WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY
August 4–August 22 1914
‘The Time to visualise what will fall under the harrow of war is
before the harrow is set in motion. Afterwards comes in Inevitableness
with iron lips, and Fatalism with unscrutinising gaze, and Us with
filmed eyes, and Instinct with her cry, “Do not look too closely,
seeing one must keep one’s senses!”’
MARY JOHNSTON, ‘_Cease Firing_,’ Chapter XXIX.
British Strategy—The Great War Council, August 5—Four Divisions or
Six—Changes in the Cabinet—Lord Kitchener: Secretary of State for
War—Organisation of the British Armies—Lord Kitchener’s Task—The
Royal Naval Division—Departure of the German and Austrian
Ambassadors—The Board of Admiralty in War—Responsibilities of the
First Lord—Procedure—The German Method—Relative Naval Strength—The
Prospects of Battle—British Command of the Sea—Paralysis of the
German Mercantile Marine—Frustration of the German Attack on
Trade—The _Goeben_ at Messina on August 5—Knowledge and
Dispositions of Sir Berkeley Milne—Orders to the _Indomitable_—The
Southern Exit—No Contact with the French—The _Goeben_ and
_Breslau_ leave Messina—Rear-Admiral Troubridge’s Successive
Decisions—Second Escape of the _Goeben_—Explanations—A Sinister
Fatality—Final Abandonment of the Pursuit—Transportation of the
British Army to France—Instructions to Sir John Jellicoe—Covering
Movements of the Fleet—Safe Passage of the Army—The Deadly Hush.
The entry of Great Britain into war with the most powerful military
Empire which has ever existed was strategically impressive. Her large
Fleets vanished into the mists at one end of the island. Her small Army
hurried out of the country at the other. By this double gesture she
might seem to uninstructed eyes to divest herself of all her means of
defence, and to expose her coasts nakedly to the hostile thrust. Yet
these two movements, dictated by the truest strategy, secured at once
our own safety and the salvation of our Allies. The Grand Fleet gained
the station whence the control of the seas could be irresistibly
asserted. The Regular Army reached in the nick of time the vital post on
the flank of the French line. Had all our action been upon this level,
we should to-day be living in an easier world.
* * * * *
The differences which had prevailed about entering the war were
aggravated by a strong cross-current of opinion, by no means operative
only in the Cabinet, that if we participated it should be by naval
action alone. Men of great power and influence, who throughout the
struggle laboured tirelessly and rendered undoubted services, were found
at this time resolutely opposed to the landing of a single soldier on
the Continent. And, if everything had not been prepared, if the plan had
not been perfected, if it had not been the only plan, and if all
military opinion had not been industriously marshalled round it—who
shall say what fatal hesitancy might not have intervened?
On the afternoon of August 5 the Prime Minister convened an
extraordinary Council of War at Downing Street. I do not remember any
gathering like it. It consisted of the Ministers most prominently
associated with the policy of our entering the war, the chiefs of the
Navy and the Army, all the high military commanders, and in addition
Lord Kitchener and Lord Roberts. Decision was required upon the
question, How should we wage the war that had just begun? Those who
spoke for the War Office knew their own minds and were united. The whole
British Army should be sent at once to France, according to what may
justly be called the Haldane Plan. Everything in that Minister’s eight
years’ tenure of the War Office had led up to this and had been
sacrificed for this. To place an army of four or six divisions of
infantry thoroughly equipped with their necessary cavalry on the left of
the French line within twelve or fourteen days of the order to mobilise,
and to guard the home island meanwhile by the fourteen Territorial
Divisions he had organised, was the scheme upon which, aided by
Field-Marshals Nicholson and French, he had concentrated all his efforts
and his stinted resources. It was a simple plan, but it was a practical
plan. It had been persistently pursued and laboriously and minutely
studied. It represented approximately the maximum war effort that the
voluntary system would yield applied in the most effective and daring
manner to the decisive spot; and mobilisation schemes, railway graphics,
time-tables, the organisation of bases, depots, supply arrangements,
etc., filling many volumes, regulated and ensured a thorough and
concerted execution. A commander whose whole life led up to this moment
had been chosen. All that remained to be done was to take the decision
and give the signal.
At this point I reported on behalf of the Admiralty that our
mobilisation being in every respect complete and all our ships in their
war stations, we would waive the claim we had hitherto made in all the
discussions of the Committee of Imperial Defence that two Regular
Divisions should be retained in Great Britain as a safeguard against
invasion, and that so far as the Admiralty was concerned, not four but
the whole six divisions could go at once; that we would provide for
their transportation and for the security of the island in their
absence. This considerable undertaking was made good by the Royal Navy.
Discussion then turned upon the place to which they should be
dispatched. Lord Roberts inquired whether it was not possible to base
the British Army on Antwerp so as to strike, in conjunction with the
Belgian armies, at the flank and rear of the invading German hosts. We
were not able from an Admiralty point of view to guarantee the sea
communications of so large a force on the enemy side of the Straits of
Dover, but only inside the Anglo-French flotilla cordon which had
already taken up its station. Moreover, no plans had been worked out by
the War Office for such a contingency. They had concentrated all their
thought upon integral co-operation with the French left wherever it
might be. It was that or nothing.
Another discussion took place upon how far forward the British
Expeditionary Force should be concentrated. Some high authorities,
dwelling on the fact that the mobilisation of the British army had begun
three days later than the French, were for concentrating it around
Amiens for intervention after the first shock of battle had been taken.
But in the end Sir John French and the forward school had their way and
it was felt that we must help France in the way the French Staff thought
would be most effective.
* * * * *
When I next went to the Cabinet after the declaration of war, I found
myself with new companions. During the previous seven years Lord Morley
had always sat on the left of the Prime Minister, and I had always sat
next to Lord Morley. Many a wise and witty admonition had I received
pencilled in scholarly phrase from my veteran neighbour, and many a
charming courtesy such as he excelled in had graced the toilsome path of
business. He had said to me on the Sunday of Resolve, ‘If it has to be,
I am not the man to do it. I should only hamper those like you who have
to bear the burden.’ Now he was gone. In his place sat Lord Kitchener.
On my left also there was a fresh figure—the new Minister of
Agriculture, Lord Lucas. I had known him since South African War days,
when he lost his leg: and to know him was to delight in him. His open,
gay, responsive nature, his witty, ironical, but never unchivalrous
tongue, his pleasing presence, his compulsive smile, made him much
courted by his friends, of whom he had many and of whom I was one. Young
for the Cabinet, heir to splendid possessions, happy in all that
surrounded him, he seemed to have captivated Fortune with the rest.
Both these two men were marked for death at the hands of the enemy, the
young Minister grappling with his adversary in the high air, the old
Field Marshal choking in the icy sea. I wonder what the twenty
politicians round the table would have felt if they had been told that
the prosaic British Cabinet was itself to be decimated in the war they
had just declared. I think they would have felt a sense of pride and of
relief in sharing to some extent the perils to which they were to send
their countrymen, their friends, their sons.
* * * * *
At the Council of War on August 5 Lord Kitchener had not yet become
Secretary of State for War, but I knew that his appointment was
impending. The Prime Minister, then also Secretary of State for War,
could not possibly be burdened with the continuous flow of
inter-departmental work proceeding between the War Office and the
Admiralty and requiring to be transacted between Ministers. He therefore
invited Lord Kitchener to undertake ministerial charge of the War
Office, and the Field-Marshal, who had certainly not sought this post in
any way, had no choice but to accept.
My relations with Lord Kitchener had been limited. Our first meeting had
been on the field of Omdurman, when as a lieutenant in the 21st Lancers
I had been sent back to report verbally to the Commander-in-Chief the
position of the advancing Dervish Army. He had disapproved of me
severely in my youth, had endeavoured to prevent me from coming to the
Soudan Campaign, and was indignant that I had succeeded in getting
there. It was a case of dislike before first sight. On my side, I had
dealt with his character and campaigns in two bulky volumes conceived
throughout in a faithful spirit of critical impartiality. It was twelve
years before I saw him again, when we were formally introduced to each
other and had a brief talk at the Army Manœuvres in 1910. I got to know
him a little at the Malta Conference in 1912, and thenceforward we used
to talk over Imperial Defence topics when from time to time we met. On
these occasions I had found him much more affable than I had been led to
expect from my early impressions or from all I had heard about him. In
the week before the war we had lunched and dined together two or three
times, and we had discussed all the possibilities so far as we could
foresee them. I was glad when he was appointed Secretary of State for
War, and in those early days we worked together on close and cordial
terms. He consulted me constantly on the political aspects of his work,
and increasingly gave me his confidence in military matters. Admiralty
and War Office business were so interlaced that during the whole of the
first ten months we were in almost daily personal consultation. I cannot
forget that when I left the Admiralty in May, 1915, the first and, with
one exception, the only one of my colleagues who paid me a visit of
ceremony was the over-burdened Titan whose disapprobation had been one
of the disconcerting experiences of my youth.
* * * * *
As is well known, the British armies on mobilisation consisted of a
highly organised expeditionary force of six Regular Divisions of
Infantry and a Cavalry Division. In addition there were two Regular
Infantry Divisions, the 7th and 8th, which had to be collected from
their garrisons all over the Empire or formed out of troops surplus to
the Expeditionary Force at home; and it was decided also to employ two
divisions, half British and half native, from India. Behind these
trained forces, unquestionably of a very high order, stood fourteen
Territorial Divisions and thirteen Mounted Brigades to whom the defence
of Britain must be confided. These were little trained, lightly equipped
with artillery, but composed of farsighted and intelligent men who had
not waited for the hour of danger to make their country’s cause their
own. In six months or, as some thought, in a shorter period, such troops
could be made to play their part.
Lord Kitchener now came forward to the Cabinet, on almost the first
occasion after he joined us, and in soldierly sentences proclaimed a
series of inspiring and prophetic truths. Every one expected that the
war would be short; but wars took unexpected courses, and we must now
prepare for a long struggle. Such a conflict could not be ended on the
sea or by sea power alone. It could be ended only by great battles on
the Continent. In these the British Empire must bear its part on a scale
proportionate to its magnitude and power. We must be prepared to put
armies of millions in the field and maintain them for several years. In
no other way could we discharge our duty to our allies or to the world.
These words were received by the Cabinet in silent assent; and it is my
belief that had Lord Kitchener proceeded to demand universal national
service to be applied as it might be required, his request would have
been acceded to. He, however, proposed to content himself with calling
for volunteers, and in the first instance to form six new regular
divisions. It would have been far better to have formed the new
volunteers upon the cadres of the Territorial Army, each of which could
have been duplicated or quadruplicated in successive stages. But the new
Secretary of State had little knowledge of and no faith in the British
territorial system. The name itself was to him a stumbling-block. In the
war of 1870 he had been present at a battle on the Loire, probably Le
Mans, in which the key of the position, confided to French territorial
troops, had been cast away, entailing the defeat of the whole army. He
dwelt on this incident to me on several occasions, and I know it had
created fixed impressions in his mind. Vain to explain how entirely
different were the characters of the troops forming the French and
British territorial forces—the former aged conscripts in their last
periods of service; the latter keen and ardent youths of strong military
predilections. They were territorials, and that was the end of it.
This at the very outset aggravated the difficulties of his already
gigantic task. He set himself to create the cadres first of six, then of
twelve, and ultimately of twenty-four ‘Kitchener Army’ divisions, at the
same time that the recruits were pouring in upon him by the hundred
thousand. That this vast feat of improvisation was accomplished must
certainly rank among the wonders of the time.
The arguments against compulsory service, cogent as they no doubt were,
were soon reinforced by the double event of overwhelming numbers of
volunteers and of a total lack of arms and equipment. Apart from the
exiguous stores held by the Regular Army, there was literally nothing.
The small scale of our military forces had led to equally small
factories for war material. There were no rifles, there were no guns;
and the modest supplies of shells and ammunition began immediately to
flash away with what seemed appalling rapidity. Many months must elapse,
even if the best measures were taken, before new sources of supply even
on a moderate scale could be opened up. One was now to learn for the
first time that it took longer to make a rifle than a gun; and rifles
were the cruellest need of all. We had nothing but staves to put in the
hands of the eager men who thronged the recruiting stations. I ransacked
the Fleet and the Admiralty stores and scraped together another 30,000
rifles, which literally meant another 30,000 men in the field. Afloat
only the Marines would have their rifles; Jack must, in the last resort
trust to his cutlass as of old.
At the moment when Lord Kitchener began the formation of his first six
new army divisions and before the great rush of recruits had begun, I
offered him the Royal Naval Division, which he gladly accepted. Before
the war we had foreseen the fact that the Navy would on mobilisation
have many thousands of men in their depots for whom there would be no
room in any ship of war that we could send to sea. I had therefore
proposed to the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1913 the formation of
three brigades, one composed of Marines and the other two of men of the
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and of the Royal Fleet Reserve. These
brigades it was intended to use to assist in home defence in the early
stages of a war. The cadres were therefore easily formed from the
available resources. The Marine Brigade was already virtually in
existence, and it was clear that all three would be ready for action
long before any of the new troops that were being raised. The Naval
Volunteers, who longed to serve afloat, accepted the new task with many
heartburnings but with boundless loyalty. Alas, for most of them it
proved a fateful decision. Few there were of that gallant company that
survived unscathed. As for their deeds, they will not be forgotten in
the history even of these crowded times.[32]
* * * * *
It fell to my lot to prescribe the arrangements for the departure of the
German Ambassador and, eight days later, of his Austrian Colleague.
Accordingly on the morning of August 5 I sent my Naval Secretary Admiral
Hood in uniform to the German Embassy desiring to know in what manner we
might facilitate Prince Lichnowsky’s wishes and convenience. While the
German mob were insulting and even pelting the departing French and
British Ambassadors, we set ourselves to work with meticulous care to
secure the observance of every propriety and courtesy towards those for
whom we were responsible. Prince Lichnowsky has given his own record of
his ceremonious treatment, which appeared to make a marked impression
upon his mind.
To Count Mensdorf, the Austrian Ambassador, I wrote as follows:—
_August 13, 1914._
‘My Naval Secretary Admiral Hood, who brings this letter, is
instructed to put himself at your disposal in arranging for the
comfort and convenience of your journey by sea. If there is any way in
which I can be of service to you at this time, you will not I hope
fail to command me.
Although the terrible march of events has swept aside the ancient
friendship between our countries, the respect and regard which spring
from so many years of personal association cannot pass from the hearts
of your English friends.’
The Austrian Ambassador asked that a ship might be provided to take him
direct to Trieste, and that consideration might be shown to a number of
unhappy Austrian non-combatants long resident in London who now had to
fly the country. I therefore arranged that upwards of 200 persons should
embark in the Ambassador’s ship. I felt sure that in taking these
measures I was acting in accord with what British dignity required.
* * * * *
The position of the Admiralty in relation to the Fleet, and of the First
Lord in relation to his naval colleagues under conditions of war
requires explanation. The control of the main armies was divided between
the War Office and General Headquarters, but in the Admiralty these
functions were inevitably combined to a far larger extent. The Naval
Commander-in-Chief, living with his actual fighting Fleet and always
ready at a few hours’ notice to lead it personally into full battle,
stood much nearer to the event than his military counterpart. The staff
which he could accommodate upon his flagship, the volume of business
which he could transact, were necessarily limited by physical
conditions. Everything must be ready to move at the shortest notice into
extreme danger, and Staff, office, organisation, Commander-in-Chief,
might vanish out of existence in an instant. The first duty of the
Commander-in-Chief was to keep his mind and body fit for the supreme
task of personally commanding the mighty array of ships when in contact
with the enemy. The vigilant guarding of the Fleet from danger, its
training for battle, its organisation, its efficiency and the direct
personal conduct of individual operations were all concentrated in one
man. But this was enough. It was the duty of the Admiralty so far as
possible to shield him from all further responsibilities or anxieties,
to lap him round with securities and assistance and to bear all other
parts of the great load of war themselves.
The Admiralty itself was also in direct contact with the event. It not
only exercised administrative control over the Navy and over the whole
of the preparations for strengthening and developing the Fleet; it not
only determined the strategic distribution of our naval power in every
theatre; but from its wireless masts or by cable it issued information
often of a vital character to ships in many instances actually in
contact with the enemy. It was the only place from which the supreme
view of the naval scene could be obtained. It was the intelligence
centre where all information was received, where alone it could be
digested, and whence it was transmitted wherever required. It moved the
fleets, squadrons and flotillas out of harbour when information pointed
to enemy’s activities being probable. It specified the minimum forces
which should be employed in any operation, while leaving the
Commander-in-Chief free to add to them at his discretion. Apart from
actual battle or the tactical conduct of particular operations, in which
the Admiralty never interfered, it decided every important question
arising out of the conduct of the naval war. Robed in the august
authority of centuries of naval tradition and armed with the fullest
knowledge available, the Board of Admiralty wielded unchallenged power.
As these conditions arose naturally and inevitably and will certainly be
reproduced in one form or another should there be a future war, it is of
high importance to pierce beneath the corporate responsibility of this
organism and lay bare how the machine actually worked. In practice it
resolved itself, and could only resolve itself, into the intimate
comradeship and co-operation of the First Lord and the First Sea Lord,
with the Chief of the Staff, not at this time a member of the Board,
standing at their side. By the Letters Patent and Orders in Council
constituting his office, the First Lord is responsible to Crown and
Parliament for all the business of the Admiralty. In virtue of this he
delegates to an eminent sailor the responsibility for its technical and
professional conduct. But he cannot thus relieve himself either in
theory or in fact. He is held strictly accountable for all that takes
place; for every disaster he must bear the blame. The credit of
victories rightly goes to the commanders who gain them; the burden of
defeat or miscarriage must be shouldered by the Admiralty, and the
censures of the nation fall primarily upon its Head.
How then is a civilian Minister appointed for political or parliamentary
reasons and devoid of authoritative expert knowledge, to acquit himself
of his duty? Clearly it depends upon the character, temperament and
capacity both of the First Lord and the First Sea Lord. They must settle
it between themselves, and if they cannot agree wholeheartedly on the
momentous problems with which they are confronted in swift succession,
another combination must be chosen by the Sovereign on the advice of the
Prime Minister. I interpreted my duty in the following way:—I accepted
full responsibility for bringing about successful results, and in that
spirit I exercised a close general supervision over everything that was
done or proposed. Further, I claimed and exercised an unlimited power of
suggestion and initiative over the whole field, subject only to the
approval and agreement of the First Sea Lord on all operative orders.
Right or wrong, that is what I did, and it is on that basis that I wish
to be judged.
In practice the difficulties were less than would be imagined. Indeed,
over long periods of unending crisis and tension the machine worked very
smoothly. The Second, Third and Fourth Sea Lords dropped back upon the
outbreak of war into the positions the ‘Supply Boards’ had occupied in
the great naval wars of the past. They were the providers of men, of
ships and of stores. They took no part, or only a very occasional part,
in strategic decisions. It was the responsibility of the First Sea Lord
to keep the Second Sea Lord fully informed of what was in progress in
order that the latter could replace him temporarily at a moment’s
notice. In practice, however, both Prince Louis and Lord Fisher worked
more closely with the Chief of the Staff, and these two presented
themselves to me always in full accord.
The constitutional authority of the Board of Admiralty was exercised at
that time in accordance with long custom by two Members of the Board,
sitting together with the Secretary of the Admiralty. Thus the Admiralty
War Group at the beginning of the struggle consisted of the First Lord,
the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Staff and the Secretary. To these
were added, when the First Sea Lord wished and on particular occasions,
the Second Sea Lord and certain special advisers, of whom more anon. We
met every day and sometimes twice a day, reviewed the whole position and
arrived at a united decision on every matter of consequence. The
execution was confided to the Chief of the Staff. The Secretary
registered, recorded, and, apart from the orders given by the War Staff,
took the consequential action. Besides our regular meetings the First
Sea Lord and I consulted together constantly at all hours. Within the
limits of our agreed policy either he or I gave in writing authority for
telegrams and decisions which the Chief of the Staff might from hour to
hour require. Moreover, it happened in a large number of cases that
seeing what ought to be done and confident of the agreement of the First
Sea Lord, I myself drafted the telegrams and decisions in accordance
with our policy, and the Chief of the Staff took them personally to the
First Sea Lord for his concurrence before dispatch. In addition to these
urgent executive matters, the regular flow of Admiralty papers passed
upwards from the First Sea Lord or other Lords to me for decision by
minute; and I further, by minutes and memoranda, initiated discussion
and action over the whole area of naval business.
The advantages and disadvantages of these methods must be judged by
their general results; but it is instructive to compare them with those
which we now know prevailed at the German Admiralty. On the outbreak of
war, the Naval Secretary of State von Tirpitz, himself an admiral, found
himself cut off entirely from the strategical and quasi-tactical control
of the fleets, to such an extent that he declares ‘he did not know the
naval war plans.’ He was confined to purely administrative business, and
thus charged, he was carried off as an adjunct to the Emperor’s suite at
Great Headquarters. The Naval Staff, headed in the first instance by von
Pohl, alone had the ear of the Emperor and received from the lips of the
All-Highest indications of his Imperial pleasure. The position of
Admiral von Tirpitz was therefore most unhappy. The Naval Staff warded
him off the Emperor as much as possible, and persuaded the Emperor to
repulse his efforts to break in. The Emperor, oppressed with the whole
burden of the State, gave to the Staff from time to time directions and
uttered passing expressions which thereafter operated with irresistible
authority. It is to this state of affairs that Admiral von Tirpitz
ascribes the paralysis which gripped the German Fleet through the first
critical months of the naval war. This it was, according to him, that
lost the opportunity of fighting the supreme battle under the least
unfavourable conditions, enabled the control of the seas to pass into
our hands practically without a struggle, and secured the uninterrupted
transport of our armies to the Continent. If our solution of the
difficult problem of naval war direction was imperfect, so also was that
of our enemy.
* * * * *
A study of the tables and diagrams set out in the Appendix[33] shows
that our known margin of superiority in Home Waters was smaller then
than at any subsequent moment in the war. The Grand Fleet as
concentrated in its Northern war station on August 1, 1914, comprised 24
vessels classified as ‘Dreadnoughts’ or better. In addition the battle
cruiser _Invincible_ was at Queenstown watching the Atlantic, the two
_Lord Nelsons_ were with the Channel Fleet, and three battle cruisers
were in the Mediterranean. The Germans actually mobilised 16 ships
similarly classed.[34] We could not be absolutely certain, though we
thought it unlikely, that they might not have ready two, or even three,
more; and these of the greatest power. Happily, every British ship was
ready and in perfect order. None was under repair. Our strength for an
immediate fleet action was 24 to a certain 16 and a possible 19. These
figures do not, as the tables in the Appendix reveal, do justice to the
full material strength of the British Fleets as a whole, still less to
the gun-power of the British Line of Battle, which after the
Dreadnoughts comprised eight King Edwards markedly superior to the next
eight Germans. But apart from all that may be said on this, and of the
confidence which it inspired, the fact remains that from five to eight
Dreadnoughts was all the certain numerical superiority we had. There was
not much margin here for mischance, nor for the percentage of mechanical
defects which in so large a Fleet has to be expected, and no margin
whatever for a disaster occasioned by surprise had we been unready. To a
superficial observer who from the cliffs of Dover or Portland had looked
down upon a Battle Squadron of six or seven ships, lying in distant
miniature below, the foundation upon which the British world floated
would have presented itself in a painfully definite form. If the
intelligence and courage of British seamen were not all that we believed
them to be; if the workmanship which had built these great vessels were
not honest and thorough; if our seamanship or our gunnery had turned out
to be inferior; if some ghastly novelty or blunder supervened, the
battle might be very even.
It is easy to understand how tense were the British naval expectations.
If the German Navy was ever to fight a battle, now at the beginning was
its best chance. The German Admiralty knew, of course, what ships we had
available, and that we were mobilised, concentrated and at sea. Even if
they assumed the extraordinary fact that every one of our Dreadnoughts
was ready and that not one of them had developed a defect, they could
fight to German eyes a battle 16 against a maximum 27—heavy odds from
their point of view, still heavier when the survey was extended to the
whole of the Fleets, but yet odds far less heavy than they would have to
face after six months, after twelve months or at any later period. For
look at the reinforcements which were approaching these two opposing
Fleets. They must assume that, in addition to completing our own
vessels, we should requisition every battleship building for a foreign
Power in our yards, and on this basis seven great ships must join the
Grand Fleet within three months, and twelve great ships within six
months, against which only three in three months and five in six months
could be reckoned on their side, leaving the balance in three months at
34 to 19 and in six months at 39 to 21; and this took no account of
three battle-cruisers in the Mediterranean and one (_Australia_) in the
Pacific which obviously we could bring home if necessary.
Here then, was the least unfavourable moment for Germany; here was the
best chance they would ever see. Was it not also the strategic moment?
Might they not assume that the transportation of the British Army to
France would be a grave preoccupation for the Admiralty? Was it not
clear that a victory, even a partial victory, would be more fruitful at
this juncture than at any other? Forty-two fast German merchant cruisers
needed only a breathing space to get loose and to arm upon the seas,
requiring afterwards to be hunted down one by one. Might not above all
the interruption and delay in the transportation of the Army be of real
effect in the supreme trial of strength on land? The German Staff
believed in a short war. They were staking everything upon a supreme
trial of strength on land. Why should not the German Fleet be hurled in
too and play its part for what it was worth in the supreme decision? To
what other use could it ever be put?
We therefore looked for open battle on the sea. We expected it and we
courted it. The news that the two Navies were approaching each other to
take a decision in blue water would have been received in the Fleet with
unaffected satisfaction, and at the Admiralty with composure. We could
not send our Grand Fleet into the minefields and submarine-infested
areas of the Heligoland Bight. But had battle been offered by the enemy
under any conditions which did not put us at a serious disadvantage, it
would have been at once accepted.
In fact, however, the sober confidence of the Admiralty was based upon
calculations of relative naval strength, the soundness of which was not
disputed by the German Naval Staff. Even von Tirpitz, the advocate of
action, writes (p. 356): ‘Against an immediate fight was the fact that
the whole English Fleet was ready for battle when the war broke out
owing to the test mobilisation, whereas only our active squadrons were
ready.’ ‘Great Britain,’ says the Official German Naval History, ‘...
had secured extensive military advantages by her test mobilisation and
her subsequent measures, regardless of the uneasiness necessarily
provoked thereby ... which advantage Germany could not counter or
overtake.’ The German Staff felt that even if this was the best chance
for a trial of strength, it was still a chance so hazardous and even so
forlorn that it was not worth taking; and their Battle Fleet remained
hoarded up in harbour for an ignominious day, imposing upon the British,
no doubt, a continued and serious expenditure of our resources for naval
purposes, gaining for Germany substantial advantages of a secondary
character, but not exercising any decisive influence upon the whole
course of the war.
So we waited; and nothing happened. No great event immediately occurred.
No battle was fought. The Grand Fleet remained at sea: the German Fleet
did not quit the shelter of its harbours. There were no cruiser actions.
A German minelayer sowing a minefield off Harwich was chased and sunk by
a flotilla of destroyers led by the _Amphion_; and the _Amphion_
returning, was blown up on the German minefield. Otherwise silence
unbroken by cannon brooded over the broad and narrow waters. But during
that silence and from its first moment the sea-power of Great Britain
ruled unchallenged throughout the world. Every German cruiser in foreign
waters vanished into the immense spaces of the sea; every German
merchant ship, from the earliest moment when the entry of Britain into
the war became apparent, fled for neutral harbours. Seven out of eight,
potential commerce destroyers, were bottled up without ever a shot being
fired. German seaborne trade outside the Baltic ceased to exist from the
night of August 4. On the other hand, after a few days of hesitation the
swarming mercantile marine of Britain, encouraged by a Government
insurance of no more than six per cent., began to put to sea; and even
before the main armies had met in battle on the Continent, the whole
vast ocean traffic of the British Empire was proceeding with the utmost
activity. By the end of August the rate of insurance had already fallen
to six per cent. and the Admiralty was able to announce that of the
forty-two German liners from whom attacks on trade were to be
apprehended, eleven were tied up unarmed in harbours of the United
States watched outside territorial limits by British cruisers, six had
taken refuge in other neutral harbours, where they were either
dismantled or observed, fourteen were in German ports gripped by the
blockade, six were held as prizes in British hands, and only five
remained unaccounted for and unlocated. The fate of these five will be
recounted later.
All fell out in these respects, therefore, in broad accordance with the
views set forth in my memorandum on commerce protection of August 23,
1913, revised in April, 1914, which is printed in full in the Appendix
for the benefit of the thorough.[35] None of those gloomy prophecies
which had formed the staple of so many debates and articles, that our
merchant ships would be hunted from the seas by German raiders, that
scores of additional British cruisers would be required for commerce
protection, that British merchant ships once safe in harbour would not
venture to sea, materialised; and they might be relegated to the limbo
of exploded alarms. The three great naval dangers which had bulked most
largely in our minds in the years before the war—first, the danger of
surprise of the Fleet; second, the Mine danger; third, the paralysis of
our seaborne trade—rolled away behind us like giant waves which a ship
has finally surmounted.
More than a hundred years had passed since the British Navy had been
called upon to face an emergency of the first magnitude. If a hundred
years hence, in similar circumstances, it is found equally ready, we
shall have no more reason to complain of our descendants than they have
reason to complain of us.
* * * * *
It is time to return to the Mediterranean.
Admiral Souchon, the German Commander, having outdistanced our shadowing
cruisers in the darkness of the night, pursued his course to Messina,
where he arrived with the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ on the morning of
August 5. He had already received, as we now know, a telegram sent from
Nauen at 1.35 a.m. on the preceding day by the German Admiralty. This
message gave him all-important information. It stated that an alliance
had been concluded between Germany and Turkey, and directed him to
proceed to Constantinople immediately. Of this treaty we knew nothing.
All our reports were of an entirely different tenor; nor was it till
long afterwards that we learnt the true attitude of Turkey at this hour.
On arrival at Messina the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ began to coal from
German colliers. This occupied the whole of the day, the whole of the
night and the greater part of the next day, the 6th. Exactly thirty-six
hours elapsed before the _Goeben_ moved. Meanwhile the light cruiser
_Gloucester_, watching off the Southern exit of the Straits of Messina,
reported at 3.35 p.m. on August 5 to Sir Berkeley Milne that the
strength of the wireless signals she was taking in indicated that the
Goeben must be at Messina.
The British Commander-in-Chief had left the Malta Channel in his
flagship the _Inflexible_ after midnight of August 4, and at about 11
a.m. on August 5 he had assembled all his three battle cruisers and two
light cruisers off Pantellaria island, midway between Sicily and the
African coast.[36] According to his own published account[37] he had
learned on the 4th that the German mail steamer _General_ was remaining
at Messina at the disposition of the _Goeben_. He therefore believed
throughout the whole of the 5th that ‘the _Goeben_, _Breslau_ and
_General_ were all at Messina.’ His belief was correct.
One of his battle cruisers, the _Indomitable_, had to coal. He sent her
to Biserta. This was an important decision. Considering that he believed
that the _Goeben_ was at Messina, and that he intended himself to watch
to the Northward with two battle cruisers, some authorities have held
that it would have been a sensible precaution to let this third ship
coal at Malta, where facilities were certain and instant, and whence she
could so easily move to close the Southern exit from Messina, or join
Rear-Admiral Troubridge in the mouth of the Adriatic, as that officer
had been led to expect.[38] By sending the _Indomitable_ to coal at
Malta, he could have placed two battle cruisers watching the Northern
exit and one at the Southern. But the Commander-in-Chief decided to keep
all three battle cruisers together in his own hand and to patrol off the
Western end of Sicily between Sardinia and Biserta. The Southern exit
was therefore left completely open to the _Goeben_: and a severe action
was reserved for Rear-Admiral Troubridge if, as seemed likely, she ran
up the Adriatic.
At 5 p.m. on the 5th Sir Berkeley Milne received the signal sent by the
_Gloucester_ at 3.35 p.m. reporting the presence of the _Goeben_ at
Messina. Here was certain confirmation of his belief. He was at this
moment about 100 miles West of Sicily. He continued however to cruise
with his two ships between Sicily and Sardinia, and as late as the
evening of August 6, his orders to the _Indomitable_ were still to join
him thereabouts. He did this because he considered that placing all
three battle cruisers in this position was his surest way of carrying
out the instructions of the Admiralty telegram of July 30 about aiding
the French in the transport of their African army. That it was one
method of carrying out these orders cannot be disputed, and the Admiral
has set out in his book the reasons which led him to adopt it. The
superior speed of the Goeben made it necessary, he states, if he were to
intercept her, that he should stand a long way off and have timely
notice of her approach. To place his whole force in this way between her
and the French transports was, he argues, the best chance of catching
the _Goeben_ if she tried to attack them. He reported his intended
dispositions late on the 4th to the Admiralty, whose only comment upon
them was, ‘Watch over the Adriatic should be maintained for the double
purpose of preventing the Austrians from coming out or the Germans from
entering.’ The exceedingly prompt manner in which the _Goeben_ had been
found, although in the open sea, on the 4th had given the Admiralty the
feeling that the Admiral on the spot had a grip of the situation and
needed no further directions.
Sir Berkeley Milne had not, however, succeeded in communicating with the
French Admiral, although he had made repeated attempts by wireless and
had sent the _Dublin_ to Biserta with a letter. He did not know where
the French Fleet or the French transports were. He did not tell the
Admiralty this. The Admiralty for their part, after the general telegram
of August 4 enjoining immediate consultation with the French, assumed
that the two Commanders-in-Chief in the Mediterranean were acting in
concert. They did not therefore ask the French for any information, nor
was any volunteered by the French Admiralty. Any inquiry addressed to
Paris would have elicited the fact that the French had changed their
plans and that no transports were yet at sea. All parties were on this
point to some extent in fault.
Meanwhile the British Ambassador in Rome was endeavouring to tell the
Admiralty as soon as the pressure on the wires allowed that the _Goeben_
was at Messina. The news did not reach London till 6 p.m. on August 5.
The Admiralty passed it without comment, though with some delay, to Sir
Berkeley Milne, who already knew from other sources. It is a fair
criticism on the Admiralty that they did not immediately they knew the
_Goeben_ was at Messina authorise the British ships to follow her into
the Straits. The point was not put to me either by the First Sea Lord or
the Chief of the Staff, and as I had not myself been concerned in
initiating or drafting the telegram about rigidly respecting Italian
neutrality, it was not specially in my mind. Had it been put to me I
should at once have consented. This was no petty incident and the prize
was well worth the risk of vexing the Italians. In fact, permission to
chase through the Straits was given by the Admiralty unasked to Sir
Berkeley Milne, as soon as it was realised that the _Goeben_ was
escaping unblocked to the Southward. It was then too late.
In pursuance of the orders he had received from Germany, Admiral Souchon
with the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, having at length completed coaling and
made his will, steamed out of Messina harbour at 5 p.m. on August 6,
cleared for action and with his bands playing. He no doubt expected to
encounter at least one and possibly two of the British battle cruisers
as soon as he was outside territorial waters. In view of the fact that,
as he was aware, his position must have been accurately known to the
British Commander-in-Chief for many hours, this assumption was not
unreasonable. Unhappily, as has been described, every one of the three
British battle cruisers was otherwise engaged. Thus when the German
Admiral rounded the Southern point of Italy and turned Eastward, the
only three antagonists whose combination of power and speed he had to
dread were already far astern.
Still there was the British armoured cruiser squadron watching the
Adriatic. This squadron consisted of four good ships, viz. _Defence_,
_Warrior_, _Duke of Edinburgh_ and _Black Prince_. It was commanded by
Rear-Admiral Troubridge, who had also under his orders eight destroyers,
and was being joined by the light cruiser _Dublin_ and two more
destroyers from Malta. It is necessary to restate the facts of this
officer’s action.
On the assumption—which was dominant—that the _Goeben_ would make for
Pola, Admiral Troubridge was well placed for meeting her. It was not
until he heard from the _Gloucester_ that she had turned South and was
persistently steering on a South-Easterly course that any new decision
was required from him. He received no orders to quit his station from
Sir Berkeley Milne. He was in constant hope of receiving a battle
cruiser. But Admiral Troubridge decided to act on his own
responsibility. Eight minutes after midnight of August 6 (i.e. 0.08,
August 7) he gave orders to his four cruisers and his eight destroyers
to steam Southward at full speed for the purpose of intercepting the
_Goeben_. He also signalled to the _Dublin_ (Captain John Kelly) at that
moment coming from Malta to join him with the two extra destroyers, to
head her off. He reported his decision to the Commander-in-Chief. Thus
at midnight August 6–7 sixteen British vessels were converging upon the
_Goeben_ and _Breslau_ and were in positions from which they could
hardly fail to intercept the enemy shortly after daylight. At 3.50 a.m.,
however, after further reflection and having received no orders or reply
from Sir Berkeley Milne, Admiral Troubridge became convinced that he
could not hope to engage the _Goeben_ under the advantageous conditions
of the half light of dawn, and that in an action fought in broad waters
in full daylight, his four ships would be sunk one after another by the
_Goeben_, who all the time would keep outside the range—16,000 yards—of
the British 9.2–inch guns. This is thought by some naval officers to be
an extreme view. The limited ammunition of the _Goeben_ would have had
to have been wonderfully employed to have sunk all four British armoured
cruisers _seriatim_ at this long range.[39] Moreover, if the _Goeben_
and _Breslau_ had become involved in an action, it is hard to believe
that none of the sixteen British cruisers and destroyers which were
available could have closed in upon them and attacked them with gun or
torpedo. All the destroyers were capable of reaching the enemy and could
have found their opportunity to attack. It would have been indeed a
prodigious feat on the part of the Germans to dispose of so many
antagonists at once. However, the Admiral came to the conclusion that
the _Goeben_ was ‘a superior force’ which by his instructions, passed to
him by the Commander-in-Chief, he was not to engage. And in this
conclusion he has been sustained by a British naval court-martial.
He thereupon desisted from his attempt to intercept the _Goeben_, turned
his ships and destroyers and entered the harbour of Zante about 10 a.m.
preparatory to resuming his watch in the Adriatic. The _Dublin_ and her
two destroyers having asked and been refused permission to make a
daylight attack, had attempted to intercept the _Goeben_ before dawn,
but did not succeed in finding her in the darkness.
By 6 o’clock therefore on the morning of August 7 the _Goeben_, already
the fastest capital unit in the Mediterranean, was steaming on an
unobstructed course for the Dardanelles, carrying with her for the
peoples of the East and Middle East more slaughter, more misery and more
ruin than has ever before been borne within the compass of a ship.
Thus of all the British vessels which were or could have been brought
within effective distance, none did anything useful excepting only the
two light cruisers _Dublin_ and _Gloucester_, commanded, as it happened,
by two brothers. The _Dublin_ (Captain John Kelly) as we have seen did
all in her power to place herself athwart the enemy’s course and to
fight him by night or day; and the _Gloucester_ (Captain W. A. Howard
Kelly) hung on to the heels of the _Goeben_ till late in the afternoon,
in extreme danger and with the utmost tenacity, and only relinquished
the chase under the direct orders of the Commander-in-Chief.
Various explanations have been offered for the failure to bring the
_Goeben_ to action after the declaration of war, and every telegram sent
by the Admiralty was searched to find phrases which could justify or
palliate what had occurred. For instance, it was pleaded that the
sentence in the Admiralty telegram to the Commander-in-Chief of July 30,
‘Do not at this stage be brought to action against superior forces
except in combination with the French as part of a general battle,’
justified Admiral Troubridge in refraining from attacking the _Goeben_
with his four armoured cruisers. On this it may be observed that this
sentence is clearly shown by the context to refer to the Austrian Fleet
against whose battleships it was not desirable that our three battle
cruisers should be engaged without battleship support. Secondly it was
contained in a telegram giving the Commander-in-Chief general directions
for the strategic conduct of the naval campaign in the Mediterranean. It
was not intended by the Admiralty to govern tactical action. The words,
however, acquired a more particular significance when they were
repeated—as they were—by the Commander-in-Chief to his subordinate
Admiral Troubridge. But even so it ought not to have been treated as a
veto upon British ships ever engaging superior forces however needful
the occasion. This was an unreasonable reading of the Admiralty
instructions. On such a reading both the _Gloucester_ and the _Dublin_
were guilty of disobedience. On such a reading, pedantically construed,
no individual British ship in the Mediterranean would have been allowed
to fight a vessel stronger by a single gun. Nobody ever honestly
supposed that such doctrines were being laid down by the Admiralty.
Moreover, the self-same telegram specifically emphasised the importance
of bringing the _Goeben_ to action and singled out that vessel
particularly among all the hostile forces in the Mediterranean. No such
conception of his duty was taken by either of the Captains Kelly. Nor
was it the view of Sir Berkeley Milne himself; for he disapproved
strongly of Admiral Troubridge’s abandonment of the chase.
Again it has been urged that the sentence, ‘Your first task should be to
aid the French in the transportation of their African army,’ imposed
upon Sir Berkeley Milne the duty of placing _all three_ of his battle
cruisers west of Sicily. Thus wrested from their context and from the
whole series of Admiralty telegrams, these directions have been made to
serve as an explanation. Against them must be read the full text. On
July 30, ‘Your first task should be to aid the French in the
transportation of their African army _by covering and if possible
bringing to action individual fast German ships, particularly
“Goeben.”_‘[40] And again, on August 2, ‘_Goeben_ must be shadowed by
two battle cruisers.’ And again on August 3, ‘_Goeben_ is your
objective. Follow her and shadow her _wherever she goes_, and be ready
to act on declaration of war, which appears probable and imminent.’ And
again on August 4, ‘Good. Hold her. War imminent.’
Certainly if the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean had in reliance
upon these dominant and reiterated instructions managed to put one
battle cruiser each side of the Straits of Messina, instead of all on
one side, and if in consequence he had brought the _Goeben_ to action,
as would have been inevitable, and if he had thus protected the French
transports in the most effectual manner by fighting the _Goeben_, no one
could have found fault with him on the score that he had exceeded his
orders.
The reader is now in a position to form his own judgment on this affair.
I have indicated plainly the point on which the Admiralty was in fault,
namely, in not spontaneously lifting the prohibition to enter Italian
waters the moment we learned the _Goeben_ was at Messina. The conduct of
Rear-Admiral Troubridge was subsequently investigated by a Court of
Inquiry composed of the three Commanders-in-Chief of Portsmouth,
Devonport and Chatham. As the result of their report, he was tried by
court-martial at Portland in September and honourably acquitted of all
blame. His career in the Navy was, however, at an end, the general
feeling of the Service not accepting the view that the four armoured
cruisers and other vessels at his disposal ought not to have fought the
_Goeben_. In view of his acquittal he was appointed to take charge of
the naval guns which we sent with a mission to Serbia. In this capacity
his work was distinguished and successful. He gained the confidence and
respect of the Serbians and their Government, and he proved on numerous
occasions that whatever might be thought of his reasons for not
attacking the _Goeben_, want of personal courage was not among them.
After studying the reports of Sir Berkeley Milne and other officers
concerned, the First Sea Lord recorded the opinion that Admiral Milne
had taken the best measures with the force at his disposal, that his
dispositions were the proper ones, and that they were successful
inasmuch as they prevented the Germans from carrying out their primary
rôle of interrupting French troops crossing from Africa. On this I find
that my sole comment was (August 27): ‘The explanation is satisfactory;
the result unsatisfactory.’ Thereafter on August 30, 1914, the Admiralty
issued a statement that: ‘The conduct and dispositions of Sir Berkeley
Milne in regard to the German vessels _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ have been
the subject of the careful examination of the Board of Admiralty with
the result that their Lordships have approved the measures taken by him
in all respects.’
In all this story of the escape of the _Goeben_ one seems to see the
influence of that sinister fatality which at a later stage and on a far
larger scale was to dog the enterprise against the Dardanelles. The
terrible ‘Ifs’ accumulate. If my first thoughts on July 27 of sending
the _New Zealand_ to the Mediterranean had materialised; if we could
have opened fire on the _Goeben_ during the afternoon of August 4; if we
had been less solicitous for Italian neutrality; if Sir Berkeley Milne
had sent the _Indomitable_ to coal at Malta instead of Biserta; if the
Admiralty had sent him direct instructions when on the night of the 5th
they learned where the _Goeben_ was; if Rear-Admiral Troubridge in the
small hours of August 7 had not changed his mind; if the _Dublin_ and
her two destroyers had intercepted the enemy during the night of the
6th–7th—the story of the _Goeben_ would have ended here. There was,
however, as it turned out, one more chance of annulling the doom of
which she was the bearer. That chance, remote though it was, the Fates
were vigilant to destroy.
[Illustration: THE ESCAPE OF THE “GOEBEN”]
EXPLANATION
M MILNE WITH TWO BATTLE-CRUISERS, TWO LIGHT
CRUISERS.
T TROUBRIDGE WITH FOUR ARMOURED CRUISERS, EIGHT
DESTROYERS.
D LIGHT CRUISER DUBLIN AND TWO DESTROYERS
JOINING TROUBRIDGE.
G GOEBEN AND BRESLAU SHADOWED BY GLOUCESTER.
X POSITIONS AT MIDNIGHT, AUGUST 6TH–7TH.
TIME TABLE
0.8 A.M., 5th. MILNE LEAVES MALTA FOR MERIDIAN
OF 10°E.
1.15 A.M., 5th. ORDERS RECEIVED TO COMMENCE
HOSTILITIES AGAINST GERMANY
5.0 A.M., 5th. GOEBEN ARRIVED MESSINA.
11.0 A.M., 5th. INFLEXIBLE, INDEFATIGABLE,
INDOMITABLE, DUBLIN,
WEYMOUTH, CHATHAM RENDEZVOUS
OFF PANTELLARIA. DUBLIN SENT
TO MALTA TO COAL AND THEN
TAKE 2 DESTROYERS TO
TROUBRIDGE; INDOMITABLE SENT
TO BIZERTA TO COAL. MILNE
WITH INFLEXIBLE,
INDEFATIGABLE, WEYMOUTH AND
CHATHAM STEERS FOR MERIDIAN
10°E.
3.35 P.M., 5th. GLOUCESTER REPORTS GOEBEN AT
MESSINA.
7.30 A.M., 6th. MILNE LEAVES HIS PATROL LINE
AND STEAMS EAST.
5.0 P.M., 6th. GOEBEN LEAVES MESSINA.
10.45 P.M., 6th. GOEBEN TURNS SOUTH-EAST.
0.8 A.M., 7th. TROUBRIDGE RESOLVES TO
INTERCEPT HER AND STEERS
SOUTH.
3.51 A.M., 7th. TROUBRIDGE TURNS INTO ZANTE.
NOON, 7th. MILNE ARRIVES MALTA.
4.40 P.M., 7th. GLOUCESTER OFF MATAPAN, GIVES
UP, BY ORDERS, HER TENACIOUS
CHASE.
At 1 a.m. on August 8 Sir Berkeley Milne, having collected and coaled
his three battle cruisers at Malta, set out at a moderate speed on an
Easterly course in pursuit of the _Goeben_. At this juncture the Fates
moved a blameless and punctilious Admiralty clerk to declare war upon
Austria. The code telegram ordering hostilities to be commenced against
Austria was inadvertently released without any authority whatever. The
mistake was repaired a few hours later; but the first message reached
Sir Berkeley Milne at 2 p.m. on August 8 when he was half-way between
Sicily and Greece. His original war orders, had prescribed that in the
event of a war with Austria he should in the first instance concentrate
his fleet near Malta, and faithful to these instructions he turned his
ships about and desisted from the pursuit of the _Goeben_. Twenty-four
hours were thus lost before orders could reach him to resume it. But the
_Goeben_ herself had come to a standstill. Admiral Souchon was cruising
irresolutely about the Greek islands endeavouring to make sure that he
would be admitted by the Turks to the Dardanelles. He dallied thirty-six
hours at Denusa and was forced to use his tell-tale wireless on several
occasions. It was not till the evening of the 10th that he entered the
Dardanelles and the Curse descended irrevocably upon Turkey and the
East.
* * * * *
From the 9th to the 22nd of August the Army was crossing the Channel.
This was a period of great anxiety to us. All the most fateful
possibilities were open. We were bound to expect a military descent upon
our coasts with the intention of arresting or recalling our Army, or a
naval raid into the Channel to cut down the transports, or a
concentrated submarine attack upon these vessels crowded with our
troops. The great naval battle might begin at any moment, either
independently or in connection with any of these operations. It was a
period of extreme psychological tension.
In continued anxiety lest some capital mistake should be made through a
different sense of proportion prevailing in the Fleet and at the
Admiralty, I drew up the following appreciation which with the
concurrence of the First Sea Lord was sent officially to Sir John
Jellicoe.
_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets. August 8, 1914. Sent
10.15 p.m._
1. To-morrow, Sunday, the Expeditionary Force begins to cross the
Channel. During that week the Germans have the strongest incentives to
action. They know that the Expeditionary Force is leaving, and that
the mobilisation and training of the Territorial Army is incomplete.
They may well argue that a raid or raids now upon the East Coast would
interrupt, confuse and probably delay the departure of the Army, and
further that it might draw the Grand Fleet rapidly South to interfere
with the landing.
2. Alternatively, or simultaneously, they may attempt to rush the
Straits and interrupt the passage of the Army. It seems in the last
degree improbable that if they did so they would use their modern
Battle Fleet. Their principle has been, according to all we know about
them, to aim at a general battle with the British Fleet when by
attrition and accident our margin of superiority has been reduced.
They may be assumed to know our general dispositions in the South, and
the strong and numerous Submarine flotillas of which we and the French
dispose. They must apprehend that the Straits are mined. Since the
distance across the Channel can be covered in 6 to 8 hours, 3 hours’
notice of their approach would enable every transport to reach safety.
To force the Straits and enter the Channel with their best ships means
the certain loss of units which it is vital to them to preserve if
they are ever to fight a general battle. And this sacrifice, with all
its hazards, would lead them only into an Anglo-French lake, lined
with fortified harbours and infested with torpedo craft, at the end of
which lies the Atlantic Ocean, and the Grand Fleet—wherever it
is—certainly between them and home. If this plan were followed by the
Germans, we should mine the Straits of Dover heavily behind them, and
leave you to engage them at your convenience.
3. A far more probable German plan would be (A) to send a fast
division to rush the Straits and attack the transports, while at the
same time (B) making raids on the East Coast to create a diversion.
Our dispositions in the Channel and its approaches provide fully for
(A). With regard to (B), it is not considered that more than 10,000
men can be spared from Germany at present for raids. Such raid or
raids would inconvenience the military arrangements, but the Army is
ready to meet the raiders if they land. Their Lordships would wish to
emphasise that _it is not part of the Grand Fleet’s duty to prevent
such raids, but to deal with the enemy’s Battle Fleet_. The enemy’s
older ships will possibly be used to cover either one or more raids.
Their main Battle Fleet may be in rear to support them. They may
expect you to come direct to prevent the raid, and therefore may lay
one or more lines of mines across your expected course, or use their
Submarines for the same purpose. Whereas if you approach from an
Easterly or North-Easterly direction, i.e. behind them, you would cut
the German Battle Fleet from its base, the landed raiders from all
reinforcements, and you would approach by a path along which the
chance of meeting mines would be sensibly reduced. In our view
therefore you should ignore the raid or raids, and work by a
circuitous route so as to get between the enemy’s fleet, or covering
force, and home. It would seem undesirable to come South of latitude
57° until news of a raid has been actually received; and even then the
possibility of the German Battle Fleet being still in the Heligoland
Bight, i.e. behind you, cannot be excluded.
This appreciation of the situation is not intended to hamper your
discretion to act according to circumstances.
The naval dispositions by which the passage of the Army was covered have
been fully described in the Official History of the War and in other
Service works. The northern approaches to the Straits of Dover were
patrolled by cruiser squadrons and by flotillas from Harwich and the
Thames. The Straits of Dover were minutely watched by the British and
French Destroyer flotillas of the Dover cordon and by the Submarine
flotillas of Commodore Keyes. Behind these there was constituted on
August 7 the Channel Fleet, comprising nineteen battleships of the 5th,
7th and 8th Battle Squadrons, now all fully mobilised. This fleet,
having assembled under the command of Admiral Burney at Portland,
cruised in readiness for battle at the western end of the Channel at
such distances from the Dover cordon as its commander might judge
convenient. The western entrance to the Channel was guarded by other
cruiser squadrons.
During the first few days of the transportation no great numbers of
troops were crossing the Channel, but from the 12th to the 17th the bulk
of the Army was in transit, and the strategic tension reached its
climax. Until this period was reached the Grand Fleet was kept in its
northern station and was even permitted to cruise northwards of the
Orkneys, but on August 12 Admiral Jellicoe was directed to re-enter the
North Sea and to cruise southward into a position of effective
proximity.
_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets._
_August 12, 1914._
We cannot wholly exclude the chance of an attempt at a landing during
this week on a large scale supported by High Sea Fleet. In addition to
the possibilities explained in Admiralty appreciation of situation
sent you 8th, extraordinary silence and inertia of enemy may be
prelude to serious enterprises. Our view remains as expressed in
appreciation, and even if larger landing forces were employed the
general principles of action would remain unaltered except that the
urgency of interrupting the landing would of course be greater. You
ought however to be nearer the theatre of decisive action, as we
originally contemplated, and now that you have shaken off the
submarine menace, or as soon as you can do so, it would appear
necessary to bring the Fleet to the Eastward of the Orkneys passing
either N. or S. of the Shetlands keeping well out of sight of land and
stopping traffic if necessary. Cruiser sweeps to the South and
South-east should be made as convenient. Acknowledge this immediately
on receipt.
During the three days of heaviest transportation, August 15, 16 and 17,
the Heligoland Bight was closely blockaded by submarines and destroyers,
supported between the Horn Reef and the Dogger Bank by the whole of the
Grand Fleet. Thus battle in open water was offered to the German Navy
during the three days when their inducements to fight were at their
maximum. But except for an occasional submarine, no sign betrayed the
existence of the enemy’s naval power.
All went well. Not a ship was sunk, not a man was drowned: all
arrangements worked with the utmost smoothness and punctuality. The Army
concentration was completed three days in advance of Sir John French’s
original undertaking to General Lanrezac;[41] and with such secrecy was
the whole of this vast operation enshrouded, that on the evening of
August 21, only a few hours before the British cavalry patrols were in
contact with the Germans, General von Kluck, commanding the First German
Army in Belgium, received from the Supreme Command no better information
than the following:—
‘A landing of British troops at Boulogne and their advance from about
Lille must be reckoned with. It is believed that no landing of British
troops on a big scale has yet taken place.’[42]
Three days later the whole British Army was fighting the battle of Mons.
The silence at sea was accompanied by a suspense on land. Except for the
overrunning and trampling down of Liége, and a French raid into Alsace,
only the covering troops of the great armies were in contact. There was
a long, stifling pause before the breaking of the storm. All over Europe
millions of men, pouring along the roads and railroads, flowing across
the Rhine bridges, draining from the farthest provinces of the wide
Russian Empire, streaming northwards from Southern France and Northern
Africa, were forming in the immense masses of manœuvre or the lines of
battle. There was plenty to fill the newspapers; but to those who
understood what was coming, the fortnight with which this chapter is
concerned seemed oppressed by a deathly hush.