two theories seem to coincide in the notion of a living and conscious
monad. We meet it when they are farthest apart! Thus, for Mme. Clémence
Royer, life and consciousness are everywhere, they are in the atom, and
from the beginning. There, in the great "romance of being," is a scene
which reappears almost always the same. As to the ultimate explanation
we have no great choice, and each of the hypotheses that we form almost
produces the other. All the value of a system of philosophy is really
in the help it lends to scientific curiosity or to the conduct of life.
* * * * *
M. ERNEST NAVILLE is one of those who cannot comprehend moral conduct
in life apart from spiritualism. He endeavors, accordingly, in a work
called _La Physique Moderne_, to prove that the study of the phenomena
of matter does not imply materialism and does not necessarily lead to
atheism. The argument of M. Naville is well worn. We shall grant to
him only that "it is necessary to avoid implicitly solving questions
by saying that we do not deal with them at all." On the whole, this
pledges to nothing. Practically, and in good faith, abstention is
nevertheless a solution.
* * * * *
I have now to point out _L'Esthétique d'Aristote et de ses
Successeurs_, by M. CH. BÉNARD, an _Etude sur Francois Bacon_ by M.
J. BARTHÉLEMY ST. HILAIRE, and _L'Anthropologie Criminelle et ses
Récents Progrès_, by M. CESARE LOMBROSO. M. Bénard is one of the good
old masters, who, what they do know, know well, and his book is one
of those that it is profitable to possess. The study of M. Barthélemy
St. Hilaire is followed by the Report on the Memoirs presented to
the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, which had proposed as a
subject "The Philosophy of Bacon." As to M. Lombroso, the celebrated
Italian criminologist, he has wished to reply to the objections that
have been made to his views, especially by the French medical alienists
at the Congress of 1889, and this is why he has written on this
occasion in our language: he supports by new facts the notion, hitherto
contested, of a "criminal type."
* * * * *
The last work of which I have to speak, is the _Souvenirs de M. Charles
Mismer_,[31] of which the third volume which recently appeared, has
for its title _Souvenirs de la Martinique et du Mexique pendant
l'Intervention Francaise_. There is in these volumes no express
philosophy, as this term is understood, but they are the work of an
observing, reflecting mind, and in these pages one sees a man living
and growing. In the course of his adventurous existence, M. Mismer,
already instructed by experience, by chance acquired knowledge of the
_Cours_ of August Comte; he became attached to it, and found there an
opening into sociology, a tie by which to link together his personal
ideas. He afterwards published several articles[32] in the Review
conducted by M. Littré, and he records to-day in his _Souvenirs_
the valuable observations which he has had occasion to make on very
different races of men and strongly opposed social states. He is one
of those whom the philosophic spirit has led to a philosophic life,
and the persons who read his work will thank me for having made them
acquainted with a unique and worthy character.
[31] In course of publication by Hachette. The other works
mentioned are published by Alcan.
[32] A part of these articles formed a volume entitled
_Principes Sociologiques_.
LUCIEN ARRÉAT.
BOOK REVIEWS.
THE WAY OUT OF AGNOSTICISM, or, THE PHILOSOPHY OF FREE RELIGION. By
_Francis Ellingwood Abbott_, Ph. D., Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
"This book aims to show that, in order to refute agnosticism and
establish enlightened theism, nothing is now necessary but to
philosophise that very scientific method which agnosticism barbarously
misunderstands and misuses ... It aims to develop the philosophy
which must (consciously or unconsciously) underlie any and every free
religious movement or institution: namely the philosophy which results
from the faithful application of the scientific method to the universe
as a whole."
The author further observes that "nothing is more common or more
confusing than a loose vague and indeterminate use of this phrase"
[scientific method] and that his object is "to give definiteness and
scientific precision to a much abused expression by showing that the
Scientific Method ... is neither more nor less than the SCIENTIFIC
THEORY OF UNIVERSALS APPLIED IN PRACTICE TO THE ACQUISITION OF
KNOWLEDGE."
Now whether or not the identification of the scientific method with
the practical application of the theory mentioned, will give the
much needed definiteness and precision, depends very much upon the
definiteness and precision of that theory itself.
The Scientific Theory of Universals, the author tells us, receives "no
adequate exposition" in this book. We are in possession, however, of
several other publications of the author, one of which—"Scientific
Theism"—is largely devoted to that purpose.
We will endeavor in a spirit of studious candor and fidelity, to state
as well as we can the essentials of that theory. We must protest,
however, that we cannot undertake to clear up the obscurity that must
necessarily involve any theory that is stated by the aid of such shifty
and inconstant terms, as objective, subjective, knowledge, relation,
existence, reality, etc., when the same are used without rigorous
definitions of the respective senses thereof that are intended.
The Scientific Theory of Universals affirms, that objectively real
individuals do exist, that objectively real genera do exist, that
objectively real relations do exist, that the objectively real genera
are in every instance constituted as such by that set of objectively
real relations uniquely appropriate to it; that in every instance of a
genus the objectively real relations "reproduce" themselves _in specie_
in the mind separate from aught of the objective realities that are
brought into relation by them, that these "reproduced" relations in the
mind constitute the subjective concept that is designated by the word
appropriate thereto, and that the single objective Universal is _at
once_ and integrally the objective genus, the subjective concept, and
the term or word. The Universe is the _summum genus_, concept and word,
which is, means, and expresses the correlated totality of all genera
together.
Dr. Abbott neglects reference to genera of purely mental existences,
and relies for proof of his theory upon the single argument that no
postulate is used that Science has not taken for granted, and proved by
the finding that the facts are in agreement with the postulates.
Now "the only possible justification of any theory is that it
makes things clear and reasonable." In this theory the central and
controlling position is that the objectively real relations invade
the mind in person and there obtain as the concept.—This doctrine
is so far as we can see the original idea of Dr. Abbott and must be
considered as his contribution to philosophy. It is by this that his
work is to be tested. Does the addition of this new postulate clear up
any obscurity?—Is this new postulate one of the assumptions of Science?
The truth about this whole matter of universals seems to be that it
belongs to the theory of notation primarily, and then to psychology and
ontology.
The mind proceeds to obtain correspondence with its alternative by
analysis and synthesis. The recognition of difference or otherness
is an indispensable condition of consciousness itself. One phase of
the recognition of difference is that activity called abstraction.
But along with difference comes the recognition of what is different
from difference, or likeness in all its grades and involutions. The
sense of relation, and the impulse of generalisation also arise,
and altogether these mentalities become effectual in virtue of some
system or some plexus of systems of notation. Long before man ever
began to reflect upon his mental operations and the means or tools
employed on that behalf, his mental manners and customs had become a
second mental nature. What warrant have we for taking these mental
manners and customs as the same are reflected in ordinary language as
adequate criteria for the world-problems, or even as representative
of the very constitutional laws of thought itself? Just as philosophy
found it profitable to postpone ontology to psychology, so it is
submitted may it again find it profitable to postpone psychology to a
study not merely of language but of notation generally, of which the
notation of mathematics will undoubtedly be found the most significant.
Here we have distinction, abstraction, assimilation, relation, and
generalisation carried on and carried out with unchecked thoroughness,
and systems of universals ascertained that not only correspond exactly
with every acquired and incoming item of our experience, but are also
in respect to one another continuous throughout the whole of their
range. It will be impossible for any one who once appreciates the
nature and competence of mathematical notation to regard any theory of
universals relating to ordinary language as a solution of its problem
that does not conform to the perfect models set in mathematics.
Dr. Abbott claims that _scientific method_ is neither more nor less
than the application of his theory. Granting that science makes the
same presumptions, can scientific method be said to be neither more
nor less than the application of his theory in any other sense than it
could be said to be neither more nor less than the application of the
theory of the existence of matter, energy, ether, and mind?
The scientific method consists not in its data but in the ways in which
it deals with its data, in other words it consists in its logic. It
observes and infers. It never stops to inquire if what it observes
are the "things in themselves" or only phenomena. That is an utterly
inconsequential question to it. It tests the validity of inductive and
hypothetical inferences by comparison with experience, and phenomenal
experience is every whit as good a criterion for it as any other.
It has a metaphysics of its own which is mathematics and which it
acknowledges as the supreme and unquestionable arbiter over whatever of
its presumptions and theories that arbiter may undertake to govern.
No philosophy that neglects to comprehend and apply the now supremely
important methods and results of mathematics can be anything but an
ineffectual attempt. No doubt this will seem to most of those who
affect philosophy a statement worthy only of scorn. Prof. Crystal,
at the close of his article on "Parallels," in the ninth edition of
the Encyclopedia Britannica "calls the attention of those who busy
themselves with mental philosophy" to that geometrical subject and its
affiliations "as one of the results of modern mathematical research
which they cannot afford to overlook." We can imagine with what an air
of conscious eminence one or more of our dilettanti philosophers may
have perused this suggestion, wondering what in the world parallels and
measurement have to do with philosophy.
But, nevertheless, so it is that a new departure in philosophy has been
made inevitable by the stupendous researches of modern mathematics and
this the philosophical world is just beginning to find out. It seems
to us, that the incomplete view taken by Dr. Abbott will prevent that
success for his theory which his most distinguished ability might
otherwise achieve, and which his devoted efforts well merit.
F. C. R.
RACES AND PEOPLES: LECTURES ON THE SCIENCE OF ETHNOGRAPHY. By _Daniel
G. Brinton_, A.M., M.D., etc., etc. New York: N. D. C. Hodges.
These lectures, which are dedicated to Mr. Horatio Hale, the veteran
philologist and ethnographer to the United States exploring expedition
in 1832-42, go over a very wide ground. The ground traversed is,
indeed, so extensive that Dr. Brinton feels bound to apologise for
being often superficial, as otherwise he could not have compressed into
so small a space the subjects of which he treats. This apology must
necessarily to some extent disarm the critic, although it should do
so only where a conclusion is not supported by sufficient evidence.
Where a statement made is not merely unsupported by, but is contrary
to, the best evidence available, the author must expect to be called
to account. We were prepared to act on this principle, thinking that
possibly confession like charity would be found to cover a multitude
of sins, but we must admit that with certain exceptions, the chief of
which are to be found in the lecture on "the psychical elements of
Ethnography," we were mistaken.
We do not propose to follow the author in his classification of the
varieties of mankind, or in his views of the origin of the various
races into which they are divided, both of which will meet with keen
opposition from most of the anthropologists of Western Europe, although
those of Germany may receive them with more favor. We are concerned
chiefly with the opening and the closing chapters of the work before
us, from which we may draw some conclusions bearing on the race
question, that disturbs the minds of so many people in this country.
Dr. Brinton remarks that the physical traits of man are correlated to
the physiological functions in such a manner as profoundly to influence
the destiny of nations. He adds that from the physical point of view,
the pure white is weaker than the dark races, worse prepared for the
combat of life, with inferior viability; but in the white this is
more than compensated by the development of the nervous system and
intellectual power. The white "can bear greater mental strain than any
other race, and the activity of his mind supplies him with means to
overcome the inferiority of his body, and thus places him at the head
of the whole species." It might be supposed that a mixture of races
having these different qualities, would result in the formation of a
hybrid race, superior to either of the parent stocks.
Dr. Brinton, who is strongly opposed to the practice of miscegenation,
endorses the opinion that the offspring of a cross between the white
and the black races are deficient in physical vigor, and that such
hybrids gradually die out. He admits, however, that it was not so
within the African area in early times, and he suggests that special
causes are now at work to affect the results of race-mixture. One of
these is the fact that the white blood is derived exclusively from the
father, and the dark blood exclusively from the mother. Now, if it be
true, as is supposed, that physical qualities are derived chiefly from
the father and the psychical qualities chiefly from the mother, we
may reasonably expect, as is indeed recognised, that the children of
such unions will be physically superior to members of the black stock,
although inferior to those of the white race. It is admitted, moreover,
that mulattoes are, as a rule, intellectually superior to pure negroes;
so that miscegenation is undoubtedly of relative advantage to the
immediate offspring, whatever may be its result on their descendants.
What Dr. Brinton and other writers of the same opinion object to,
however, is the deterioration of the white stock. If there was any
reason to believe this possible, the objection would have weight. But
it supposes miscegenation to become general, which, in the first place,
is an event which could never happen, unless the women of this country
descended to the level of a Messalina. And in the second place, Dr.
Brinton admits that "in the earlier conditions of social life, no
such debility attended the crossing of the Eurafrican [white race]
and African race as seems at present to be the case." It is possible,
therefore, that if the mixture of the two races became general, and
were regarded as perfectly legitimate, the present physical and
intellectual debility attending such unions might disappear. We do not
advocate miscegenation, but we wish to point out, that those who oppose
it under the present limitations of our knowledge, do so either on
insufficient grounds, or because they are influenced, consciously or
unconsciously, by sentimental considerations.
We are glad to see that Dr. Brinton does not endorse the views so
prevalent among English Ethnologists as to the existence of "communal
marriage" among the lower races of mankind. In his recent work on "The
Origin and Development of Marriage and Kinship," Mr. C. Staniland Wake
has dealt exhaustively with that subject, and shown that the "marriage
law" is fully recognised among the most savage peoples. We cannot
accept Dr. Brinton's statements where he says that the Australian
aborigines are led to associate "by much the same motives as prompt
buffaloes to gather in a herd," or when he speaks of the "rare" custom
of polyandry, or declares that mutual affection has no existence among
the Australians and many other tribes, and that romantic love is
practically absent among the African and Mongolian races. Our author
is equally at fault when he says that no Asiatic nation respects truth
telling, and that "the idea of independent personal ownership does
not exist among them." These errors, and such misstatements as that
"the excellent results of the extension of the Slavonian supremacy in
Central Asia have been studiously ignored by British writers," which
are due to Dr. Brinton's preference for Continental authorities, are
serious blemishes. Nevertheless, his book is an excellent one, and we
can heartily recommend it as an introductory Manual of Ethnology.
Ω.
STUDIES IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. With a Chapter On Christian
Unity in America. By _J. Macbride Sterrett_, D. D., Professor of
Ethics and Apologetics in Seabury Divinity School. New York: D.
Appleton & Co.
These studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, except Chapters III
and VIII, claim to be something more than a mere expository paraphrase
of Hegel, although following Hegel's argument in Chapter IV. The
author's purpose is strictly theological and _apologetic_. His work
is written with faith, and in the interest of "the faith." In fact,
in England and America the theological rather than philosophical
interest taken in the study of Hegel has mainly been called forth
by the supposed intimate relation of his thought to religion and to
Christianity regarded as the absolute, full, and final religion. To
this pseudo-Hegelian school of England and America, Hegel, above all,
is radically a _theologian_; all his thoughts beginning and ending in
that of divinity. It regards Hegel's Philosophy of Religion as the
very heart of his thinking, as "the highest bloom of his philosophy."
It is supposed to reconcile Christian theology with the modern science
of religion (or comparative religion), with anthropology, and with the
classification of positive, pre-Christian religions. American students
of Hegelian philosophy, as a rule, do not desire to be regarded as
Hegelians. "Bound to swear in the name of no master in philosophy,
and only in the name of Christ in religion, would better characterise
them all. They are simply using his _method_ ... they are getting
great help, and looking for still greater from the method, which was
greater than even Hegel's own employment of it." Hegel's method is thus
declared to be greater than himself, and is received like an article
of faith. In these studies, while freely discussing and criticising
all that Hegel has thought or said upon the subject of the philosophy
of religion, the author entirely omits to enter into a critical
discussion of precisely the most important point; namely, the absolute
value of Hegel's philosophical _method_. He overlooks the interesting
fact, that all that is permanently true and great in Hegel was really
reached by Hegel himself, and understood, from a point of view that
was _diametrically opposed to his own accepted method_; in glaring
contrast to his evolution of the logical idea, and to his theory of
"pure thought" or "reines Denken." "To reconcile reason with religion,
by finding reason in religion and religion in reason," is doubtless a
correct Hegelian statement, yet, at the same time, it only expresses an
exclusive, one-sided aspect of the system.
There was a time when the Hegelian system ranked as a foremost
intellectual phenomenon. It was, perhaps, the highest that philosophy
ever had achieved; but its manifest fault consisted in its being
a purely philosophical and _a priori_ system. A philosophy that
existed in external opposition to the sciences remained only an empty
abstraction, just as force when severed from the phenomenon, or Deity
when opposed to the outside world. Hegel's philosophy ultimately
recognised, that force only is or exists in the phenomenon; that the
internal itself constitutes the external, the Deity is only present in
the universe, the infinite in the finite. Any philosophy proclaiming
all this must be said to have succumbed with a vengeance to its own
dialectic process.
A philosophy of this kind would seem to have signed its own
death-warrant—or according to the popular German saying, "hat
selbst den Stab über sich gebrochen!" And thus it really happened to
Hegelianism—we mean to _genuine German_ Hegelianism. From that moment
it forfeited its claim to be regarded as the highest truth. It was
compelled to step forth out of its one-sided exclusiveness, out of
its opposition to empirical science. Hegelianism was not expected to
effect any kind of compromise or reconciliation with empirical science,
because any yielding on its own part would have been illogical, and
could only have brought about a momentary truce, but no lasting peace.
On the contrary, Hegelianism had to suffer the infinitely bitter pang
of self-immolation. It had deliberately to commit suicide, in order
thereupon to be welded with empirical science into a much higher and
more comprehensive _unity_. In other words,—in fact in _Hegel's own
words_—"when the old principle thus reappears, it is no longer what
it was before, for it is changed and purified by the higher element
into which it is now taken up."
The Hegelian system was thus compelled to acknowledge, that not only
must philosophy agree with experience, but moreover, the creation of
a philosophical science premises as an indispensable condition the
hypothesis of an empirical science, which itself implies that the ideas
of space, of time, of movement, and of matter cannot be obtained _a
priori_,—that is before the experience of the things themselves,—or
be purely evolved, according to the Hegelian method, from the logical
idea. To attempt to reconcile reason with religion by finding reason
in religion and religion in reason, is simply to evolve _a priori_
a philosophy of religion from the logical idea. This is believed to
be possible by means of the mystic factors—"the Hegelian method"
and the "Logos." The original contents of eternal reason itself—of
the _logos_—are supposed to exist within our mind in a form that
constitutes our inmost truth; our spontaneous logical thinking
coincides with the innate eternal reason in form and contents, and thus
attains to the full revelation of itself.
But all this is purely an hypothesis, or a kind of belief in reason,
"der Glaube an die Vernunft!" Hegel himself in conclusion was forced to
admit that philosophy must closely observe the method of nature. (See
Encycl. III, 22.) The editor of Hegel's Philosophy of History (Gans,
page XV) says, "Hegel did not wish to personate the deity that creates
or evolves history, but to be a man who contemplates created rational
history"; and Hegel himself says (page 13), "we must take history as it
is; we have to proceed according to an historical, empirical method.
... Only from the study of history itself are we allowed to infer
that historical events are really rational events." And in Hegel's
"Naturphilosophie," (page 24,) and elsewhere there are to be found
perfectly analogous passages.