THE BATTLE IN FRANCE
August 20–September 6, 1914
‘For while the dagger gleam’d on high
Reel’d soul and sense, reel’d brain and eye.’
SCOTT, ‘The Lady of the Lake,’ Canto V-XVI.
Germany’s Choice: Prudence or Audacity—Her Dangerous Compromise—The
French Offensive School—One View of French Strategy—Plan XVII—Its
Complete Failure—The Despatch of the Sixth Division—The Morrow of
Mons—Fears for the Channel Ports—The Lloyd George of Agadir—The
British Base Shifted to St. Nazaire—Some expedients—The Retreat—A
Press Communiqué—The Eve of the Marne—The Russian Pressure—Lord
Kitchener’s Journey to Paris—Correspondence with Sir John French—A
Day on the Aisne—The Sea Flank Project—Lord Kitchener’s Wise
Restraint.
Prudence and audacity may be alternated but not mixed. Having gone to
war it is vain to shrink from facing the hazards inseparable from it. At
the outset of the war Germany had a choice between a prudent and an
audacious strategy. She could either have fallen, as she did, upon
France with her main strength and held off Russia meanwhile, or have
fallen upon Russia with ample forces and stood on the defensive against
France. If she had taken the second course she would have said to France
and to Europe: “This is an Eastern quarrel. Let us endeavour to limit
the area of the conflict. We are going to rescue our ally Austria from
Russia. We have no dispute with France. We have no intention of invading
French territory. Unless you attack us, we shall not touch you: if you
attack us, we shall have to defend ourselves. As for Belgium, it is
sacred to us.” The German Government would then have appealed to England
to help to localise the struggle, and a well-meaning effort would most
probably have been made with that object. France would therefore have
had to choose between deserting her ally and invading Germany in cold
blood, alone. Neither Belgium nor England would have entered the war. By
the winter the Russian armies would have been torn to pieces in the
East, and France brought to a standstill before barbed wire and
entrenchments on German soil in the West. France would therefore have
appeared the aggressor, who had made a treaty with Russia in order to
get back her lost provinces, and then in pursuance of this treaty had
flagrantly invaded Germany and had been arrested by the defenders of the
Fatherland. On the other hand, the moment Russia was beaten,
overwhelming German forces could be brought to bear on France. And if in
this second stage the Germans had chosen to violate the neutrality of
Belgium, Britain, if she had intervened at all, would have intervened
divided and too late. All these tremendous political-strategic
considerations were present in the minds of British Ministers, and Mr.
Lloyd George in particular would never believe, until the mass invasion
of Belgium was an actual fact, that the Germans would be so unwise as to
ignore them. Ludendorff, however, tells us that the German General Staff
rejected such a plan for one decisive reason, namely, that it involved a
long war. This answer seems insufficient.
Germany had long and deliberately committed herself to the alternative
plan of the invasion of France through Belgium with the intention of
destroying the French armies in a few weeks. This was a decision of
extreme hazard and audacity; flying in the face of world opinion, openly
assuming the rôle of the aggressor, committing a hideous wrong against
Belgium, incurring probably Belgian resistance and possibly, as they
must apprehend, British intervention. But having embarked on such an
audacious adventure, the Germans failed to concentrate wholly upon it.
In order to secure victory in a few weeks in France before England could
develop her strength, they must be prepared to endure serious injuries
in the East. The German force opposing Russia was therefore rightly cut
down to the absolute minimum. But to carry their plan through in its
integrity more territory should have been yielded to the Russian
invaders, and in no circumstances should any reinforcements have been
transferred from the West to the Eastern front until the decision in the
West had been reached.
* * * * *
I had throughout the greatest misgivings of an impulsive offensive by
the French based, not on calm calculations of numbers, distances and
times, but upon ‘the psychology of the French nation,’ ‘the best
traditions of the French Army,’ ‘the natural _élan_ of the _poilu_.’ I
knew, of course, that the offensive school held the dominance in France.
One could see its reflection in the language of our military men, though
these were strongly anchored to modern realities by unpleasant
recollections of the Boer War. Without knowing with any certainty or
exactness the French plan, I dreaded, whenever I reflected on the
problem, an impetuous onset followed by a shattering shock.
As between the two nations, France and Germany, it would be natural for
the stronger to be left to take the offensive and invade the weaker.
Four or five marches from the frontier the task of the invader becomes
very difficult and may be made more difficult still. The defenders have
superior communications from flank to flank and from front to rear; they
fall back on carefully-chosen, well-prepared positions and on ample
magazines of munitions and supplies. The invader finds himself in a
hostile country, surrounded by spies, with bridges and roads, especially
lateral roads, broken and disorganised, and important junctions defended
by fortresses still in the hands of the enemy. He is thus forced to
deliver the first great battle on ground selected and prepared by his
opponent. It is surely at this moment, and after this first shock has
been sustained under the best conditions, that the opportunity for the
offensive energy of the weaker Power presents itself.
If the Germans invaded France it seemed to me in those days that the
French would be wise to act as follows:—
They should entrench themselves conveniently along or near their
frontier, constructing a vast system of field fortifications, open and
concealed, sham and real, according to every device known at that time;
and in these positions they should await the first shock of the Germans.
I believed that the Germans did not appreciate the tremendous power of
modern weapons, particularly the rifle. I based this on what I had seen
of their methods in their manœuvres of 1906 and 1909 and on what I had
learned about rifle fire in the South African War. The Germans were the
challengers; they were the stronger, but not, in my opinion, strong
enough for the continuous storming and reduction of well-fortified
positions held by French regular armies or by British troops. I did not,
of course, contemplate that the French would dig one uniform line along
the whole length of their frontier. They would naturally treat the
problem selectively, here resisting with their utmost strength, there
allowing the enemy to penetrate and bulge into unpromising country or
into some well-considered tactical area only to be brought up by lines
fifteen to twenty miles in rear. They would not hesitate to sell the
Germans piece by piece a certain amount of ground for disproportionate
losses. The universal tactical object to be pursued in this first phase
should be to force the Germans to expose themselves in the open to the
rifle and artillery fire of well-trained Frenchmen.
It would be reasonable to hope that a process of this kind, continued
for three or four days along the whole front, would have resulted in far
heavier losses to the Germans than to the French, and that a larger
proportion of the German than of the French armies would have been
deployed and extended. One hoped in this way to see the French take toll
of the manhood of the German nation at the outset of the war, as the
British Army did on a small scale at Mons and Le Cateau. This would in
no way have excluded tactical action by means of counter-attacks
wherever opportunities presented themselves. Meanwhile at least
two-fifths of the French armies should have been held back in a great
mass of manœuvre, north-east of Paris. With this mass of manœuvre I
hoped the British Army would have been associated. This general
disposition should not have been compromised by any effort to proceed to
the relief of Belgium, except with cavalry and small detachments to
encourage the Belgians and to gain time. I was, of course, firmly
persuaded, in common with the British General Staff, that the main
German encircling movement would take place through Belgium and would
comprise considerable forces west of the Belgian Meuse. I hoped that if
this movement eventuated and prolonged itself in great strength, the
French would find an opportunity of using the greater part of their
armies of manœuvre against it after the Germans had been well punished
along the whole front. At any rate, that is the sort of way in which I
thought then, before the event, and think still, the French Command
might best have safeguarded the vital interests of France.
Very different, however, were the ideas of General Joffre. The famous
‘Plan XVII’ consisted in a general offensive in an easterly and
north-easterly direction by four French armies, with the last remaining
army in reserve behind their centre. It was based upon an ardent faith
that the French right would penetrate deeply into Alsace and Lorraine
and an obstinate disbelief that the French left would be turned by a
German movement west of the Meuse through Belgium. Both these
calculations were to be completely falsified by the first events of the
war. From the very earliest days it was clear that the views which the
British General Staff had consistently held, since 1911, of a great
German turning movement through Belgium, probably on both sides of the
Belgian Meuse, were correct. Why should the Germans with their eyes open
throw first Belgium and then the British Empire into the scales against
them unless for an operation of supreme magnitude? Besides, there were
the evidences of their long preparations—camps, railways and railway
sidings—which the British Staff under Sir John French and Sir Henry
Wilson had so minutely studied. Lastly, reported with much accuracy from
day to day, there came the enormous troop movements on the German right,
towards and into Belgium on both sides of the Meuse. Before the end of
the first week in August General Lanrezac, the Commander of the left
French Army (the Fifth), was raising loud cries of warning and alarm
about the menace to his left, and indeed his rear, if he carried out the
rôle assigned to him and attacked as ordered in a north-easterly
direction. By the end of the second week the presence of the
accumulating masses of the German right could no longer be denied by the
French High Command, and certain measures, tardy and inadequate, were
taken to cope with it. Nevertheless, after the raid of a corps and a
cavalry division into Alsace on the 13th August, General Joffre began
his offensive into Lorraine with the two armies of the French right, the
centre armies conforming a few days later; and up till the evening of
the 18th General Lanrezac and the left French army were still under
orders to advance north-east. Three days later this same army was
defending itself in full battle from an attack from the north and
north-west. It had been compelled to make a complete left wheel. The
main shock began on the 20th, when the two armies of the French right
battered themselves in vain against the strongly-prepared German
defences. By the 21st the French centre armies were definitely stopped,
and by noon on the 23rd General Lanrezac and the French army of the left
were outflanked and beaten. Meanwhile our small army, thrust hurriedly
forward towards Mons to shield the French left, found itself in presence
of not less than four army corps with numerous cavalry constituting the
swinging fist and sabre of the German encircling advance. By the evening
of the 23rd ‘Plan XVII’ had failed in every single element. The French
armies of the right were thrown back into France and were entirely
occupied in defending themselves. Their armies of the centre and the
left were in full retreat towards Paris and the south, and the British
Army, isolated and beset by overwhelming numbers, was in the direst
peril of complete destruction. So much for ‘Plan XVII.’
* * * * *
The utmost secrecy had naturally been maintained by the French about
their general plan. The existence of their nation was at stake. Neither
the British Cabinet nor what was left of the War Office were in a
position to understand what was passing. I do not know how far Lord
Kitchener was specially informed. I think it very improbable that he
shared the secrets of the French Headquarters to the extent of being
able to measure what was happening on the front as a whole. If he shared
them, he did not show it by any remark which escaped him. He knew, of
course, all there was to be known about the situation of our own army,
and a good deal about the forces contiguous to it.
As the shock drew near, Prince Louis and I felt it our duty at the
Admiralty to free Lord Kitchener’s hands in every respect and to bear to
the full our burden of responsibility. I therefore wrote to him on the
22nd August as follows:
The Admiralty are confident of their ability to secure this country
against invasion or any serious raid. If you wish to send the 6th
Division abroad at once, we should not raise any objection from the
naval standpoint. The situation, now that both the Navy and the
Territorials are mobilised and organised, is entirely different from
those which have been discussed in the Invasion Committee, of the
C.I.D.[43]; and if you want to send the last Regular Division, the
First Sea Lord and I are quite ready to agree, and so far as possible
to accept responsibility.
He replied:
‘It is very doubtful if the division now crossing[44] will get up in
time to take part in the battle now impending on the Sambre. As soon
as I can I will let you know about the 6th Division going over. If I
send it we have practically nothing left.’
Late on the evening of August 23 I had a talk with Lord Kitchener. We
knew the main battle had been joined and that our men had been fighting
all day; but he had received no news. He was darkly hopeful. The map was
produced. The dense massing of German divisions west of the Belgian
Meuse and curling round the left flank of the Anglo-French line was
visible as a broad effect. So was the pivot of Namur, in front of which
this whole vast turning movement seemed precariously to be hinged. He
had in his mind a great French counterstroke—a thrust at the shoulder,
as it were, of the long, straining, encircling arm which should lop it
off or cripple it fatally. He said of the Germans, ‘They are running a
grave risk. No one can set limits to what a well-disciplined army can
do; but if the French were able to cut in here,’ he made a vigorous
arrow N.W. from Namur, ‘the Germans might easily have a Sedan of their
own on a larger scale.’ I had a pleasing vision of the first phase of
Austerlitz, with the Austrians stretching and spreading their left far
out to the villages of Tellnitz and Sokolnitz, while Napoleon remained
crouched for his spring at the Pratzen plateau. But had France a
Napoleon? One had marched through Charleroi ninety-nine years before.
Was there another? And were the Germans like the Austrians and Russians
of Austerlitz? However, we went anxiously but hopefully to our slumbers.
At 7 o’clock the next morning I was sitting up in bed in Admiralty House
working at my boxes, when the door of my bedroom opened and Lord
Kitchener appeared. These were the days before he took to uniform, and
my recollection is that he had a bowler hat on his head, which he took
off with a hand which also held a slip of paper. He paused in the
doorway and I knew in a flash and before ever he spoke that the event
had gone wrong. Though his manner was quite calm, his face was
different. I had the subconscious feeling that it was distorted and
discoloured as if it had been punched with a fist. His eyes rolled more
than ever. His voice, too, was hoarse. He looked gigantic. ‘Bad news,’
he said heavily and laid the slip of paper on my bed. I read the
telegram. It was from Sir John French.
‘My troops have been engaged all day with the enemy on a line roughly
east and west through Mons. The attack was renewed after dark, but we
held our ground tenaciously. I have just received a message from
G.O.C. 5th French Army that his troops have been driven back, that
Namur has fallen, and that he is taking up a line from Maubeuge to
Rocroi. I have therefore ordered a retirement to the line
Valenciennes-Longueville-Maubeuge, which is being carried out now. It
will prove a difficult operation, if the enemy remains in contact. I
remember your precise instructions as to method and direction of
retirement if necessity arises.
‘I think that immediate attention should be directed to the defence of
Havre.’
I did not mind it much till I got to Namur. Namur fallen! Namur taken in
a single day—although a French brigade had joined the Belgians in its
defence. We were evidently in the presence of new facts and of a new
standard of values. If strong fortresses were to melt like wisps of
vapour in a morning sun, many judgments would have to be revised. The
foundations of thought were quaking. As for the strategic position, it
was clear that the encircling arm was not going to be hacked off at the
shoulder, but would close in a crushing grip. Where would it stop? What
of the naked Channel ports? Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne! ‘Fortify Havre,’
said Sir John French. One day’s general battle and the sanguine advance
and hoped-for counterstroke had been converted into ‘Fortify Havre.’ ‘It
will be difficult to withdraw the troops if the enemy remains in
contact’—a disquieting observation. I forget much of what passed between
us. But the apparition of Kitchener _Agonistes_ in my doorway will dwell
with me as long as I live. It was like seeing old John Bull on the rack!
When I met the Admirals later, at ten, they were deeply perturbed about
these Channel ports. They had never taken the War Office view of the
superiority of the French Army. They saw in this first decisive shock
the confirmation of their misgivings. Some one suggested we should at
any rate make sure of the Cotentin peninsula, as an ample place of arms,
girt on three sides by the sea, from which the British armies of the
future might proceed to the rescue of France. Fortify Havre indeed!
Already we looked to Cherbourg and St. Nazaire.
_British Admiralty to French Admiralty._
_August 24th, 1914._
* Admiralty think it most important to naval interests to defend
Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne as long as possible. We release Admiral
Rouyer’s armoured cruiser squadron to co-operate in the land defences
of these three places. We will reinforce him if necessary with a
battle squadron. French flotilla bases and naval stores at Calais and
Boulogne can be transferred to Dover, and all preparations for that
should be immediately worked out.... We wish also to receive without
delay French views about land defences of Dunkirk, Boulogne, Calais
and Havre and what military prospects are of holding on to all of
them. We will, of course, assist in any way in our power.
Lastly we are considering shifting all military stores of British
Expeditionary Force now at Boulogne to Cherbourg. We wish to know
French views on the necessity for this as the result of the present
battle becomes more clear....
_First Lord to Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet._
_August 24th, 1914._
* Personal. News from France is disappointing and serious results of
battle cannot yet be measured, as it still continues over enormous
front.
I have had the telegrams about it repeated to you.
We have not entered the business without resolve to see it through and
you may be assured that our action will be proportioned to the gravity
of the need.
I have absolute confidence in final result.
No special action is required from you at present, but you should
address your mind to a naval situation which may arise where Germans
control Calais and French coasts and what ought to be the position of
Grand Fleet in that event.
I had not seen the Chancellor of the Exchequer, except at Cabinets,
since the fateful Sunday before the war. I had been buried in the
Admiralty and he in the Treasury. I sustained vague general impressions
of a tremendous financial crisis—panic, bankruptcies, suspension of the
Bank Act, moratoriums, paper money—like a distant tumult. I realised
that he, aided by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Reading, was riding the
storm and regaining effective control of events. But I did not attempt
to follow and appreciate the remarkable sequence of decisions by which
an unprecedented, unimaginable situation was met. Now, however, with
this fateful news, I felt intensely the need of contact with him, and I
wanted to know how it would strike him and how he would face it. So I
walked across the Horse Guards Parade and made my way to the tunnel
entrance of the Treasury Board Room. It must have been about 10 o’clock
in the morning and, as I opened the door, I saw the room was crowded.
One of that endless series of conferences with all the great business
and financial authorities of Britain, by means of which the corner was
turned, was in progress. He saw me at once: I beckoned with my finger
and he came out. We went into a little room scarcely bigger than a
cupboard which adjoined, and I told him what had happened. I was
relieved and overjoyed at his response. He was once again the Lloyd
George of Agadir. Not since the morning of the Mansion House speech,
three years before, had I seen him so strong and resolute for our
country or so sure of its might.
_First Lord to Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet_
_August 25th, 1914._
* British retirement on French frontier successfully and skilfully
effected. Army now in strong position, well supported. Our casualties
reported not severe considering continued engagement with two German
corps and two cavalry divisions. Enemy was well punished and lost
heavily. Main battle has still to be fought. General impression better
this morning. Hope all is well with you.
Then came the days of retreat. We saw that the French armies of the
right were holding their own, but all the centre and left was marching
southwards towards Paris as fast as possible, while our own five
divisions[45] were for several days plainly in the very jaws of
destruction. At the Admiralty we received requests to shift the base of
the whole army from Havre to St. Nazaire; and with this complicated
business we had to cope. The process of retreat continued day after day.
A seemingly irresistible compulsion was pressing and forcing backwards
the brave armies of France. Why should it stop? Would they ever be able
to turn? If France could not save herself, nothing could save her.
Casting about for help in this bitter time, I ventured to make the
suggestions which follow. But it was not found possible, in view of all
the difficulties, to give effect to them.
_Mr. Churchill to Lord Kitchener._
_August 28th, 1914_.
Here is an idea which deserves examination. The Siberian troops would,
if used against Germany and Austria, have to come south at an awkward
moment and derange the communications (so I am told). On the other
hand, it would probably be easy to send them to Archangel, and it is
(roughly) only six days from Archangel to Ostend.
If a couple of Russian Corps d’Armée were transported round this
route, it would be possible to strike at the German communications in
a very effective manner.
It is an interesting idea, though I dare say it would not greatly
commend itself to the Russians. Don’t trouble to answer.
_Prime Minister._
_Sir Edward Grey._
_Lord Kitchener._
_September 5, 1914._
I hear from many sources of the keen and widespread desire of
individual Americans to take part in the war on our side. It has been
stated that 50,000 or 60,000 Americans have volunteered, including a
number of Virginians. I also hear that wealthy Americans are anxious
to subscribe to the equipment of a force. There is no doubt that a
large number of American citizens of quality and character are anxious
to fight on our side. The value and advantage of such aid cannot be
overrated from any point of view. I am ignorant of the law on these
subjects: but Foreign Legions have played their part in many wars. It
ought to be possible to organise in Canada an American volunteer force
amounting to at least a Division, which could go into action as such.
Nothing will bring American sympathy along with us so much as American
blood shed in the field. What is wanted now is that there should be an
announcement made that we will accept the services of Americans who
come to Canada or England and volunteer; that they will be formed into
units in which they can serve together with their friends and
comrades; that they will be able to choose their own regimental
officers; and that the British Government will bear the whole expense
of equipment and transportation; and that they shall share in every
way the perils and fortunes of our troops.
I believe there is a source of fighting manhood here of the highest
possible quality, whose very employment would produce beneficial
reactions in every direction. The problem is how to set up the
rallying flag in Canada, and so indicate where those who wish to help
us can go to join.
W. S. C.
Personally I was hopeful that the wave of invasion would spend its fury,
and as I had indicated in my memorandum of three years before, I
believed that if the French forces had not been squandered by
precipitate action on the frontiers, an opportunity of striking the
decisive blow would occur about the fortieth day. In order to encourage
my colleagues I reprinted this memorandum and circulated it to the whole
Cabinet on September 2, pointing out that I had never counted upon a
victorious issue at the frontiers, had always expected that the French
armies would be driven into retreat by the twentieth day, but that, in
spite of this, there were good hopes of success. But I had no means of
measuring the forces by which this result would be achieved, except by
the most general processes.
Meanwhile the impression of an overwhelming disaster was conveyed to
England through a hundred channels. Newspaper correspondents made their
way in the confusion to the very fringe of the German advance.
Stragglers by the thousand and even detachments from the British Army,
appeared in a desperate condition far to its rear and on its flanks. In
spite of the censorship, the reports in the papers were alarming, while
rumour far exceeded anything that was printed. Acute distress was
manifested. In these circumstances, at the request of Lord Kitchener and
the Prime Minister, I drafted on Sunday, September 4, the following
communiqué, which was universally accepted as coming from the Army, and
I hope and believe gave comfort without concealing the truth.
It is now possible to make another general survey, in continuation of
that issued on August 30, of the operations of the British Army during
the last week.
No new main trial of strength has taken place. There have indeed been
battles in various parts of the immense front which in other wars
would have been considered operations of the first magnitude, but in
this war they are merely the incidents of the strategic withdrawal and
contraction of the allied forces necessitated by the initial shock on
the frontiers and in Belgium, and by the enormous strength which the
Germans have thrown into the western theatre while suffering heavily
through weakness in the eastern.
The British Expeditionary Army has conformed to the general movement
of the French forces and acted in harmony with the strategic
conceptions of the French General Staff. Since the battle at Cambrai
[Le Cateau] on August 26, where the British troops successfully
guarded the left flank of the whole line of French Armies from a
deadly turning attack supported by enormous force, the 7th French
Army[46] has come into operation on our left, and this, in conjunction
with the 5th Army on our right, has greatly taken the strain and
pressure off our men. The 5th French Army in particular on August 29
advanced from the line of the Oise River to meet and counter the
German forward movement, and a considerable battle developed to the
south of Guise. In this the 5th French Army gained a marked and solid
success, driving back with heavy loss and in disorder three German
Army Corps—the 10th, the Guard, and a reserve corps. It is believed
that the Commander of the 10th German Corps was among those killed. In
spite of this success, however, and all the benefits which flowed from
it, the general retirement to the south continued, and the German
Armies, seeking persistently after the British troops, remained in
practically continuous contact with our rearguards. On August 30 and
31 the British covering and delaying troops were frequently engaged,
and on September 1 a very vigorous effort was made by the Germans,
which brought about a sharp action in the neighbourhood of Compiègne.
This action was fought principally by the 1st British Cavalry Brigade
and the 4th Guards Brigade and was entirely satisfactory to the
British. The German attack, which was most strongly pressed, was not
brought to a standstill until much slaughter had been inflicted upon
them and until ten German guns had been captured. The brunt of this
creditable affair fell upon the Guards Brigade, who lost in killed and
wounded about 300 men.[47]
After this engagement our troops were no longer molested. Wednesday,
September 2, was the first quiet day they had had since the battle of
Mons, on August 23. During the whole of this period marching and
fighting had been continuous, and in the whole period the British
casualties had amounted, according to the latest estimates, to about
15,000 officers and men. The fighting having been in open order upon a
wide front, with repeated retirements, has led to a large number of
officers and men, and even small parties, missing their way and
getting separated, and it is known that a very considerable number of
those now included in the total will rejoin the colours safely. These
losses, though heavy in so small a force, have in no wise affected the
spirit of the troops. They do not amount to a third of the losses
inflicted by the British force upon the enemy, and the sacrifice
required of the Army has not been out of proportion to its military
achievements. In all, drafts amounting to 19,000 men have reached our
Army or are approaching them on the line of communications, and
advantage is being taken of the five quiet days that have passed since
the action of September 1 to fill up the gaps and refit and
consolidate the units.
The British Army is now south of the Marne and is in line with the
French forces on the right and left. _The latest information about the
enemy is that they are neglecting Paris and are marching in a
south-easterly direction towards the Marne and towards the left and
centre of the French line._[48] The 1st German Army is reported to be
between La Ferté sous Jouarre and Essises Viffort. The 2nd German
Army, after taking Rheims,[49] has advanced to Chateau-Thierry and to
the east of that place. The 4th German Army is reported to be marching
south on the west of the Argonne between Suippes and Ville sur Tourbe.
All these points were reached by the Germans on September 3. The 7th
German Army has been repulsed by a French Corps near D’Einville. It
_would therefore appear that the enveloping movement upon the
Anglo-French left flank has been abandoned by the Germans, either
because it is no longer practicable to continue such a great extension
or because the alternative of a direct attack upon the Allied line is
preferred_. Whether this change of plan by the Germans is voluntary or
whether it has been enforced upon them by the strategic situation and
the great strength of the Allied Armies in their front, will be
revealed by the course of events.
There is no doubt whatever that our men have established a personal
ascendancy over the Germans and that they are conscious of the fact
that with anything like even numbers the result would not be doubtful.
At this time I knew, of course, that another supreme battle was
impending. My principal fear was that the French would turn too soon and
make their new effort before the German thrust had reached its full
extension. I was glad therefore to learn on September 3 that the French
Government were quitting Paris, as it showed a resolve to treat the
capital just as if it were an ordinary tactical feature to be fought
round or through as might be convenient in a purely military sense. It
also showed a determination to continue the war whatever might happen to
Paris. We were now at the thirty-fifth day of mobilisation. The Germans
must be strung out in their pursuit and far ahead of supplies, munitions
and drafts. The great mass of Paris with its circle of forts must
either, like a breakwater, divide the oncoming German waves, or by
compelling them to pass wholly to the east of it serve as a secure flank
for the French.
And at this culminating moment the Russian pressure began to produce
substantial effects. Honour must ever be done to the Tsar and Russian
nation for the noble ardour and loyalty with which they hurled
themselves into the war. A purely Russian treatment of their military
problem would have led the Russian armies into immediate withdrawals
from their frontiers until the whole of their vast mobilisation was
completed. Instead of this, they added to a forward mobilisation an
impetuous advance not only against Austria but into Germany. The flower
of the Russian army was soon to be cut down in enormous and fearful
battles in East Prussia. But the results of their invasion were gathered
at the decisive point. The nerve of the German Headquarters failed. On
August 25 two army corps and a cavalry division of the German right were
withdrawn from France. On August 31 Lord Kitchener was able to telegraph
to Sir John French: ‘Thirty-two trains of German troops were yesterday
reported moving from the western field to meet the Russians.’[50]
Awful was the responsibility of General Joffre and the French High
Command for the decision which must now be taken. To turn too late was
to risk the demoralisation of the armies. To turn too soon was to court
another and this time a final defeat. And how compute the balance of all
the agonies and pressures simultaneously operating and reciprocally
interacting which should determine the dread issue? Whatever the
mistakes of the opening phase, however wrong the tactical and strategic
conceptions which had induced them, immortal glory crowns the brows of
those who gave the fateful signal, and lights the bayonets of the heroic
armies that obeyed it.
On September 6, being the thirty-seventh day of mobilisation, all the
French armies between Verdun and Paris, together with the British Army
and the French forces in Paris and to the north of Paris, turned upon
their pursuers and sprang at their throats. The Battle of the Marne had
begun.
* * * * *
I may now be permitted to descend to a small scale of events, and to
refer to an incident which has caused both stir and controversy.
By the 27th August the Cabinet had formed the opinion that great
friction had arisen between Sir John French and General Lanrezac and
also between the British and French Head-quarters. Actually the
difference was with General Lanrezac, who Sir John French considered had
not given him due notice of his intention to retire after the battle on
the 22nd and 23rd. We were concerned with the apparent intention of the
British Army to retire and refit behind the French left. Their losses so
far reported to us did not exceed 10,000 men. We could not measure the
exhaustion of the troops nor the extent of the disorganisation
inseparable from continued fighting and retreating. We accordingly
decided to send Lord Kitchener at once to see the British and French
Commanders-in-Chief and make sure that nothing that Britain could do
should be left undone.[51] If Lord Kitchener had gone in plain clothes
no difficulty would have risen, but his appearance in Paris in the
uniform of a Field-Marshal senior to the Commander-in-Chief at that dark
and critical moment, wounded and disconcerted Sir John French deeply and
not unnaturally. I laboured my utmost to put this right and to make it
clear that the Cabinet and not Lord Kitchener were responsible.
ADMIRALTY,
_September 4, 1914_.
_Mr. Churchill to Sir John French._
I have wanted so much to write to you and yet not to bother you with
reading letters. Still, I suppose there are moments when you can find
the leisure to read a few lines from a friend. The Cabinet was
bewildered by your telegram proposing to retire from the line, coming
on the top of a casualty list of 6,000, and your reports as to the
good spirit of the troops. We feared that you and Joffre might have
quarrelled, or that something had happened to the Army of which we had
not been informed. In these circumstances telegraphing was useless,
and a personal consultation was indispensable if further
misunderstandings were to be avoided.
I am sure it would be wise to have some good officer on your staff
like, say, Major Swinton, who could without troubling you unduly give
us a clear and complete impression of what is taking place day by day.
Our only wish is to sustain and support you. We are at a point where
losses will only rouse still further the spirit of the nation,
provided they are incurred, as yours have been, in brilliant and
successful action. But we ought to be kept in a position to form a
true and connected impression of the course of events.
For my own part, I am only anxious that you shall be sustained and
reinforced in every way, and I look forward confidently to seeing you
ere long at the head of a quarter of a million men, and in the spring
of half a million.
I enclose you a paper which I wrote three years ago, which seems to
have been borne out by the course of events, and which I hope will
continue to be confirmed.
In case any further difficulties arise, and you think I can be of any
use, you have only to send for me, and subject to the naval situation
I could reach you very quickly by motor-car or aeroplane.
It is hard sitting here day after day with so many friends engaged.
The resolution of the nation is splendid. It is a different country to
the one you left....
God guard you and prosper our arms.
FRANCE,
_September 6, 1914_.
_Sir John French to Mr. Churchill._
Thank you very much for your kind and encouraging letter. It was a
keen pleasure to hear from you and to read your words.
I have had a terribly anxious time and the troops have suffered
severely, but they are simply _glorious_!
I think you have heard me say that I would be ready to take on any
enemy in Europe half as strong again. I say that more than ever _now_!
I can’t find words to say all I think of them.
There has been some extraordinary misunderstanding at home as to my
relations with General Joffre, the French C-in-C. We have been on the
very best terms all through, and he has spoken most kindly of the help
he has received from us. I can’t understand what brought Kitchener to
Paris. I am writing to you as one of my greatest friends and I know
you’ll let me write freely and privately. His visit was really most
unfortunate. He took me away from the front to visit him in Paris on a
very critical day when I should have been directing the operation most
carefully, and I tell you between ourselves _strictly_ that when I
returned to my Head-quarters I found a very critical situation
existing (8 p.m.!) and authoritative orders and directions badly
needed. It was the day when the Guards and a Cavalry Brigade were so
heavily engaged.
I do beg of you, my dear Friend, to add one more to all the many great
kindnesses you have done me and _stop this interference_ with field
operations.
In reply I sent further explanations which, aided as they were by
victory, proved acceptable.
_Sir John French to Mr. Churchill_.
GENERAL HEAD-QUARTERS,
BRITISH FORCES,
_September 10, 1914_.
Thank you, my dear Friend, with all my heart for your truly kind reply
to my letter, and also for your previous letter of the 4th. I fear I
was a little unreasonable about K. and his visit, but we have been
through a hard time and perhaps my temper isn’t made any better by it!
However, as usual, you have poured balm into my wounds—although they
may have been only imaginary—and I am deeply grateful.
Since I wrote to you last the whole atmosphere has changed and for 5
solid days we have been pursuing instead of pursued, and the Germans
have had simply _hell_. This very day we have captured several
hundred, cut off a whole lot of transport and got 10 or 12 guns—and
the ground is strewn with dead and wounded Germans. Something like
this happened yesterday and the day before. But this is nothing to
what they have lost in front of the 5th and 6th French armies, which
have been much more strongly opposed. They are indeed fairly on the
run and we are following hard.
What a wonderful forecast you made in 1911. I don’t remember the
paper, but it has turned out almost as you said. I have shown it to a
few of my Staff.
I was afraid of Joffre’s strategy at first and thought he ought to
have taken the offensive much sooner, but he was quite right.
* * * * *
I felt it vitally important to my whole structure of thought on this war
problem to see for myself with my own eyes what was passing at the front
and what were the conditions of this new war, and to have personal
contact with Sir John French. Reflection and imagination can only build
truly when they are checked point by point by direct impressions of
reality. I believed myself sufficiently instructed to derive an immense
refreshment of judgment from personal investigation without incurring
the opposite danger of a distorted view through particular experiences.
But it was not until the armies came to a standstill along the line of
the Aisne, that I felt justified in asking Lord Kitchener to allow me to
accept the repeated invitations of Sir John French. He gladly gave his
permission and I started the next morning. On the 16th September the
Duke of Westminster drove me from Calais to the British Head-quarters at
La Fère-en-Tardenois. We made a fairly wide detour as we had no exact
information as to where the flanks of the moving armies actually lay,
and it was not until nightfall that we fell in with the left flank of
the British line. Sir John had all his arrangements ready made for me,
and the next day between daylight and dark I was able to traverse the
entire British artillery front from the edge of the Craonne Plateau on
the right to the outskirts of Soissons on the left. I met everybody I
wanted to meet and saw everything that could be seen without unnecessary
danger. I lunched with “The Greys” then commanded by that fine soldier
Colonel Bulkeley-Johnson. I had a long talk with Sir Henry Rawlinson on
a haystack from which we could observe the fire of the French artillery
near Soissons. I saw for the first time what then seemed the prodigy of
a British aeroplane threading its way among the smoke puffs of searching
shells. I saw the big black German shells, “the coal boxes” and “Jack
Johnsons” as they were then called, bursting in Paissy village or among
our patient, impassive batteries on the ridge. I climbed to a wooded
height beneath which the death-haunted bridge across the Aisne was
visible. When darkness fell I saw the horizon lighted with the quick
flashing of the cannonade. Such scenes were afterwards to become
commonplace: but their first aspect was thrilling. I dined with the
young officers of the Head-quarters Staff and met there, for the last
time alas, my brilliant, gallant friend Hugh Dawnay. Early next morning
I opened with Sir John French the principal business I had to discuss,
namely, the advantages of disengaging the British Army from its position
on the Aisne and its transportation to its natural station on the sea
flank in contact with the Navy. I found the Field Marshal in the most
complete accord, and I undertook to lay his views before Lord Kitchener
and the Prime Minister, who I knew would welcome such a development. I
started home immediately and reached London the next morning.
Contact with the Army was always a great encouragement to every one who
visited France. In the field, in spite of the newly-dug graves and
hurrying ambulances, there was not the same sense of tragedy as hung
around our windows in Whitehall. But I could not share the universal
optimism of the Staff. It was firmly believed and loudly declared on
every side that if all available reinforcements in officers and men were
sent to the Army without delay, the war would be finished by Christmas.
Fierce were the reproaches that the War Office were withholding vitally
needed officers, instructors and material for the purpose of training
vast armies that would never be ready in time. I combated these views to
the best of my ability, being fully convinced of Lord Kitchener’s
commanding foresight and wisdom in resisting the temptation to meet the
famine of the moment by devouring the seed-corn of the future. I
repeated the memorable words he had used to the Cabinet that ‘The
British Empire must participate in the land war on the greatest scale
and that in no other way could victory be won.’ Taking a complete
survey, I consider now that this prudent withholding from the Army in
the field in the face of every appeal and demand the key-men who alone
could make the new armies, was the greatest of the services which Lord
Kitchener rendered to the nation at this time, and it was a service
which no one of lesser authority than he could have performed.