THE MOBILISATION OF THE NAVY
July 31–August 4
‘The meteor flag of England
Shall yet terrific burn;
Till danger’s troubled night depart,
And the star of peace return.’
CAMPBELL.
Cabinet Tension—The Opposition Leaders—The Naval Reserves—British
Decision to close the Chanel to German Warships—Germany declares
War upon Russia—General Mobilisation of the Navy—Sir John Jellicoe
appointed Commander-in-Chief—German Invasion of Luxemburg and
Belgium—Monday, August 3, in the House of Commons—British
Ultimatum to Germany—Nation and Empire—Situation in the
Mediterranean—Menace of the _Goeben_—Admiralty Instructions to Sir
Berkeley Milne—August 4. The _Goeben_ found—Cabinet veto on
Hostilities—Italian Declaration of Neutrality—First Escape of the
_Goeben_—Awaiting the Signal—‘Commence hostilities against
Germany.’
There was complete agreement in the Cabinet upon every telegram sent by
Sir Edward Grey and in his handling of the crisis. But there was also an
invincible refusal on the part of the majority to contemplate British
intervention by force of arms should the Foreign Secretary’s efforts
fail and a European war begin. Thus, as the terrific week wore on and
the explosion became inevitable, it seemed probable that a rupture of
the political organism by which the country had so long been governed
was also rapidly approaching. I lived this week entirely in the official
circle, seeing scarcely anyone but my colleagues of the Cabinet or of
the Admiralty, and moving only to and fro across the Horse Guards
between Admiralty House and Downing Street. Each day as the telegrams
arrived showing the darkening scene of Europe, and the Cabinets ended in
growing tension, I pulled over the various levers which successively
brought our naval organisation into full preparedness. It was always
necessary to remember that if Peace was preserved every one of these
measures, alarmist in their character and involving much expense, would
have to be justified to a Liberal House of Commons. That assembly once
delivered from the peril, would certainly proceed upon the assumption
that British participation in a Continental struggle would have been
criminal madness. Yet it was not practicable often to divert the main
discussions of the Cabinet into purely technical channels. It was
therefore necessary for me to take a peculiar and invidious personal
responsibility for many things that had to be done when their turn came.
I had also to contemplate a break up of the governing instrument. Judged
by reports and letters from members, the attitude of the House of
Commons appeared most uncertain.
On Thursday evening I entered into communication with the Unionist
leaders through Mr. F. E. Smith.[30] I informed him of the increasing
gravity of the European situation and of the military preparations which
were everywhere in progress in Europe. I stated that no decision had
been reached by the Cabinet, and that I had received letters from one or
two Unionists of influence protesting vehemently against our being drawn
into a Continental war. I asked him to let me know where he and his
friends stood on the supreme issue. He replied at once that he himself
was unreservedly for standing by France and Belgium. After consulting
with Mr. Bonar Law, Sir Edward Carson and others who were gathered at
Sir Edward Goulding’s house at Wargrave, he sent me the following
written assurance, which I showed to Mr. Asquith the next morning
(Saturday).
_Mr. F. E. Smith to Mr. Churchill._
_July 31, 1914._
I have spoken to my friends of whom you know and I have no doubt that
on the facts as we understand them—and more particularly on the
assumption (which we understand to be certain) that Germany
contemplates a violation of Belgian neutrality—the Government can rely
upon the support of the Unionist Party in whatever manner that support
can be most effectively given.
Saturday, _August 1, 1914_.
Secretary,
First Sea Lord.
It seems certain that the order to mobilise will be issued after
Cabinet this morning. Have everything in readiness.
Examination service should be put into force simultaneously.
W. S. C.
At the Cabinet I demanded the immediate calling out of the Fleet
Reserves and the completion of our naval preparations. I based this
claim on the fact that the German Navy was mobilising and that we must
do the same. The Cabinet, who were by no means ill-informed on matters
of naval organisation, took the view after a sharp discussion that this
step was not necessary to our safety, as mobilisation only affected the
oldest ships in the Fleet, and that our main naval power was already in
full preparedness for war and the Fleet in its war station. I replied
that though this was true, we needed the Third Fleet ships, particularly
the older cruisers, to fulfil the rôles assigned to them in our war
plan. However, I did not succeed in procuring their assent.
On Saturday evening I dined alone at the Admiralty. The foreign
telegrams came in at short intervals in red boxes which already bore the
special label ‘Sub-Committee,’ denoting the precautionary period. The
flow was quite continuous, and the impression produced on my mind after
reading for nearly an hour was that there was still a chance of peace.
Austria had accepted the conference, and intimate personal appeals were
passing between the Tsar and the Kaiser. It seemed to me, from the order
in which I read the series of telegrams, that at the very last moment
Sir Edward Grey might succeed in saving the situation. So far no shot
had been fired between the Great Powers. I wondered whether armies and
fleets could remain mobilised for a space without fighting and then
demobilise.
I had hardly achieved this thought when another Foreign Office box came
in. I opened it and read ‘Germany has declared war on Russia.’ There was
no more to be said. I walked across the Horse Guards Parade and entered
10 Downing Street, by the garden gate. I found the Prime Minister
upstairs in his drawing-room: with him were Sir Edward Grey, Lord
Haldane and Lord Crewe; there may have been other Ministers. I said that
I intended instantly to mobilise the Fleet notwithstanding the Cabinet
decision, and that I would take full personal responsibility to the
Cabinet the next morning. The Prime Minister, who felt himself bound to
the Cabinet, said not a single word, but it was clear from his look that
he was quite content. As I walked down the steps of Downing Street with
Sir Edward Grey, he said to me, ‘You should know I have just done a very
important thing. I have told Cambon that we shall not allow the German
fleet to come into the Channel.’ I went back to the Admiralty and gave
forthwith the order to mobilise. We had no legal authority for calling
up the Naval Reserves, as no proclamation had been submitted to His
Majesty in view of the Cabinet decision, but we were quite sure that the
Fleet men would unquestioningly obey the summons. This action was
ratified by the Cabinet on Sunday morning, and the Royal Proclamation
was issued some hours later.
Another decision and a painful one was required. Sir George Callaghan’s
command of the Home Fleets had been extended by a year, and was now due
to end on the 1st October. It had been announced that he would then be
succeeded by Sir John Jellicoe. Further, our arrangements prescribed
that Sir John Jellicoe should act as second-in-command in the event of
war. The First Sea Lord and I had a conference with Sir George
Callaghan, on his way through London to the North on the 30th. As the
result of this conference we decided that if war came, it would be
necessary to appoint Sir John Jellicoe immediately to the chief command.
We were doubtful as to Sir George Callaghan’s health and physical
strength being equal to the immense strain that would be cast upon him;
and in the crash of Europe it was no time to consider individuals. Sir
John Jellicoe left London for the Fleet with sealed instructions,
directing him on the seals being broken to take over the command. On the
night of August 2, when we considered war certain, we telegraphed to
both Admirals apprising them of the Admiralty decision. It was naturally
a cruel blow to Sir George Callaghan to have to lay down his charge at
such a moment, and his protests were re-echoed by practically all the
principal Admirals who had served under him and by Sir John Jellicoe
himself. It was also a grave matter to make a change in the command of
the Fleets at this juncture. However, we did what we thought right, and
that without an hour’s delay. Sir John Jellicoe assumed command on the
evening of August 3, and received almost immediately an order from the
Admiralty to proceed to sea at daylight on the 4th.
The Cabinet sat almost continuously throughout the Sunday, and up till
luncheon-time it looked as if the majority would resign. The grief and
horror of so many able colleagues were painful to witness. But what
could any one do? In the luncheon interval I saw Mr. Balfour, a
veritable rock in times like these, and learned that the Unionist
leaders had tendered formally in writing to the Prime Minister their
unqualified assurances of support.
I returned to the Admiralty. We telegraphed to our Commanders-in-Chief:—
To-day, August 2, at 2.20 the following note was handed to the French
and German Ambassadors. [_Begins_] The British Government would not
allow the passage of German ships through the English Channel or the
North Sea in order to attack the coasts or shipping of France
[_ends_].
Be prepared to meet surprise attacks.
The French Naval Attaché, the Comte de Saint-Seine had been summoned.
The following is the précis of our conversation:—
_August 2, 1914._
The First Lord in the presence of the First Sea Lord and Chief of the
War Staff, informed the French Naval Attaché of the Cabinet’s decision
and the note on naval matters handed to M. Cambon at 2.20 p.m., August
2.
In order to prepare for the possibility of an alliance being concluded
between the Governments, but without prejudging the question, the
following preliminary steps are to be taken:—
The package containing the secret signal books to be distributed and
opened but not used.
Mutual regulations for the entry of allied ships into each other’s
ports to be issued now.
The officers in command of the Mediterranean and China Stations will
be given permission to enter into communication with the French Senior
Officers in command on their stations.
Certain staff questions were discussed, but the First Lord clearly
pointed out that these involved no question of policy which would have
to be decided by Parliament.
The general direction of the naval war to rest with the British
Admiralty.
The direction of the allied fleets in the Mediterranean to rest with
the French, the British Admiral being junior.
In the event of the neutrality of Italy being assured, France would
undertake to deal with Austria assisted only by such British ships as
would be required to cover German ships in that sea, and secure a
satisfactory composition of the allied fleet.
The arrangement come to locally on the China Station would be carried
out under the general direction of the British Admiral.
British naval bases would be at the disposal of the French.
Should any portion of the German main fleet make its way South towards
the Mediterranean, it would be followed by a superior British force.
The Attaché was asked to communicate the above at once to his
Government by telegraph and obtain full knowledge and authority for a
further discussion on details to-night.
Meanwhile events were influencing opinion hour by hour. When the Cabinet
met on Sunday morning we were in presence of the violation of the Grand
Duchy of Luxemburg by the German troops. In the evening the German
ultimatum to Belgium was delivered. The next day arrived the appeal of
the King of the Belgians that the guaranteeing Powers should uphold the
sanctity of the Treaty regarding the neutrality of Belgium. This last
was decisive. By Monday the majority of Mr. Asquith’s colleagues
regarded war as inevitable. Discussion was resumed on Monday morning in
a different atmosphere, though it seemed certain that there would be
numerous resignations.
Before the Cabinet separated on Monday morning, Sir Edward Grey had
procured a predominant assent to the principal points and general tone
of his statement to Parliament that afternoon. Formal sanction had been
given to the already completed mobilisation of the Fleet and to the
immediate mobilisation of the Army. No decision had been taken to send
an ultimatum to Germany or to declare war upon Germany, still less to
send an army to France. These supreme decisions were never taken at any
Cabinet. They were compelled by the force of events, and rest on the
authority of the Prime Minister. We repaired to the House of Commons to
hear the statement of the Foreign Secretary. I did not know which of our
colleagues had resigned or what the composition of a War Government
would be. The aspect of the assembly was awed but resolute. No one could
mistake its intention. Sir Edward Grey made his statement with the
utmost moderation. In order that there should be no ground for future
reproaches, he informed the House that the Germans were willing to
comply with the British demand that no German warships should be sent
into the English Channel. The sombre march of his argument carried this
weighty admission forward in its stride. When he sat down he was
possessed in an overwhelming measure of the support of the assembly.
Neither he nor I could remain long in the House. Outside, I asked him
‘What happens now?’ ‘Now,’ he said, ‘we shall send them an ultimatum to
stop the invasion of Belgium within 24 hours.’
Some of the Ministers still clung to the hope that Germany would comply
with the British ultimatum and would arrest the onrush of her armies
upon Belgium. As well recall the avalanche, as easily suspend in
mid-career the great ship that has been launched and is sliding down the
ways. Germany was already at war with Russia and France. It was certain
that in 24 hours she would be at war with the British Empire also.
All through the tense discussions of the Cabinet one had in mind another
greater debate which must begin when these were concluded. Parliament,
the nation, the Dominions, would have to be convinced. That the cause
was good, that the argument was overwhelming, that the response would be
worthy, I did not for a moment doubt. But it seemed that an enormous
political task awaited us, and I saw in the mind’s eye not only the
crowded House of Commons, but formidable assembly of the people
throughout the land requiring full and swift justification of the
flaming action taken in their name. But such cares were soon dispersed.
When the Council doors had opened and Ministers had come into the outer
air, the British nation was surging forward in its ancient valour, and
the Empire had sprung to arms.
‘Men met each other with erected look,
The steps were higher that they took,
Friends to congratulate their friends made haste;
And long inveterate foes saluted as they passed.’[31]
* * * * *
Meanwhile in the Mediterranean a drama of intense interest and as it
ultimately proved of fateful consequence, was being enacted.
The event which would dominate all others, if war broke out, was the
main shock of battle between the French and German armies. We knew that
the French were counting on placing in the line a whole army corps of
their best troops from North Africa, and that every man was needed. We
were informed also that they intended to transport these troops across
the Mediterranean as fast as ships could be loaded, under the general
protection of the French Fleet, but without any individual escort or
system of convoys. The French General Staff calculated that whatever
happened most of the troops would get across. The French Fleet disposed
between this stream of transports and the Austrian Fleet afforded a good
guarantee. But there was one ship in the Mediterranean which far
outstripped in speed every vessel in the French Navy. She was the
_Goeben_. The only heavy ships in the Mediterranean that could attempt
to compete with the _Goeben_ in speed were the three British
battle-cruisers. It seemed that the _Goeben_, being free to choose any
point on a front of three or four hundred miles, would easily be able to
avoid the French Battle Squadrons and, brushing aside or outstripping
their cruisers, break in upon the transports and sink one after another
of these vessels crammed with soldiers. It occurred to me at this time
that perhaps that was the task she had been sent to the Mediterranean to
perform. For this reason as a further precaution I had suggested to the
First Sea Lord as early as July 28 that an additional battle cruiser,
the _New Zealand_, should be sent to reinforce our squadron. When it
came to the pinch a few days later, Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère, the
French Commander-in-Chief, adopted a system of convoys; and on August 4
he prudently delayed the embarkation of the troops until he could
organise adequate escorts. But of this change of plan the Admiralty was
not advised.
On July 30 I called for the war orders of the Mediterranean command and
discussed them fully with the First Sea Lord. These orders, issued in
August, 1913, had had to take into consideration a variety of political
contingencies, viz. Great Britain at war with Germany only, with Germany
and Austria only, or with Germany, Austria and Italy; and Great Britain
and France allied together against each or any of the three aforesaid
opponents. The course to be followed differed somewhat in each case.
Briefly, if Britain found herself single-handed against the whole Triple
Alliance, we should temporarily have to abandon the Mediterranean and
concentrate at Gibraltar. In all other cases the concentration would be
at Malta, and if the French were allies our squadrons would join them
for a general battle. It now seemed necessary to give the
Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean some more specific information
and directions.
_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean._
_July 30, 1914._
It now seems probable should war break out and England and France
engage in it, that Italy will remain neutral and that Greece can be
made an ally. Spain also will be friendly and possibly an ally. The
attitude of Italy is however uncertain, and it is especially important
that your Squadron should not be seriously engaged with Austrian ships
before we know what Italy will do. Your first task should be to aid
the French in the transportation of their African army by covering and
if possible bringing to action individual fast German ships,
particularly _Goeben_, which may interfere with that transportation.
You will be notified by telegraph when you may consult with the French
Admiral. Except in combination with the French as part of a general
battle, do not at this stage be brought to action against superior
forces. The speed of your Squadrons is sufficient to enable you to
choose your moment. You must husband your force at the outset and we
shall hope later to reinforce the Mediterranean.
These directions on which the First Sea Lord and I were completely in
accord, gave the Commander-in-Chief guidance in the general conduct of
the naval campaign; they warned him against fighting a premature
single-handed battle with the Austrian Fleet in which our battle
cruisers and cruisers would be confronted with Austrian Dreadnought
Battleships; they told him to aid the French in transporting their
African forces, and they told him how to do it, viz., ‘by covering and,
if possible, bringing to action individual fast German ships,
particularly _Goeben_.’ So far as the English language may serve as a
vehicle of thought, the words employed appear to express the intentions
we had formed.
Sir Berkeley Milne accordingly replied on July 31 that he would keep his
forces concentrated in readiness to assist the French Fleet to protect
the transports, and he rightly left our trade in the Eastern
Mediterranean to shift for itself. In this posture he awaited permission
to consult with the French Admiral. This permission could not be given
him till August 2 at 7.6 p.m., when I telegraphed as follows to our
Commanders-in-Chief all over the world:—
‘Situation very critical. Be prepared to meet surprise attacks. You
can enter into communication with the French Senior Officer on your
station for combined action in case Great Britain should decide to
become ally of France against Germany.’
Earlier that same day the following, initialled both by the First Sea
Lord and myself, was also sent to Sir Berkeley Milne from the
Admiralty:—
‘_Goeben_ must be shadowed by two battle-cruisers. Approaches to
Adriatic must be watched by cruisers and destroyers. Remain near Malta
yourself. It is believed that Italy will remain neutral, but you
cannot yet count absolutely on this.’
At 12.50 a.m. on August 3, I emphasised the importance of the _Goeben_
compared with all other objectives by a further telegram, which I
drafted myself, to Sir Berkeley Milne:—
‘Watch on mouth of Adriatic should be maintained, but _Goeben_ is your
objective. Follow her and shadow her wherever she goes and be ready to
act on declaration of war, which appears probable and imminent.’
Early on the morning of August 4 we were delighted by the following news
from the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to the Admiralty:—
‘_Indomitable_, _Indefatigable_ shadowing _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ 37·44
North 7·56 East.’
We replied:—
‘Very good. Hold her. War imminent.’
(This to go now.)
‘_Goeben_ is to be prevented by force from interfering with French
transports.’
(This to await early confirmation.)
I then sent the following minute to the Prime Minister and Sir Edward
Grey:—
MEMORANDUM
(_Most Urgent._)
Prime Minister.
Sir Edward Grey.
German battle-cruiser _Goeben_ and fast light cruiser _Breslau_ have
been found west of Sicily and are being shadowed by British
battle-cruisers _Indomitable_ and _Indefatigable_. It would be a great
misfortune to lose these vessels as is possible in the dark hours. She
is evidently going to interfere with the French transports which are
crossing to-day.
The following telegram has already been sent:—
‘Good. Hold her. War imminent.’
We wish to add this:—
‘If _Goeben_ attacks French transports you should at once engage her.’
An immediate decision is required.
W. S. C.
Sir Edward Grey agreed to this and so did the Prime Minister, but the
latter asked that it should be mentioned to the Cabinet, which was
meeting almost immediately, for their confirmation. On this I sent,
before going to the Cabinet, the following:—
‘If _Goeben_ attacks French transports you should at once engage her.
You should give her fair warning of this beforehand.’
The Cabinet, however, adhered formally to the view that no act of war
should be committed by us before the expiration of the ultimatum. The
moral integrity of the British Empire must not be compromised at this
solemn moment for the sake of sinking a single ship.
The _Goeben_ of course did not attack the French transports. In fact,
though this we did not know at the time, she was steaming away from the
French transport routes when sighted by the _Indomitable_ and
_Indefatigable_. Even if, however, she had attacked transports, the
decision of the British Cabinet would have prevented our battle-cruisers
from interfering. This decision obviously carried with it the still more
imperative veto against opening fire on the _Goeben_, if she did not
attack French transports, during the hours when we had her in our power.
I cannot impeach the decision. It is right that the world should know of
it. But little did we imagine how much this spirit of honourable
restraint was to cost us and all the world.
In consequence of the Cabinet decision, the First Sea Lord sent by my
directions the following telegram from the Admiralty:—
_Admiralty to all ships, August 4_, 2.5 p.m.
The British ultimatum to Germany will expire at midnight Greenwich
Mean Time, August 4. No act of war should be committed before that
hour, at which time the telegram to commence hostilities against
Germany will be dispatched from the Admiralty.
Special addition to Mediterranean, _Indomitable_, _Indefatigable_.
This cancels the authorisation to _Indomitable_ and _Indefatigable_ to
engage _Goeben_ if she attacks French transports.
At about the same time I received the following minute from the First
Sea Lord:—
_August 4._
First Lord.
In view of the Italian declaration of neutrality, propose to telegraph
to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, acquainting him and enjoining
him to respect this rigidly and not to allow a ship to come within six
miles of the Italian coast.
B.
Considering how disastrous it would be if any petty incident occurred
which could cause trouble at this fateful moment with Italy and
approving of the First Sea Lord’s precaution, I replied in writing:—
_August 4._
So proceed. Foreign Office should intimate this to Italian Government.
W. S. C.
Thereupon at 12.55 p.m. the following telegram was sent by the Admiralty
to the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean:—
Italian Government have declared neutrality. You are to respect this
neutrality rigidly and should not allow any of His Majesty’s ships to
come within six miles of Italian coast.
This certainly as it turned out was destined to complicate the task of
catching the _Goeben_; but not, as it will appear, in a decisive manner.
During the afternoon I sent the following minute to the Chief of the
Staff and the First Sea Lord.
_August 4, 1914._
I presume you have fully informed French Admiralty of our intentions
and that the closest co-operation has been established at all points
with the French Fleet. If not, this should be done immediately.
W. S. C.
On this the Chief of the Staff sent the following telegram to all
stations: ‘You can enter into the closest co-operation with the French
officers on your station.’
Throughout this long summer afternoon three great ships, hunted and
hunters, were cleaving the clear waters of the Mediterranean in tense
and oppressive calm. At any moment the _Goeben_ could have been smitten
at under 10,000 yards range by sixteen 12–inch guns firing nearly treble
her own weight of metal. At the Admiralty we suffered the tortures of
Tantalus.
At about 5 o’clock Prince Louis observed that there was still time to
sink the _Goeben_ before dark. In the face of the Cabinet decision I was
unable to utter a word. Nothing less than the vital safety of Great
Britain could have justified so complete an overriding of the authority
of the Cabinet. We hoped to sink her the next day. Where could she go?
Pola seemed her only refuge throughout the Mediterranean. According to
international law nothing but internment awaited her elsewhere. The
Turks had kept their secret well. As the shadows of night fell over the
Mediterranean the _Goeben_ increased her speed to twenty-four knots,
which was the utmost that our two battle-cruisers could steam. She
increased her speed still further. We have since learned that she was
capable for a very short time of an exceptional speed, rising even to
twenty-six or twenty-seven knots. Aided by this, she shook off her
unwelcome companions and vanished gradually in the gathering gloom.
We shall return to this story in due course.
* * * * *
At 5.50 p.m. we sent the following message:—
_Admiralty to all ships._
General message. The war telegram will be issued at midnight
authorising you to commence hostilities against Germany, but in view
of our ultimatum they may decide to open fire at any moment. You must
be ready for this.
Now, after all the stress and convulsion of the preceding ten days,
there came to us at the Admiralty a strange interlude of calm. All the
decisions had been taken. The ultimatum to Germany had gone: it must
certainly be rejected. War would be declared at midnight. As far as we
had been able to foresee the event, all our preparations were made.
Mobilisation was complete. Every ship was in its station: every man at
his post. All over the world, every British captain and admiral was on
guard. It only remained to give the signal. What would happen then? It
seemed that the next move lay with the enemy. What would he do? Had he
some deadly surprise in store? Some awful design, long planned and
perfected, ready to explode upon us at any moment NOW? Would our ships
in foreign waters have been able to mark down their German antagonists?
If so, morning would witness half a dozen cruiser actions in the outer
seas. Telegrams flowed in from the different naval stations round our
coasts reporting the movements of vessels and rumours of sighting of
enemies. Telegrams still flowed in from the Chancelleries of Europe as
the last futile appeals of reason were overtaken by the cannonade. In
the War Room of the Admiralty, where I sat waiting, one could hear the
clock tick. From Parliament Street came the murmurs of the crowd; but
they sounded distant and the world seemed very still. The tumult of the
struggle for life was over: it was succeeded by the silence of ruin and
death. We were to awake in Pandemonium.
I had the odd sense that it was like waiting for an election result. The
turmoil of the contest seemed finished: the votes were being counted,
and in a few hours the announcement would be made. One could only wait;
but for what a result! Although the special duties of my office made it
imperative that I, of all others, should be vigilant and forward in all
that related to preparation for war, I claim, as these pages show, that
in my subordinate station I had in these years before the war done
nothing wittingly or willingly to impair the chances of a peaceable
solution, and had tried my best as opportunity offered to make good
relations possible between England and Germany. I thank God I could feel
also in that hour that our country was guiltless of all intended purpose
of war. Even if we had made some mistakes in the handling of this awful
crisis, though I do not know them, from the bottom of our hearts we
could say that we had not willed it. Germany it seemed had rushed with
head down and settled resolve to her own undoing. And if this were what
she had meant all along, if this was the danger which had really menaced
us hour by hour during the last five years, and would have hung over us
hour by hour until the crash eventually came, was it not better that it
should happen now: now that she had put herself so hopelessly in the
wrong, now that we were ready beyond the reach of surprise, now that
France and Russia and Great Britain were all in the line together?
The First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Staff came in with French
Admirals who had hurried over to concert in detail arrangements for the
co-operation of the two Fleets in the Channel and in the Mediterranean.
They were fine figures in uniform, and very grave. One felt in actual
contact with these French officers how truly the crisis was life or
death for France. They spoke of basing the French Fleet on Malta—that
same Malta for which we had fought Napoleon for so many years, which was
indeed the very pretext of the renewal of the war in 1803. ‘_Malta ou la
guerre!_’ Little did the Napoleon of St. Helena dream that in her most
desperate need France would have at her disposal the great Mediterranean
base which his strategic instinct had deemed vital. I said to the
Admirals, ‘Use Malta as if it were Toulon.’
The minutes passed slowly.
Once more now in the march of centuries Old England was to stand forth
in battle against the mightiest thrones and dominations. Once more in
defence of the liberties of Europe and the common right must she enter
upon a voyage of great toil and hazard across waters uncharted, towards
coasts unknown, guided only by the stars. Once more ‘the far-off line of
storm-beaten ships’ was to stand between the Continental Tyrant and the
dominion of the world.
It was 11 o’clock at night—12 by German time—when the ultimatum expired.
The windows of the Admiralty were thrown wide open in the warm night
air. Under the roof from which Nelson had received his orders were
gathered a small group of Admirals and Captains and a cluster of clerks,
pencil in hand, waiting. Along the Mall from the direction of the Palace
the sound of an immense concourse singing ‘God save the King’ floated
in. On this deep wave there broke the chimes of Big Ben; and, as the
first stroke of the hour boomed out, a rustle of movement swept across
the room. The war telegram, which meant ‘Commence hostilities against
Germany,’ was flashed to the ships and establishments under the White
Ensign all over the world.
I walked across the Horse Guards’ Parade to the Cabinet room and
reported to the Prime Minister and the Ministers who were assembled
there that the deed was done.