We are now to consider upon what the preservation of governments in

general and of each state in particular depends; and, in the first

place, it is evident that if we are right in the causes we have assigned

for their destruction, we know also the means of their preservation; for

things contrary produce contraries: but destruction and preservation are

contrary to each other. In well-tempered governments it requires as much

care as anything whatsoever, that nothing be done contrary to law: and

this ought chiefly to be attended to in matters of small consequence;

for an illegality that approaches insensibly, approaches secretly, as in

a family small expenses continually repeated consume a man's income;

for the understanding is deceived thereby, as by this false argument; if

every part is little, then the whole is little: now, this in one sense

is true, in another is false, for the whole and all the parts together

are large, though made up of small parts. The first therefore of

anything is what the state ought to guard against. In the next place,

no credit ought to be given to those who endeavour to deceive the people

with false pretences; for they will be [1308a] confuted by facts. The

different ways in which they will attempt to do this have been already

mentioned. You may often perceive both aristocracies and oligarchies

continuing firm, not from the stability of their forms of government,

but from the wise conduct of the magistrates, both towards those who

have a part in the management of public affairs, and those also who

have not: towards those who have not, by never injuring them; and also

introducing those who are of most consequence amongst them into office;

nor disgracing those who are desirous of honour; or encroaching on the

property of individuals; towards those who have, by behaving to each

other upon an equality; for that equality which the favourers of a

democracy desire to have established in the state is not only just,

but convenient also, amongst those who are of the same rank: for which

reason, if the administration is in the hands of many, those rules which

are established in democracies will be very useful; as to let no one

continue in office longer than six months: that all those who are of

the same rank may have their turn; for between these there is a sort

of democracy: for which reason demagogues are most likely to arise up

amongst them, as we have already mentioned: besides, by this means both

aristocracies and democracies will be the less liable to be corrupted

into dynasties, because it will not be so easy for those who are

magistrates for a little to do as much mischief as they could in a

long time: for it is from hence that tyrannies arise in democracies

and oligarchies; for either those who are most powerful in each state

establish a tyranny, as the demagogues in the one, the dynasties in the

other, or the chief magistrates who have been long in power. Governments

are sometimes preserved not only by having the means of their corruption

at a great distance, but also by its being very near them; for those who

are alarmed at some impending evil keep a stricter hand over the state;

for which reason it is necessary for those who have the guardianship of

the constitution to be able to awaken the fears of the people, that they

may preserve it, and not like a night-guard to be remiss in protecting

the state, but to make the distant danger appear at hand. Great care

ought also to be used to endeavour to restrain the quarrels and disputes

of the nobles by laws, as well as to prevent those who are not already

engaged in them from taking a part therein; for to perceive an evil

at its very first approach is not the lot of every one, but of the

politician. To prevent any alteration taking place in an oligarchy or

free state on account of the census, if that happens to continue the

same while the quantity of money is increased, it will be useful to take

a general account of the whole amount of it in former times, to compare

it with the present, and to do this every year in those cities where the

census is yearly, [1308b] in larger communities once in three or five

years; and if the whole should be found much larger or much less than it

was at the time when the census was first established in the state,

let there be a law either to extend or contract it, doing both these

according to its increase or decrease; if it increases making the census

larger, if it decreases smaller: and if this latter is not done in

oligarchies and free states, you will have a dynasty arise in the one,

an oligarchy in the other: if the former is not, free states will

be changed into democracies, and oligarchies into free states or

democracies. It is a general maxim in democracies, oligarchies,

monarchies, and indeed in all governments, not to let any one acquire a

rank far superior to the rest of the community, but rather to endeavour

to confer moderate honours for a continuance than great ones for a short

time; for these latter spoil men, for it is not every one who can bear

prosperity: but if this rule is not observed, let not those honours

which were conferred all at once be all at once taken away, but rather

by degrees. But, above all things, let this regulation be made by the

law, that no one shall have too much power, either by means of his

fortune or friends; but if he has, for his excess therein, let it be

contrived that he shall quit the country. Now, as many persons promote

innovations, that they may enjoy their own particular manner of living,

there ought to be a particular officer to inspect the manners of every

one, and see that these are not contrary to the genius of the state

in which he lives, whether it may be an oligarchy, a democracy, or any

other form of government; and, for the same reason, those should be

guarded against who are most prosperous in the city: the means of doing

which is by appointing those who are otherwise to the business and the

offices of the state. I mean, to oppose men of account to the common

people, the poor to the rich, and to blend both these into one body, and

to increase the numbers of those who are in the middle rank; and

this will prevent those seditions which arise from an inequality of

condition. But above all, in every state it is necessary, both by the

laws and every other method possible, to prevent those who are employed

by the public from being venal, and this particularly in an oligarchy;

for then the people will not be so much displeased from seeing

themselves excluded from a share in the government (nay, they will

rather be glad to have leisure to attend their private affairs) as at

suspecting that the officers of the state steal the public money, then

indeed they are afflicted with double concern, both because they are

deprived of the honours of the state, and pillaged by those who enjoy

them. There is one method of blending together a democracy and an

aristocracy, [1309a] if office brought no profit; by which means both

the rich and the poor will enjoy what they desire; for to admit all to

a share in the government is democratical; that the rich should be

in office is aristocratical. This must be done by letting no public

employment whatsoever be attended with any emolument; for the poor will

not desire to be in office when they can get nothing by it, but had

rather attend to their own affairs: but the rich will choose it, as

they want nothing of the community. Thus the poor will increase their

fortunes by being wholly employed in their own concerns; and the

principal part of the people will not be governed by the lower sort.

To prevent the exchequer from being defrauded, let all public money be

delivered out openly in the face of the whole city, and let copies of

the accounts be deposited in the different wards tribes, and divisions.

But, as the magistrates are to execute their offices without any

advantages, the law ought to provide proper honours for those who

execute them well. In democracies also it is necessary that the rich

should be protected, by not permitting their lands to be divided, nor

even the produce of them, which in some states is done unperceivably. It

would be also better if the people would prevent them when they offer to

exhibit a number of unnecessary and yet expensive public entertainments

of plays, music, processions, and the like. In an oligarchy it is

necessary to take great care of the poor, and allot them public

employments which are gainful; and, if any of the rich insult them, to

let their punishment be severer than if they insulted one of their own

rank; and to let estates pass by affinity, and not gift: nor to permit

any person to have more than one; for by this means property will be

more equally divided, and the greater part of the poor get into better

circumstances. It is also serviceable in a democracy and an oligarchy

to allot those who take no part in public affairs an equality or a

preference in other things; the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an

oligarchy: but still all the principal offices in the state to be filled

only by those who are best qualified to discharge them.

CHAPTER IX

There are three qualifications necessary for those who fill the

first departments in government; first of all, an affection for the

established constitution; second place, abilities every way completely

equal to the business of their office; in the third, virtue and justice

correspondent to the nature of that particular state they are placed in;

for if justice is not the same in all states, it is evident that there

must be different species thereof. There may be some doubt, when all

these qualifications do not in the same persons, in what manner the

choice shall be made; as for instance, suppose that one person is

an accomplished general, but a bad man and no friend to the [1309b]

constitution; another is just and a friend to it, which shall one

prefer? we should then consider of two qualities, which of them the

generality possess in a greater degree, which in a less; for which

reason in the choice of a general we should regard his courage more than

his virtue as the more uncommon quality; as there are fewer capable of

conducting an army than there are good men: but, to protect the state

or manage the finances, the contrary rule should be followed; for these

require greater virtue than the generality are possessed of, but only

that knowledge which is common to all. It may be asked, if a man has

abilities equal to his appointment in the state, and is affectionate to

the constitution, what occasion is there for being virtuous, since

these two things alone are sufficient to enable him to be useful to

the public? it is, because those who possess those qualities are often

deficient in prudence; for, as they often neglect their own affairs,

though they know them and love themselves, so nothing will prevent their

serving the public in the same manner. In short, whatsoever the laws

contain which we allow to be useful to the state contributes to its

preservation: but its first and principal support is (as has been often

insisted upon) to have the number of those who desire to preserve it

greater than those who wish to destroy it. Above all things that ought

not to be forgotten which many governments now corrupted neglect;

namely, to preserve a mean. For many things seemingly favourable to a

democracy destroy a democracy, and many things seemingly favourable to

an oligarchy destroy an oligarchy. Those who think this the only virtue

extend it to excess, not considering that as a nose which varies a

little from perfect straightness, either towards a hook nose or a

flat one, may yet be beautiful and agreeable to look at; but if this

particularity is extended beyond measure, first of all the properties of

the part is lost, but at last it can hardly be admitted to be a nose at

all, on account of the excess of the rise or sinking: thus it is with

other parts of the human body; so also the same thing is true with

respect to states; for both an oligarchy and a democracy may something

vary from their most perfect form and yet be well constituted; but if

any one endeavours to extend either of them too far, at first he will

make the government the worse for it, but at last there will be no

government at all remaining. The lawgiver and the politician therefore

should know well what preserves and what destroys a democracy or an

oligarchy, for neither the one nor the other can possibly continue

without rich and poor: but that whenever an entire equality of

circumstances [1310a] prevails, the state must necessarily become of

another form; so that those who destroy these laws, which authorise an

inequality in property, destroy the government. It is also an error in

democracies for the demagogues to endeavour to make the common people

superior to the laws; and thus by setting them at variance with the

rich, dividing one city into two; whereas they ought rather to speak

in favour of the rich. In oligarchies, on the contrary, it is wrong to

support those who are in administration against the people. The oaths

also which they take in an oligarchy ought to be contrary to what they

now are; for, at present, in some places they swear, "I will be adverse

to the common people, and contrive all I can against them;" whereas they

ought rather to suppose and pretend the contrary; expressing in their

oaths, that they will not injure the people. But of all things which I

have mentioned, that which contributes most to preserve the state is,

what is now most despised, to educate your children for the state; for

the most useful laws, and most approved by every statesman, will be of

no service if the citizens are not accustomed to and brought up in

the principles of the constitution; of a democracy, if that is by law

established; of an oligarchy, if that is; for if there are bad morals

in one man, there are in the city. But to educate a child fit for the

state, it must not be done in the manner which would please either those

who have the power in an oligarchy or those who desire a democracy, but

so as they may be able to conduct either of these forms of governments.

But now the children of the magistrates in an oligarchy are brought up

too delicately, and the children of the poor hardy with exercise

and labour; so that they are both desirous of and able to promote

innovations. In democracies of the purest form they pursue a method

which is contrary to their welfare; the reason of which is, that they

define liberty wrong: now, there are two things which seem to be the

objects of a democracy, that the people in general should possess the

supreme power, and all enjoy freedom; for that which is just seems to

be equal, and what the people think equal, that is a law: now, their

freedom and equality consists in every one's doing what they please:

that is in such a democracy every one may live as he likes; "as his

inclination guides," in the words of Euripides: but this is wrong, for

no one ought to think it slavery to live in subjection to government,

but protection. Thus I have mentioned the causes of corruption in

different states, and the means of their preservation.

CHAPTER X

It now remains that we speak of monarchies, their causes of corruption,

and means of preservation; and indeed almost the same things which have

been said of other governments happen to kingdoms and tyrannies; for a

kingdom partakes of an aristocracy, a tyranny of the worst species of an

oligarchy and democracy; for which reason it is the worst that man

can submit to, as being composed of two, both of which are bad, and

collectively retains all the corruptions and all the defects of both

these states. These two species of monarchies arise from principles

contrary to each other: a kingdom is formed to protect the better sort

of people against the multitude, and kings are appointed out of those,

who are chosen either for their superior virtue and actions flowing from

virtuous principles, or else from their noble descent; but a tyrant is

chosen out of the meanest populace; an enemy to the better sort, that

the common people may not be oppressed by them. That this is true

experience convinces us; for the generality of tyrants were indeed mere

demagogues, who gained credit with the people by oppressing the nobles.

Some tyrannies were established in this manner after the cities were

considerably enlarged--others before that time, by kings who exceeded

the power which their country allowed them, from a desire of governing

despotically: others were founded by those who were elected to the

superior offices in the state; for formerly the people appointed

officers for life, who came to be at the head of civil and religious

affairs, and these chose one out of their body in whom the supreme power

over all the magistrates was placed. By all these means it was easy

to establish a tyranny, if they chose it; for their power was ready at

hand, either by their being kings, or else by enjoying the honours of

the state; thus Phidon at Argos and other tyrants enjoyed originally the

kingly power; Phalaris and others in Ionia, the honours of the state.

Pansetius at Leontium, Cypselus at Corinth, Pisistratus at Athens,

Dionysius at Syracuse, and others, acquired theirs by having been

demagogues. A kingdom, as we have said, partakes much of the nature of

an aristocracy, and is bestowed according to worth, as either virtue,

family, beneficent actions, or these joined with power; for those who

have been benefactors to cities and states, or have it in their powers

to be so, have acquired this honour, and those who have prevented a

people from falling into slavery by war, as Codrus, or those who have

freed them from it, as Cyrus, or the founders of cities, or settlers of

colonies, as the kings of Sparta, Macedon, and Molossus. A king desires

to be the guardian of his people, that those who have property may be

secure in the possession of it, and that the people in general meet with

no injury; but a tyrant, as has been often said, has no regard to the

common good, except for his own advantage; his only object is pleasure,

but a king's is virtue: what a tyrant therefore is ambitious of

engrossing is wealth, but a king rather honour. The guards too of a king

are citizens, a tyrant's foreigners.

That a tyranny contains all that is bad both in a democracy and an

oligarchy is evident; with an oligarchy it has for its end gain, as the

only means of providing the tyrant with guards and the luxuries of life;

like that it places no confidence in the people; and therefore deprives

them of the use of arms: it is also common to them both to persecute the

populace, to drive them out of the city and their own habitations. With

a democracy it quarrels with the nobles, and destroys them both

publicly and privately, or drives them into banishment, as rivals and

an impediment to the government; hence naturally arise conspiracies

both amongst those who desire to govern and those who desire not to be

slaves; hence arose Periander's advice to Thrasybulus to take off the

tallest stalks, hinting thereby, that it was necessary to make away with

the eminent citizens. We ought then in reason, as has been already

said, to account for the changes which arise in a monarchy from the

same causes which produce them in other states: for, through injustice

received, fear, and contempt, many of those who are under a monarchical

government conspire against it; but of all species of injustice,

injurious contempt has most influence on them for that purpose:

sometimes it is owing to their being deprived of their private fortunes.

The dissolution too of a kingdom and a tyranny are generally the same;

for monarchs abound in wealth and honour, which all are desirous to

obtain. Of plots: some aim at the life of those who govern, others at

their government; the first arises from hatred to their persons; which

hatred may be owing to many causes, either of which will be sufficient

to excite their anger, and the generality of those who are under the

influence of that passion will join in a conspiracy, not for the sake

of their own advancement, but for revenge. Thus the plot against

the children of Pisistratus arose from their injurious treatment of

Harmodius's sister, and insulting him also; for Harmodius resenting the

injury done to his sister, and Aristogiton the injury done to Harmodius.

Periander the tyrant of Ambracia also lost his life by a conspiracy, for

some improper liberties he took with a boy in his cups: and Philip was

slain by Pausanias for neglecting to revenge him of the affront he had

received from Attains; as was Amintas the Little by Darda, for insulting

him on account of his age; and the eunuch by Evagoras the Cyprian in

revenge for having taken his son's wife away from him....

Many also who have had their bodies scourged with stripes have, through

resentment, either killed those who caused them to be inflicted or

conspired against them, even when they had kingly power, as at Mitylene

Megacles, joining with his friends, killed the Penthelidee, who used

to go about striking those they met with clubs. Thus, in later times,

Smendes killed Penthilus for whipping him and dragging him away from

his wife. Decamnichus also was the chief cause of the conspiracy against

Archelaus, for he urged others on: the occasion of his resentment was

his having delivered him to Euripides the poet to be scourged; for

Euripides was greatly offended with him for having said something of the

foulness of his breath. And many others have been killed or conspired

against on the same account. Fear too is a cause which produces the

same effects, as well in monarchies as in other states: thus Artabanes

conspired against Xerxes through fear of punishment for having hanged

Darius according to his orders, whom he supposed he intended to pardon,

as the order was given at supper-time. Some kings also have been [1312a]

dethroned and killed in consequence of the contempt they were held in by

the people; as some one conspired against Sardanapalus, having seen him

spinning with his wife, if what is related of him is true, or if not of

him, it may very probably be true of some one else. Dion also conspired

against Dionysius the Younger, seeing his subjects desirous of a

conspiracy, and that he himself was always drunk: and even a man's

friends will do this if they despise him; for from the confidence he

places in them, they think that they shall not be found out. Those

also who think they shall gain his throne will conspire against a king

through contempt; for as they are powerful themselves, and despise the

danger, on account of their own strength, they will readily attempt it.

Thus a general at the head of his army will endeavour to dethrone the

monarch, as Cyrus did Astyages, despising both his manner of life and

his forces; his forces for want of action, his life for its effeminacy:

thus Suthes, the Thracian, who was general to Amadocus, conspired

against him. Sometimes more than one of these causes will excite men

to enter into conspiracies, as contempt and desire of gain; as in the

instance of Mithridates against Ariobarzanes. Those also who are of a

bold disposition, and have gained military honours amongst kings, will

of all others be most like to engage in sedition; for strength and

courage united inspire great bravery: whenever, therefore, these join

in one person, he will be very ready for conspiracies, as he will easily

conquer. Those who conspire against a tyrant through love of glory

and honour have a different motive in view from what I have already

mentioned; for, like all others who embrace danger, they have only glory

and honour in view, and think, not as some do, of the wealth and pomp

they may acquire, but engage in this as they would in any other noble

action, that they may be illustrious and distinguished, and destroy a

tyrant, not to succeed in his tyranny, but to acquire renown. No doubt

but the number of those who act upon this principle is small, for we

must suppose they regard their own safety as nothing in case they should

not succeed, and must embrace the opinion of Dion (which few can do)

when he made war upon Dionysius with a very few troops; for he said,

that let the advantage he made be ever so little it would satisfy him to

have gained it; and that, should it be his lot to die the moment he had

gained footing in his country, he should think his death sufficiently

glorious. A tyranny also is exposed to the same destruction as all other

states are, from too powerful neighbours: for it is evident, that an

opposition of principles will make them desirous of subverting it;

and what they desire, all who can, do: and there is a principle of

opposition in one state to another, as a democracy against a tyranny, as

says Hesiod, "a potter against a potter;" for the extreme of a democracy

is a tyranny; a kingly power against an aristocracy, from their

different forms of government--for which reason the Lacedaemonians

destroyed many tyrannies; as did the Syracusians during the prosperity

of their state. Nor are they only destroyed from without, but also

from within, when those who have no share in the power bring about a

revolution, as happened to Gelon, and lately to Dionysius; to the first,

by means of Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiero, who nattered Gelon's

son, and induced him to lead a life of pleasure, that he himself might

govern; but the family joined together and endeavoured to support the

tyranny and expel Thrasybulus; but those whom they made of their party

seized the opportunity and expelled the whole family. Dion made war

against his relation Dionysius, and being assisted by the people, first

expelled and then killed him. As there are two causes which chiefly

induce men to conspire against tyrants, hatred and contempt, one of

these, namely hatred, seems inseparable from them. Contempt also is

often the cause of their destruction: for though, for instance, those

who raised themselves to the supreme power generally preserved it; but

those who received it from them have, to speak truth, almost immediately

all of them lost it; for, falling into an effeminate way of life, they

soon grew despicable, and generally fell victims to conspiracies. Part

of their hatred may be very fitly ascribed to anger; for in some cases

this is their motive to action: for it is often a cause which impels

them to act more powerfully than hatred, and they proceed with greater

obstinacy against those whom they attack, as this passion is not under

the direction of reason. Many persons also indulge this passion through

contempt; which occasioned the fall of the Pisistratidae and many

others. But hatred is more powerful than anger; for anger is accompanied

with grief, which prevents the entrance of reason; but hatred is free

from it. In short, whatever causes may be assigned as the destruction

of a pure oligarchy unmixed with any other government and an extreme

democracy, the same may be applied to a tyranny; for these are divided

tyrannies.

Kingdoms are seldom destroyed by any outward attack; for which reason

they are generally very stable; but they have many causes of subversion

within; of which two are the principal; one is when those who are

in power [1313a] excite a sedition, the other when they endeavour to

establish a tyranny by assuming greater power than the law gives them.

A kingdom, indeed, is not what we ever see erected in our times, but

rather monarchies and tyrannies; for a kingly government is one that

is voluntarily submitted to, and its supreme power admitted upon great

occasions: but where many are equal, and there are none in any respect

so much better than another as to be qualified for the greatness and

dignity of government over them, then these equals will not willingly

submit to be commanded; but if any one assumes the government, either by

force or fraud, this is a tyranny. To what we have already said we shall

add, the causes of revolutions in an hereditary kingdom. One of these

is, that many of those who enjoy it are naturally proper objects of

contempt only: another is, that they are insolent while their power is

not despotic; but they possess kingly honours only. Such a state is soon

destroyed; for a king exists but while the people are willing to obey,

as their submission to him is voluntary, but to a tyrant involuntary.

These and such-like are the causes of the destruction of monarchies.

CHAPTER XI

Monarchies, in a word, are preserved by means contrary to what I have

already mentioned as the cause of their destruction; but to speak to

each separately: the stability of a kingdom will depend upon the power

of the king's being kept within moderate bounds; for by how much the

less extensive his power is, by so much the longer will his government

continue; for he will be less despotic and more upon an equality of

condition with those he governs; who, on that account, will envy him the

less.

It was on this account that the kingdom of the Molossi continued so

long; and the Lacedaemonians from their government's being from the

beginning divided into two parts, and also by the moderation introduced

into the other parts of it by Theopompus, and his establishment of the

ephori; for by taking something from the power he increased the duration

of the kingdom, so that in some measure he made it not less, but bigger;

as they say he replied to his wife, who asked him if he was not ashamed

to deliver down his kingdom to his children reduced from what he

received it from his ancestors? No, says he, I give it him more lasting.

Tyrannies are preserved two ways most opposite to each other, one of

which is when the power is delegated from one to the other, and in this

manner many tyrants govern in their states. Report says that Periander

founded many of these. There are also many of them to be met with

amongst the Persians. What has been already mentioned is as conducive

as anything can be to preserve a tyranny; namely, to keep down those who

are of an aspiring disposition, to take off those who will not submit,

to allow no public meals, no clubs, no education, nothing at all, but

to guard against everything that gives rise to high spirits or mutual

confidence; nor to suffer the learned meetings of those who are at

leisure to hold conversation with each other; and to endeavour by every

means possible to keep all the people strangers to each other; for

knowledge increases mutual confidence; and to oblige all strangers to

appear in public, and to live near the city-gate, that all their actions

may be sufficiently seen; for those who are kept like slaves seldom

entertain any noble thoughts: in short, to imitate everything which the

Persians and barbarians do, for they all contribute to support slavery;

and to endeavour to know what every one who is under their power does

and says; and for this purpose to employ spies: such were those women

whom the Syracusians called potagogides Hiero also used to send out

listeners wherever there was any meeting or conversation; for the people

dare not speak with freedom for fear of such persons; and if any one

does, there is the less chance of its being concealed; and to endeavour

that the whole community should mutually accuse and come to blows with

each other, friend with friend, the commons with the nobles, and the

rich with each other. It is also advantageous for a tyranny that all

those who are under it should be oppressed with poverty, that they may

not be able to compose a guard; and that, being employed in procuring

their daily bread, they may have no leisure to conspire against their

tyrants. The Pyramids of Egypt are a proof of this, and the votive

edifices of the Cyposelidse, and the temple of Jupiter Olympus, built by

the Pisistratidae, and the works of Polycrates at Samos; for all these

produced one end, the keeping the people poor. It is necessary also to

multiply taxes, as at Syracuse; where Dionysius in the space of five

years collected all the private property of his subjects into his own

coffers. A tyrant also should endeavour to engage his subjects in a war,

that they may have employment and continually depend upon their general.

A king is preserved by his friends, but a tyrant is of all persons the

man who can place no confidence in friends, as every one has it in his

desire and these chiefly in their power to destroy him. All these things

also which are done in an extreme democracy should be done in a tyranny,

as permitting great licentiousness to the women in the house, that they

may reveal their husbands' secrets; and showing great indulgence to

slaves also for the same reason; for slaves and women conspire not

against tyrants: but when they are treated with kindness, both of them

are abettors of tyrants, and extreme democracies also; and the people

too in such a state desire to be despotic. For which reason flatterers

are in repute in both these: the demagogue in the democracy, for he is

the proper flatterer of the people; among tyrants, he who will servilely

adapt himself to their humours; for this is the business of [1314a]

flatterers. And for this reason tyrants always love the worst of

wretches, for they rejoice in being flattered, which no man of a liberal

spirit will submit to; for they love the virtuous, but flatter none. Bad

men too are fit for bad purposes; "like to like," as the proverb says. A

tyrant also should show no favour to a man of worth or a freeman; for he

should think, that no one deserved to be thought these but himself; for

he who supports his dignity, and is a friend to freedom, encroaches upon

the superiority and the despotism of the tyrant: such men, therefore,

they naturally hate, as destructive to their government. A tyrant

also should rather admit strangers to his table and familiarity than

citizens, as these are his enemies, but the others have no design

against him. These and such-like are the supports of a tyranny, for

it comprehends whatsoever is wicked. But all these things may be

comprehended in three divisions, for there are three objects which a

tyranny has in view; one of which is, that the citizens should be of

poor abject dispositions; for such men never propose to conspire against

any one. The second is, that they should have no confidence in each

other; for while they have not this, the tyrant is safe enough from

destruction. For which reason they are always at enmity with those of

merit, as hurtful to their government; not only as they scorn to be

governed despotically, but also because they can rely upon each other's

fidelity, and others can rely upon theirs, and because they will not

inform against their associates, nor any one else. The third is, that

they shall be totally without the means of doing anything; for no one

undertakes what is impossible for him to perform: so that without power

a tyranny can never be destroyed. These, then, are the three objects

which the inclinations of tyrants desire to see accomplished; for all

their tyrannical plans tend to promote one of these three ends, that

their people may neither have mutual confidence, power, nor spirit.

This, then, is one of the two methods of preserving tyrannies: the other

proceeds in a way quite contrary to what has been already described,

and which may be discerned from considering to what the destruction of

a kingdom is owing; for as one cause of that is, making the government

approach near to a tyranny, so the safety of a tyranny consists in

making the government nearly kingly; preserving only one thing, namely

power, that not only the willing, but the unwilling also, must be

obliged to submit; for if this is once lost, the tyranny is at an end.

This, then, as the foundation, must be preserved: in other particulars

carefully do and affect to seem like a king; first, appear to pay a

great attention [1314b] to what belongs to the public; nor make such

profuse presents as will offend the people; while they are to supply

the money out of the hard labour of their own hands, and see it given

in profusion to mistresses, foreigners, and fiddlers; keeping an exact

account both of what you receive and pay; which is a practice some

tyrants do actually follow, by which means they seem rather fathers of

families than tyrants: nor need you ever fear the want of money while

you have the supreme power of the state in your own hands. It is also

much better for those tyrants who quit their kingdom to do this than to

leave behind them money they have hoarded up; for their regents will

be much less desirous of making innovations, and they are more to be

dreaded by absent tyrants than the citizens; for such of them as he

suspects he takes with him, but these regents must be left behind. He

should also endeavour to appear to collect such taxes and require such

services as the exigencies of the state demand, that whenever they are

wanted they may be ready in time of war; and particularly to take care

that he appear to collect and keep them not as his own property, but the

public's. His appearance also should not be severe, but respectable, so

that he should inspire those who approach him with veneration and not

fear; but this will not be easily accomplished if he is despised. If,

therefore, he will not take the pains to acquire any other, he ought to

endeavour to be a man of political abilities, and to fix that opinion of

himself in the judgment of his subjects. He should also take care not to

appear to be guilty of the least offence against modesty, nor to suffer

it in those under him: nor to permit the women of his family to treat

others haughtily; for the haughtiness of women has been the ruin of many

tyrants. With respect to the pleasures of sense, he ought to do directly

contrary to the practice of some tyrants at present; for they do not

only continually indulge themselves in them for many days together, but

they seem also to desire to have other witnesses of it, that they may

wonder at their happiness; whereas he ought really to be moderate in

these, and, if not, to appear to others to avoid them-for it is not the

sober man who is exposed either to plots or contempt, but the drunkard;

not the early riser, but the sluggard. His conduct in general should

also be contrary to what is reported of former tyrants; for he ought to

improve and adorn his city, so as to seem a guardian and not a tyrant;

and, moreover., always to [1315a] seem particularly attentive to the

worship of the gods; for from persons of such a character men entertain

less fears of suffering anything illegal while they suppose that he who

governs them is religious and reverences the gods; and they will be less

inclined to raise insinuations against such a one, as being peculiarly

under their protection: but this must be so done as to give no occasion

for any suspicion of hypocrisy. He should also take care to show such

respect to men of merit in every particular, that they should not think

they could be treated with greater distinction by their fellow-citizens

in a free state. He should also let all honours flow immediately from

himself, but every censure from his subordinate officers and judges. It

is also a common protection of all monarchies not to make one person too

great, or, certainly, not many; for they will support each other: but,

if it is necessary to entrust any large powers to one person, to take

care that it is not one of an ardent spirit; for this disposition is

upon every opportunity most ready for a revolution: and, if it should

seem necessary to deprive any one of his power, to do it by degrees,

and not reduce him all at once. It is also necessary to abstain from all

kinds of insolence; more particularly from corporal punishment; which

you must be most cautious never to exercise over those who have a

delicate sense of honour; for, as those who love money are touched to

the quick when anything affects their property, so are men of honour and

principle when they receive any disgrace: therefore, either never employ

personal punishment, or, if you do, let it be only in the manner in

which a father would correct his son, and not with contempt; and, upon

the whole, make amends for any seeming disgrace by bestowing greater

honours. But of all persons who are most likely to entertain designs

against the person of a tyrant, those are chiefly to be feared and

guarded against who regard as nothing the loss of their own lives, so

that they can but accomplish their purpose: be very careful therefore

of those who either think themselves affronted, or those who are dear

to them; for those who are excited by anger to revenge regard as nothing

their own persons: for, as Heraclitus says, it is dangerous to fight

with an angry man who will purchase with his life the thing he aims at.

As all cities are composed of two sorts of persons, the rich and the

poor, it is necessary that both these should find equal protection from

him who governs them, and that the one party should not have it in their

power to injure the other; but that the tyrant should attach to himself

that party which is the most powerful; which, if he does, he will have

no occasion either to make his slaves free, or to deprive citizens of

their arms; for the strength of either of the parties added to his

own forces will render him superior to any conspiracy. It would be

superfluous to go through all particulars; for the rule of conduct which

the tyrant ought to pursue is evident enough, and that is, to affect to

appear not the tyrant, but the king; the guardian of those he governs,

not their plunderer, [1315b] but their protector, and to affect

the middle rank in life, not one superior to all others: he should,

therefore, associate his nobles with him and soothe his people; for his

government will not only be necessarily more honourable and worthy of

imitation, as it will be over men of worth, and not abject wretches who

perpetually both hate and fear him; but it will be also more durable.

Let him also frame his life so that his manners may be consentaneous

to virtue, or at least let half of them be so, that he may not be

altogether wicked, but only so in part.

CHAPTER XII

Indeed an oligarchy and a tyranny are of all governments of the shortest

duration. The tyranny of Orthagoras and his family at Sicyon, it is

true, continued longer than any other: the reason for which was, that

they used their power with moderation, and were in many particulars

obedient to the laws; and, as Clisthenes was an able general, he never

fell into contempt, and by the care he took that in many particulars his

government should be popular. He is reported also to have presented a

person with a crown who adjudged the victory to another; and some say

that it is the statue of that judge which is placed in the forum.

They say also, that Pisistratus submitted to be summoned into the court

of the Areopagites. The second that we shall mention is the tyranny of

the Cypselidse, at Corinth, which continued seventy-seven years and

six months; for Cypselus was tyrant there thirty years, Periander

forty-four, and Psammetichus, the son of Georgias, three years; the

reason for which was, that Cypselus was a popular man, and governed

without guards. Periander indeed ruled like a tyrant, but then he was an

able general. The third was that of the Pisistradidae at Athens; but it

was not continual: for Pisistratus himself was twice expelled; so that

out of thirty-three years he was only fifteen in power, and his son

eighteen; so that the whole time was thirty-three years. Of the rest

we shall mention that of Hiero, and Gelo at Syracuse; and this did not

continue long, for both their reigns were only eighteen years; for

Gelo died in the eighth year of his tyranny, and Hiero in his tenth.

Thrasybulus fell in his eleventh month, and many other tyrannies have

continued a very short time. We have now gone through the general cases

of corruption and [1316a] means of preservation both in free states and

monarchies. In Plato's Republic, Socrates is introduced treating upon

the changes which different governments are liable to: but his discourse

is faulty; for he does not particularly mention what changes the best

and first governments are liable to; for he only assigns the general

cause, of nothing being immutable, but that in time everything will

alter [***tr.: text is unintelligible here***] he conceives that nature

will then produce bad men, who will not submit to education, and in

this, probably, he is not wrong; for it is certain that there are some

persons whom it is impossible by any education to make good men; but

why should this change be more peculiar to what he calls the best-formed

government, than to all other forms, and indeed to all other things

that exist? and in respect to his assigned time, as the cause of the

alteration of all things, we find that those which did not begin

to exist at the same time cease to be at the same time; so that, if

anything came into beginning the day before the solstice, it must alter

at the same time. Besides, why should such a form of government be

changed into the Lacedaemonian? for, in general, when governments alter,

they alter into the contrary species to what they before were, and

not into one like their former. And this reasoning holds true of other

changes; for he says, that from the Lacedaemonian form it changes into

an oligarchy, and from thence into a democracy, and from a democracy

into a tyranny: and sometimes a contrary change takes place, as from a

democracy into an oligarchy, rather than into a monarchy. With respect

to a tyranny he neither says whether there will be any change in it; or

if not, to what cause it will be owing; or if there is, into what other

state it will alter: but the reason of this is, that a tyranny is an

indeterminate government; and, according to him, every state ought to

alter into the first, and most perfect, thus the continuity and circle

would be preserved. But one tyranny often changed into another; as

at Syria, from Myron's to Clisthenes'; or into an oligarchy, as was

Antileo's at Chalcas; or into a democracy, as was Gelo's at Syracuse; or

into an aristocracy, as was Charilaus's at Lacedaemon, and at Carthage.

An oligarchy is also changed into a tyranny; such was the rise of most

of the ancient tyrannies in Sicily; at Leontini, into the tyranny of

Panaetius; at Gela, into that of Cleander; at Rhegium into that of

Anaxilaus; and the like in many other cities. It is absurd also to

suppose, that a state is changed into an oligarchy because those who are

in power are avaricious and greedy of money, and not because those who

are by far richer than their fellow citizens think it unfair that those

who have nothing should have an equal share in the rule of the state

with themselves, who possess so much-for in many oligarchies it is not

allowable to be employed in money-getting, and there are many laws to

prevent it. But in Carthage, which is a democracy, money-getting is

creditable, and yet their form of government remains unaltered. It is

also absurd to say, that in an oligarchy there are two cities, one of

the poor and another of the rich; for why should this happen to them

more than to the Lacedaemonians, or any other state where all possess

not equal property, or where all are not equally good? for though no

one member of the community should be poorer than he was before, yet

a democracy might nevertheless change into an oligarchy; if the rich

should be more powerful than the poor, and the one too negligent, and

the other attentive: and though these changes are owing to many causes,

yet he mentions but one only, that the citizens become poor by luxury,

and paying interest-money; as if at first they were all rich, or the

greater part of them: but this is not so, but when some of those who

have the principal management of public affairs lose their fortunes,

they will endeavour to bring about a revolution; but when others do,

nothing of consequence will follow, nor when such states do alter is

there any more reason for their altering into a democracy than any

other. Besides, though some of the members of the community may not have

spent their fortunes, yet if they share not in the honours of the state,

or if they are ill-used and insulted, they will endeavour to raise

seditions, and bring about a revolution, that they may be allowed to do

as they like; which, Plato says, arises from too much liberty. Although

there are many oligarchies and democracies, yet Socrates, when he is

treating of the changes they may undergo, speaks of them as if there was

but one of each sort.

BOOK VI

CHAPTER I

We have already shown what is the nature of the supreme council in the

state, and wherein one may differ from another, and how the different

magistrates should be regulated; and also the judicial department, and

what is best suited to what state; and also to what causes both the

destruction and preservation of governments are owing.

As there are very many species of democracies, as well as of other

states, it will not be amiss to consider at the same time anything which

we may have omitted to mention concerning either of them, and to allot

to each that mode of conduct which is peculiar to and advantageous for

them; and also to inquire into the combinations of all these different

modes of government which we [1317a] have mentioned; for as these are

blended together the government is altered, as from an aristocracy to

be an oligarchy, and from a free state to be a democracy. Now, I mean

by those combinations of government (which I ought to examine into, but

have not yet done), namely, whether the deliberative department and the

election of magistrates is regulated in a manner correspondent to an

oligarchy, or the judicial to an aristocracy, or the deliberative part

only to an oligarchy, and the election of magistrates to an aristocracy,

or whether, in any other manner, everything is not regulated according

to the nature of the government. But we will first consider what

particular sort of democracy is fitted to a particular city, and also

what particular oligarchy to a particular people; and of other states,

what is advantageous to what. It is also necessary to show clearly, not

only which of these governments is best for a state, but also how

it ought to be established there, and other things we will treat of

briefly.

And first, we will speak of a democracy; and this will at the same

time show clearly the nature of its opposite which some persons call

an oligarchy; and in doing this we must examine into all the parts of

a democracy, and everything that is connected therewith; for from the

manner in which these are compounded together different species of

democracies arise: and hence it is that they are more than one, and of

various natures. Now, there are two causes which occasion there being so

many democracies; one of which is that which we have already mentioned;

namely, there being different sorts of people; for in one country the

majority are husbandmen, in another mechanics, and hired servants; if

the first of these is added to the second, and the third to both of

them, the democracy will not only differ in the particular of better or

worse, but in this, that it will be no longer the same government; the

other is that which we will now speak of. The different things which are

connected with democracies and seem to make part of these states, do,

from their being joined to them, render them different from others: this

attending a few, that more, and another all. It is necessary that he who

would found any state which he may happen to approve of, or correct one,

should be acquainted with all these particulars. All founders of states

endeavour to comprehend within their own plan everything of nearly the

same kind with it; but in doing this they err, in the manner I have

already described in treating of the preservation and destruction of

governments. I will now speak of these first principles and manners, and

whatever else a democratical state requires.

CHAPTER II

Now the foundation of a democratical state is liberty, and people have

been accustomed to say this as if here only liberty was to be found; for

they affirm that this is the end proposed by every democracy. But one

part of liberty is to govern and be governed alternately; for, according

to democratical justice, equality is measured by numbers, and not by

worth: and this being just, it is necessary that the supreme power

should be vested in the people at large; and that what the majority

determine should be final: so that in a democracy the poor ought to have

more power than the rich, as being the greater number; for this is one

mark of liberty which all framers of a democracy lay down as a criterion

of that state; another is, to live as every one likes; for this, they

say, is a right which liberty gives, since he is a slave who must live

as he likes not. This, then, is another criterion of a democracy. Hence

arises the claim to be under no command whatsoever to any one, upon any

account, any otherwise than by rotation, and that just as far only as

that person is, in his turn, under his also. This also is conducive to

that equality which liberty demands. These things being premised, and

such being the government, it follows that such rules as the following

should be observed in it, that all the magistrates should be chosen out

of all the people, and all to command each, and each in his turn all:

that all the magistrates should be chosen by lot, except to those

offices only which required some particular knowledge and skill: that no

census, or a very small one, should be required to qualify a man for any

office: that none should be in the same employment twice, or very few,

and very seldom, except in the army: that all their appointments should

be limited to a very short time, or at least as many as possible:

that the whole community should be qualified to judge in all causes

whatsoever, let the object be ever so extensive, ever so interesting, or

of ever so high a nature; as at Athens, where the people at large judge

the magistrates when they come out of office, and decide concerning

public affairs as well as private contracts: that the supreme power

should be in the public assembly; and that no magistrate should be

allowed any discretionary power but in a few instances, and of no

consequence to public business. Of all magistrates a senate is best

suited to a democracy, where the whole community is not paid for giving

their attendance; for in that case it loses its power; for then the

people will bring all causes before them, by appeal, as we have

already mentioned in a former book. In the next place, there should, if

possible, be a fund to pay all the citizens--who have any share in the

management of public affairs, either as members of the assembly, judges,

and magistrates; but if this cannot be done, at least the magistrates,

the judges the senators, and members of the supreme assembly, and also

those officers who are obliged to eat at a common table ought to be

paid. Moreover, as an oligarchy is said to be a government of men of

family, fortune, and education; so, on the contrary, a democracy is a

government in the hands of men of no birth, indigent circumstances, and

mechanical employments. In this state also no office [1318a] should be

for life; and, if any such should remain after the government has been

long changed into a democracy, they should endeavour by degrees to

diminish the power; and also elect by lot instead of vote. These things,

then, appertain to all democracies; namely, to be established on that

principle of justice which is homogeneous to those governments; that is,

that all the members of the state, by number, should enjoy an equality,

which seems chiefly to constitute a democracy, or government of the

people: for it seems perfectly equal that the rich should have no more

share in the government than the poor, nor be alone in power; but that

all should be equal, according to number; for thus, they think, the

equality and liberty of the state best preserved.

CHAPTER III

In the next place we must inquire how this equality is to be procured.

Shall the qualifications be divided so that five hundred rich should be

equal to a thousand poor, or shall the thousand have equal power with

the five hundred? or shall we not establish our equality in this manner?

but divide indeed thus, and afterwards taking an equal number both out

of the five hundred and the thousand, invest them with the power of

creating the magistrates and judges. Is this state then established

according to perfect democratical justice, or rather that which is

guided by numbers only? For the defenders of a democracy say, that that

is just which the majority approve of: but the favourers of an oligarchy

say, that that is just which those who have most approve of; and that we

ought to be directed by the value of property. Both the propositions are

unjust; for if we agree with what the few propose we erect a tyranny:

for if it should happen that an individual should have more than the

rest who are rich, according to oligarchical justice, this man alone

has a right to the supreme power; but if superiority of numbers is to

prevail, injustice will then be done by confiscating the property of the

rich, who are few, as we have already said. What then that equality is,

which both parties will admit, must be collected from the definition

of right which is common to them both; for they both say that what the

majority of the state approves of ought to be established. Be it so; but

not entirely: but since a city happens to be made up of two different

ranks of people, the rich and the poor, let that be established which

is approved of by both these, or the greater part: but should there be

opposite sentiments, let that be established which shall be approved

of by the greater part: but let this be according to the census; for

instance, if there should be ten of the rich and twenty of the poor, and

six of the first and fifteen of the last should agree upon any measure,

and the remaining four of the rich should join with the remaining five

of the poor in opposing it, that party whose census when added together

should determine which opinion should be law, and should these happen

to be equal, it should be regarded as a case similar to an assembly or

court of justice dividing equally upon any question that comes before

them, who either determine it by lot or some such method. But although,

with [1318b] respect to what is equal and just, it may be very difficult

to establish the truth, yet it is much easier to do than to persuade

those who have it in their power to encroach upon others to be guided

thereby; for the weak always desire what is equal and just, but the

powerful pay no regard thereunto.

CHAPTER IV

There are four kinds of democracies. The best is that which is composed

of those first in order, as we have already said, and this also is the

most ancient of any. I call that the first which every one would place

so, was he to divide the people; for the best part of these are the

husbandmen. We see, then, that a democracy may be framed where the

majority live by tillage or pasturage; for, as their property is

but small, they will not be at leisure perpetually to hold public

assemblies, but will be continually employed in following their own

business, not having otherwise the means of living; nor will they be

desirous of what another enjoys, but will rather like to follow their

own business than meddle with state affairs and accept the offices of

government, which will be attended with no great profit; for the major

part of mankind are rather desirous of riches than honour (a proof of

this is, that they submitted to the tyrannies in ancient times, and do

now submit to the oligarchies, if no one hinders them in their usual

occupations, or deprives them of their property; for some of them soon

get rich, others are removed from poverty); besides, their having the

right of election and calling their magistrates to account for their

conduct when they come out of office, will satisfy their desire of

honours, if any of them entertain that passion: for in some states,

though the commonalty have not the right of electing the magistrates,

yet it is vested in part of that body chosen to represent them: and it

is sufficient for the people at large to possess the deliberative power:

and this ought to be considered as a species of democracy; such was that

formerly at Mantinsea: for which reason it is proper for the democracy

we have been now treating of to have a power (and it has been usual for

them to have it) of censuring their magistrates when out of office,

and sitting in judgment upon all causes: but that the chief magistrates

should be elected, and according to a certain census, which should vary

with the rank of their office, or else not by a census, but according

to their abilities for their respective appointments. A state thus

constituted must be well constituted; for the magistracies will be

always filled with the best men with the approbation of the people;

who will not envy their superiors: and these and the nobles should

be content with this part in the administration; for they will not be

governed by their inferiors. They will be also careful to use their

power with moderation, as there are others to whom full power is

delegated to censure their conduct; for it is very serviceable to the

state to have them dependent upon others, and not to be permitted to do

whatsoever they choose; for with such a liberty there would be no check

to that evil particle there is in every one: therefore it is [1319a]

necessary and most for the benefit of the state that the offices thereof

should be filled by the principal persons in it, whose characters are

unblemished, and that the people are not oppressed. It is now evident

that this is the best species of democracy, and on what account; because

the people are such and have such powers as they ought to have. To

establish a democracy of husbandmen some of those laws which were

observed in many ancient states are universally useful; as, for

instance, on no account to permit any one to possess more than a certain

quantity of land, or within a certain distance from the city. Formerly

also, in some states, no one was allowed to sell their original lot of

land. They also mention a law of one Oxylus, which forbade any one to

add to their patrimony by usury. We ought also to follow the law of

the Aphutaeans, as useful to direct us in this particular we are now

speaking of; for they having but very little ground, while they were

a numerous people, and at the same time were all husbandmen, did not

include all their lands within the census, but divided them in such a

manner that, according to the census, the poor had more power than

the rich. Next to the commonalty of husbandmen is one of shepherds and

herdsmen; for they have many things in common with them, and, by their

way of life, are excellently qualified to make good soldiers, stout in

body, and able to continue in the open air all night. The generality of

the people of whom other democracies are composed are much worse than

these; for their lives are wretched nor have they any business with

virtue in anything they do; these are your mechanics, your exchange-men,

and hired servants; as all these sorts of men frequent the exchange and

the citadel, they can readily attend the public assembly; whereas the

husbandmen, being more dispersed in the country, cannot so easily meet

together; nor are they equally desirous of doing it with these others!

When a country happens to be so situated that a great part of the land

lies at a distance from the city, there it is easy to establish a good

democracy or a free state for the people in general will be obliged to

live in the country; so that it will be necessary in such a democracy,

though there may be an exchange-mob at hand, never to allow a legal

assembly without the inhabitants of the country attend. We have shown in

what manner the first and best democracy ought to be established, and it

will be equally evident as to the rest, for from these we [1319b] should

proceed as a guide, and always separate the meanest of the people from

the rest. But the last and worst, which gives to every citizen without

distinction a share in every part of the administration, is what few

citizens can bear, nor is it easy to preserve for any long time, unless

well supported by laws and manners. We have already noticed almost every

cause that can destroy either this or any other state. Those who have

taken the lead in such a democracy have endeavoured to support it, and

make the people powerful by collecting together as many persons as they

could and giving them their freedom, not only legitimately but naturally

born, and also if either of their parents were citizens, that is to say,

if either their father or mother; and this method is better suited to

this state than any other: and thus the demagogues have usually managed.

They ought, however, to take care, and do this no longer than the common

people are superior to the nobles and those of the middle rank, and

then stop; for, if they proceed still further, they will make the

state disorderly, and the nobles will ill brook the power of the common

people, and be full of resentment against it; which was the cause of

an insurrection at Cyrene: for a little evil is overlooked, but when it

becomes a great one it strikes the eye. It is, moreover, very-useful in

such a state to do as Clisthenes did at Athens, when he was desirous of

increasing the power of the people, and as those did who established the

democracy in Cyrene; that is, to institute many tribes and fraternities,

and to make the religious rites of private persons few, and those

common; and every means is to be contrived to associate and blend the

people together as much as possible; and that all former customs be

broken through. Moreover, whatsoever is practised in a tyranny

seems adapted to a democracy of this species; as, for instance, the

licentiousness of the slaves, the women, and the children; for this to

a certain degree is useful in such a state; and also to overlook every

one's living as they choose; for many will support such a government:

for it is more agreeable to many to live without any control than as

prudence would direct.

CHAPTER V

It is also the business of the legislator and all those who would

support a government of this sort not to make it too great a work, or

too perfect; but to aim only to render it stable: for, let a state be

constituted ever so badly, there is no difficulty in its continuing a

few days: they should therefore endeavour to procure its safety by

all those ways which we have described in assigning the causes of the

preservation and destruction of governments; avoiding what is hurtful,

and by framing such laws, written and unwritten, as contain those things

which chiefly tend to the preservation of the state; nor to suppose that

that is useful either for a democratic or [1320a] an oligarchic form of

government which contributes to make them more purely so, but what will

contribute to their duration: but our demagogues at present, to flatter

the people, occasion frequent confiscations in the courts; for which

reason those who have the welfare of the state really at heart should

act directly opposite to what they do, and enact a law to prevent

forfeitures from being divided amongst the people or paid into the

treasury, but to have them set apart for sacred uses: for those who

are of a bad disposition would not then be the less cautious, as their

punishment would be the same; and the community would not be so ready to

condemn those whom they sat in judgment on when they were to get nothing

by it: they should also take care that the causes which are brought

before the public should be as few as possible, and punish with the

utmost severity those who rashly brought an action against any one; for

it is not the commons but the nobles who are generally prosecuted: for

in all things the citizens of the same state ought to be affectionate to

each other, at least not to treat those who have the chief power in

it as their enemies. Now, as the democracies which have been lately

established are very numerous, and it is difficult to get the common

people to attend the public assemblies without they are paid for it,

this, when there is not a sufficient public revenue, is fatal to the

nobles; for the deficiencies therein must be necessarily made up by

taxes, confiscations, and fines imposed by corrupt courts of justice:

which things have already destroyed many democracies. Whenever, then,

the revenues of the state are small, there should be but few public

assemblies and but few courts of justice: these, however, should have

very extensive jurisdictions, but should continue sitting a few days

only, for by this means the rich would not fear the expense, although

they should receive nothing for their attendance, though the poor did;

and judgment also would be given much better; for the rich will not

choose to be long absent from their own affairs, but will willingly

be so for a short time: and, when there are sufficient revenues, a

different conduct ought to be pursued from what the demagogues at

present follow; for now they divide the surplus of the public money

amongst the poor; these receive it and again want the same supply, while

the giving it is like pouring water into a sieve: but the true patriot

in a democracy ought to take care that the majority of the community are

not too poor, for this is the cause of rapacity in that government; he

therefore should endeavour that they may enjoy perpetual plenty; and

as this also is advantageous to the rich, what can be saved out of the

public money should be put by, and then divided at once amongst the

poor, if possible, in such a quantity as may enable every one of them to

purchase a little field, and, if that cannot be done, at least to give

each of them enough to procure the implements [1320b] of trade and

husbandry; and if there is not enough for all to receive so much at

once, then to divide it according to tribes or any other allotment. In

the meantime let the rich pay them for necessary services, but not be

obliged to find them in useless amusements. And something like this

was the manner in which they managed at Carthage, and preserved the

affections of the people; for by continually sending some of their

community into colonies they procured plenty. It is also worthy of a

sensible and generous nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and

supplying them with what is necessary, induce them to work; or to

imitate the conduct of the people at Tarentum: for they, permitting the

poor to partake in common of everything which is needful for them, gain

the affections of the commonalty. They have also two different ways of

electing their magistrates; for some are chosen by vote, others by

lot; by the last, that the people at large may have some share in the

administration; by the former, that the state may be well governed: the

same may be accomplished if of the same magistrates you choose some by

vote, others by lot. And thus much for the manner in which democracies

ought to be established.

CHAPTER VI

What has been already said will almost of itself sufficiently show how

an oligarchy ought to be founded; for he who would frame such a state

should have in his view a democracy to oppose it; for every species of

oligarchy should be founded on principles diametrically opposite to some

species of democracy.

The first and best-framed oligarchy is that which approaches near to

what we call a free state; in which there ought to be two different

census, the one high, the other low: from those who are within the

latter the ordinary officers of the state ought to be chosen; from the

former the supreme magistrates: nor should any one be excluded from a

part of the administration who was within the census; which should be

so regulated that the commonalty who are included in it should by means

thereof be superior to those who have no share in the government; for

those who are to have the management of public affairs ought always to

be chosen out of the better sort of the people. Much in the same manner

ought that oligarchy to be established which is next in order: but as to

that which is most opposite to a pure democracy, and approaches nearest

to a dynasty and a tyranny, as it is of all others the worst, so it

requires the greatest care and caution to preserve it: for as bodies of

sound and healthy constitutions and ships which are well manned and

well found for sailing can bear many injuries without perishing, while

a diseased body or a leaky ship with an indifferent crew cannot support

the [1321a] least shock; so the worst-established governments want most

looking after. A number of citizens is the preservation of a democracy;

for these are opposed to those rights which are founded in rank: on

the contrary, the preservation of an oligarchy depends upon the due

regulation of the different orders in the society.

CHAPTER VII

As the greater part of the community are divided into four sorts of

people; husbandmen, mechanics, traders, and hired servants; and as those

who are employed in war may likewise be divided into four; the horsemen,

the heavy-armed soldier, the light-armed, and the sailor, where the

nature of the country can admit a great number of horse; there a

powerful oligarchy may be easily established: for the safety of the

inhabitants depends upon a force of that sort; but those who can support

the expense of horsemen must be persons of some considerable fortune.

Where the troops are chiefly heavy-armed, there an oligarchy, inferior

in power to the other, may be established; for the heavy-armed are

rather made up of men of substance than the poor: but the light-armed

and the sailors always contribute to support a democracy: but where the

number of these is very great and a sedition arises, the other parts of

the community fight at a disadvantage; but a remedy for this evil is

to be learned from skilful generals, who always mix a proper number of

light-armed soldiers with their horse and heavy-armed: for it is with

those that the populace get the better of the men of fortune in an

insurrection; for these being lighter are easily a match for the horse

and the heavy-armed: so that for an oligarchy to form a body of troops

from these is to form it against itself: but as a city is composed of

persons of different ages, some young and some old, the fathers should

teach their sons, while they were very young, a light and easy exercise;

but, when they are grown up, they should be perfect in every warlike

exercise. Now, the admission of the people to any share in the

government should either be (as I said before) regulated by a census, or

else, as at Thebes, allowed to those who for a certain time have ceased

from any mechanic employment, or as at Massalia, where they are chosen

according to their worth, whether citizens or foreigners. With respect

to the magistrates of the highest rank which it may be necessary to

have in a state, the services they are bound to do the public should be

expressly laid down, to prevent the common people from being desirous

of accepting their employments, and also to induce them to regard their

magistrates with favour when they know what a price they pay for their

honours. It is also necessary that the magistrates, upon entering into

their offices, should make magnificent sacrifices and erect some public

structure, that the people partaking of the entertainment, and seeing

the city ornamented with votive gifts in their temples and public

structures, may see with pleasure the stability of the government: add

to this also, that the nobles will have their generosity recorded: but

now this is not the conduct which those who are at present at the head

of an oligarchy pursue, but the contrary; for they are not more desirous

of honour than of gain; for which reason such oligarchies may more

properly be called little democracies. Thus [1321b] we have explained on

what principles a democracy and an oligarchy ought to be established.

CHAPTER VIII

After what has been said I proceed next to treat particularly of the

magistrates; of what nature they should be, how many, and for what

purpose, as I have already mentioned: for without necessary magistrates

no state can exist, nor without those which contribute to its dignity

and good order can exist happily: now it is necessary that in small

states the magistrates should be few; in a large one, many: also to

know well what offices may be joined together, and what ought to be

separated. The first thing necessary is to establish proper regulators

in the markets; for which purpose a certain magistrate should be

appointed to inspect their contracts and preserve good order; for of

necessity, in almost every city there must be both buyers and sellers to

supply each other's mutual wants: and this is what is most productive

of the comforts of life; for the sake of which men seem to have joined

together in one community. A second care, and nearly related to the

first, is to have an eye both to the public and private edifices in

the city, that they may be an ornament; and also to take care of all

buildings which are likely to fall: and to see that the highways are

kept in proper repair; and also that the landmarks between different

estates are preserved, that there may be no disputes on that account;

and all other business of the same nature. Now, this business may be

divided into several branches, over each of which in populous cities

they appoint a separate person; one to inspect the buildings, another

the fountains, another the harbours; and they are called the inspectors

of the city. A third, which is very like the last, and conversant nearly

about the same objects, only in the country, is to take care of what

is done out of the city. The officers who have this employment we call

inspectors of the lands, or inspectors of the woods; but the business

of all three of them is the same. There must also be other officers

appointed to receive the public revenue and to deliver it out to those

who are in the different departments of the state: these are called

receivers or quaestors. There must also be another, before whom all

private contracts and sentences of courts should be enrolled, as well

as proceedings and declarations. Sometimes this employment is divided

amongst many, but there is one supreme over the rest; these are called

proctors, notaries, and the like. Next to these is an officer whose

business is of all others the most necessary, and yet most difficult;

namely, to take care that sentence is executed upon those who are

condemned; and that every one pays the fines laid on him; and also to

have the charge of those who are in prison. [1322a] This office is very

disagreeable on account of the odium attending it, so that no one will

engage therein without it is made very profitable, or, if they do,

will they be willing to execute it according to law; but it is most

necessary, as it is of no service to pass judgment in any cause without

that judgment is carried into execution: for without this human society

could not subsist: for which reason it is best that this office should

not be executed by one person, but by some of the magistrates of the

other courts. In like manner, the taking care that those fines which

are ordered by the judges are levied should be divided amongst different

persons. And as different magistrates judge different causes, let the

causes of the young be heard by the young: and as to those which are

already brought to a hearing, let one person pass sentence, and another

see it executed: as, for instance, let the magistrates who have the care

of the public buildings execute the sentence which the inspectors of

the markets have passed, and the like in other cases: for by so much the

less odium attends those who carry the laws into execution, by so much

the easier will they be properly put in force: therefore for the same

persons to pass the sentence and to execute it will subject them to

general hatred; and if they pass it upon all, they will be considered

as the enemies of all. Thus one person has often the custody of the

prisoner's body, while another sees the sentence against him executed,

as the eleven did at Athens: for which reason it is prudent to separate

these offices, and to give great attention thereunto as equally

necessary with anything we have already mentioned; for it will certainly

happen that men of character will decline accepting this office, and

worthless persons cannot properly be entrusted with it, as having

themselves rather an occasion for a guard than being qualified to guard

others. This, therefore, ought by no means to be a separate office from

others; nor should it be continually allotted to any individuals, but

the young men; where there is a city-guard, the youths ought in turns

to take these offices upon them. These, then, as the most necessary

magistrates, ought to be first mentioned: next to these are others no

less necessary, but of much higher rank, for they ought to be men of

great skill and fidelity. These are they who have the guard of the city,

and provide everything that is necessary for war; whose business it is,

both in war and peace, to defend the walls and the gates, and to take

care to muster and marshal the citizens. Over all these there are

sometimes more officers, sometimes fewer: thus in little cities there is

only one whom they call either general or polemarch; but where there are

horse and light-armed troops, and bowmen, and sailors, they sometimes

put distinct commanders over each of these; who again have others under

them, according to their different divisions; all of which join together

to make one military body: and thus much for this department. Since some

of the magistrates, if not all, have business with the public money,

it is necessary that there should be other officers, whose employment

should be nothing else than to take an account of what they have, and

correct any mismanagement therein. But besides all these magistrates

there is one who is supreme over them all, who very often has in his own

power the disposal of the public revenue and taxes; who presides over

the people when the supreme power is in them; for there must be some

magistrate who has a power to summon them together, and to preside as

head of the state. These are sometimes called preadvisers; but where

there are many, more properly a council. These are nearly the civil

magistrates which are requisite to a government: but there are other

persons whose business is confined to religion; as the priests, and

those who are to take care of the temples, that they are kept in proper

repair, or, if they fall down, that they may be rebuilt; and whatever

else belongs to public worship. This charge is sometimes entrusted to

one person, as in very small cities: in others it is delegated to many,

and these distinct from the priesthood, as the builders or keepers of

holy places, and officers of the sacred revenue. Next to these are

those who are appointed to have the general care of all those public

sacrifices to the tutelar god of the state, which the laws do not

entrust to the priests: and these in different states have different

appellations. To enumerate in few words the different departments of

all those magistrates who are necessary: these are either religion,

war, taxes, expenditures, markets, public buildings, harbours, highways.

Belonging to the courts of justice there are scribes to enroll private

contracts; and there must also be guards set over the prisoners, others

to see the law is executed, council on either side, and also others to

watch over the conduct of those who are to decide the causes. Amongst

the magistrates also may finally be reckoned those who are to give their

advice in public affairs. But separate states, who are peculiarly happy

and have leisure to attend to more minute particulars, and are very

attentive to good order, require particular magistrates for themselves;

such as those who have the government of the women; who are to see the

laws are executed; who take care of the boys and preside over their

education. To these may be added those who have the care of their

gymnastic exercises, [1323a] their theatres, and every other public

spectacle which there may happen to be. Some of these, however, are not

of general use; as the governors of the women: for the poor are obliged

to employ their wives and children in servile offices for want of

slaves. As there are three magistrates to whom some states entrust the

supreme power; namely, guardians of the laws, preadvisers, and senators;

guardians of the laws suit best to an aristocracy, preadvisers to an

oligarchy, and a senate to a democracy. And thus much briefly concerning

all magistrates.

BOOK VII

CHAPTER I

He who proposes to make that inquiry which is necessary concerning what

government is best, ought first to determine what manner of living is

most eligible; for while this remains uncertain it will also be equally

uncertain what government is best: for, provided no unexpected accidents

interfere, it is highly probable, that those who enjoy the best

government will live the most happily according to their circumstances;

he ought, therefore, first to know what manner of life is most desirable

for all; and afterwards whether this life is the same to the man and

the citizen, or different. As I imagine that I have already sufficiently

shown what sort of life is best in my popular discourses on that

subject, I think I may very properly repeat the same here; as most

certainly no one ever called in question the propriety of one of the

divisions; namely, that as what is good, relative to man, may be divided

into three sorts, what is external, what appertains to the body, and

what to the soul, it is evident that all these must conspire to make

a man happy: for no one would say that a man was happy who had no

fortitude, no temperance, no justice, no prudence; but was afraid of the

flies that flew round him: nor would abstain from the meanest theft if

he was either hungry or dry, or would murder his dearest friend for

a farthing; and also was in every particular as wanting in his

understanding as an infant or an idiot. These truths are so evident that

all must agree to them; though some may dispute about the quantity and

the degree: for they may think, that a very little virtue is sufficient

for happiness; but for riches, property, power, honour, and all such

things, they endeavour to increase them without bounds: but to such we

reply, that it is easy to prove from what experience teaches us in these

cases, that these external goods produce not virtue, but virtue them.

As to a happy life, whether it is to be found in pleasure or virtue or

both, certain it is, that those whose morals are most pure, and whose

understandings are best cultivated, will enjoy more of it, although

their fortune is but moderate than those do who own an exuberance of

wealth, are deficient in those; and this utility any one who reflects

may easily convince himself of; for whatsoever is external has its

boundary, as a machine, and whatsoever is useful in its excess is either

necessarily hurtful, or at best useless to the possessor; but every good

quality of the soul the higher it is in degree, so much the more useful

it is, if it is permitted on this subject to use the word useful as well

as noble. It is also very evident, that the accidents of each subject

take place of each other, as the subjects themselves, of which we allow

they are accidents, differ from each other in value; so that if the soul

is more noble than any outward possession, as the body, both in itself

and with respect to us, it must be admitted of course that the best

accidents of each must follow the same analogy. Besides, it is for the

sake of the soul that these things are desirable; and it is on this

account that wise men should desire them, not the soul for them. Let us

therefore be well assured, that every one enjoys as much happiness as he

possesses virtue and wisdom, and acts according to their dictates; since

for this we have the example of GOD Himself, _who is completely happy,

not from any external good, but in Himself, and because such is His

nature_. For good fortune is something different from happiness, as every

good which depends not on the mind is owing to chance or fortune; but

it is not from fortune that any one is wise and just: hence it follows,

that that city is happiest which is the best and acts best: for no one

can do well who acts not well; nor can the deeds either of man or city

be praiseworthy without virtue and wisdom; for whatsoever is just, or

wise, or prudent in a man, the same things are just, wise, and prudent

in a city.

Thus much by way of introduction; for I could not but just touch upon

this subject, though I could not go through a complete investigation

of it, as it properly belongs to another question: let us at present

suppose so much, that a man's happiest life, both as an individual and

as a citizen, is a life of virtue, accompanied with those enjoyments

which virtue usually procures. If [1324a] there are any who are not

convinced by what I have said, their doubts shall be answered hereafter,

at present we shall proceed according to our intended method.

CHAPTER II

It now remains for us to say whether the happiness of any individual

man and the city is the same or different: but this also is evident; for

whosoever supposes that riches will make a person happy, must place the

happiness of the city in riches if it possesses them; those who prefer a

life which enjoys a tyrannic power over others will also think, that the

city which has many others under its command is most happy: thus also

if any one approves a man for his virtue, he will think the most worthy

city the happiest: but here there are two particulars which require

consideration, one of which is, whether it is the most eligible life

to be a member of the community and enjoy the rights of a citizen, or

whether to live as a stranger, without interfering in public affairs;

and also what form of government is to be preferred, and what

disposition of the state is best; whether the whole community should be

eligible to a share in the administration, or only the greater part, and

some only: as this, therefore, is a subject of political examination

and speculation, and not what concerns the individual, and the first of

these is what we are at present engaged in, the one of these I am not

obliged to speak to, the other is the proper business of my present

design. It is evident that government must be the best which is so

established, that every one therein may have it in his power to act

virtuously and live happily: but some, who admit that a life of virtue

is most eligible, still doubt which is preferable a public life of

active virtue, or one entirely disengaged from what is without and

spent in contemplation; which some say is the only one worthy of a

philosopher; and one of these two different modes of life both now

and formerly seem to have been chosen by all those who were the most

virtuous men; I mean the public or philosophic. And yet it is of no

little consequence on which side the truth lies; for a man of sense

must naturally incline to the better choice; both as an individual and a

citizen. Some think that a tyrannic government over those near us is

the greatest injustice; but that a political one is not unjust: but that

still is a restraint on the pleasures and tranquillity of life. Others

hold the quite contrary opinion, and think that a public and active life

is the only life for man: for that private persons have no opportunity

of practising any one virtue, more than they have who are engaged

in public life the management of the [1324b] state. These are their

sentiments; others say, that a tyrannical and despotical mode of

government is the only happy one; for even amongst some free states the

object of their laws seems to be to tyrannise over their neighbours: so

that the generality of political institutions, wheresoever dispersed,

if they have any one common object in view, have all of them this,

to conquer and govern. It is evident, both from the laws of the

Lacedaemonians and Cretans, as well as by the manner in which they

educated their children, that all which they had in view was to make

them soldiers: besides, among all nations, those who have power enough

and reduce others to servitude are honoured on that account; as were the

Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Gauls: with some there are laws to

heighten the virtue of courage; thus they tell us that at Carthage they

allowed every person to wear as many rings for distinction as he had

served campaigns. There was also a law in Macedonia, that a man who had

not himself killed an enemy should be obliged to wear a halter; among

the Scythians, at a festival, none were permitted to drink out of

the cup was carried about who had not done the same thing. Among the

Iberians, a warlike nation, they fixed as many columns upon a man's tomb

as he had slain enemies: and among different nations different things

of this sort prevail, some of them established by law, others by custom.

Probably it may seem too absurd to those who are willing to take this

subject into their consideration to inquire whether it is the business

of a legislator to be able to point out by what means a state may govern

and tyrannise over its neighbours, whether they will, or will not: for

how can that belong either to the politician or legislator which is

unlawful? for that cannot be lawful which is done not only justly, but

unjustly also: for a conquest may be unjustly made. But we see nothing

of this in the arts: for it is the business neither of the physician nor

the pilot to use either persuasion or force, the one to his patients,

the other to his passengers: and yet many seem to think a despotic

government is a political one, and what they would not allow to be just

or proper, if exercised over themselves, they will not blush to exercise

over others; for they endeavour to be wisely governed themselves, but

think it of no consequence whether others are so or not: but a despotic

power is absurd, except only where nature has framed the one party for

dominion, the other for subordination; and therefore no one ought to

assume it over all in general, but those only which are the proper

objects thereof: thus no one should hunt men either for food or

sacrifice, but what is fit for those purposes, and these are wild

animals which are eatable.

Now a city which is well governed might be very [1325a] happy in itself

while it enjoyed a good system of laws, although it should happen to be

so situated as to have no connection with any other state, though its

constitution should not be framed for war or conquest; for it would then

have no occasion for these. It is evident therefore that the business of

war is to be considered as commendable, not as a final end, but as the

means of procuring it. It is the duty of a good legislator to examine

carefully into his state; and the nature of the people, and how they may

partake of every intercourse, of a good life, and of the happiness which

results from it: and in this respect some laws and customs differ from

others. It is also the duty of a legislator, if he has any neighbouring

states to consider in what manner he shall oppose each of them, or what

good offices he shall show them. But what should be the final end of the

best governments will be considered hereafter.

CHAPTER III

We will now speak to those who, while they agree that a life of virtue

is most eligible, yet differ in the use of it addressing ourselves to

both these parties; for there are some who disapprove of all political

governments, and think that the life of one who is really free is

different from the life of a citizen, and of all others most eligible:

others again think that the citizen is the best; and that it is

impossible for him who does nothing to be well employed; but that

virtuous activity and happiness are the same thing. Now both parties in

some particulars say what is right, in others what is wrong, thus, that

the life of a freeman is better than the life of a slave is true, for

a slave, as a slave, is employed in nothing honourable; for the common

servile employments which he is commanded to perform have nothing

virtuous in them; but, on the other hand, it is not true that a

submission to all sorts of governments is slavery; for the government of

freemen differs not more from the government of slaves than slavery and

freedom differ from each other in their nature; and how they do has been

already mentioned. To prefer doing of nothing to virtuous activity is

also wrong, for happiness consists in action, and many noble ends are

produced by the actions of the just and wise. From what we have already

determined on this subject, some one probably may think, that supreme

power is of all things best, as that will enable a man to command very

many useful services from others; so that he who can obtain this ought

not to give it up to another, but rather to seize it: and, for this

purpose, the father should have no attention or regard for the son, or

the son for the father, or friend for friend; for what is best is most

eligible: but to be a member of the community and be in felicity is

best. What these persons advance might probably be true, if the supreme

good was certainly theirs who plunder and use violence to others: but

it is [1325b] most unlikely that it should be so; for it is a mere

supposition: for it does not follow that their actions are honourable

who thus assume the supreme power over others, without they were by

nature as superior to them as a man to a woman, a father to a child, a

master to a slave: so that he who so far forsakes the paths of virtue

can never return back from whence he departed from them: for amongst

equals whatever is fair and just ought to be reciprocal; for this is

equal and right; but that equals should not partake of what is equal, or

like to like, is contrary to nature: but whatever is contrary to nature

is not right; therefore, if there is any one superior to the rest of the

community in virtue and abilities for active life, him it is proper to

follow, him it is right to obey, but the one alone will not do, but must

be joined to the other also: and, if we are right in what we have now

said, it follows that happiness consists in virtuous activity, and that

both with respect to the community as well as the individual an active

life is the happiest: not that an active life must necessarily refer to

other persons, as some think, or that those studies alone are practical

which are pursued to teach others what to do; for those are much more

so whose final object is in themselves, and to improve the judgment and

understanding of the man; for virtuous activity has an end, therefore

is something practical; nay, those who contrive the plan which others

follow are more particularly said to act, and are superior to the

workmen who execute their designs. But it is not necessary that states

which choose to have no intercourse with others should remain inactive;

for the several members thereof may have mutual intercourse with each

other; for there are many opportunities for this among the different

citizens; the same thing is true of every individual: for, was it

otherwise, neither could the Deity nor the universe be perfect; to

neither of whom can anything external separately exist. Hence it is

evident that that very same life which is happy for each individual is

happy also for the state and every member of it.

CHAPTER IV

As I have now finished what was introductory to this subject, and

considered at large the nature of other states, it now remains that I

should first say what ought to be the establishment of a city which one

should form according to one's wish; for no good state can exist without

a moderate proportion of what is necessary. Many things therefore

ought to be forethought of as desirable, but none of them such as are

impossible: I mean relative to the number of citizens and the extent

of the territory: for as other artificers, such as the weaver and the

shipwright, ought to have such materials as are fit for their work,

since so much the better they are, by so much [1326a] superior will the

work itself necessarily be; so also ought the legislator and politician

endeavour to procure proper materials for the business they have in

hand. Now the first and principal instrument of the politician is the

number of the people; he should therefore know how many, and what they

naturally ought to be: in like manner the country, how large, and what

it is. Most persons think that it is necessary for a city to be large to

be happy: but, should this be true, they cannot tell what is a large one

and what a small one; for according to the multitude of the inhabitants

they estimate the greatness of it; but they ought rather to consider its

strength than its numbers; for a state has a certain object in view, and

from the power which it has in itself of accomplishing it, its greatness

ought to be estimated; as a person might say, that Hippocrates was a

greater physician, though not a greater man, than one that exceeded him

in the size of his body: but if it was proper to determine the strength

of the city from the number of the inhabitants, it should never be

collected from the multitude in general who may happen to be in it;

for in a city there must necessarily be many slaves, sojourners, and

foreigners; but from those who are really part of the city and properly

constitute its members; a multitude of these is indeed a proof of a

large city, but in a state where a large number of mechanics inhabit,

and but few soldiers, such a state cannot be great; for the greatness of

the city, and the number of men in it, are not the same thing. This too

is evident from fact, that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to

govern properly a very numerous body of men; for of all the states which

appear well governed we find not one where the rights of a citizen are

open to an indiscriminate multitude. And this is also evident from the

nature of the thing; for as law is a certain order, so good law is of

course a certain good order: but too large a multitude are incapable of

this, unless under the government of that DIVINE POWER which comprehends

the universe. Not but that, as quantity and variety are usually

essential to beauty, the perfection of a city consists in the largeness

of it as far as that largeness is consistent with that order already

mentioned: but still there is a determinate size to all cities, as well

as everything else, whether animals, plants, or machines, for each of

these, if they are neither too little nor too big, have their

proper powers; but when they have not their due growth, or are badly

constructed, as a ship a span long is not properly a ship, nor one of

two furlongs length, but when it is of a fit size; for either from its

smallness or from its largeness it may be quite useless: so is it with

a city; one that is too small has not [1326b] in itself the power of

self-defence, but this is essential to a city: one that is too large is

capable of self-defence in what is necessary; but then it is a nation

and not a city: for it will be very difficult to accommodate a form

of government to it: for who would choose to be the general of such

an unwieldy multitude, or who could be their herald but a stentor? The

first thing therefore necessary is, that a city should consist of such

numbers as will be sufficient to enable the inhabitants to live

happily in their political community: and it follows, that the more the

inhabitants exceed that necessary number the greater will the city be:

but this must not be, as we have already said, without bounds; but what

is its proper limit experience will easily show, and this experience is

to be collected from the actions both of the governors and the governed.

Now, as it belongs to the first to direct the inferior magistrates and

to act as judges, it follows that they can neither determine causes

with justice nor issue their orders with propriety without they know the

characters of their fellow-citizens: so that whenever this happens not

to be done in these two particulars, the state must of necessity be

badly managed; for in both of them it is not right to determine too

hastily and without proper knowledge, which must evidently be the case

where the number of the citizens is too many: besides, it is more easy

for strangers and sojourners to assume the rights of citizens, as they

will easily escape detection in so great a multitude. It is evident,

then, that the best boundary for a city is that wherein the numbers are

the greatest possible, that they may be the better able to be sufficient

in themselves, while at the same time they are not too large to be under

the eye and government of the magistrates. And thus let us determine the

extent of a city.

CHAPTER V

What we have said concerning a city may nearly be applied to a country;

for as to what soil it should be, every one evidently will commend it

if it is such as is sufficient in itself to furnish what will make the

inhabitants happy; for which purpose it must be able to supply them

with all the necessaries of life; for it is the having these in plenty,

without any want, which makes them content. As to its extent, it should

be such as may enable the inhabitants to live at their ease with freedom

and temperance. Whether we have done right or wrong in fixing this limit

to the territory shall be considered more minutely hereafter, when

we come particularly to inquire into property, and what fortune is

requisite for a man to live on, and how and in what manner they ought

to employ it; for there are many doubts upon this question, while each

party insists upon their own plan of life being carried to an excess,

the one of severity, the other of indulgence. What the situation of the

country should be it is not difficult to determine, in some particulars

respecting that we ought to be advised by those who are skilful in

military affairs. It should be difficult of access to an enemy, but

easy to the inhabitants: and as we said, that the number of [1327a]

inhabitants ought to be such as can come under the eye of the

magistrate, so should it be with the country; for then it is easily

defended. As to the position of the city, if one could place it to one's

wish, it is convenient to fix it on the seaside: with respect to

the country, one situation which it ought to have has been already

mentioned, namely, that it should be so placed as easily to give

assistance to all places, and also to receive the necessaries of life

from all parts, and also wood, or any other materials which may happen

to be in the country.

CHAPTER VI

But with respect to placing a city in the neighbourhood of the sea,

there are some who have many doubts whether it is serviceable or hurtful

to a well-regulated state; for they say, that the resort of persons

brought up under a different system of government is disserviceable

to the state, as well by impeding the laws as by their numbers; for a

multitude of merchants must necessarily arise from their trafficking

backward and forward upon the seas, which will hinder the well-governing

of the city: but if this inconvenience should not arise, it is evident

that it is better, both on account of safety and also for the easier

acquisition of the necessaries of life, that both the city and the

country should be near the sea; for it is necessary that those who are

to sustain the attack of the enemy should be ready with their assistance

both by land and by sea, and to oppose any inroad, both ways if possible

but if not, at least where they are most powerful, which they may

do while they possess both. A maritime situation is also useful for

receiving from others what your own country will not produce, and

exporting those necessaries of your own growth which are more than you

have occasion for; but a city ought to traffic to supply its own wants,

and not the wants of others; for those who themselves furnish an open

market for every one, do it for the sake of gain; which it is not proper

for a well-established state to do, neither should they encourage such

a commerce. Now, as we see that many places and cities have docks and

harbours lying very convenient for the city, while those who frequent

them have no communication with the citadel, and yet they are not too

far off, but are surrounded by walls and such-like fortifications, it is

evident, that if any good arises from such an intercourse the city will

receive it, but if anything hurtful, it will be easy to restrain it by

a law declaring and deputing whom the state will allow to have an

intercourse with each other, and whom not. As to a naval power, it is by

no means doubtful that it is necessary to have one to a certain degree;

and this not only for the sake of the [1327b] city itself, but also

because it may be necessary to appear formidable to some of the

neighbouring states, or to be able to assist them as well by sea as

by land; but to know how great that force should be, the health of the

state should be inquired into, and if that appears vigorous and enables

her to take the lead of other communities, it is necessary that her

force should correspond with her actions. As for that multitude of

people which a maritime power creates, they are by no means necessary to

a state, nor ought they to make a part of the citizens; for the mariners

and infantry, who have the command, are freemen, and upon these depends

a naval engagement: but when there are many servants and husbandmen,

there they will always have a number of sailors, as we now see happens

to some states, as in Heraclea, where they man many triremes, though

the extent of their city is much inferior to some others. And thus we

determine concerning the country, the port, the city, the sea, and a

maritime power: as to the number of the citizens, what that ought to be

we have already said.

CHAPTER VII

We now proceed to point out what natural disposition the members of the

community ought to be of: but this any one will easily perceive who

will cast his eye over the states of Greece, of all others the most

celebrated, and also the other different nations of this habitable

world. Those who live in cold countries, as the north of Europe, are

full of courage, but wanting in understanding and the arts: therefore

they are very tenacious of their liberty; but, not being politicians,

they cannot reduce their neighbours under their power: but the Asiatics,

whose understandings are quick, and who are conversant in the arts, are

deficient in courage; and therefore are always conquered and the

slaves of others: but the Grecians, placed as it were between these

two boundaries, so partake of them both as to be at the same time both

courageous and sensible; for which reason Greece continues free, and

governed in the best manner possible, and capable of commanding the

whole world, could they agree upon one system of policy. Now this is the

difference between the Grecians and other nations, that the latter have

but one of these qualities, whereas in the former they are both happily

blended together. Hence it is evident, that those persons ought to be

both sensible and courageous who will readily obey a legislator, the

object of whose laws is virtue. As to what some persons say, that the

military must be mild and tender to those they know, but severe and

cruel to those they know not, it is courage which [1328a] makes any one

lovely; for that is the faculty of the soul which we most admire: as

a proof of this, our resentment rises higher against our friends and

acquaintance than against those we know not: for which reason Archilaus

accusing his friends says very properly to himself, Shall my friends

insult me? The spirit of freedom and command also is what all inherit

who are of this disposition for courage is commanding and invincible. It

also is not right for any one to say, that you should be severe to those

you know not; for this behaviour is proper for no one: nor are those who

are of a noble disposition harsh in their manners, excepting only to the

wicked; and when they are particularly so, it is, as has been already

said, against their friends, when they think they have injured them;

which is agreeable to reason: for when those who think they ought to

receive a favour from any one do not receive it, beside the injury done

them, they consider what they are deprived of: hence the saying, "Cruel

are the wars of brothers;" and this, "Those who have greatly loved

do greatly hate." And thus we have nearly determined how many the

inhabitants of a city ought to be, and what their natural disposition,

and also the country how large, and of what sort is necessary; I say

nearly, because it is needless to endeavour at as great accuracy in

those things which are the objects of the senses as in those which are

inquired into by the understanding only.

CHAPTER VIII

As in natural bodies those things are not admitted to be parts of them

without which the whole would not exist, so also it is evident that in

a political state everything that is necessary thereunto is not to be

considered as a part of it, nor any other community from whence one

whole is made; for one thing ought to be common and the same to the

community, whether they partake of it equally or unequally, as, for

instance, food, land, or the like; but when one thing is for the benefit

of one person, and another for the benefit of another, in this there is

nothing like a community, excepting that one makes it and the other

uses it; as, for instance, between any instrument employed in making any

work, and the workmen, as there is nothing common between the house and

the builder, but the art of the builder is employed on the house. Thus

property is necessary for states, but property is no part of the state,

though many species of it have life; but a city is a community of

equals, for the purpose of enjoying the best life possible: but the

happiest life is the best which consists in the perfect practice of

virtuous energies: as therefore some persons have great, others little

or no opportunity of being employed in these, it is evident that this

is the cause of the difference there is between the different cities and

communities there are to be found; for while each of these endeavour to

acquire what is best by various and different means, they give [1328b]

rise to different modes of living and different forms of government. We

are now to consider what those things are without which a city cannot

possibly exist; for what we call parts of the city must of necessity

inhere in it: and this we shall plainly understand, if we know the

number of things necessary to a city: first, the inhabitants must

have food: secondly, arts, for many instruments are necessary in life:

thirdly, arms, for it is necessary that the community should have an

armed force within themselves, both to support their government against

those of their own body who might refuse obedience to it, and also

to defend it from those who might attempt to attack it from without:

fourthly, a certain revenue, as well for the internal necessities of

the state as for the business of war: fifthly, which is indeed the chief

concern, a religious establishment: sixthly in order, but first of all

in necessity, a court to determine both criminal and civil causes. These

things are absolutely necessary, so to speak, in every state; for a city

is a number of people not accidentally met together, but with a purpose

of ensuring to themselves sufficient independency and self-protection;

and if anything necessary for these purposes is wanting, it is

impossible that in such a situation these ends can be obtained. It is

necessary therefore that a city should be capable of acquiring all these

things: for this purpose a proper number of husbandmen are necessary to

procure food, also artificers and soldiers, and rich men, and priests

and judges, to determine what is right and proper.

CHAPTER IX

Having determined thus far, it remains that we consider whether all

these different employments shall be open to all; for it is possible

to continue the same persons always husbandmen, artificers, judges,

or counsellors; or shall we appoint different persons to each of those

employments which we have already mentioned; or shall some of them be

appropriated to particulars, and others of course common to all? but

this does not take place in every state, for, as we have already said,

it is possible that all may be common to all, or not, but only common to

some; and this is the difference between one government and another:

for in democracies the whole community partakes of everything, but in

oligarchies it is different.

Since we are inquiring what is the best government possible, and it is

admitted to be that in which the citizens are happy; and that, as we

have already said, it is impossible to obtain happiness without virtue;

it follows, that in the best-governed states, where the citizens are

really men of intrinsic and not relative goodness, none of them should

be permitted to exercise any mechanic employment or follow merchandise,

as being ignoble and destructive to virtue; neither should they be

husband-[1329a] men, that they may be at leisure to improve in virtue

and perform the duty they owe to the state. With respect to the

employments of a soldier, a senator, and a judge, which are evidently

necessary to the community, shall they be allotted to different persons,

or shall the same person execute both? This question, too, is easily

answered: for in some cases the same persons may execute them, in

others they should be different, where the different employments require

different abilities, as when courage is wanting for one, judgment for

the other, there they should be allotted to different persons; but when

it is evident, that it is impossible to oblige those who have arms

in their hands, and can insist on their own terms, to be always under

command; there these different employments should be trusted to one

person; for those who have arms in their hands have it in their option

whether they will or will not assume the supreme power: to these two

(namely, those who have courage and judgment) the government must be

entrusted; but not in the same manner, but as nature directs; what

requires courage to the young, what requires judgment to the old; for

with the young is courage, with the old is wisdom: thus each will be

allotted the part they are fit for according to their different merits.

It is also necessary that the landed property should belong to these

men; for it is necessary that the citizens should be rich, and these are

the men proper for citizens; for no mechanic ought to be admitted to the

rights of a citizen, nor any other sort of people whose employment is

not entirely noble, honourable, and virtuous; this is evident from the

principle we at first set out with; for to be happy it is necessary

to be virtuous; and no one should say that a city is happy while he

considers only one part of its citizens, but for that purpose he ought

to examine into all of them. It is evident, therefore, that the landed

property should belong to these, though it may be necessary for them to

have husbandmen, either slaves, barbarians, or servants. There remains

of the different classes of the people whom we have enumerated, the

priests, for these evidently compose a rank by themselves; for neither

are they to be reckoned amongst the husbandmen nor the mechanics; for

reverence to the gods is highly becoming every state: and since the

citizens have been divided into orders, the military and the council,

and it is proper to offer due worship to the gods, and since it is

necessary that those who are employed in their service should have

nothing else to do, let the business of the priesthood be allotted

to those who are in years. We have now shown what is necessary to the

existence of a city, and of what parts it consists, and that husbandmen,

mechanic, and mercenary servants are necessary to a city; but that

the parts of it are soldiers and sailors, and that these are always

different from those, but from each other only occasionally.

CHAPTER X