_Capt Donald L. Dickson said of his watercolor: “I wanted to catch on
paper the feeling one has as a shell comes whistling over.... There is
a sense of being alone, naked and unprotected. And time seems endless
until the shell strikes somewhere.”_]
Following the 1st Marines’ tangle with the Ichiki detachment, General
Vandegrift was inspired to write the Marine Commandant, Lieutenant
General Thomas Holcomb, and report: “These youngsters are the darndest
people when they get started you ever saw.” And all the Marines on
the island, young and old, tyro and veteran, were becoming accomplished
jungle fighters. They were no longer “trigger happy” as many had been
in their first days ashore, shooting at shadows and imagined enemy.
They were waiting for targets, patrolling with enthusiasm, sure of
themselves. The misnamed Battle of the Tenaru had cost Colonel Hunt’s
regiment 34 killed in action and 75 wounded. All the division’s Marines
now felt they were bloodied. What the men on Tulagi, Gavutu, and
Tanambogo and those of the Ilu had done was prove that the 1st Marine
Division would hold fast to what it had won.
[Illustration: _Cactus Air Force commander, MajGen Roy S. Geiger,
poses with Capt Joseph J. Foss, the leading ace at Guadalcanal with
26 Japanese aircraft downed. Capt Foss was later awarded the Medal of
Honor for his heroic exploits in the air._
Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52622
]
While the division’s Marines and sailors had earned a breathing spell
as the Japanese regrouped for another onslaught, the action in the air
over the Solomons intensified. Almost every day, Japanese aircraft
arrived around noon to bomb the perimeter. Marine fighter pilots
found the twin-engine Betty bombers easy targets; Zero fighters were
another story. Although the Wildcats were a much sturdier aircraft, the
Japanese Zeros’ superior speed and better maneuverability gave them a
distinct edge in a dogfight. The American planes, however, when warned
by the coastwatchers of Japanese attacks, had time to climb above the
oncoming enemy and preferably attacked by making firing runs during
high speed dives. Their tactics made the air space over the Solomons
dangerous for the Japanese. On 29 August, the carrier _Ryujo_ launched
aircraft for a strike against the airstrip. Smith’s Wildcats shot down
16, with a loss of four of their own. Still, the Japanese continued to
strike at Henderson Field without letup. Two days after the _Ryujo_
raid, enemy bombers inflicted heavy damage on the airfield, setting
aviation fuel ablaze and incinerating parked aircraft. VMF-223’s
retaliation was a further bag of 13 attackers.
On 30 August, two more MAG-23 squadrons, VMF-224 and VMSB-231, flew in
to Henderson. The air reinforcements were more than welcome. Steady
combat attrition, frequent damage in the air and on the ground, and
scant repair facilities and parts kept the number of aircraft available
a dwindling resource.
Plainly, General Vandegrift needed infantry reinforcements as much
as he did additional aircraft. He brought the now-combined raider and
parachute battalions, both under Edson’s command, and the 2d Battalion,
5th Marines, over to Guadalcanal from Tulagi. This gave the division
commander a chance to order out larger reconnaissance patrols to probe
for the Japanese. On 27 August, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, made a
shore-to-shore landing near Kokumbona and marched back to the beachhead
without any measurable results. If the Japanese were out there beyond
the Matanikau--and they were--they watched the Marines and waited for a
better opportunity to attack.
[Sidebar (page 5): First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II
The United States Marine Corps entered World War II wearing essentially
the same summer field uniform that it had worn during the “Banana
Wars.” The Marines defending America’s Pacific outposts on Guam, Wake
Island, and in the Philippines in the late months of 1941 wore a
summer field uniform consisting of a khaki cotton shirt and trousers,
leggings, and a M1917A1 steel helmet. Plans to change this uniform had
been underway for at least one year prior to the opening of hostilities.
As had the Army, the Marine Corps had used a loose-fitting blue denim
fatigue uniform for work details and some field exercises since the
1920s. This fatigue uniform was either a one-piece coverall or a
two-piece bib overall and jacket, both with “USMC” metal buttons. In
June 1940, it was replaced by a green cotton coverall. This uniform
and the summer field uniform were replaced by what would become known
as the utility uniform. Approved for general issue on the Marine
Corps’ 166th birthday, 10 November 1941, this new uniform was made of
sage-green (although “olive drab” was called for in the specifications)
herringbone twill cotton, then a popular material for civilian work
clothing. The two-piece uniform consisted of a coat (often referred to
as a “jacket” by Marines) and trousers. In 1943, a cap made of the same
material would be issued.
The loose-fitting coat was closed down the front by four two-piece
rivetted bronze-finished steel buttons, each bearing the words “U.S.
MARINE CORPS” in relief. The cuffs were closed by similar buttons. Two
large patch pockets were sewn on the front skirts of the jacket and a
single patch pocket was stitched to the left breast. This pocket had
the Marine Corps eagle, globe, and anchor insignia and the letters
“USMC” stencilled on it in black ink. The trousers, worn with and
without the khaki canvas leggings, had two slashed front pockets and
two rear patch pockets.
[Illustration]
The new uniform was issued to the flood of new recruits crowding
the recruit depots in the early months of 1942 and was first worn
in combat during the landing on Guadalcanal in August 1942. This
uniform was subsequently worn by Marines of all arms from the Solomons
Campaign to the end of the war. Originally, the buttons on the coat
and the trousers were all copper-plated, but an emergency alternate
specification was approved on 15 August 1942, eight days after the
landing on Guadalcanal, which allowed for a variety of finishes on the
buttons. Towards the end of the war, a new “modified” utility uniform
which had been developed after Tarawa was also issued, in addition
to a variety of camouflage uniforms. All of these utility uniforms,
along with Army-designed Ml helmets and Marine Corps-designed cord and
rubber-soled rough-side-out leather “boondocker” shoes, would be worn
throughout the war in the Pacific, during the postwar years, and into
the Korean War.--_Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas_
]
[Sidebar (page 11): LVT (1)--The ‘Amtrac’
While the Marine Corps was developing amphibious warfare doctrine
during the 1920s and 1930s, it was apparent that a motorized amphibian
vehicle was needed to transport men and equipment from ships across
fringing reefs and beaches into battle, particularly when the beach was
defended.
In 1940, the Marines adopted the Landing Vehicle, Tracked (1), designed
by Donald Roebling. More commonly known as the “amtrac” (short for
amphibian tractor), the LVT(1) had a driver’s cab in front and a small
engine compartment in the rear, with the bulk of the body used for
carrying space. During the next three years, 1,225 LVT(1)s were built,
primarily by the Food Machinery Corporation.
The LVT(1) was constructed of welded steel and was propelled on both
land and water by paddle-type treads. Designed solely as a supply
vehicle, it could carry 4,500 pounds of cargo. In August 1942, the
LVT(1) first saw combat on Guadalcanal with the 1st Amphibian Tractor
Battalion, 1st Marine Division. Throughout the Solomon Islands
campaigns, the LVT(1) provided Marines all types of logistical support,
moving thousands of tons of supplies to the front lines. At times they
also were pressed into tactical use: moving artillery pieces, holding
defensive positions, and occasionally supporting Marines in the attack
with their machine guns. They also were used as pontoons to support
bridges across Guadalcanal rivers.
The LVT proved to be more seaworthy than a boat of comparable size; it
was able to remain afloat with its entire cargo hold full of water.
However, defects in the design soon became apparent. The paddle treads
on the tracks and the rigid suspension system were both susceptible
to damage when driven on land and did not provide the desired speeds
on land or water. Although the LVT(1) performed admirably against
undefended beachheads, its lack of armor made it unsuitable for
assaults against the heavily defended islands of the central Pacific.
This weakness was apparent during the fighting in the Solomon Islands,
but LVT(1)s with improvised armor were still in use at the assault on
Tarawa, where 75 percent of them were lost in three days.
The LVT(1) proved its value and validated the amphibious vehicle
concept through the great versatility and mobility it demonstrated
throughout numerous campaigns in the Pacific. Although intended
solely for supply purposes, it was thrust into combat use in early
war engagements. In its initial role as a support vehicle, the LVT(1)
delivered ammunition, supplies and reinforcements that made the
difference between victory and defeat.--_Second Lieutenant Wesley L.
Feight, USMC_
[Illustration]
]
[Sidebar (page 14): General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division
Staff
Whenever a work about the Guadalcanal operation is published, one of
the pictures always included is that of Major General Alexander A.
Vandegrift, 1st Marine Division commanding general, and his staff
officers and commanders, who posed for the photograph on 11 August
1942, just four days after the assault landings on the island. Besides
General Vandegrift, there are 40 Marines and one naval officer in
this picture, and each one deserves a page of his own in Marine Corps
history.
Among the Marines, 23 were promoted to general officer rank and three
became Commandants of the Marine Corps: General Vandegrift and Colonels
Cates and Pate. The naval officer, division surgeon Commander Warwick
T. Brown, MC, USN, also made flag officer rank while on active duty and
was promoted to vice admiral upon retirement.
Four of the officers in the picture served in three wars. Lieutenant
Colonels Gerald C. Thomas, division operations officer, and Randolph
McC. Pate, division logistics officer, served in both World Wars I
and II, and each commanded the 1st Marine Division in Korea. Colonel
William J. Whaling similarly served in World Wars I and II, and was
General Thomas’ assistant division commander in Korea. Major Henry W.
Buse, Jr., assistant operations officer, served in World War II, Korea,
and the Vietnam War. Others served in two wars--World Wars I and II,
or World War II and Korea. Represented in the photograph is a total
of nearly 700 years of cumulative experience on active Marine Corps
service.
Three key members of the division--the Assistant Division Commander,
Brigadier General William H. Rupertus; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-1, Colonel Robert C. Kilmartin, Jr.; and the commanding officer of
the 1st Raider Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson--were not
in this picture for a good reason. They were on Tulagi, where Rupertus
headed the Tulagi Command Group with Kilmartin as his chief of staff,
and Edson commanded the combat troops. Also notably absent from this
photograph was the commander of the 7th Marines, Colonel James C. Webb,
who had not joined the division from Samoa, where the regiment had been
sent before the division deployed overseas.
In his memoir, _Once a Marine_, General Vandegrift explained why this
photograph was taken. The division’s morale was affected by the fact
that Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was forced to withdraw his
fleet from the area--with many of his ships not yet fully unloaded
and holding more than half of the division’s supplies still needed
ashore. Adding to the Marines’ uneasiness at seeing their naval support
disappear below the horizon, was the fact that they had been under
almost constant enemy air attacks beginning shortly after their landing
on Guadalcanal. In an effort to counter the adverse influence on morale
of the day and night air attacks, Vandegrift began making tours of the
division perimeter every morning to talk to as many of his Marines as
possible, and to keep a personal eye on the command. As he noted:
By August 11, the full impact of the vanished transports was
permeating the command, so again I called a conference of my staff
and command officers.... I ended the conference by posing with this
fine group of officers, a morale device that worked because they
thought if I went to the trouble of having the picture taken then I
obviously planned to enjoy it in future years.
Recently, General Merrill B. “Bill” Twining, on Guadalcanal a
lieutenant colonel and assistant D-3, recalled the circumstances of the
photograph and philosophized about the men who appeared in it:
The group is lined up on the slope of the coral ridge which
provided a degree of protection from naval gunfire coming from the
north and was therefore selected as division CP....
There was no vital reason for the conclave. I think V[andegrift]
just wanted to see who was in his outfit. Do you realize these
people had never been together before? Some came from as far away
as Iceland....
V[andegrift] mainly introduced himself, gave a brief pep talk....
I have often been asked how we could afford to congregate all
this talent in the face of the enemy. We didn’t believe we (_at
the moment_) faced any threat from the Japanese. The defense area
was small and every responsible commander could reach his CP in 5
minutes and after all there were a lot of good people along those
lines. Most of the fresh-caught second lieutenants were battalion
commanders two years later. We believed in each other and trusted.
--_Benis M. Frank_