[Illustration]
[Illustration]
1. Col George R. Rowan
2. Col Pedro A. del Valle
3. Col William C. James
4. MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift
5. LtCol Gerald C. Thomas
6. Col Clifton B. Cates
7. Col Randolph McC. Pate
8. Cdr Warwick T. Brown, USN
9. Col William J. Whaling
10. Col Frank B. Goettge
11. Col LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr.
12. LtCol Frederick C. Biebush
13. LtCol Edwin A. Pollock
14. LtCol Edmund J. Buckley
15. LtCol Walter W. Barr
16. LtCol Raymond P. Coffman
17. LtCol Francis R. Geraci
18. LtCol William E. Maxwell
19. LtCol Edward G. Hagen
20. LtCol William N. McKelvy, Jr.
21. LtCol Julian N. Frisbie
22. Maj Milton V. O’Connell
23. Maj William Chalfant III
24. Maj Horace W. Fuller
25. Maj Forest C. Thompson
26. Maj Robert G. Ballance
27. Maj Henry C. Buse, Jr.
28. Maj James W. Frazer
29. Maj Henry H. Crockett
30. LtCol Lenard B. Cresswell
31. Maj Robert O. Brown
32. LtCol John A. Bemis
33. Col Kenneth W. Benner
34. Maj Robert B. Luckey
35. LtCol Samuel B. Taxis
36. LtCol Eugene H. Price
37. LtCol Merrill B. Twining
38. LtCol Walker A. Reaves
39. LtCol John D. Macklin
40. LtCol Hawley C. Waterman
41. Maj James C. Murray, Jr.
]
[Sidebar (page 17): The Coastwatchers
A group of fewer than 1,500 native Coastwatchers served as the eyes and
ears of Allied forces in reporting movements of Japanese units on the
ground, in the air, and at sea.
Often performing their jobs in remote jungle outposts, the
Coastwatchers were possessed of both mental and physical courage.
Their knowledge of the geography and peoples of the Pacific made them
invaluable additions to the Allied war effort.
The concept for this service originated in 1919 in a proposal by the
Royal Australian Navy to form a civilian coastwatching organization
to provide early warning in the event of an invasion. By the outbreak
of war in September 1939, approximately 800 persons were serving as
coastwatchers, operating observation posts mainly on the Australian
coast. They were, at the outset, government officials aided by
missionaries and planters who, as war with Japan neared, were placed
under the control of the intelligence section of the Australian Navy.
[Illustration: _Coastwatcher Capt W. F. Martin Clemens, British Solomon
Islands Defence Force, poses with some of his constabulary._
National Archives Photo 80-G-17080 courtesy of Richard Frank
]
By 1942, the system of coastwatchers and the accompanying intelligence
network covered an area of 500,000 square miles, and was placed
under the control of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB). The AIB
coordinated Allied intelligence activities in the southwest Pacific,
and had as its initial principal mission the collection of all possible
information about the enemy in the vicinity of Guadalcanal.
Coastwatchers proved extremely useful to U.S. Marine forces in
providing reports on the number and movement of Japanese troops.
Officers from the 1st Marine Division obtained accurate information
on the location of enemy forces in their objective areas, and were
provided vital reports on approaching Japanese bombing raids. On 8
August 1942, Coastwatcher Jack Reed on Bougainville alerted American
forces to an upcoming raid by 40 Japanese bombers, which resulted in
36 of the enemy planes being destroyed. The “early warning system”
provided by the Coastwatchers helped Marine forces on Guadalcanal to
hold onto the Henderson Field airstrip.
The Coastwatchers also rescued and sheltered 118 Allied pilots,
including Marines, during the Solomons Campaign, often at the immediate
risk of their own lives. Pipe-smoking Coastwatcher Reed also was
responsible for coordinating the evacuation on Bougainville of four
nuns and 25 civilians by the U.S. submarine _Nautilus_.
It is unknown exactly how many Coastwatchers paid the ultimate
sacrifice in the performance of their duties. Many died in anonymity,
without knowledge of the contribution their services had made to
final victory. Perhaps they would be gratified to know that no
less an authority than Admiral William F. Halsey recorded that
the Coastwatchers saved Guadalcanal, and Guadalcanal saved the
Pacific.--_Robert V. Aquilina_
]
[Sidebar (page 19): The 1st Marine Division Patch
[Illustration]
The 1st Division shoulder patch originally was authorized for wear by
members of units who were organic or attached to the division in its
four landings in the Pacific War. It was the first unit patch to be
authorized for wear in World War II and specifically commemorated the
division’s sacrifices and victory in the battle for Guadalcanal.
As recalled by General Merrill B. Twining, a lieutenant colonel and the
division’s operations officer on Guadalcanal, for a short time before
the 1st left Guadalcanal for Australia, there had been some discussion
by the senior staff about uniforming the troops. It appeared that the
Marines might have to wear Army uniforms, which meant that they would
lose their identity and Twining came up with the idea for a division
patch. A number of different designs were devised by both Lieutenant
Colonel Twining and Captain Donald L. Dickson, adjutant of the 5th
Marines, who had been an artist in civilian life. The one which Twining
prepared on the flight out of Guadalcanal was approved by Major General
Alexander A. Vandegrift, the division commander.
General Twining further recalled that he drew a diamond in his notebook
and “in the middle of the diamond I doodled a numeral one ... [and]
I sketched in the word ‘Guadalcanal’ down its length.... I got to
thinking that the whole operation had been under the Southern Cross, so
I drew that in, too.... About an hour later I took the drawing up to
the front of the aircraft to General Vandegrift. He said, ‘Yes, that’s
it!’ and wrote his initials, A.A.V., on the bottom of the notebook
page.”
[Illustration: _Designer of the patch, LtCol Merrill B. Twining (later
Gen) sits in the 1st Marine Division operations bunker. Behind him is
his assistant D-3, a very tired Maj Henry IV. Buse, Jr._]
After he arrived in Brisbane, Australia, Colonel Twining bought a
child’s watercolor set and, while confined to his hotel room by a bout
of malaria, drew a bunch of diamonds on a big sheet, coloring each one
differently. He then took samples to General Vandegrift, who chose one
which was colored a shade of blue that he liked. Then Twining took
the sketch to the Australian Knitting Mills to have it reproduced,
pledging the credit of the post exchange funds to pay for the patches’
manufacture. Within a week or two the patches began to roll off the
knitting machines, and Colonel Twining was there to approve them.
General Twining further recalled: “After they came off the machine, I
picked up a sheet of them. They looked very good, and when they were
cut, I picked up one of the patches. It was one of the first off the
machine.”
The division’s post exchanges began selling the patches almost
immediately and they proved to be popular, with Marines buying extras
to give away as souvenirs to Australian friends or to send home to
families. Before long, newly established Marine divisions, as well as
the raider and parachute units, and as the aircraft wings, sea-going
Marines, Fleet Marine Force Pacific units, and others, were authorized
to have their own distinctive patch, a total of 33, following the lead
of the 1st Marine Division. Marines returning to the United States for
duty or on leave from a unit having a distinctive shoulder insignia
were authorized to wear that insignia until they were assigned to
another unit having a shoulder patch of its own. For many 1st Marine
Division men joining another unit and having to relinquish the wearing
of the 1st Division patch, this rankled.
Shortly after the end of the war, Colonel Twining went to now-Marine
Commandant General Vandegrift saying that he “no longer thought Marines
should wear anything on their uniforms to distinguish them from other
Marines. He agreed and the patches came off for good.”--_Benis M. Frank_
]
_September and the Ridge_
Admiral McCain visited Guadalcanal at the end of August, arriving
in time to greet the aerial reinforcements he had ordered forward,
and also in time for a taste of Japanese nightly bombing. He got to
experience, too, what was becoming another unwanted feature of Cactus
nights: bombardment by Japanese cruisers and destroyers. General
Vandegrift noted that McCain had gotten a dose of the “normal ration
of shells.” The admiral saw enough to signal his superiors that
increased support for Guadalcanal operations was imperative and that
the “situation admits no delay whatsoever.” He also sent a prophetic
message to Admirals King and Nimitz: “Cactus can be a sinkhole for
enemy air power and can be consolidated, expanded, and exploited to the
enemy’s mortal hurt.”
On 3 September, the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,
Brigadier General Roy S. Geiger, and his assistant wing commander,
Colonel Louis Woods, moved forward to Guadalcanal to take charge of
air operations. The arrival of the veteran Marine aviators provided
an instant lift to the morale of the pilots and ground crews. It
reinforced their belief that they were at the leading edge of air
combat, that they were setting the pace for the rest of Marine
aviation. Vandegrift could thankfully turn over the day-to-day
management of the aerial defenses of Cactus to the able and experienced
Geiger. There was no shortage of targets for the mixed air force of
Marine, Army, and Navy flyers. Daily air attacks by the Japanese,
coupled with steady reinforcement attempts by Tanaka’s destroyers
and transports, meant that every type of plane that could lift off
Henderson’s runway was airborne as often as possible. Seabees had begun
work on a second airstrip, Fighter One, which could relieve some of the
pressure on the primary airfield.
[Illustration: