_This is an oblique view of Henderson Field looking north with
Ironbottom Sound (Sealark Channel) in the background. At the left
center is the “Pagoda,” operations center of Cactus Air Force flyers
throughout their first months of operations ashore._]
Most of General Kawaguchi’s brigade had reached Guadalcanal. Those
who hadn’t, missed their landfall forever as a result of American air
attacks. Kawaguchi had in mind a surprise attack on the heart of the
Marine position, a thrust from the jungle directly at the airfield. To
reach his jumpoff position, the Japanese general would have to move
through difficult terrain unobserved, carving his way through the dense
vegetation out of sight of Marine patrols. The rugged approach route
would lead him to a prominent ridge topped by Kunai grass which wove
snake-like through the jungle to within a mile of Henderson’s runway.
Unknown to the Japanese, General Vandegrift planned on moving his
headquarters to the shelter of a spot at the inland base of this ridge,
a site better protected, it was hoped, from enemy bombing and shellfire.
[Illustration: _Marine ground crewmen attempt to put out one of many
fires occuring after a Japanese bombing raid on Henderson Field causing
the loss of much-needed aircraft._
Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection
]
The success of Kawaguchi’s plan depended upon the Marines keeping the
inland perimeter thinly manned while they concentrated their forces on
the east and west flanks. This was not to be. Available intelligence,
including a captured enemy map, pointed to the likelihood of an attack
on the airfield and Vandegrift moved his combined raider-parachute
battalion to the most obvious enemy approach route, the ridge. Colonel
Edson’s men, who scouted Savo Island after moving to Guadalcanal
and destroyed a Japanese supply base at Tasimboko in another
shore-to-shore raid, took up positions on the forward slopes of the
ridge at the edge of the encroaching jungle on 10 September. Their
commander later said that he “was firmly convinced that we were in the
path of the next Jap attack.” Earlier patrols had spotted a sizable
Japanese force approaching. Accordingly, Edson patrolled extensively as
his men dug in on the ridge and in the flanking jungle. On the 12th,
the Marines made contact with enemy patrols confirming the fact that
Japanese troops were definitely “out front.” Kawaguchi had about 2,000
of his men with him, enough he thought to punch through to the airfield.
Japanese planes had dropped 500-pound bombs along the ridge on the 11th
and enemy ships began shelling the area after nightfall on the 12th,
once the threat of American air attacks subsided. The first Japanese
thrust came at 2100 against Edson’s left flank. Boiling out of the
jungle, the enemy soldiers attacked fearlessly into the face of rifle
and machine gun fire, closing to bayonet range. They were thrown back.
They came again, this time against the right flank, penetrating the
Marines’ positions. Again they were thrown back. A third attack closed
out the night’s action. Again it was a close affair, but by 0230 Edson
told Vandegrift his men could hold. And they did.
[Illustration: _The raging battle of Edson’s Ridge is depicted in all
its fury in this oil painting by the late Col Donald L. Dickson, who,
as a captain, was adjutant of the 5th Marines on Guadalcanal. Dickson’s
artwork later was shown widely in the United States._
Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
]
On the morning of 13 September, Edson called his company commanders
together and told them: “They were just testing, just testing. They’ll
be back.” He ordered all positions improved and defenses consolidated
and pulled his lines towards the airfield along the ridge’s center
spine. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, his backup on Tulagi, moved into
position to reinforce again.
[Illustration: EDSON’S (BLOODY) RIDGE