1881--AFTER MAJUBA
The Military situation compels inaction--Ambiguous telegrams from
the Cabinet--Piet Joubert asks me to meet him--Lord Kimberley
approves of my doing so--His instructions--I urge Military
action--Walkinshaw’s endurance--The Boers disperse--Boer flag
at Heidelberg--Pretoria--A painful journey.
The following was the Military position of the frontier when I arrived
at Newcastle: at Prospect there were 1200 Infantry and a few Mounted
Infantry. All the troops had been engaged once; about two-thirds,
twice, and all three engagements had ended in a withdrawal of the
British troops. In the camp at Prospect there were six weeks’ rations
for men, and at Newcastle twelve days’, with six days’ forage. Although
we were so short of forage, no horses had been allowed to graze for two
days, for fear of a raid by the Boers, still over 25 miles distant. I
found of two and a half Squadrons of Cavalry, one Squadron was kept
continuously on outpost duty. These I withdrew, replacing them by six
scouts, only farther out than the Squadron had gone.
Rain had fallen for ten successive days, and on one occasion for twenty
hours without ceasing, causing the Incandu River at Newcastle to rise 7
feet in one day.
The Colonial Secretary urged me to bring the troops back to Newcastle,
and asked to have the Natal Police moved back to Colenso. The
Inniskilling Dragoons, a battery and a half Royal Artillery, and
the 83rd Regiment were marching up country, but did not arrive till
twenty-three days later, when, although the Dragoons led their horses
all the way, they had only a hundred of them fit for work, in spite
of the fact that they had taken eighteen days to cover 140 miles. The
tracks, called roads, in Natal were indeed almost impassable, but by
leaving their waggons the troops could have arrived a week earlier.
There was no necessity for an immediate advance, except as regards
Potchefstroom. Sir George Colley had been very anxious for that
Garrison. He wrote on the 15th January: “Unless I can in some way
relieve the pressure on Potchefstroom before the middle of next month,
that Garrison and its guns must fall into the Boers’ hands,” and this
anxiety induced his movement on the 28th January. Although he had not
the power to ensure success, he kept the Boer forces occupied, and it
should be remembered to his credit that none of the garrisons fell.
I received simultaneously the two following telegrams:
“SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR TO SIR EVELYN WOOD, BRIGADIER-GENERAL.
“_1st March 1881._
“Although Sir F. Roberts is going out with large reinforcements,
we place full confidence in you, and do not desire to fetter your
military discretion.”
* * * * *
“LORD KIMBERLEY TO SIR EVELYN WOOD.
“_1st March._
“When did Sir George Colley communicate to Kruger the fact that
the British Government would appoint Commissioners with extensive
powers for the friendly settlement of all difficulties, and what
answer was given?”
And on the 3rd March, Lord Kimberley ordered me to inquire whether an
answer would be sent to me; and again, on the 4th March, asked for a
reply.
Most of the Ministry, possibly, but certainly a majority of the Nation,
would have been better satisfied if I could have consulted my own
wishes, and driven the Boers from the Nek before the Transvaal was
given back. With the troops then at hand, however, success against a
well-posted enemy, four times as strong, was unattainable. Before the
reinforcements arrived the dominant will of the Premier decided the
question.[215]
On the 3rd March, Mr. Brand telegraphed to me, stating he had written
to Kruger to urge him to suspend hostilities, and begged me, as one
formerly on friendly terms with some of the Boers, to contribute to
a peaceable settlement. I replied thanking Mr. Brand, and endorsing
his sentiments for our Boer friends, said I would gladly abstain from
a forward movement till the 10th March, if the Boers made a similar
promise.
I telegraphed Brand’s message and my reply to Lord Kimberley, and
he next day replied approving my message. When sending a copy of my
telegram I added, “Referring to the above, please consider with this my
telegram to Brand. I suggest I wait for a day or two, as I shall not
be ready for another week, and then I must act if Potchefstroom is to
be saved. When I move, I am confident, with God’s blessing, of success.”
I received late, on the 4th March, a communication from Mr. Piet
Joubert, enclosing a telegram from Mr. Brand, and asking would I meet
him? I replied, I would meet him on the 6th; and while informing Lord
Kimberley, added, “My constant endeavour shall be to carry out your
orders; but considering the disasters we have sustained, I think the
happiest result will be that after a successful action, which I hope
to fight in about fourteen days, the Boers should disperse without any
guarantees, and then many now undoubtedly coerced will settle down.”
Later in the day I telegraphed: “Joubert is coming to meet me. Shall
follow strictly the lines of your instructions.”
I rode out about 17 miles to O’Neill’s, an empty farm at Prospect, on
the afternoon of the 5th, and was deciphering telegrams till 9 p.m.,
when I asked Walkinshaw for my eye-douche, the rose of which could not
be found; and I desired him somewhat impatiently to call me at 4 a.m.,
at which hour he held a jug over my head. “What’s the use; you left the
rose behind?” “It’s here.” “Where was it?” “On the mantelpiece.” It was
only months later I learned he had ridden to Newcastle and back, 34
miles, swimming twice the Ingogo River, in fording which an officer and
some men had been lost on the 8th February.
I met Mr. Joubert and three Boer leaders on the 6th March, and at
their request, in order to allow time for Mr. Kruger, who was then
near Rustenberg, to reply to Sir George Colley’s communication, agreed
to an armistice for eight days, _i.e._ to midnight on the 18th March.
The Boers undertook to pass eight days’ supplies to the invested
garrisons, and inform them of the Truce, which was to count only from
the arrival of the supplies. I telegraphed this arrangement to Mr.
Brand, and begged him to ensure the faithful transmission of the news
to Potchefstroom, which he undertook the same day to do.
I telegraphed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and for
War: “Want of food prevents advance for about ten days. Ingagane and
Incandu are impassable. I have therefore lost nothing in suspending
hostilities, and gained eight days’ food for the garrisons most in
want.” Next day the Cabinet approved my action, not only in the
Political, but also in the Military point of view.
On receipt of this message I replied to Lord Kimberley, 8th March: “Do
not imagine I wish to fight, I know the attending misery too well; but
now you have so many troops coming, I recommend decided though lenient
action, and I can, humanly speaking, promise victory. Colley never
engaged more than six companies; I shall use twenty, and two Cavalry
regiments, in directions known only to myself, and I undertake to
enforce dispersion.”
That same day Lord Kimberley, telegraphing with reference to my
telegram of the 5th March, in which, while suggesting an amnesty for
leaders, I urged, “The happiest results will be after a successful
action, which I hope to fight in about fourteen days,” replied, “There
will be complete amnesty.... We will now appoint Commissioners for
friendly communications to Boers.” Later in the day he telegraphed,
“Prolong Armistice as needful.”
On the 11th March, in referring to my telegram of the 9th, showing
the food supplies in the garrisons, I asked if the Armistice was to
be prolonged, stating, “The situation on military grounds scarcely
justifies prolongation, certainly not beyond the 18th March.” And in
reply I received orders “To prolong the Armistice, and inform the
Boers, if they desisted from armed opposition, a Royal Commission,
consisting of Sir Hercules Robinson, Sir Henry de Villiers, and
yourself, will be appointed to consider the giving back of the
Transvaal, subject to British Suzerainty, a Resident at Capital, and
provisions for guarding native interests, Mr. Brand being present as
representing the Friendly State.”
On the 12th March, Lord Kimberley telegraphed: “In order to enable me
to answer questions in Parliament, inform me whether suggestions for
Armistice proceeded from you or Joubert, or from whom?” I might have
replied briefly, “From you. See your telegram of 16th February.”[216]
Although Mr. Kruger on the 16th March, in the conference under Lang’s
Nek, claimed the credit of the Armistice, as being the result of his
letter of the 12th February to Sir George Colley. However, appreciating
Lord Kimberley’s difficulties in the Houses of Parliament, I replied:
“Mount Prospect, 14th March. Whole history of Armistice. 3rd March,
Brand appealed to me, as former friend of Boers, to stop bloodshed, by
arranging temporary cessation of hostilities. 4th March, Sent my answer
to you. 5th March, You approved. 3rd March, Brand appealed to Joubert
to meet me to arrange armistice. 4th March, Joubert sending me Brand’s
message; asks how far I will co-operate so (_sic_) he wishes to stop
his patrols. 5th March, I offered to meet him on the 6th.”
During the next few days I had much discussion with some of the Boer
leaders, who were, however, unable to give definite opinions on many
points, as Mr. Kruger,[217] whom they all regarded as their chief, was
still absent. I wrote to Lady Wood on the 15th March: “Buller, who
went with me to meet Joubert yesterday, thinks the Boers will go on
fighting. I think they will not, if we concede all that Lord Kimberley
has telegraphed.”
His Lordship had sketched roughly to me before I left London his
views regarding the Government of the territories inhabited mainly by
Natives after the retrocession of the Transvaal, but his views were
not in accordance with the wishes of the Boers, who subsequently, in
consequence of the recommendation of two of the Royal Commissioners,
obtained what they wanted.
I told the Boers plainly on the 15th that the Government would
not consent to the recall of our garrisons until the country was
handed over by a Royal Commission, and on this point, which had been
represented as one of paramount importance, they gave way. We talked
for hours on the 16th, and I telegraphed that evening to Lord Kimberley
as follows: “After eight hours’ talk I am confirmed in the opinion
expressed in my telegram of the 5th instant, namely, ‘Considering the
disasters we have sustained, I think the happiest result will be that
after a successful action which I hope to fight, the Boers should
disperse without any guarantees.’ On the 19th, the Boers who were in
telegraphic communication through the Free State with Parliamentary
and other supporters in London, abated their tone considerably, and in
writing that night to my wife I said, “Buller now thinks they will not
fight; if they do, we shall beat them.”
On the 20th, Lord Kimberley replied to my telegram of the 16th as
follows: “I have not heard from you the result of your communication to
the Boers relative to my telegram of the 17th inst. We rely upon you,
unless Military Necessity requires immediate action, to give us time to
consider points on which you may not be able to come to agreement with
the Boers.”
On the 21st March the Boers accepting Lord Kimberley’s terms, including
any separation of land in the interests of the natives which the Royal
Commission might consider necessary, agreed to disperse; and while
informing Lord Kimberley, I telegraphed to the Secretary of State
for War asking him to see the telegram, and added, “If authorised,
can advance 24th, but may be delayed by rivers.” On the 22nd, Lord
Kimberley approved of the conditions under which the Boers undertook to
disperse; and on the 24th nearly all their waggons had moved off, about
1,800 remaining on the Nek to receive me as I descended from the Majuba
with the Boer leaders, who had ascended to show me the respective
positions of the contending forces on the 27th February.
At a breakfast given to me on the Boer position there were three young
couples who were to have been married six months earlier, but the
girls, like all the Boer women, declined to have anything to say to
lovers or husbands until Peace was made, and it was, I believe, mainly
owing to the influence of the women that the spirit of the Rebellion
was maintained.
It is remarkable that none of us ever heard either Boer leader boast,
or even speak in a tone of exultation, of their successes. This was not
the case with the young men, but the leaders on every occasion ascribed
the result of their struggles to the intervention of the Almighty. Mr.
Brand asserted that another check to our arms would have brought into
the field all the young Dutchmen of South Africa. As I telegraphed to
Lord Kimberley, “A check, humanly speaking, was impossible;” and in
spite of Brand’s experience, assuming one occurred, I could endorse his
opinion only as regards the Free State men, of whom there were about
300 on the Lang’s Nek position on the morning of the 24th March.
I had much interesting conversation with Mr. Joubert during the
intervals of the negotiations. He was by far the most far-seeing
and moderate of the Boer leaders. I was told on the 24th, when the
Boers were dispersing, that Joubert had had considerable trouble to
obtain the assent of the different Commandoes (detachments) to Lord
Kimberley’s conditions, many of the leaders objecting strenuously to
any interference with the power of the Boers to deal with the Natives.
Joubert did not tell me, but I learnt while on the Nek, that the
evening before it was decided to accept the British terms, Joubert,
after a long discussion, said, with some heat, and decision, “I advise
you to accept these terms, which are liberal; and if you refuse them,
you had better nominate another Commandant-General, for I do not mean
to fight.”
When talking to him alone I said, “You dislike our reservations about
Native territories. Why not stand out, and let us have another fight?”
“Oh,” he replied, “I do not want any more bloodshed.” “Well, as you are
not quite satisfied with the terms, why not fight again; you say you
have won three times?” “Yes, but we shall not win again now, and I am
in favour of a peaceful settlement.”
On my return to Newcastle I received the following telegram: “22nd
March. Her Majesty’s Government desire to convey to you their high
sense of your conduct in the recent proceedings, and the skill and
judgment you have shown throughout in your communications with the Boer
leaders.”
I had heard from Lord Kimberley on the 1st April that he thought it
desirable I should go to Pretoria and explain the Situation, and
replied I had already placed relays of horses, and was starting on the
3rd April.
I travelled in a “Spider” drawn by two Artillery horses, and at Paarde
Kop, a few miles out of Prospect, the driver having dismounted to
adjust some harness, left the horses’ heads, and they started off
while I was in the carriage. The man made a determined effort to stop
them, and catching the rein, was dragged a hundred yards, when the
horses breaking into a gallop he let go. As the Spider bounded over an
ant-bear heap I was tossed out, falling on my spine on the off horse’s
head. Very little damage was done to the carriage, and in a short time
we were again on the track.
When I reached Heidelberg at sunset on the 4th, I found the Boer flag
flying over the Court House in the market square, and going up to
speak to the sentry, who did not understand English, he showed such
decided intention of shooting me if I interfered with the flag, that I
went back to the hotel, and sending for Messrs. Pretorius and Smidt,
desired them to have the flag hauled down. To this they demurred, and
attempted to argue the point. Eventually bidding them good-night, I
said, “You have got several hours to think about it, but if at 6 a.m.
to-morrow--now, please compare your watches--that flag is flying, I
shall pull it down with my own hands, and assuming the same man is on
sentry he will shoot me. This will be unpleasant for my family, but
honestly speaking I think it will be a gain for England. You gentlemen
believe, and rightly, Mr. Gladstone has great power with the British
Public, but not even he will be able to give you back your country if
you are so foolish as to shoot a Governor, who dies insisting on your
carrying out the terms under which you dispersed from Lang’s Nek. There
cannot be two Governments in the country at one moment.”
At daylight next morning I looked out from my window and saw the flag
was flying,[218] and exactly at six o’clock, telling Walkinshaw what
I was about to do, I walked across the square to the flag-staff. As
I approached it, saying a little prayer, for I thought that my last
moment had come, the non-commissioned officer in charge of the guard
hauled down the flag, and Smidt coming out, admitted that his argument
of the previous evening had been fallacious.[219]
I left Pretoria on the 8th, sleeping at Heidelberg that night, where I
met the Boer leaders, who apologised for Cronje’s dishonourable conduct
in withholding the terms of the armistice from the Potchefstroom
Garrison, and they begged to be absolved from any complicity in the
act, which they desired should be undone as soon as possible by the
surrender being cancelled, and the Arms and Ammunition returned. This
was done, and a Garrison replaced for a short time.
I was more injured in my fall than I realised at the time, and in the
next two or three days the irritation set up in the spine was so severe
as to make my feet swell to an enormous size. I had necessarily to
ride about at Pretoria, and thus made myself worse; and when leaving
Heidelberg on the return journey was in such agony that I could travel
only propped up with pillows and rugs, with my feet higher than my
body. When I was lifted out of the Spider at Standerton, and the doctor
asked me to turn over, I said, “That is impossible; you must turn me.”
I had lost all power of movement. Rolling me over, he injected some
morphia close to the back-bone, and in a few minutes, saying, “Oh, this
is Heaven,” I slept soundly many hours in succession, for the first
time since the accident.
I vexed the High Commissioner somewhat by my persistence in urging
him to come up to Natal and open the Commission. He probably thought
I was unreasonable in not estimating sufficiently the importance of
his Constitutional position, as regards the Ministers of the Cape, who
at this time, as indeed was often the case, were uncertain how long
they would hold office. On the other hand, Lord Kimberley wishing me
to persuade the Boer leaders to provide for our current expenditure,
was asking what arrangements I proposed as to Revenue and Expenditure
of the Government during the interval before they got Self-government.
I pointed out that we could hope to get nothing out of the country,
and for that reason I wanted the interval shortened, and had therefore
been urging the High Commissioner to come up as soon as possible. I
explained to him, and to Lord Kimberley, that as the entire expenditure
for the purposes of governing the Transvaal was only one-twelfth of the
military expenditure, which could not be reduced without the troops
being sent away, we had every reason for giving over the country as
soon as possible. In the meantime the young Boers who had not seen the
troops assembled in the North of Natal, were somewhat impatient with
their leaders, and inclined to get out of hand.[220]
I had plenty of occupation before the High Commissioner arrived, for
I held daily conferences with the Boer leaders for the purpose of
bringing to justice the murderers of Major Elliot, Paymaster, who was
shot while crossing the Vaal River, into which the Boers forced him and
his companion, Captain Lambart; and the case of Doctor Barbour, who
was murdered under somewhat similar circumstances, a few hundred yards
inside the Free State boundary. There was no doubt of the identity of
the murderers in either case, but to obtain a conviction was unusually
difficult, as martial law had not been proclaimed. Sir Henry de
Villiers, my colleague, the Chief Justice of Cape Colony, advised me
that to try the men by court-martial would be to create _ex post facto_
legislation, and with the prevailing feeling in the Transvaal, trial by
Boers for such deeds would have been useless.
The Free State judge who tried Barbour’s murderers, in spite of the
evidence given by Mr. ---- that he saw ---- fire at Barbour, advised
the jury: “If you are not certain that ---- shot Mr. Barbour, you
should give the prisoner the benefit of the doubt,” and so they did.
Similarly, Major Elliot’s murderers were acquitted, in spite of Captain
Lambart’s evidence, who escaped only by diving like a duck in the Vaal
River.
When not inquiring into such and somewhat similar cases of outrage,
not, however, involving loss of life, I spent many hours, averaging
16 daily, in considering the affairs of Zululand, where the system
of dividing up the country amongst a number of Chiefs had become
unsatisfactory. Several Chiefs complained of acts of oppression by
Usibebu, and Mnyamane complained of oppression at the hand of Uhamu.
In the opinion of Lord Kimberley the terms of settlement had not
contemplated any interference on the part of the British, so in
telegraphing to him on the 13th April I said, “All these Chiefs have
asked me to inquire into the matters in dispute, and to give a decision
which they bind themselves to carry out, but I am not certain how you
will regard my giving any decision. Shall I do so, or let the Chiefs
fight it out?” Next day His Lordship told me to decide the matter,
which I did four months later.[221]