
_First Lord to Sir John French._
_October 17, 1914._
* Monitors were delayed by weather, but will be in position from
daylight 18th; meanwhile eight destroyers should have arrived on the
flank between 4 and 5 p.m. 17th, and two scout cruisers an hour later.
They have been told to communicate with Colonel Bridges on the quays
of Nieuport.
We are sending two battleships mounting eight 12–inch guns to Dunkirk
roadstead to-morrow to cover the fortress and its coast approaches.
We set to work forthwith to support the Allied left flank. I entrusted
this operation, which required an officer of first quality, to Admiral
Hood, till then my Naval Secretary. He was now appointed to the Dover
Command, while I took in his stead Admiral Oliver. On the 18th the three
ex-Brazilian monitors, renamed _Humber_, _Mersey_ and _Severn_, escorted
by four destroyers, arrived at Dunkirk and the memorable series of naval
operations on the Belgian Coast began.
There was no difficulty in finding plenty of ships of different classes
to cover the flank of the army. Besides the three monitors, a large
proportion of the destroyers from Dover were readily available. There
were many old battleships, and these at certain states of the tide could
get into suitable positions for bombarding. In addition there was the
Scout class, seven of which were available, all happily newly re-armed
with the very best 4–inch guns. But Admiralty reserves of ammunition had
been based upon the needs of purely naval actions, which are few and far
between, and not many of which all ships survive. Bombarding the German
positions on the Belgian Coast week after week, and possibly for months,
made demands upon our stores of a totally different character. We had to
pick ships primarily for the class of ammunition they fired; ships that
could use up old ammunition and ships whose value was so small that we
could afford to spend all their ammunition. As October wore on we
scoured the dockyards for every little vessel that carried a gun of any
kind. Even the smallest gunnery tenders, 250 ton gunboats forty years
old, were pressed into service, and in one way or another the fire was
continuously maintained.
It was evident that these operations would have to be carried on under
unceasing submarine attack. Moreover, we had to be prepared for a sudden
dash by German cruisers and destroyers. We trusted to Commodore Tyrwhitt
with the Harwich Striking Force either to protect us from this or to
exact retribution on the return journey. On the 17th the Germans, torn
between the will to wound and the fear to strike, broke all the
commandments of the text books by sending a feeble force of four small
destroyers from the Ems down the Dutch Coast. They were almost
immediately destroyed by the Commodore, the British ships engaged being
the light cruiser _Undaunted_ and the destroyers _Lance_, _Lennox_,
_Legion_ and _Loyal_.
From the middle of October onwards the German hosts could look upon salt
water. First Zeebrugge was occupied, then Ostend, then mile by mile the
sand-dunes and golf courses and gay villas of that pleasure coast were
devoured by invading war. In his first contact with the new element the
land monster committed several imprudences. Apparently contemptuous of
the power of ships’ guns, he deployed batteries of artillery on the open
beach, and opened fire on our Scouts and destroyers. These experiments
were not repeated. A Swedish writer, Dr. Sven Hedin, at that time with
the German armies, belauding them and bowing obsequiously before what he
had convinced himself was world-conquering power, has described a scene
in the restaurant of the best Ostend hotel. The room was crowded with
hungry officers of the invading army, just marched in, all sitting down
to excellent fare.
‘A destroyer had just detached itself from the rest and was making at
full speed for Ostend, parallel with the coast, as close as possible
to the shore. Presently another destroyer appeared, following in the
wake of the first. What could they want, these ruffians? Strong
language was heard—it was a piece of consummate impudence to come
steaming right under our noses like this. Evidently they were
reconnoitring—but what insolence, they must have known that we had
occupied Ostend! Aha! they suspect that there are submarines and
destroyers in the inner harbour, and want to see whether they can
detect anything from outside!... Astounding insolence. Two small
German guns are hurried up. “Are they going to shoot?” I asked. “Oh,
yes, they are going to shoot all right.”... The first shot rang
out.... Directly the German shots had been fired, the two destroyers
swung round to port and at the same moment opened fire. Their guns
seemed to flash out straight at us....’
The results were instantaneous. The restaurant, which had been ‘one of
the most elegant in Europe,’ was blasted into a smoking shambles of ruin
and death.
In this manner the German Army and the British Navy first came into
contact with one another.
Here are a few of our messages at that time:—
_October 17, 1914_, 1.2 p.m.
_Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Hood, Dover._
Most important to send the scouts at once and some destroyers to
Dunkirk to work along the coast to Nieuport to support the Belgian
left, now being attacked by the Germans; also monitors as soon as
weather permits.
Acknowledge.
7.20 p.m.
_Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Hood, H.M.S. ‘Attentive.’_
Belgian Army is on line River Yser left bank, from Nieuport to
Dixmude, with advanced posts on E. bank at Lombartzyde Rattevalle and
Mannekensvere.
King is at La Panne, the last village on French coast.
The rôle of ships is as follows:—
Firstly, to prevent any disembarkation of German troops between
Nieuport and La Panne and to South-West.
Secondly to fire against enemy, which are advancing on Nieuport.
8.20 p.m.
_Admiralty to Commodore Tyrwhitt, H.M.S. ‘Maidstone,’ Harwich._
The first German attempt to send destroyers down the Broad Fourteens
being so successfully defeated may cause a larger number to be sent
next time: be ready to meet them. We are sending scouts and destroyers
to support the Belgian left at Nieuport.
Two battleships are leaving Portland to-night for Dover, four more
destroyers are being sent to escort them. Therefore, if you can spare
four destroyers, send them temporarily for Dover patrol to arrive at
daylight.
_October 19._
_Rear-Admiral Hood to Admiralty._
Engagement continues at Nieuport. I believe that naval bombardment has
done harm to enemy.
6–inch ammunition is urgently required for monitors, and must be sent
as soon as possible, otherwise they will be useless....
_October 21_, 10.55 p.m.
_Rear-Admiral Hood to Admiralty._
Fired to-day 11 hours continuously, could see no improvement in
situation. Patrolling coast every night. Monitors expended 600 6–inch
shells daily. In _Foresight_ alone 1,100 shells fired to-day, and even
then unable to comply with all demands.
_October 22._
_Rear-Admiral Hood, Dunkirk, to First Lord._
I have returned for a few hours to Dunkirk, at the request of Colonel
Bridges, to confer on future movements.
I have enough ships.
Firing has been less to-day.
In the event of a sudden northerly gale, the monitors and _Bustard_
would be lost. This is a justifiable risk if they are doing valuable
work, and is much less than submarine risk.
22/10/14.
_Communiqué._
On the 18th instant requests for naval assistance were made to the
Admiralty by the Allied Commanders. In consequence a naval flotilla,
mounting a large number of powerful long range guns, came into action
at daybreak on the 19th off the Belgian Coast, supporting the left of
the Belgian Army and firing against the right of the German attack,
which they were by their position able to enfilade. The Germans
replied by shells from their heavy guns, but owing to the superior
range of the British Marine Artillery practically no damage has been
done. The three monitors, which were building in British ports for
Brazil and were acquired on the outbreak of war, have proved
particularly well suited to this class of operation. A heavy
bombardment of the German flank has been maintained without
intermission since the morning of the 19th and is being continued
to-day. Observation is arranged from the shore by means of naval
balloons, and all reports indicate that substantial losses have been
inflicted upon the enemy and that the fire is well directed and
effective against his batteries and heavy guns. Yesterday a heavy
explosion, probably of an ammunition wagon, followed upon a naval
shot. The naval losses have so far been very small considering the
damage done and the important assistance rendered to the Belgian left
flank. All reports received by the Admiralty show the courage and
determination with which the Belgian Army, animated by the King in
person, is defending the last few miles of Belgian soil. The naval
operations are under the command of Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace L. A.
Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.
_October 23_, 1.5 a.m.
_Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Hood._
From First Lord.
* Vital to sustain Belgian Army with effective Naval Artillery support
to-morrow.
Arrange details with Bridges.
Am sending Gunnery School tenders to Dunkirk; draw upon them as you
need.
Recognise importance to Navy of dominating Belgian Coast; make the
most of your opportunity.
_October 23._
_Rear-Admiral Hood to First Lord._
Thanks for message. All going well.
Will bombard Ostend. Belgian Head-quarters granted permission.
Am quite satisfied that our firing has done good.
24/10/14.
_Communiqué._
All yesterday the monitors and other vessels of the British bombarding
flotilla fired on the German right, which they searched thoroughly and
effectively in concert with the operations of the Belgian Army. All
German attacks on Nieuport were repulsed. Much damage was done to the
enemy by naval fire which enfilades the German line, and enemy’s
prisoners taken yesterday and the day before testify to the heavy
losses they have suffered from this cause. Fire was also opened in the
afternoon on the German batteries near Ostend. Admiral Hood now has a
fine flotilla of vessels very suitable for this work and at the same
time not of great naval value. During the day our ships were
persistently attacked by an enemy’s submarine, and torpedoes were
fired without success at _Wildfire_ and _Myrmidon_. Other British
vessels again attacked the submarine. The naval aeroplanes and
balloons aided in the direction of the fire. The weather continued
fine and favourable. No loss was sustained by the flotillas yesterday.
_October 26_, 12.21 a.m.
_Rear-Admiral Hood to Admiralty._
Am off Nieuport. All well here. Have not succeeded so well to-day
owing to long range of German batteries, which are not yet located by
me. Aeroplanes reconnoitre the place when weather permits, and, if
located, shall attack batteries with guns I can muster. Portion of
shell on board here proves bigger guns.
Noon.
_Admiralty to Senior Naval Officer, Dover._
Urgent. Order _Venerable_[73] to raise steam at once ready to proceed
to support Allied left off Nieuport. Report how soon she can be ready
to proceed.
Four destroyers must accompany her.
_October 27_, 11.30 p.m.
_First Lord to Rear-Admiral Hood._
Certainly go on, husband ammunition till good targets show, but risks
must be run and Allies’ left must be supported without fail by the
Navy. You have all done very well, and on land the line has been
maintained. Keep it up.
_October 28_, 1.37 a.m.
_Rear-Admiral Hood to Admiralty._
The Belgian authorities begged me to fire more rapidly. Deliberate
firing will not produce more results as it is unmarked. I understand
that 48 hours of clinging to Nieuport may achieve decisive results. If
I am to order the firing to be deliberate, I shall not be able to do
what the Belgian army requires.
_October 28_, 4.34 p.m.
_Rear-Admiral Hood to Admiralty._
Have continued bombardment against increasing opposition. Captain of
Falcon and five men killed and several wounded. _Wildfire_ hit on the
water line and sent in for repairs. _Brilliant_ one killed and several
wounded. _Rinaldo_ eight wounded.... Submarine sighted—all destroyers
now chasing [her]. _Venerable_ has just grounded on sand-bank out of
gunfire. Tide rising, fine weather. She will be off in half an hour.
_October 29_, 1 a.m.
_First Lord to Rear-Admiral Hood._
Save ammunition where possible, but don’t lose any chance of hitting
the enemy. Give your ships the following message: ‘The inshore
flotilla and squadron have played an appreciable part in the great
battle now proceeding. You have shown the Germans that there is one
flank they cannot turn.’
You have full discretion to go ahead.
Meanwhile the British Army was heavily engaged. Sir John French wrote to
me October 21:—
I began this letter two days ago. I had to stop in the middle of a
sentence and hadn’t a single minute to go on with it. We have been
hard pressed the last two days. The enemy has received considerable
reinforcements and a big battle has been raging all along our front
from a point 10 miles North of Ypres to La Bassée, which is W.S.W. of
Lille. We have given way now and then in places and recovered the
ground again—and on the whole have lost nothing (except unfortunately,
men and officers!) although the enemy has attacked with the utmost
vigour.
I have been all along the line but the ground is so flat and the
buildings so numerous that it is impossible to see much of the
infantry work. I have this moment got a wire from the 1st Corps that
they have captured 350 prisoners this afternoon....
He ended by some very friendly expressions about Kitchener and my part
in clearing up misunderstandings; also with some kind words about
Antwerp.
26/10/14.
_Mr. Churchill to Sir John French._
(Private and Secret.)
I am touched and honoured by the kindness of your letter written from
the field of Armentières. It was a disappointment to have to give up
my visit but the press of events here was decisive.
Antwerp was a bitter blow to me, and some aspects of it have given a
handle to my enemies, and perhaps for a time reduced my power to be
useful. From minute to minute one does not know that some fine ship
will not be blown up by mine or submarine.[74] Great good fortune has
attended us so far. Out of twenty-five submarine attacks only five
have been effective, and only on ships of no value. But every
reconnaissance ordered, carries with it the risk of a disproportionate
loss. And if an atmosphere of distrust and malice is created—as is
deliberately and laboriously being done—an unlucky incident might
produce a most unpleasant state of feeling.... However, I am resolved
not to be drawn by any impatience from those carefully considered
plans of the naval war which I revealed to you in July, which are the
result of three years’ study, and with which Jellicoe is in the
fullest accord. These plans will not produce any feat of _éclat_, but
they will keep England safe and prosperous, and enable her in good
time to put in the field an army which will definitely and finally
turn the scale.
Kitchener is strangely alarmed about invasion, and on the C.I.D. we
have witnessed an absolute reversal of rôles—the W.O.[75] declaring
the country not safe and an invasion of 250,000 a possibility, and the
Admiralty reassuring them, or trying to. You know how carefully I have
examined that position, and how I have never minimised the risks. But
now that we are face to face with realities, I am not alarmed, and my
policy is that you should be reinforced by any effective division that
can be formed and maintained; and that the Navy will prevent any
invasion of a serious character. The Prime Minister is solid as a
rock; but waves of nervousness pass over others, and may result in
some retardation of your reinforcements.
We are making extraordinary efforts to grapple with the submarine
menace which tends to drive our great ships so far away, and during
November we shall, I believe, have got the better of it, and have
secured all our anchorages by network and other means. Then we shall
be able to give a greater assurance to those who need it.
But my dear friend, I do trust you realise how damnable it will be if
the enemy settles down for the winter along lines which comprise
Calais, Dunkirk or Ostend. There will be continual alarms and greatly
added difficulties. We must have him off the Belgian Coast, even if we
cannot recover Antwerp.
I am getting old ships with the heaviest guns ready, protected by
barges with nets against submarines, so as to dispute the whole
seaboard with him. On the 31st instant _Revenge_, four 13½-inch guns,
will come into action if required, and I have a regular fleet of
monitors and ‘bomb-ketches’ now organised which they all say has hit
the Germans hard, and is getting stronger every day.
If you could again passage off to the left, I could give you
overwhelming support from the sea, and there you will have a flank
which certainly they cannot turn.
You have on your front gained a fine success in hurling back the whole
weight of the German right. All your messages are so good—cool,
resolute and informing. They will make a good page of military
history. My heart is with you in the army.
_Sir John French to Mr. Churchill._
_October 28._
‘Your letters are always a great help and strength to me. Thank you
indeed for the last one. I wish you would try and take a less gloomy
view of what those people chatter about. What _does_ it matter....’ I
tried hard to retain a hold on the Belgians and with them to operate
alone on the northern flank; but the French sent Foch and a _Mission_.
As the Belgians were practically the guests of France, using their
territory and Calais as a base, I had no alternative but to gracefully
‘submit.’
I am, however, on the very best terms with Foch, who is doing splendid
work....
He added—
The fighting is still severe—I’ve been at two points of the line
to-day—but it is certainly slackening.
The Germans will never get further west.
This is only a hurried line written in the watches of the night.
No words written after the event can convey half so truthful or half so
vivid an impression as these unstudied letters and brief operative
telegrams flashing to and fro. Reading them again I feel once more the
battle going on, the exhausted Belgians clinging desperately to the last
few miles of soil left to their nation, their dauntless King and Queen
amid the shells at Furnes; the French troops hastening up, but only in
driblets; the heroic _Fusiliers Marins_ holding Dixmude till not a fifth
were left alive; our little ships barking away along the coast with the
submarines stabbing at them from underneath and heavier metal opening on
them every day from the shore; inundations slowly growing, a shield of
merciful water rising inch by inch, hour by hour, between the fainting
Belgian line and the cruel monster who had come upon them; and all the
time our own men fighting against appalling odds, ten days, twenty days,
thirty days, from Ypres to Armentières; nothing to send anyone, not a
man, not a musket. Each night Colonel Bridges spoke to me on the
telephone from the Belgian Head-quarters at Furnes. Each night we felt
it might be the last time he would speak from that address. It was only
very gradually towards the end of October that one began to feel that
the French and Belgian troops were getting a firm grip of the line of
the Yser, and that Sir John French could write, ‘The Germans will never
get further west.’ But three more weeks of agony ensued before the
decision at Ypres finally declared itself in favour of the British Army.
* * * * *
We are, I feel, entitled to treat the Antwerp episode as an integral and
vital part of this tremendous battle for the Channel Ports. If we had
not made our belated effort to prolong its defence, the whole after
course of events would have been different, and could hardly have been
better. But for the time gained at Antwerp and the arrival in such a
forward situation of the British and French forces assigned so hurriedly
for its relief, the impulsion of the Allied Armies towards the
sea—already less than was required—must have been sensibly weakened. The
great collision and battle with the German right would have taken place
all the same. Perhaps the same result would have been achieved. But
where? Where would the line have been drawn when the armies settled down
into trenches from which they were not appreciably displaced for more
than four years? At the very best the water defences, Gravelines—St.
Omer—Aire, would have been secured. Dunkirk and its fine harbour would
have become another nest of submarines to prey on our communications in
the Channel; and Calais would have been exposed to a constant
bombardment. The complications of these evils—the least that could be
expected—must have reacted formidably upon the whole subsequent fortunes
of the Allied Armies in France.
If this be true—and history must pronounce—the men who were responsible
for the succour of Antwerp will have no reason to be ashamed of their
effort. Hazard and uncertainty pervade all operations of war. It is idle
to pretend that Lord Kitchener or anyone else foresaw all the
consequences that flowed from the decisions of October 4. The event was
very different from both hopes and expectations. But rarely in the Great
War were more important results achieved by forces so limited and for
losses so small, as those which rewarded this almost forlorn enterprise;
nor is there in modern times, a more remarkable example of the
flexibility, the celerity, and the baffling nature of that amphibious
power which Britain alone wields, but which she has so often neglected.