1. In a re-entrant in the line.

[Illustration]

2. On the second line, particularly when it presents an elevated

position permitting a tier of fire over the first line.

[Illustration]

3. Squarely in front to obtain a flanking fire; in this case, they are

found in a small _boyau_ (branch trench) which leaves the principal

trench, and it is very difficult to see them from the front.

[Illustration]

Thus, in front of La Targette, in studying the position in profile and

having moved considerably toward the right for that purpose, I

discovered a machine-gun emplacement which completely enfiladed the

front of the German trenches for 600 metres.

One generally believes he recognizes a very large number of machine-gun

emplacements; but it is infinitely better to mark the position of too

many than to overlook one of them; moreover, the Germans have in their

defensive organization an unsuspected number of them.

_Means of Destroying the Machine Guns._—_Machine Guns of the

Trenches._—In the course of preparation by artillery, a very distinct

part of the program is reserved for the destruction of the machine-gun

nests. The destruction of the machine guns should not be commenced as

soon as they have been located, that is to say, often several days

before the final preparations, for the enemy would have ample time to

shift them. The 75 is employed to destroy the machine guns.

Unfortunately, on account of the dispersion, it does not perfectly

fulfil its rôle; its shots often fall to one side and a great number of

them are often necessary to find exactly the small space that holds the

machine gun.

I recollect that before the attack of May 9, I fretted with impatience

and went continually to find the artillery observer, as I saw an

accursed rectangular loophole obstinately remain intact up to the end.

When we started forward, fire burst out from this loophole, and two

sections were wiped out.

To destroy these machine guns, there would be needed not only cannon

placed at 1,500 metres, which have many other tasks, but cannon placed

in the trench itself. The _mountain 80_ seems to realize the desired

conditions of effectiveness and mobility. Hidden in the trench before

the preparation, it unmasks itself during that operation; it takes under

direct fire like a rifle all the machine-gun shelters successively,

occupying itself with those alone and not leaving them until they are

all completely out of action.

_Destruction of Machine Guns that may be set up outside the

Trenches._—On the 9th of May, the survivors of my company and of the

adjoining company, about eighty men, arrived at 11 o’clock[5] about 200

metres from the cemetery of Neuville-Saint-Vaast. The cemetery being

unoccupied, the field of battle seemed void of Germans. In the distance,

the batteries were fleeing. Two machine guns remained in the mill; this

was the only resistance over an immense space, but it was sufficient.

Impossible for my men to advance; we signal the fact with difficulty to

the artillery, which from this time on is under open field conditions;

it opens fire a long time afterwards and mistakes the objective. Then

before the eyes of our furious men, abandoned by all because they were

too far to the front, the cemetery fills up with Germans. Four hours

afterwards, the 146th appears on the field and is mowed down by the

machine guns; the next day the 229th succeeds it; new repetition with a

slight and extremely costly advance.

With these machine guns revealing themselves thus without our being able

to foresee their emplacement, and taking up positions to stop our

progress in a region no longer familiar to us, we must have the means of

suppressing them instantly. The field artillery is too far away;

communication hardly exists after passing beyond the extremity of the

telephone lines. The question is of the greatest importance and merits

study. It would be absolutely necessary that the first waves of attack

be followed, after the taking of the first lines of trenches, by light

guns, the 37 for example, drawn by their cannoneers. These independent

crews would be all eyes and ears to discover the machine guns and

destroy them immediately. There are enough officers or noncommissioned

officers of artillery to command them intelligently.

III.

FORM OF ATTACK.[6]

To create a complete gap, it is necessary:

(_a_) _To take the first line of the hostile defense (zone of the first

trenches and centers of resistance)_;

(_b_) _To take the second line of defense_;

(_c_) _To prevent the enemy from reestablishing a barrier by the aid of

reinforcements brought up in haste beyond the zone already fortified._

To overcome successively these difficulties, one must have:

(_a_) A first line of attack composed of several waves of assault with

(as an element of preparation) a formidable artillery (field, heavy, and

torpedo guns) minutely regulated.

(_b_) A second line of attack as strong as the first, except perhaps in

front of the centers of resistance, sent straight to the front all in

one piece exactly like the first line. The same precise and effective

artillery preparation is not here present, but it is compensated for by

groups of light guns and machine guns destined rapidly to destroy all

resistance. Accompanying batteries (_batteries d’accompagnement_) start

as soon as the first trenches are taken.

(_c_) A reserve without initial assignment, destined to reinforce any

point and conquer any irreducible or hindering resistance. This reserve

is entirely at the disposition of the superior commander, while the

first and second lines are no longer in his hands after they are in

their parallel of departure. On the 9th of May, this reserve was made up

of the troops which should have normally composed the second line of

attack, which did not exist. This explains the disastrous delay of its

engagement, which was furthermore very hesitating, because it tried to

maneuver before having broken through and waited for the mêlée to clear

away in order to maneuver.

(_d_) Cavalry, auto-cannon, auto-machine guns, battalions of infantry on

automobiles with pioneer crews to clear the roads.—Large units, ready to

commence new combats, capable of being brought up within two or three

hours.—_Do not, after the hole has been pierced, depend any longer upon

the regiments who made it._

The Attack in Trench Warfare: Impressions and Reflections of a Company Commander · 第 12 / 32 题