1881--THE LAND OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS
Preliminaries to Rebellion--Modelled on Hampden’s conduct--To South
Africa--Dutchmen from Cape Colony deprecate resistance to
Government--Death of Sir George Colley--An appreciation.
South Africa, sometimes named “The land of Misfortune,” may be more
aptly termed “The land of Misunderstandings.” The problem of ensuring
good government in a vast country inhabited by a few dominant white
men, in the midst of warlike native races, has always been difficult.
Many Governors and Generals have been recalled by a dissatisfied Home
Government, mainly because it did not understand the local conditions
of the country, and twenty-five years ago the solution of the Zulu
question, instead of solving the Boer-British difficulties, brought
their opposing interests into sharper antagonism.
In 1880, before the gold industry had been developed, Mr. Kruger and
his friends worked against Confederation, mainly, I believe, from
the wish, after regaining their independence, to be left alone. The
successes of 1881, and the accumulation of vast wealth from gold mines
turning the farmer’s head, encouraged him later to strive for the
mastery in South Africa.
The proclamation annexing the Transvaal, in 1877, promised as much
Self-government as the circumstances of the country permitted. Sir
Bartle Frere confirmed this pledge, and the Boers hoped on for its
fulfilment, though the nominated Assembly of officers, and other
Britons, in November 1879, in nowise satisfied their aspirations.
The answer brought back by the Deputation to the Colonial Minister
in London showed the Boers they had little to hope for by peaceful
measures; but, as Kruger and Joubert told me in May 1881, the step
which eventually determined their resort to arms was the perusal of
a despatch from the Administrator, published in _The Times_, arguing
with perfect honesty of purpose, the people must be contented, since
taxes had never been so satisfactorily collected. “These English cannot
understand our love of freedom,” they said, and the prearranged refusal
to pay taxes by Bezeidenhout, at Potchefstroom, for which he was
indemnified in advance, was the first overt act of rebellion, following
the precedents of Eliot, Hampden, and Pym in the early Parliaments of
Charles I.
The British Authorities, determined to strengthen Pretoria, called in
two-thirds of the Lydenburg garrison. The Boers waylaying it on the
20th December, demanded it should retrace its steps. The Senior officer
refused to do so, and was extending for action when the Boers opened
fire from cover, destroyed or captured the detachment.
Major-General Sir George Colley had succeeded Sir Garnet Wolseley as
High Commissioner for East South Africa, but had been requested to
regard his authority in the Transvaal as dormant, to be exercised only
in case of necessity.
Unfortunately Sir Bartle Frere, the strongest Governor South Africa has
ever seen, was no longer at Cape Town. First the Conservatives, later
the Liberals, had retained him as the keystone of the much-desired
Confederation. He had left Cape Town in September 1880, and his
successor, Sir Hercules Robinson, only arrived at the end of January
1881. On the 25th December the Acting Governor in Cape Town cabled
a resolution of the Cape Legislature, urging Lord Kimberley to send
a special Commissioner to the Transvaal to avert hostilities. Lord
Kimberley replied on the 30th December that “the moment was not
opportune.”
Throughout January 1881 Mr. Brand strove strenuously for concessions
to the Boers, telegraphing on the 10th and 12th to Lord Kimberley, and
many messages passed between Brand and some of the British Authorities
in South Africa.
On the 23rd January, General and High Commissioner Sir George Colley
wrote to Mr. Joubert calling on him to dismiss his followers, and
undertaking to submit any representations the Boers might wish to put
forward. Although the hostile camps were within 4 miles, Joubert’s
refusal to disperse unless Annexation was cancelled, dated 27th
January, was not received until 15th February. On the 28th January,
Colley attacked Joubert in position on Lang’s Nek, in Natal, and was
repulsed.
On the 28th January, Lord Kimberley telegraphed to Mr. Brand, through
the Free State British Consul, “Inform President, that if armed
opposition ceases forthwith Her Majesty’s Government will thereupon
endeavour to form such scheme as they believe would satisfy all
enlightened friends of the Transvaal community.”
On the 3rd February, in telegrams passing between Mr. Brand and Sir
George Colley, he learnt of Lord Kimberley’s message to Brand of the
26th January, and, asking Sir Hercules Robinson, received a copy of it,
and next day begged Mr. Brand “to give every publicity to it.”
On the 5th February, Mr. Joubert wrote to Sir George Colley protesting
against the attack of the 28th January, made before he had had time to
reply to Sir George’s letter of the 23rd; but Joubert, at the same time
using the Free State Territory, sent troops round the British flank,
and stopped the post on the 7th February, on the Ingogo River, 7 miles
south of Colley’s camp at Mount Prospect. The General tried to reopen
the Newcastle road next day with 5 companies and 2 guns; was heavily
attacked; retained his position until sunset, when the Boers drew off,
and after dark Sir George Colley fell back on Prospect Camp. Although
the Boers held the ground next morning for a short time, the engagement
reopened the communication a few days later.
On the 4th January I received a note from the Military Secretary asking
me in the name of the Commander-in-Chief if I would return to South
Africa to serve under Sir George Colley, to whom I was one senior
in the Army List, and requesting me to go to London to discuss the
question. I agreed to go out on the Adjutant-General’s observing, “Your
Rank, Pay, and Allowances will be the same as at Chatham.”
In a “Letter of Service” received on the 6th, it was stated that I was
going out as a “Colonel on the Staff.” This I declined by telegraph,
recalling the previous day’s conversation, and was again ordered to the
War Office. Though the Adjutant-General predicted I should repent it, I
maintained my decision. In the result a fresh “Letter of Service” was
handed to me, with the rank of Brigadier-General, which I had held at
Chatham, and also when I left the Colony eighteen months earlier, after
having commanded in two campaigns and five fights a strong brigade of
all Arms.
Lord Kimberley sent for me and explained his views of the question of
the Zulu and Swazi States after the Annexation should be annulled,
which he gave me to understand he already accepted in principle. I took
leave of Her Majesty the Queen, who was very gracious to me, on the 7th
January, and sailed on the 14th, reaching Cape Town on the 7th February.
We heard on the 8th, at Cape Town, of the action on the Ingogo; and the
mail steamer being delayed, I transhipped into a transport, reaching
Durban on the afternoon of the 9th. I left immediately, arriving at
Government House early next morning, where I was kindly received by
Lady Colley, with whom I had danced at her first ball. I found a letter
from Sir George Colley, dated the 4th February, couched in graceful
terms, as follows:--“I was right glad to hear you were coming out, and
thought it very generous of you to be ready to serve under a junior and
less experienced officer. I propose to give you half the troops, to
relieve Lydenburg.”
The situation had changed since he wrote, and so I left Maritzburg in
the evening, sleeping a few hours at Estcourt, as the tracks were heavy
and the mules had much difficulty in pulling the cart. I stopped on the
14th at Ladysmith, after travelling from daylight till 9 p.m. for two
hours, to clear up some work about which the Colonial Secretary had
telegraphed to me, and then drove on through the night, arriving at
the Biggarsberg at daylight, where I received a letter from Sir George
Colley, dated Mount Prospect, 16th February. He had heard I was coming
up, and warned that a Force was on my left, estimated to be from eight
to fifteen hundred men, adding he did not know the position it was
supposed they intended to hold.
I found on the Biggarsberg two infantry Battalions, and two Squadrons
of Cavalry, but the Senior officer had taken no military precautions.
Having ascended the top of the mountain, and assured myself there was
no enemy in the immediate neighbourhood, I left orders for the troops
to march after an early dinner, and went out at nine o’clock with a
small escort of 15th Hussars, to reconnoitre. I could see no signs of
the Boers on our side of the Drakensberg Mountain,[212] and turned
eastwards in the afternoon, arriving on the Biggarsberg-Newcastle track
at sunset.
I approached the rise overlooking the Ingagane River, cautiously as a
matter of habit, and it was well I did so, for just below me there was
a party of 200 Boers pillaging a public-house on the north bank. They
had cleared the building, destroying all the liquor, and were leaving.
As they never looked back, I was able to ford the river and follow
them until it was clear where they intended to cross the Drakensberg
into the Free State. None but the leaders knew why Joubert declined to
attack us.
When I returned late to the camp I sent for the Commanding officers,
and told them that I had seen a Boer Patrol; and while I had no reason
to suppose that a large body was close at hand, yet even a small number
of mounted men might hold the Ingagane position and render our crossing
difficult. They had made one march, so I asked if they would prefer to
make a night march to get to the bank, and cross with the first streak
of dawn, or wait and take the chance of the Boers occupying it. They
unanimously preferred to march, as we did at 1 a.m.
We began to cross at daylight, but the water had risen since the
previous evening, and as single men could not resist the current, we
were obliged to form a chain to ensure getting them over in safety. We
moved on to the Horn River, 7 miles, and the difficulties of the track
may be understood from the fact that our last waggon did not get into
camp until 10 p.m., the oxen being on the trek-tow[213] twenty hours.
Next morning, preceding the troops, I went early to Newcastle, and had
the pleasure of meeting Sir George Colley, who had ridden through the
previous night from Prospect Camp. I told him Lord Kimberley’s views on
the steps to be taken after the Annexation was annulled, and Sir George
protested in a telegram dated the 19th February, against any division
of the country.
On the 8th February, Lord Kimberley had telegraphed to Sir George
Colley, “If the Boers cease from armed opposition, Her Majesty’s
Government will be ready to give all reasonable guarantees as to their
treatment after submission, and that scheme will be framed with a view
to permanent friendly settlement of difficulties.”
On the 13th February, Sir George telegraphed the purport of a letter
from Mr. Kruger asking for a Royal Commission, which he was confident
would give Boers their rights, adding, if Annexation were upheld they
would fight to the end. On the 16th, Lord Kimberley, understanding
Colley was shut up in Prospect Camp, telegraphed to me, “Inform Kruger
that if Boers will desist from armed opposition, we shall be quite
ready to appoint Commissioners with extensive powers, and who may
develop scheme referred to in my telegram of 8th inst. And that if
this proposal is accepted you are authorised to agree to suspension of
hostilities on our part.”
I had not answered this telegram, hoping to hand it personally to Sir
George, as I did when we met. Sir George replied that day to Lord
Kimberley, “Latter part of your telegram to Wood not understood. There
can be no hostilities if no resistance is made; but am I to leave
Lang’s Nek, in Natal territory, in Boer occupation, and our garrisons
isolated, and short of provisions, or occupy former, and relieve
latter?”
Lord Kimberley replied the same day,--“It is essential that garrisons
should be free to provision themselves and peaceful intercourse
allowed, but we do not mean that you should march to the relief of
garrison or occupy Lang’s Nek, if arrangement proceeds. Fix reasonable
time within which answer must be sent by Boers.”
I ascertained, in the course of conversation, that Sir George had
no information of the Left Flank and Rear of the Boer position, and
suggested that I should go as far as was necessary to see if there were
any considerable number of troops in the Wakkerstroom district.
He demurred somewhat to the risk, but eventually, after proposing to
come himself, to which I objected on the principle that two valuable
eggs should not go in one basket, allowed me to proceed; and at 11
p.m. on the 19th, I left Newcastle, and crossing the Buffalo with
100 Hussars, we proceeded to a hill overlooking Wakkerstroom, and
ascertained there was no large Force of the enemy in that direction.
When I returned next evening, after a ride of 60 miles, Sir George told
me he wished me to go back to Maritzburg and expedite the transport
of provisions, of which there were at Newcastle only thirteen days’
supply. I received two telegrams in succession from Dutchmen living
near Fort Beaufort, who had served with me in 1878, requesting me to
transmit to the Boer leaders then on the Nek, the opinion of the Fort
Beaufort district Dutchmen that they ought to submit, when no doubt
they would get all they wanted from the British Government. I sent
the telegram to Sir George Colley with a note saying I was anxious to
assist him, and not engage in any correspondence myself with the Boer
leaders. He thanked me warmly, saying he fully appreciated my loyal
desire to help him, and mentioned that he thought it was best to let
Mr. Brand deal with all such communications. I left Newcastle at 3 a.m.
on the 22nd, but was detained several hours on the Ingagane, as the
change of mules had strayed and ours were too exhausted to do a double
stage; but later, we were fortunate in the weather, and next day, by
driving from 3 a.m. to 7 p.m., got to Maritzburg.
* * * * *
During the night, 26th to 27th, Sir George Colley occupied the Majuba
Mountain, thinking the Boers intrenching its lower slopes were about
to forestall him on the summit. I heard from him at breakfast-time; he
was on the mountain; but in the afternoon we had an alarming telegram,
followed by a succession of similar messages; one announcing Sir
George’s death, urged that unless the 15th Hussars and an Infantry
Battalion moved up to Prospect at once, the camp there would be in a
critical position. I recalled the troops who had already started, for
the effect of their move would have been to leave the ammunition, and
the twelve days’ supplies at Newcastle, with 250 sick and wounded,
guarded by 100 men, in order to put 700 more men into Prospect Camp,
where there were already 1200 soldiers, and would also have added
a march of 17 miles and one more difficult river, through which the
supplies would have to be dragged.
At 8 p.m. I asked the Chief Justice to come to Government House, and
was sworn in as Acting Governor of Natal and Administrator of the
Transvaal. I could not rest, as telegrams were brought to me every
half-hour, but managed to get away at 5.30 a.m. on the 28th. Though
we started before daylight, the track was so greasy that it was dark
before we reached Estcourt, only 50 miles away. There I received
a fresh bundle of telegrams, which kept me up till midnight, and
Walkinshaw called me again before 4 a.m. That night we slept at the
Biggarsberg, and as an officer there had telegraphed to me that a
Dutchman had been watching for the post cart, asking if I was on it,
I took on an escort of six men. I saw no Boers, however; and as the
team could not pull the cart, I rode the horses of the escort in turn,
to Newcastle, where I arrived on the 3rd March. Next day I visited
Prospect in a deluge of rain, which made the track so greasy that the
horses could with difficulty keep on their feet at a walk; and on the
6th, when I again rode up, it took us five hours to travel about 20
miles.
I wrote to my wife, “Colley is gone: the best instructed soldier I
ever met.” In 1877 I wished him to take the Staff College, when I
thought it was to be offered to me, solely because I thought he would
make a better Commandant.[214] Except by Lord Wolseley, and one or
two others, Sir George’s long and valuable life is unappreciated, and
forgotten in its culminating and dramatic disaster. For him success was
impossible, no smaller mind would have attempted to achieve it with
the totally inadequate means at hand. He did not know what it was to
fear, and rated others by his own undaunted heart. He had suddenly to
face a rebellion carefully prepared in a vast country, which he was to
rule only in case of emergency; and until the end of November, when
the Administrator of the Transvaal telegraphed for troops, all that
officer’s reports had been reassuring.
Colley was justified, in a military sense, in moving on the 26th. The
hill he occupied is in Natal. The forty-eight hours, to which his
letter of the 21st had limited his offer “to suspend hostilities,” had
long since elapsed; and, moreover, as he telegraphed on the 10th to Mr.
Brand, he could not “allow any communication with the Boers to affect
his military operations” while they were trying to starve out the
British garrisons.