of religion has made a deep study of all the vast details of the
Hegelian system; but his one-sided theological criticism exclusively
aims at representing Hegel himself as a theologian. This American
pseudo-Hegelianism may probably have had the effect of stimulating
American thinkers, but in other respects it has only retained the
phantom and empty shadow of Hegelianism, playing fast and loose with
the old system under the captious name of the "Hegelian method," and
making a free use of its obscure, obsolete phraseology. The cry "back
to Kant" by English Neo-Kantianism, is declared to mean a speedy
return to Hegel's method, and to be only the first step of the protest
"against temporary, materialistic, and psychological thought."
The last chapter, in the form of an appendix, is devoted to the
discussion of "Christian Unity." The author deplores the current
abstract conceptions of the church, and regards them as the main
obstacle to its visible organic unity. The Hegelian ideas on religion
and the state are believed to suggest a more concrete, historical view,
and to destroy the abstract conception.
γνλν.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF NECESSITY; OR, LAW IN MIND AS IN MATTER. By _Charles
Bray_. Third edition, revised and abridged. London and New York:
Longmans, Green, & Co.
This work was originally published in 1841, and comprised an Exposition
of the Doctrine of the Philosophy of Necessity, or the Law of
Consequences, first, in its relation to Mental Science, secondly, in
its relation to Ethics, and thirdly, an application of its principles
to the social questions of the day. The third part has been omitted
from the present edition, as being out of date, but many of its
statistics and observations are given as an Appendix. In a prefatory
note it is stated as a reason for preserving in an accessible form the
conclusions arrived at by Mr. Bray, that he "worked out for himself a
theory as to the purpose of existence that satisfied his own mind, and
became to him a cheerful philosophy which intensified his enjoyment
of all things good and pleasant, helped him to bear the troubles of
life, and to meet the end in a spirit as bright as it was resigned"—a
statement which those who knew him personally will heartily endorse.
Mr. Bray's theory is embodied in the title of the work under review,
and its key-note is "order in nature." His object is to show "that the
mind of man is not an exception to nature's other works; that like
everything else it has received a determinate character; that all our
knowledge of it is precisely of the same kind as that of material
things, and consists in the observation of _its order_ of action, or
of the relation of cause and effect." According to this view we can
know the real nature of neither matter nor mind, Nature herself having
fixed the boundaries beyond which human knowledge cannot extend. It
would be a mistake, however, to suppose that Mr. Bray regarded Nature
as something apart, giving to man laws from the operation of which it
is itself free. A little consideration shows that such is not his idea.
Nature is with Mr. Bray only another name for God. Moreover, man is
nothing, God is all; "individuality, or anything separate from Him,
is a mode of thought, and has no real existence." Electricity, heat,
light, and other forces of nature are modes of the Unknowable, and
are transformable into each other and into the other modes which we
distinguish as sensation, emotion, thought. The qualities or properties
of matter are mere force or power, and as they are qualities of God,
the assumption of the existence of matter is not necessary. God "is
the Universal Being, of which all things are the manifestations. Every
thing is a mode of God's attribute of extension; every thought, wish,
or feeling, is a mode of His attribute of thought."
To Mr. Bray the only _reality_ is God, the great Unknown, and as He is
also the Unknowable, we have in the Philosophy of Necessity a system of
Agnosticism. And yet Mr. Bray is hardly consistent with himself. For,
unlike Mr. Herbert Spencer, he speaks of God in terms of Spirit, which
becomes in his system identical with force. When, moreover, he declares
that "the whole sensitive existence is but the innumerable individual
eyes with which the Infinite World Spirit beholds Himself," we have a
kind of Monism. This view however recognises God as "the only real and
efficient power in the universe," and, as the Great First Cause and
the Great Last Cause of all things, a Divine Being. Mr. Bray does not
enter into the question of the personality of God, but that he supposes
the Deity to possess consciousness is evident from his reference to
the Great Soul of Nature, and his statement that the operation of its
forces is governed by thought. His ideas are summed up in the words,
"we feel ourselves a part
"Of that stupendous whole,
Whose body nature is, and God the Soul."
Holding this opinion, Mr. Bray could not be otherwise than a
Necessitarian and an Utilitarian in his practical views. These are well
shown in his treatment of the question of the freedom of will, as to
which he accepts the opinion of Locke that a man is free within the
range of the preferences or directions of his own mind. Mr. Bray's own
conclusion is: "Since, then, the only freedom we have is limited to
action in accordance with our natural powers and capacities, our aim
must be to develop fully these powers and capacities, and to remove all
impediments, external and internal, to their free and complete action.
There must be no external compulsion from physical impediment, or
internal compulsion from defect in the mind itself; no obstacle to the
full exercise of our natural powers both of body and mind. Education in
its full meaning is the developing and perfecting of all these powers."
Ω
GESCHICHTE DER ETHIK IN DER NEUEREN PHILOSOPHIE. By _Friedrich
Jodl_. Volume II. Kant and the Ethics of the Nineteenth Century.
Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta.
In this volume Professor Jodl continues his history of theoretical
ethics; starting with Kant and coming down to contemporary
philosophers. His work is thus mainly concerned with the classical
philosophy of Germany till Feuerbach's time, and the spiritualistic
and positivist philosophy of France and England down to the time
of Cousin, Jouffroy, and Mill. Professor Jodl has been obliged to
forego his original intention of appending to his work an epitome
of the logical constructive results of his investigations, and has
exclusively applied himself to the investigation and historical
presentment of the fundamental and central principles of the ethical
thought of the past century. He has therefore ever held in view the
economical and historical purpose of his work, and avoided on the one
hand an exposition of all systems in which originality of principles
is lacking, and on the other abstained from the critical examination
of the systems of his contemporaries. Thus he has aspired, by the
constant emphasis of central basal principles and of the points whereon
all have agreed, to refute the belief that the history of his science
is a chaotic mass of contradictory views, and that ethical opinion
presents in its historical expression only diversity, and never
community of mental possession. Professor Jodl has only collaterally
dealt with the non-ethical literature and tendencies of the times of
which he treats, and he has disclaimed all intention of portraying the
effects and influence that ethical systems have produced and exerted
in practical spheres; France and England being the only instances in
which, for manifest reasons, the discussion of literature and politics
has preceded the criticism and analysis of philosophies. Nevertheless,
his work throughout is interspersed with many well-judged and apposite
thoughts upon the effective, though not always apparent, influence of a
nation's intellectual activity upon its practical conduct of affairs;
as well as, also, regarding the lamentable fact that, often, a people
are violently and dangerously engaged in the solution of questions that
their thinkers have solved decades before.
Let us look at Professor Jodl's examination of the historical position
of Kantian Ethics. The element of non-interest in ethical judgment we
find not to have been first emphasised by Kant. Whatever the success
and worth of their speculations, a great many of Kant's predecessors
sought to realise this very factor in their systems; thus it was with
Plato as opposed to Protagoras, with Shaftesbury and Butler as opposed
to Hobbes, Locke, and Hume; while Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston, and
Price were similarly actuated by the purely speculative consideration.
Kant's real and original advance upon previous systems of ethics, was
his emphasis of the element of conscious volition in ethical judgment
and the statement of its imperative character. It was just in this last
respect that his ethical philosophy formed so marked a contrast to the
eudæmonism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The imperative
and absolute nature of duty, eudæmonism neglected to inculcate; Kant
aroused the conscience of his time, and presented in contrast to the
moral weakness then prevalent the strength and earnest grandeur of an
absolute conception of duty.
So too in the conflict between the metaphysics of ethics and the
practical postulates, wherein the great philosopher displayed so much
ingenuity, Professor Jodl is unable to distinguish Kant's position very
sharply from that of the English intellectualists when in a similar
plight. Not that the idea of the practical postulates is valueless;
this Professor Jodl afterwards explains. Our historian merely shows
that Kant had not yet gotten clear of the ancient conflict that had
agitated the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages as well as the utilitarian
and rationalistic theologians of more modern times. Yet despite the
mysticism that inheres in Kant's argument for the practical existence
of God, the kernel of the truth he emphasises in the alliance of
ethics with religion still remains; namely that religious ideas are
essentially ethical, that in this relation only have they meaning,
and that religious ideas which are ethically valueless are to be
uncompromisingly discarded.
Especial attention should be called to Professor Jodl's estimate of
Feuerbach, whose merits have been strangely neglected. Feuerbach's
ethical system, in perfect form, has not been independently set forth
in his works, but is intermingled with the subjects dealt with in his
religious treatises. Yet he left few of the fundamental questions of
ethics untouched and his works contain a great store of most excellent
and pertinent thoughts which must be characterised, says our author,
in the widest sense of the term, as the real foundation in ethics of
modern scientific empiricism.
With regard to the presentment of English and French ethical
philosophy, Professor Jodl's work, it is claimed, is the first
historical exposition in the German language of this special department
of thought in its connection with the universal intellectual progress
of these two countries. His analysis of Bentham and Mill is very
accurate and full.
Professor Jodl exhibits an extensive acquaintance with English
philosophical literature; indeed, he has even discovered the little
book known as "Kant's Ethics," by Dr. Noah Porter, whom he calls the
"Nestor" of American philosophy.
Unity of execution, and the skilful employment of historical
perspective in dealing with the various phases of ethical thought, may
be characterised as prominent merits of Professor Jodl's performance.
In the books of its class it stands unique.
μκρκ.
ETHIK. Eine Darstellung der ethischen Principien und deren Anwendung
auf besondere Lebensverhältnisse. By Dr. _Harald Höffding_,
Professor an der Universität zu Kopenhagen. Unter Mitwirkung des
Verfassers aus dem Dänischen übersetzt von F. Benedixen. Leipsic:
1888.
Harald Höffding, Professor at the University of Copenhagen, is a
representative thinker among ethical scholars. Unhesitatingly he takes
his stand upon the real facts of life and attempts to construct a
system of ethics which shall be a science among the other sciences.
Professor Höffding says in his preface:
"If we see the snow-covered peaks of a mountain range from a far
distance, they seem to hover in the air. Not until we approach do we
discover plainly that they rest upon solid ground. It is the same with
ethical principles. In the first enthusiasm one imagines that a place
should be assigned to them above the reality of nature and life. On
further reflection and after a longer experience, which must perhaps
be dearly bought, we discover that the ethical principles can regulate
life only if they have really proceeded from life."
Professor Höffding is in a certain sense a utilitarian. The influence
of utilitarian systems upon his mode of thought can be traced
throughout the whole work, and it is this influence perhaps to which
the Danish Professor owes his positive standpoint as well as the
scientific method of his procedure. Nevertheless he differs from the
ordinary utilitarian school and prefers to characterise his system as
an ethics of general welfare. He says:
"The so-called utilitarianism,—that ethical conception which has been
founded mainly by Bentham,—has the merit of having for the first
time energetically propounded the principle of welfare. Yet Bentham
has detracted from his cause by proceeding from a psychological
theory which considers consciousness as a sum of ideas and feelings,
and dissolves society into a number of individuals. The import of
pleasurable and painful feelings for the continuous and general welfare
cannot be established by a mere process of calculation." (P. 37.)
Professor Höffding opens the first chapter of his work with the
following sentence:
"Ethical judgments contain a valuation of human actions.... The
criterion of the ethical valuation is the contents of ethics."
If life consisted of isolated sovereign moments, every one of them
would have an equal right, and no one would be obliged to resign in
favor of any other moment. No valuation, no discrimination would be
required. But the life of each individual, as well as the life of
society, makes up a "life-totality," and we possess a conception of
this life-totality. "If the state of feeling in a single moment agrees
with the conception of the life-totality, a new feeling arises which
is determined by this mutual relation.... The ethical valuation is
conditioned by this feeling." (p. 27.) Taking this ground, Professor
Höffding defines good and bad in the following way:
"'Good' accordingly becomes that which preserves the life-totality
and gives fulness and life to its contents; 'bad,' on the contrary,
that which has more or less the tendency to dissolve or to limit the
life-totality and its contents. Bad accordingly is the single moment,
the separate impulse in its revolutionary isolation from the rest of
life...." (P. 29.)
"The Bad, therefore, is egotism in its various degrees and various
forms. And the verdict about it will be the severer the more conscious
this egotism is."
Utilitarianism as a rule has been hedonistic. Utilitarians have
proposed as the criterion of an ethical valuation the consequences of
an act; if the consequences give more pleasure than pain, it is said
to be good; if they are attended with more pain than pleasure, it is
said to be bad. In the above quoted definitions by Prof. Höffding there
is no trace of hedonism, and I should consider an ethical system based
upon these definitions as being in strong opposition to hedonism.
But Prof. Höffding appears to have been so strongly biased by the
influence of hedonistic utilitarianism, that he introduces again its
fundamental idea, which identifies the good with the pleasurable.
Although he objects to employing the terms "utility" and "happiness,"
"because they are liable to lead to misunderstandings and have indeed
done so"; although he declares that "momentary feelings of pleasure
and pain are no sure criterion for the total state" (p. 37); although
for such reasons he proposes the word welfare, saying, "by the word
'welfare' I think of everything which serves to satisfy the wants of
human nature in its whole entirety": still Prof. Höffding again returns
to hedonism by limiting the idea "welfare" to the hedonistic conception
of goodness. He defines welfare as "a continuous state of pleasurable
feelings." (P. 98.)
Thus we are presented with two definitions of what constitutes the
criterion of an ethical valuation: (1) that which promotes the
life-totality, and (2) that which produces a continuous state of
pleasurable feeling.
These two definitions are in many respects harmonious, but on the other
hand they may come into conflict; and if they come into conflict, which
of the two is to be sacrificed? Supposing that a contemplation of the
evolution of organised life should teach us that the development of
a "life-totality" is not at all a pleasurable process; that on the
contrary it is attended with excessive and innumerable pains. Inorganic
nature so far as we can judge is free from pain. The isolated atom, we
may assume, exists in a state of indifference. Supposing now that pain
could be proved to increase, the higher we rise in the development of a
life-totality; supposing that the growth of a life-totality had to be
bought with pain, what would be the consequence? I will not here enter
into the subject, but I may mention that this supposition is not at
all without foundation. Assuming that it were so, would not, in such a
case, the good be as Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and Mainlaender propose,
that which destroys the life-totality of consciousness and with it
the whole world of civilised humanity, built up of the innumerable
consciousnesses of individuals?
Professor Höffding has seen this difficulty, which arises from a
conflict of the two criteria of ethical valuation (1) the hedonistic
principle and (2) the principle of progress, i. e., the constant
evolution of a higher life-totality. He says:
"John Stuart Mill has declared that it is better to be a dissatisfied
man than a satisfied pig, a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied
fool. He bases this assertion upon the fact that even if the pig and
the fool were of a contrary mind, their opinion would have to be
rejected, since they possess no knowledge of the higher point of view
from which man and Socrates consider life, whereas man knows the needs
of the pig and Socrates fathoms the fool. We most be regulated by the
judgment of those that know the two kinds of needs in question and that
are consequently able to institute an estimation of the value of the
same.
"But I feel obliged to put in a word for the pig and the fool. The
difficulty is greater than Mill imagines. Man, it is true, knows all
the wants of the pig, and it would not be difficult for a Socrates to
comprehend those of the fool. But man does not have the wants of the
pig, nor Socrates those of the fool, as his _sole and only dominant_
wants. And yet this is the very circumstance that determines the
matter. Man cannot transform himself into a pig without ceasing to
be a man, and a Socrates will hardly be able so to identify himself
with a fool as to lose completely his Socratic wants. If, now, the pig
can attain the _complete_ satisfaction of all _his_ wants, is not his
happiness greater than that of man whose desires and whose longings
are never wholly satisfied? And the fool, who does not nourish many
thoughts and makes no great demands upon life, is he not happier than
Socrates who spends his whole life in striving to know himself and
to stimulate others, only finally to declare that death is really
preferable to life?"
Professor Höffding's solution of the difficulty is summed up in the
following paragraph:
"Welfare is an illusion if we understand by it a passive condition
of things, created once for all. It must consist in _action_, work,
development. Rest can only mean a termination for the time being, the
attainment of a new level, upon which it is possible for a new course
of development to proceed."
Thus it appears that Professor Höffding decides in favor of the second
principle. The evolution of the life-totality is considered higher
than a continuous state of pleasurable feeling. Nevertheless Professor
Höffding adds:
"On that account, however, we are not obliged to retract our first
definition of welfare as that of a continuous state of pleasurable
feeling. That which must be rejected is only the notion of a passive
state."
Truly, as Professor Höffding says, "the difficulty is greater than
Mr. Mill imagined." The difficulty is great enough to undermine the
whole basis upon which welfare is defined as "a state of continuous
pleasurable feeling." If, as Professor Höffding declares, welfare is to
be interpreted as activity, work, development; if this kind of active
welfare is the greatest good, whatever admixture of pain and whatever
absence of pleasurable feeling it may have; if the greatest amount
of a state of continuous pleasurable feeling is not welfare in an
ethical sense, what becomes of the utilitarian definition of welfare as
pleasurable feeling? If, however, welfare is "the state of a continuous
pleasurable feeling," how can we declare that the life of a pessimistic
philosopher is preferable to that of a joyful fool?
Must not the ultimate reason of this conflict be sought in Professor
Höffding's statement that—
"The proposition of a purpose presupposes in the subject which makes
the proposition feelings of pleasure and displeasure." (P. 30.)
Should we not rather say that the proposition of a purpose presupposes
an expression of _will_ in the subject which makes the proposition?
Wherever there is will, there is also approval and disapproval, but
approval is not always pleasurable and disapproval is not always
attended with displeasure. Does it not often happen that we cannot help
disapproving of things which please us?
We have mainly limited our review to some topics of the first division
entitled "The Conditions of Ethics," because we have regarded them
as most important in a representation of the ethical principles. The
doubts we have raised as to the consistency of the author are less
noticeable in the remaining chapters, which contain an unusual store
of ideas presented with great lucidity. The doctrine of the freedom of
will is excellently treated (chap. v.). Social ethics, family life,
marriage, the position of woman, and the education of children are
separately and exhaustively discussed, and there is no chapter which
even if we cannot always give assent to the author's views, does not
richly repay a careful perusal.
P. C.
KURZGEFASSTE LOGIK UND PSYCHOLOGIE. By _Dr. K. Kroman_. Translated from
the second edition of the Original by F. Bendixen. Leipsic: O. R.
Reisland.
Dr. Kroman is professor of philosophy at the University of Copenhagen.
He has sought to present in this book of three hundred and eighty nine
pages the elements of Logic and Psychology. The work was principally
intended for the use of the general reader and the beginner, although
its author hopes it will not be altogether without interest to the
specialist, and that it will find its way into the schools of pedagogy
(the subject of the art of education being also incidentally dealt with
in its pages).
Dr. Kroman's method of presentation is concise and lucid; the elements
of logic occupy but some one hundred and four pages, and form a good
introduction to the common phases of that science.