rather his philosophy. He says: "Unless we assume the law of causation,
research is impossible; but assuming this, it is impossible to stop
with states of consciousness, we must assume a subject and _real_
objects." What Dr. Kroman means by _real_ is seen from the following.
"Our senses give us knowledge only of _properties_ of things, not of
_things_. We do not perceive the apple, but only its form, color, etc.
But all these sensations thus derived form an interconnected whole;
and the law of causality forces us to the assumption of a _thing_
behind these sensory manifestations. Yet, our belief that we know this
_thing in itself_ has only a practical value; in reality it is an
unknown quantity. It is a single point, a nucleus, of which _direct
and positive_ knowledge is unobtainable; yet exist it must if our
assumption of the law of causation is to be upheld." Thus Dr. Kroman
shows in an admirable manner how our everyday conceptual life _is_
formed; but it is the office of philosophy, in our view, to point out
how this same conceptual life _should be_ formed. However, Dr. Kroman
supplements this explanation—which we have much abbreviated—by
considerations that lead one to believe that he seeks only to
demonstrate the reality of existence and has collaterally accepted the
doctrine of the independent, 'outside' thing in itself. We may refer
our readers, regarding this question, to Prof. Mach's article in this
number of _The Monist_.
μκρκ
EINLEITUNG IN DIE PSYCHOLOGIE NACH KRITISCHER METHODE. By _Paul
Natorp_. Freiburg: J. C. Mohr.
In this exhaustive monograph Dr. Paul Natorp does not deal with
psychology itself, but proceeding from a number of novel points of
view he opens up the road by which the principles of psychology may be
reached. The author frankly assumes that psychology even as yet has
not absolutely and clearly defined its own _fundamental problem_, and
that this is chiefly the reason why we still disagree concerning the
significance and value of many of the results of psychology. Before
we approach the solution of the special problems, psychology _itself_
must be laid down as a problem. The author, therefore, in the first
part of his introductory task has sought to indicate the _objects_ of
psychology,—namely, what it will and rationally can pursue; and in
the second part, he points out, the only correct _method_ according to
which psychology can accomplish its aims.
Since Descartes, says our author, real and possible consciousness
constitutes the true limits of the province of psychic research, the
fundamental problem of psychology, and the characteristic distinction
between the old and new philosophy. But, in order to find out, whether
this tendency of the new philosophy has been entirely successful, it
will be necessary to examine more closely the nature of the fundamental
psychic phenomenon, and the problem that it involves.
In the fact of consciousness we can distinguish several elements which
really are inseparable, but which in the study of the problem ought
to be separated. There is the content of which one is conscious,
and secondly, the consciousness thereof, or its relation to the
ego; and, by a further abstraction, this relation itself might be
distinguished from the total fact of consciousness. The relation to
the ego, in ever varied contents, is one and the same; it makes up
both the common and specific element of consciousness, and as the
third abstract element of consciousness (Bewusstsein) it might aptly
be called self-consciousness (Bewusstheit). The ego, being a common
point of relation to all contents of consciousness, cannot itself
become the content of consciousness, because it represents a contrast
to any idea of content. We do not correctly conceive consciousness as
a thing, a cause, a force, an explanatory principle, but simply as a
phenomenon—the fundamental phenomenon of psychology. We thereupon ask,
what contains this phenomenon, and by what is it characterised? It is,
above all, characterised by _subjective_ experience. This denotes, that
it is _I_ who am conscious of a content. The reflective expression
"I am conscious" implies a "subject" that is conscious. Without this
reflective relation to the ego, consciousness no longer conveys any
meaning. Consciousness denotes _self_-consciousness. This reflective
relation is therefore the only distinctive mark of all conscious
phenomena.
Content we call anything that can be related to the ego. In the
language adopted by psychologists, a feeling or a desire can also
be regarded as content of consciousness. But our investigation
cannot proceed beyond this reflective relation. If we attempt a
_representation_ of the ego, we should turn it into _object_, and
we should have ceased to regard it as _ego_. The ego is never an
object—not even to itself.
It is not denied, that in every consciousness there can be
distinguished two elements—the existence of a content, and its
relation to the ego; but it is denied, that this relation can be made
objective, even to itself. This correctly describes the character
of consciousness, as content and activity, and moreover, precisely
delimits the domain of the psychical and determines the _positive_ task
of psychology. Those, who assume a consciousness of consciousness,
ought logically to admit the consciousness of a consciousness of
consciousness, etc.; as indeed some metaphysicians have done.
It may be maintained, however, that the distinction of the activities
of consciousness, of sensation, representation, and thinking, is
indispensable in psychology; but, at any rate, there are no different
_kinds_, or even degrees or stages of consciousness. The consciousness
of any simple sensation in kind is not different from the consciousness
of a world; the factor of consciousness in both is the same; the
difference lies exclusively in the content. This also applies to clear
and obscure consciousness.
In order to determine the positive task of psychology, we ought to
discover in every content and in every repeated act of consciousness, a
certain common characteristic. Perception, as such, does not constitute
consciousness, but merely denotes the presence of a multiple content;
apperception, on the other hand, indicates only consciousness in the
definite sense of a "unity" of that multiple content. This unity
of consciousness properly does not appear, or only appears in the
connection of the contents. That peculiarity of consciousness which we
call apperception, is psychologically only apparent in the contents
of consciousness; it does not constitute an object of psychology, but
forms only its extreme limits. The common characteristic of every
content of consciousness is therefore really to be found in the
_connection_ (Verbindung) in which the simple contents are represented
in the repeated acts of consciousness. This connection exists only
subjectively, irrespective of all objective meaning or value.
The existence of phenomena purely as phenomena, their subjective
existence irrespective of object, constitutes their psychic existence
or that side of the phenomenon from which it becomes an object of
psychological research. Under this head come all those phenomena to
which science denies an objective value: illusions of the senses,
mental hallucinations, and the normal non-scientific representations
of things, the creations of the imagination in music and in art, the
entire subjective life of feeling and of aspiration, regarded only as a
particularly characteristic association of representation, irrespective
of all objective truth, which lies beyond the limits of psychology as
such.
The characteristic, accordingly, is found in the _unity_ in which
the content represents itself in the single or reiterated acts of
consciousness. In each act of consciousness the content is simply
present, and no time is distinguished. When we distinguish time, a
plurality of consciousness also must be distinguished. It may seem
difficult to understand how two or more original acts of consciousness
are again united into one act; but in reality this takes place.
The idea of unity is thus enlarged, and becomes the consciousness
of a multiplicity, the necessary unity of a multiple, a successive
connection in time, and a simultaneous connection. All consciousness
(representation) depends on connection, as is indirectly shown by
trying to discover whether the elementary contents of consciousness can
be represented in absolute isolation.
Abstract consciousness is thus found to be the relation of given
contents to an ego, and connection constitutes the manner in which a
multiple content appears or is represented in the reiterated relation
to one and the same ego. Connection is the _concrete expression_ of
that relation itself, through which consciousness attains its definite
and positive value. Abstract consciousness seems poor, but the
multiplicity of a definite connection of contents affords a vast field
of psychological research, for on that connection depends the concrete
significance of the ego, which to us is not subject in general, but
above all, is our own particular subject.
And finally at this point there spontaneously arises the question of a
theory of the psychic phenomena. Every theory essentially presupposes
an _objective_ tendency, while consciousness, as the expression of the
purest _subjectivity_ of phenomena, cannot be rendered objective. It
clearly follows, therefore, that the _method_ of psychology must be
radically different from all methods of the objective sciences.
γνλν
DER GENIALE MENSCH. By _Cesare Lombroso_. German Translation
by Dr. M. O. Fraenkel. Hamburg: Verlagsanstalt und
Druckerei-Actien-Gesellschaft (vormals J. F. Richter).
The French edition of Lombroso's "Man of Genius" has already appeared.
The work is introduced by a preface written by M. Charles Richet,
which reviews the subject with great clearness. All in all, this is
an admirable book, well stocked with interesting facts and incidents,
and well adapted to obtain a large number of readers outside of
scientific circles. There is necessarily a dearth of abundant and
well-authenticated facts in this subject,—historians until lately not
having occupied themselves with the psychological phases of life; and
accordingly there is great danger in universal generalisation from
those that we have. This, however, Prof. Lombroso has recognised.
Genius, the author claims, is a variety of psychosis, an instance of
degeneration. Degeneration of certain parts is the condition of the
acquisition of others; thus the loss of a number of ribs and muscles,
of a tail, etc., has in man been compensated by the acquisition and
development of the brain; and so in the genius the possession of very
great intellectual or emotional faculties has been counterbalanced by
the loss of equilibrium in the other parts. Moreover, there are no
exceptions in nature; the occurrence of insanity, abnormalities, and
eccentricities in a few cases leads us inevitably to the conclusion
that there are correspondent defects in all others. And this we find to
be true in all historical instances. Popular speech and tradition have
identified genius and demency: in Hebrew and Sanskrit the words prophet
and insane are synonymous; and so we have the proverbs—'Children and
fools speak the truth,' 'Un fol avise bien un sage,' 'Saepe etiam
est morio valde opportune locutus.' The line of demarcation between
the two is hardly traceable. Genius is the exception, a deviation
from the common type of humanity, and nature avenges the aberration
by denying it permanency and inflicting upon it abnormality. Whether
degeneration or progression, genius is unusual and unstable. But
one thing distinguishes genius from mental alienation, and it is
this—that genius possesses the power of inhibition, of concentration,
of _critique_, and far-sightedness, while demency has no control of
the ideas it has formed; both possess the swift and unerring power of
origination; the one can command what it has originated, the other
cannot.
It must be admitted that the method employed for the verification of
this thesis, is not absolutely safe. Wherever an eccentricity in a
man of genius is found, it is accredited to psychosis, even though
the genius in question be upon the whole more normal than the average
"normal" man; as, for instance, Goethe. If the same method were applied
to all men, would not normality be the exception and abnormality the
rule?
μκρκ
DAS BEWUSSTSEIN UND SEIN OBJECT. By _Dr. Joh. Wolff_, Professor of
Philosophy at the University of Freiburg (Switzerland). Berlin:
Mayer & Müller.
This is a huge closely printed volume of six hundred and twenty pages.
It is the enlargement and development of a treatise offered several
years ago to the faculty of the University of Bonn, upon application by
Dr. Wolff for a University instructorship, and contains the results of
the author's thoughts and researches since that time upon the subject
there dealt with.
Among many valuable isolated speculations and suggestions, we find
fundamental theses with which it is impossible for us to agree. Thus,
Dr. Wolff says that when he speaks of soul he means 'a substance,
a substratum, a vehicle, a cause of psychical phenomena, and not
a phenomenon or sum of phenomena'; and he says it is no more a
pre-judgment or prejudice on _his_ part to begin with this thesis than
it is on the part of those who hold a different view to begin with the
opposed one,—in fact less so, since he starts from the notion which
all men hold in common, while the others do not.
Does the mathematician, in propounding a new method, or a physicist
in explaining an unsolved problem, proceed from the mathematical and
physical notions all men hold in common? And if the soul is made an
object of scientific research, why should an exception be made of
_it_? It is not so much what we begin with as what we end with, and
it is perhaps superfluous to say that Dr. Wolff has ended where he
began—with the simplicity, the substantiality, the unity, and the
permanency of the ego.
μκρκ
PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES.
We had originally intended, in this first number of _The Monist_,
to present to our readers a comprehensive statement of the courses
announced by American Universities in the departments of Philosophy,
Ethics, and Psychology; first, in order to supply students proposing
to pursue these studies and others interested, with information at
first-hand, and secondly to give the non-academic world, which is
considerable, an insight into what our higher professional schools are
doing in these branches.
Since then _The American Journal of Psychology_ has published a very
full and gratifying account of the state of psychological research
in our Universities, made up of the reports of the professors at the
head of these departments; and we therefore refer our readers for
information regarding this branch to the article entitled "Psychology
in American Universities," published in Vol. III, No. 2, of that
ably-conducted magazine.
It was also difficult to obtain the required information: most of
our professors, in the last few months, having been absent from the
university towns.
But reports from the most representative universities in different
parts of the country have been obtained. They are intended merely to
exhibit the general nature and extent of philosophical instruction in
America and do not profess to be complete.
* * * * *
A review of the Registers, Catalogues, and Programmes of a large
number of our colleges has led us to the conviction that the acquiring
in America of a broad philosophical training is not the fault of the
_professions_ of our academical authorities. The courses offered are
set forth in our college catalogues at very great length; they are very
exhaustive; and their specification is accompanied with analyses of the
work of the various departments and with bibliographical schedules that
in point of thoroughness leave nothing to be desired. This fulness of
exposition is noticeable in all the departments.
But under the obligatory system of study, the separate departments,
or rather the professions of the separate departments, must certainly
conflict: and the question arises in the mind of the observing
outsider, To which is justice done?
And, except where a specialty is exclusively followed, wherein under
the professed conditions, does the elective system differ from the
obligatory? Only that in the one case, the student is made the author
of his embarrassment, and in the other the victim of it. However, in
the absence of a decided educational sentiment in our nation, and in
the lack of a uniformity of opinion as to what must be _demanded_ of
our schools instead of a submissive acquiescence in what they give us,
the question whether a college has fulfilled what it has professed,
must be left to the faithful individual student who is forced to devote
the best years of his life to the solution of it. It seems impossible
to determine it otherwise. And yet, except in the case of our foremost
institutions, to which all of us cannot go, this is true.
We have observed, too, that the extension of the departments of
philosophy proper is not keeping pace with that of many other
departments—as, for instance, the departments of history and economics.
Perhaps this is inevitable; the last-mentioned sciences having been
until of late very much neglected.
But the tendency threatens to overbalance the curriculum; and where
pretensions to universality are made, it is not justified.
On the other hand, the firm hold that experimental psychology has
obtained in some of our foremost schools, is gratifying; though
enthusiasm may also lead too far in this direction.
Lack of co-operation in cognate branches is, with very few notable
exceptions, universal. Preparatory training is not emphasised.
At least, where so much is said of the character and method of
instruction, and where the elective system prevails, we should expect
some mention of it. But it is not found.
Philosophy would seem to be something that is to be obtained only in
the lecture-rooms of the "philosophical department," and in most cases
it is sought nowhere else. The study of Mathematics, Physics, Natural
Science, and Philology, is greatly neglected. Philosophy becomes an
aim and a means in itself, and the student at the close of his course
often discovers himself in the quest of philosophy, but with no means
of finding it.
This necessity of co-operation has been fully recognised, for instance,
at Harvard. "When a student applies for Honors," says Professor
Palmer, "we require from him not merely an acquaintance with technical
philosophy but _also with the subjects most nearly adjacent to the
special philosophical field he has chosen_."
And so it is in other of our advanced and enlightened schools. Yet
in the majority of cases, the _foundations_ of philosophical culture
are not insisted upon, but left to chance and the uncertainties of a
universal elective curriculum.
Lastly, philosophy at some institutions exhibits a sectarian and
theological complexion.
This, one thinks, might be left to the theological seminaries. But it
is not.
We have Baptist Philosophy, and Presbyterian Philosophy, and
denominational philosophies of divers other descriptions.
A president of a prominent Eastern University, (a gentleman to whom the
philosophic spirit of this country is greatly indebted for inspiration
and expansion,) has taken,—let it be remarked in this connection,—a
much more liberal step, and urged the necessity of establishing a
school of _American_ Philosophy.
This is laudable; and in harmony with the present resuscitation of
American patriotism in——matters of learning.
It was this spirit that dictated the witty proposition of a Chicago
gentleman to found a "school" of American _Geometry_.
* * * * *
We hope that the appended syllabuses of courses in philosophy will
afford a general idea of the scope of philosophical teaching in
America. The professors who have supplied us with the information we
requested, we thank for their courtesy and obligingness.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.
The Philosophical Courses of the University of Michigan may be
conveniently classified under three heads:—
I. BEGINNING.
1. ELEMENTARY LOGIC, in which there are two courses, one general
covering the rudiments of syllogistic and deductive logic in which
Jevons is used as the basis, the other in inductive logic, intended
especially for scientific students, in which Fowler is used.
2. ELEMENTARY PSYCHOLOGY. The main facts regarding modern scientific
researches and methods, and the various attempts at their philosophic
interpretation. Dewey's Psychology is the book used in connection with
this course.
3. INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY. A course of lectures on the main
problems and principles of the theory of knowledge and reality. Each of
the foregoing courses is for one semester.
II. INTERMEDIATE COURSES.
1. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. Ancient and Modern. Lectures and readings
designed to give information regarding both the historical development
of thought, and the main problems developed in its course. The
department of philosophy owns a large number of copies of the chief
thinkers in modern philosophy, Locke, Descartes, etc., etc., and these
are assigned to members of the class for readings and reports. Each
student thus becomes acquainted with at least half-a-dozen of the
leading writers at first-hand.
The course runs through the year.
2. ETHICS, THEORETICAL (one-half year) AND SOCIAL (Political
Philosophy, one-half year also). The theoretical course attempts to
arrive at an account of the ethical ideal by means of a critical
consideration of the principal modern ethical theories, especial
attention being paid to Utilitarianism, Evolutionary Ethics, and
Kantianism. The second division of the course discusses the ethical
basis and value of society and the state, law and rights, in connection
with an account of the political theories of Plato, Aristotle, Grotius,
Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Rousseau, Hegel, etc.
3. ÆSTHETICS. This course, like the previous one, unites the historical
and theoretical treatment of æsthetic doctrines and results. It is
designed largely to aid students in the interpretation and criticism of
literature. It is a half-year course, and is followed by a half-year
course (given in the English Department) on the Principles and Methods
of Literary Criticism.
4. PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. Lectures, assigned readings and elementary
experiments, and demonstrations. There is established, as yet, no
separate psycho-physical laboratory, but the new-equipped physiological
laboratory of the University is, through the courtesy of the Professor
of Physiology, at the disposal of students in this line. Half-year
course.
5. SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. Lectures, readings, etc.,
designed to give an account of the chief methods employed and results
achieved in the modern historical and comparative study of religions.
And also an account of the principal theoretical interpretations of
religion. Half-year course.
III. ADVANCED COURSES.
1. KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. A study of Kant's masterpiece
at first-hand. This is accompanied by a shorter subsidiary course,
treating of the development of the Kantian system, and criticisms upon
it. Caird's Critical Philosophy of Kant, is read and discussed in
connection with the latter course. Half-year course.
2. HEGEL'S LOGIC. A study of Wallace's translation of the lesser Logic
of Hegel. Half-year course.
3. THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHODS. A lecture course taking up the
study of the Logic of Science, and intended to make the hearers
acquainted with the standpoint and spirit of such authors as Lotze,
Sigwart, Wundt, Mill, Jevons, Bradley, Bosanquet, and the modern
movement in logic generally. Half-year course.
4. PROBLEMS IN HIGHER ÆSTHETICS. A brief course for graduate students
in Æsthetics.
5. SEMINARY IN ETHICS. Discussion of the treatment of some main ethical
problems by the chief modern ethical writers.