CHAPTER XVIII

Since then we have said that there are three sorts of regular

governments, and of these the best must necessarily be that which is

administered by the best men (and this must be that which happens to

have one man, or one family, or a number of persons excelling all the

rest in virtue, who are able to govern and be governed in such a manner

as will make life most agreeable, and we have already shown that the

virtue of a good man and of a citizen in the most perfect government

will be the same), it is evident, that in the same manner, and for those

very qualities which would procure a man the character of good, any

one would say, that the government of a state was a well-established

aristocracy or kingdom; so that it will be found to be education and

[1288b] morals that are almost the whole which go to make a good man,

and the same qualities will make a good citizen or good king.

These particulars being treated of, we will now proceed to consider

what sort of government is best, how it naturally arises, and how it

is established; for it is necessary to make a proper inquiry concerning

this.

BOOK IV

CHAPTER I

In every art and science which is not conversant in parts but in some

one genus in which it is complete, it is the business of that art alone

to determine what is fitted to its particular genus; as what particular

exercise is fitted to a certain particular body, and suits it best: for

that body which is formed by nature the most perfect and superior to

others necessarily requires the best exercise-and also of what one kind

that must be which will suit the generality; and this is the business of

the gymnastic arts: and although any one should not desire to acquire

an exact knowledge and skill in these exercises, yet it is not, on that

account, the less necessary that he who professes to be a master and

instruct the youth in them should be perfect therein: and we see that

this is what equally befalls the healing, shipbuilding, cloth-making,

and indeed all other arts; so that it evidently belongs to the same art

to find out what kind of government is best, and would of all others be

most correspondent to our wish, while it received no molestation from

without: and what particular species of it is adapted to particular

persons; for there are many who probably are incapable of enjoying the

best form: so that the legislator, and he who is truly a politician,

ought to be acquainted not only with that which is most perfect

imaginable, but also that which is the best suited to any given

circumstances. There is, moreover, a third sort, an imaginary one, and

he ought, if such a one should be presented to his consideration, to be

able to discern what sort of one it would be at the beginning; and, when

once established, what would be the proper means to preserve it a long

time. I mean, for instance, if a state should happen not to have the

best form of government, or be deficient in what was necessary, or not

receive every advantage possible, but something less. And, besides all

this, it is necessary to know what sort of government is best fitting

for all cities: for most of those writers who have treated this subject,

however speciously they may handle other parts of it, have failed in

describing the practical parts: for it is not enough to be able to

perceive what is best without it is what can be put in practice. It

should also be simple, and easy for all to attain to. But some seek only

the most subtile forms of government. Others again, choosing [1289a]

rather to treat of what is common, censure those under which they live,

and extol the excellence of a particular state, as the Lacedaemonian,

or some other: but every legislator ought to establish such a form of

government as from the present state and disposition of the people who

are to receive it they will most readily submit to and persuade the

community to partake of: for it is not a business of less trouble to

correct the mistakes of an established government than to form a new

one; as it is as difficult to recover what we have forgot as to learn

anything afresh. He, therefore, who aspires to the character of a

legislator, ought, besides all we have already said, to be able to

correct the mistakes of a government already established, as we have

before mentioned. But this is impossible to be done by him who does

not know how many different forms of government there are: some persons

think that there is only one species both of democracy and oligarchy;

but this is not true: so that every one should be acquainted with the

difference of these governments, how great they are, and whence they

arise; and should have equal knowledge to perceive what laws are best,

and what are most suitable to each particular government: for all

laws are, and ought to be, framed agreeable to the state that is to be

governed by them, and not the state to the laws: for government is a

certain ordering in a state which particularly respects the magistrates

in what manner they shall be regulated, and where the supreme power

shall be placed; and what shall be the final object which each community

shall have in view; but the laws are something different from what

regulates and expresses the form of the constitution-it is their office

to direct the conduct of the magistrate in the execution of his office

and the punishment of offenders. From whence it is evident, that the

founders of laws should attend both to the number and the different

sorts of government; for it is impossible that the same laws should be

calculated for all sorts of oligarchies and all sorts of democracies,

for of both these governments there are many species, not one only.

CHAPTER II

Since, then, according to our first method in treating of the different

forms of government, we have divided those which are regular into three

sorts, the kingly, the aristocratical, the free states, and shown

the three excesses which these are liable to: the kingly, of becoming

tyrannical; the aristocratical, oligarchical; and the free state,

democratical: and as we have already treated of the aristocratical and

kingly; for to enter into an inquiry what sort of government is best

is the same thing as to treat of these two expressly; for each of

them desires to be established upon the principles of virtue: and as,

moreover, we have already determined wherein a kingly power and an

aristocracy differ from each other, and when a state may be said to be

governed by a king, it now remains that we examine into a free state,

and also these other governments, an oligarchy, a democracy, and a

[1289b] tyranny; and it is evident of these three excesses which must be

the worst of all, and which next to it; for, of course, the excesses of

the best and most holy must be the worst; for it must necessarily happen

either that the name of king only will remain, or else that the king

will assume more power than belongs to him, from whence tyranny will

arise, the worst excess imaginable, a government the most contrary

possible to a free state. The excess next hurtful is an oligarchy; for

an aristocracy differs much from this sort of government: that which is

least so is a democracy. This subject has been already treated of by one

of those writers who have gone before me, though his sentiments are not

the same as mine: for he thought, that of all excellent constitutions,

as a good oligarchy or the like, a democracy was the worst, but of all

bad ones, the best.

Now I affirm, that all these states have, without exception, fallen into

excess; and also that he should not have said that one oligarchy was

better than another, but that it was not quite so bad. But this question

we shall not enter into at present. We shall first inquire how many

different sorts of free states there are; since there are many

species of democracies and oligarchies; and which of them is the most

comprehensive, and most desirable after the best form of government; or

if there is any other like an aristocracy, well established; and also

which of these is best adapted to most cities, and which of them is

preferable for particular persons: for, probably, some may suit better

with an oligarchy than a democracy, and others better with a democracy

than an oligarchy; and afterwards in what manner any one ought to

proceed who desires to establish either of these states, I mean every

species of democracy, and also of oligarchy. And to conclude, when we

shall have briefly gone through everything that is necessary, we will

endeavour to point out the sources of corruption, and stability, in

government, as well those which are common to all as those which are

peculiar to each state, and from what causes they chiefly arise.

CHAPTER III

The reason for there being many different sorts of governments is this,

that each state consists of a great number of parts; for, in the first

place, we see that all cities are made up of families: and again, of

the multitude of these some must be rich, some poor, and others in the

middle station; and that, both of the rich and poor, some will be used

to arms, others not. We see also, that some of the common people are

husbandmen, others attend the market, and others are artificers. There

is also a difference between the nobles in their wealth, and the dignity

in which they live: for instance, in the number of horses they breed;

for this cannot be supported without a large fortune: for which reason,

in former times, those cities whose strength consisted in horse became

by that means oligarchies; and they used horse in their expeditions

against the neighbouring cities; as the Eretrians the Chalcidians, the

Magnetians, who lived near the river Meander, and many others in Asia.

Moreover, besides the difference of fortune, there is that which arises

from family and merit; or, if there are any other distinctions [1290a]

which make part of the city, they have been already mentioned in

treating of an aristocracy, for there we considered how many parts each

city must necessarily be composed of; and sometimes each of these have a

share in the government, sometimes a few, sometimes more.

It is evident then, that there must be many forms of government,

differing from each other in their particular constitution: for the

parts of which they are composed each differ from the other. For

government is the ordering of the magistracies of the state; and these

the community share between themselves, either as they can attain them

by force, or according to some common equality which there is amongst

them, as poverty, wealth, or something which they both partake of. There

must therefore necessarily be as many different forms of governments as

there are different ranks in the society, arising from the superiority

of some over others, and their different situations. And these seem

chiefly to be two, as they say, of the winds: namely, the north and

the south; and all the others are declinations from these. And thus in

politics, there is the government of the many and the government of

the few; or a democracy and an oligarchy: for an aristocracy may be

considered as a species of oligarchy, as being also a government of the

few; and what we call a free state may be considered as a democracy: as

in the winds they consider the west as part of the north, and the east

as part of the south: and thus it is in music, according to some, who

say there are only two species of it, the Doric and the Phrygian, and

all other species of composition they call after one of these names; and

many people are accustomed to consider the nature of government in the

same light; but it is both more convenient and more correspondent to

truth to distinguish governments as I have done, into two species: one,

of those which are established upon proper principles; of which there

may be one or two sorts: the other, which includes all the different

excesses of these; so that we may compare the best form of government to

the most harmonious piece of music; the oligarchic and despotic to the

more violent tunes; and the democratic to the soft and gentle airs.

CHAPTER IV

We ought not to define a democracy as some do, who say simply, that it

is a government where the supreme power is lodged in the people; for

even in oligarchies the supreme power is in the majority. Nor should

they define an oligarchy a government where the supreme power is in the

hands of a few: for let us suppose the number of a people to be thirteen

hundred, and that of these one thousand were rich, who would not permit

the three hundred poor to have any share in the government, although

they were free, and their equal in everything else; no one would say,

that this government was a democracy. In like manner, if the poor, when

few in number, should acquire the power over the rich, though more than

themselves, no one would say, that this was an oligarchy; nor this, when

the rest who are rich have no share in the administration. We should

rather say, that a democracy is when the supreme power is in the [1290b]

hands of the freemen; an oligarchy, when it is in the hands of the rich:

it happens indeed that in the one case the many will possess it, in

the other the few; because there are many poor and few rich. And if the

power of the state was to be distributed according to the size of the

citizens, as they say it is in Ethiopia, or according to their beauty,

it would be an oligarchy: for the number of those who are large and

beautiful is small.

Nor are those things which we have already mentioned alone sufficient

to describe these states; for since there are many species both of a

democracy and an oligarchy, the matter requires further consideration;

as we cannot admit, that if a few persons who are free possess the

supreme power over the many who are not free, that this government is a

democracy: as in Apollonia, in Ionia, and in Thera: for in each of these

cities the honours of the state belong to some few particular families,

who first founded the colonies. Nor would the rich, because they are

superior in numbers, form a democracy, as formerly at Colophon; for

there the majority had large possessions before the Lydian war: but a

democracy is a state where the freemen and the poor, being the majority,

are invested with the power of the state. An oligarchy is a state where

the rich and those of noble families, being few, possess it.

We have now proved that there are various forms of government and have

assigned a reason for it; and shall proceed to show that there are

even more than these, and what they are, and why; setting out with the

principle we have already laid down. We admit that every city consists

not of one, but many parts: thus, if we should endeavour to comprehend

the different species of animals we should first of all note those parts

which every animal must have, as a certain sensorium, and also what is

necessary to acquire and retain food, as a mouth and a belly; besides

certain parts to enable it to move from place to place. If, then, these

are the only parts of an animal and there are differences between them;

namely, in their various sorts of stomachs, bellies, and sensoriums: to

which we must add their motive powers; the number of the combinations of

all these must necessarily make up the different species of animals.

For it is not possible that the same kind of animal should have any

very great difference in its mouth or ears; so that when all these are

collected, who happen to have these things similar in all, they make up

a species of animals of which there are as many as there are of these

general combinations of necessary parts.

The same thing is true of what are called states; for a city is not made

of one but many parts, as has already been often said; one of which is

those who supply it with provisions, called husbandmen, another called

mechanics, [1291a] whose employment is in the manual arts, without which

the city could not be inhabited; of these some are busied about what is

absolutely necessary, others in what contribute to the elegancies and

pleasures of life; the third sort are your exchange-men, I mean by these

your buyers, sellers, merchants, and victuallers; the fourth are your

hired labourers or workmen; the fifth are the men-at-arms, a rank not

less useful than the other, without you would have the community slaves

to every invader; but what cannot defend itself is unworthy of the name

of a city; for a city is self-sufficient, a slave not. So that when

Socrates, in Plato's Republic, says that a city is necessarily composed

of four sorts of people, he speaks elegantly but not correctly, and

these are, according to him, weavers, husbandmen, shoe-makers, and

builders; he then adds, as if these were not sufficient, smiths,

herdsmen for what cattle are necessary, and also merchants and

victuallers, and these are by way of appendix to his first list; as if

a city was established for necessity, and not happiness, or as if a

shoe-maker and a husbandman were equally useful. He reckons not the

military a part before the increase of territory and joining to the

borders of the neighbouring powers will make war necessary: and even

amongst them who compose his four divisions, or whoever have any

connection with each other, it will be necessary to have some one to

distribute justice, and determine between man and man. If, then, the

mind is a more valuable part of man than the body, every one would

wish to have those things more regarded in his city which tend to the

advantage of these than common matters, such are war and justice; to

which may be added council, which is the business of civil wisdom (nor

is it of any consequence whether these different employments are filled

by different persons or one, as the same man is oftentimes both a

soldier and a husbandman): so that if both the judge and the senator are

parts of the city, it necessarily follows that the soldier must be

so also. The seventh sort are those who serve the public in expensive

employments at their own charge: these are called the rich. The eighth

are those who execute the different offices of the state, and without

these it could not possibly subsist: it is therefore necessary that

there should be some persons capable of governing and filling the places

in the city; and this either for life or in rotation: the office of

senator, and judge, of which we have already sufficiently treated, are

the only ones remaining. If, then, these things are necessary for a

state, that it may be happy and just, it follows that the citizens who

engage in public affairs should be men of abilities therein. [1291b]

Several persons think, that different employments may be allotted to the

same person; as a soldier's, a husbandman's, and an artificer's; as also

that others may be both senators and judges.

Besides, every one supposes himself a man of political abilities, and

that he is qualified for almost every department in the state. But the

same person cannot at once be poor and rich: for which reason the most

obvious division of the city is into two parts, the poor and rich;

moreover, since for the generality the one are few, the other many, they

seem of all the parts of a city most contrary to each other; so that as

the one or the other prevail they form different states; and these are

the democracy and the oligarchy.

But that there are many different states, and from what causes they

arise, has been already mentioned: and that there are also different

species both of democracies and oligarchies we will now show. Though

this indeed is evident from what we have already said: there are also

many different sorts of common people, and also of those who are

called gentlemen. Of the different sorts of the first are husbandmen,

artificers, exchange-men, who are employed in buying and selling,

seamen, of which some are engaged in war, some in traffic, some in

carrying goods and passengers from place to place, others in fishing,

and of each of these there are often many, as fishermen at Tarentum and

Byzantium, masters of galleys at Athens, merchants at AEgina and Chios,

those who let ships on freight at Tenedos; we may add to these those who

live by their manual labour and have but little property; so that they

cannot live without some employ: and also those who are not free-born

on both sides, and whatever other sort of common people there may be.

As for gentlemen, they are such as are distinguished either by their

fortune, their birth, their abilities, or their education, or any

such-like excellence which is attributed to them.

The most pure democracy is that which is so called principally from that

equality which prevails in it: for this is what the law in that state

directs; that the poor shall be in no greater subjection than the rich;

nor that the supreme power shall be lodged with either of these, but

that both shall share it. For if liberty and equality, as some persons

suppose, are chiefly to be found in a democracy, it must be most so

by every department of government being alike open to all; but as the

people are the majority, and what they vote is law, it follows that such

a state must be a democracy. This, then, is one species thereof. Another

is, when the magistrates are elected by a certain census; but this

should be but small, and every one who was included in it should be

eligible, but as soon as he was below it should lose that right. [1292a]

Another sort is, in which every citizen who is not infamous has a share

in the government, but where the government is in the laws. Another,

where every citizen without exception has this right. Another is like

these in other particulars, but there the people govern, and not the

law: and this takes place when everything is determined by a majority of

votes, and not by a law; which happens when the people are influenced by

the demagogues: for where a democracy is governed by stated laws there

is no room for them, but men of worth fill the first offices in the

state: but where the power is not vested in the laws, there demagogues

abound: for there the people rule with kingly power: the whole composing

one body; for they are supreme, not as individuals but in their

collective capacity.

Homer also discommends the government of many; but whether he means this

we are speaking of, or where each person exercises his power separately,

is uncertain. When the people possess this power they desire to be

altogether absolute, that they may not be under the control of the law,

and this is the time when flatterers are held in repute. Nor is there

any difference between such a people and monarchs in a tyranny: for

their manners are the same, and they both hold a despotic power over

better persons than themselves. For their decrees are like the others'

edicts; their demagogues like the others' flatterers: but their greatest

resemblance consists in the mutual support they give to each other, the

flatterer to the tyrant, the demagogue to the people: and to them it is

owing that the supreme power is lodged in the votes of the people,

and not in the laws; for they bring everything before them, as their

influence is owing to their being supreme whose opinions they entirely

direct; for these are they whom the multitude obey. Besides, those who

accuse the magistrates insist upon it, that the right of determining on

their conduct lies in the people, who gladly receive their complaints as

the means of destroying all their offices.

Any one, therefore, may with great justice blame such a government as

being a democracy, and not a free state; for where the government is

not in the laws, then there is no free state, for the law ought to be

supreme over all things; and particular incidents which arise should be

determined by the magistrates or the state. If, therefore, a

democracy is to be reckoned a free state, it is evident that any such

establishment which centres all power in the votes of the people cannot,

properly speaking, be a democracy: for their decrees cannot be general

in their extent. Thus, then, we may describe the several species of

democracies.

CHAPTER V

Of the different species of oligarchies one is, when the right to the

offices is regulated by a certain census; so that the poor, although the

majority, have no share in it; while all those who are included therein

take part in the management of public affairs. Another sort is, when

[1292b] the magistrates are men of very small fortune, who upon any

vacancy do themselves fill it up: and if they do this out of the

community at large, the state approaches to an aristocracy; if out of

any particular class of people, it will be an oligarchy. Another sort of

oligarchy is, when the power is an hereditary nobility. The fourth is,

when the power is in the same hands as the other, but not under the

control of law; and this sort of oligarchy exactly corresponds to a

tyranny in monarchies, and to that particular species of democracies

which I last mentioned in treating of that state: this has the

particular name of a dynasty. These are the different sorts of

oligarchies and democracies.

It should also be known, that it often happens that a free state, where

the supreme power is in the laws, may not be democratic, and yet in

consequence of the established manners and customs of the people, may

be governed as if it was; so, on the other hand, where the laws may

countenance a more democratic form of government, these may make the

state inclining to an oligarchy; and this chiefly happens when there

has been any alteration in the government; for the people do not easily

change, but love their own ancient customs; and it is by small degrees

only that one thing takes place of another; so that the ancient laws

will remain, while the power will be in the hands of those who have

brought about a revolution in the state.

CHAPTER VI

It is evident from what has been said, that there are as many different

sorts of democracies and oligarchies as I have reckoned up: for, of

necessity, either all ranks of the people which I have enumerated must

have a share in the government, or some only, and others not; for when

the husbandmen, and those only who possess moderate fortunes, have the

supreme power, they will govern according to law; for as they must get

their livings by their employs, they have but little leisure for public

business: they will therefore establish proper laws, and never call

public assemblies but when there is a necessity for them; and they will

readily let every one partake with them in the administration of public

affairs as soon as they possess that fortune which the law requires for

their qualification: every one, therefore, who is qualified will have

his share in the government: for to exclude any would be to make the

government an oligarchy, and for all to have leisure to attend

without they had a subsistence would be impossible: for these reasons,

therefore, this government is a species of democracy. Another species is

distinguished by the mode of electing their magistrates, in which every

one is eligible, to whose birth there are no objections, provided he is

supposed to have leisure to attend: for which reason in such a democracy

the supreme power will be vested in the laws, as there will be nothing

paid to those who go to the public assemblies. A third species is where

every freeman has a right to a share in the government, which he will

not accept for the cause already assigned; for which reason here also

the supreme power will be in the law. The fourth species [1293a] of

democracy, the last which was established in order of time, arose when

cities were greatly enlarged to what they were at first, and when the

public revenue became something considerable; for then the populace, on

account of their numbers, were admitted to share in the management of

public affairs, for then even the poorest people were at leisure to

attend to them, as they received wages for so doing; nay, they were more

so than others, as they were not hindered by having anything of their

own to mind, as the rich had; for which reason these last very often did

not frequent the public assemblies and the courts of justice: thus the

supreme power was lodged in the poor, and not in the laws. These are

the different sorts of democracies, and such are the causes which

necessarily gave birth to them.

The first species of oligarchy is, when the generality of the state are

men of moderate and not too large property; for this gives them leisure

for the management of public affairs: and, as they are a numerous body,

it necessarily follows that the supreme power must be in the laws, and

not in men; for as they are far removed from a monarchical government,

and have not sufficient fortune to neglect their private affairs, while

they are too many to be supported by the public, they will of course

determine to be governed by the laws, and not by each other. But if the

men of property in the state are but few, and their property is large,

then an oligarchy of the second sort will take place; for those who have

most power will think that they have a right to lord it over the others;

and, to accomplish this, they will associate to themselves some who have

an inclination for public affairs, and as they are not powerful enough

to govern without law, they will make a law for that purpose. And if

those few who have large fortunes should acquire still greater power,

the oligarchy will then alter into one of the third sort; for they will

get all the offices of the state into their own hands by a law which

directs the son to succeed upon the death of his father; and,

after that, when, by means of their increasing wealth and powerful

connections, they extend still further their oppression, a monarchical

dynasty will directly succeed wherein men will be supreme, and not the

law; and this is the fourth species of an oligarchy correspondent to the

last-mentioned class of democracies.

CHAPTER VII

There are besides two other states, a democracy and an oligarchy, one

of which all speak of, and it is always esteemed a species of the

four sorts; and thus they reckon them up; a monarchy, an oligarchy, a

democracy, and this fourth which they call an aristocracy. There is

also a fifth, which bears a name that is also common to the other four,

namely, a state: but as this is seldom to be met with, it has escaped

those who have endeavoured to enumerate the different sorts of

governments, which [1293b] they fix at four only, as does Plato in his

Republic.

An aristocracy, of which I have already treated in the first book, is

rightly called so; for a state governed by the best men, upon the most

virtuous principles, and not upon any hypothesis, which even good men

may propose, has alone a right to be called an aristocracy, for it is

there only that a man is at once a good man and a good citizen; while in

other states men are good only relative to those states. Moreover, there

are some other states which are called by the same name, that differ

both from oligarchies and free states, wherein not only the rich but

also the virtuous have a share in the administration; and have therefore

acquired the name of aristocracies; for in those governments wherein

virtue is not their common care, there are still men of worth and

approved goodness. Whatever state, then, like the Carthaginians,

favours the rich, the virtuous, and the citizens at large, is a sort

of aristocracy: when only the two latter are held in esteem, as at

Lacedaemon, and the state is jointly composed of these, it is a virtuous

democracy. These are the two species of aristocracies after the first,

which is the best of all governments. There is also a third, which is,

whenever a free state inclines to the dominion of a few.

CHAPTER VIII

It now remains for us to treat of that government which is particularly

called a free state, and also of a tyranny; and the reason for my

choosing to place that free state here is, because this, as well

as those aristocracies already mentioned, although they do not seem

excesses, yet, to speak true, they have all departed from what a perfect

government is. Nay, they are deviations both of them equally from other

forms, as I said at the beginning. It is proper to mention a tyranny the

last of all governments, for it is of all others the least like one:

but as my intention is to treat of all governments in general, for this

reason that also, as I have said, will be taken into consideration in

its proper place.

I shall now inquire into a free state and show what it is; and we shall

the better understand its positive nature as we have already described

an oligarchy and a democracy; for a free state is indeed nothing more

than a mixture of them, and it has been usual to call those which

incline most to a democracy, a free state; those which incline most to

an oligarchy, an aristocracy, because those who are rich are generally

men of family and education; besides, they enjoy those things which

others are often guilty of crimes to procure: for which reason they are

regarded as men of worth and honour and note.

Since, then, it is the genius of an aristocracy to allot the larger

part of the government to the best citizens, they therefore say, that

an oligarchy is chiefly composed of those men who are worthy and

honourable: now it [1294a] seems impossible that where the government

is in the hands of the good, there the laws should not be good, but bad;

or, on the contrary, that where the government is in the hands of the

bad, there the laws should be good; nor is a government well constituted

because the laws are, without at the same time care is taken that they

are observed; for to enforce obedience to the laws which it makes is one

proof of a good constitution in the state-another is, to have laws well

calculated for those who are to abide by them; for if they are improper

they must be obeyed: and this may be done two ways, either by their

being the best relative to the particular state, or the best absolutely.

An aristocracy seems most likely to confer the honours of the state on

the virtuous; for virtue is the object of an aristocracy, riches of an

oligarchy, and liberty of a democracy; for what is approved of by the

majority will prevail in all or in each of these three different states;

and that which seems good to most of those who compose the community

will prevail: for what is called a state prevails in many communities,

which aim at a mixture of rich and poor, riches and liberty: as for

the rich, they are usually supposed to take the place of the worthy and

honourable. As there are three things which claim an equal rank in the

state, freedom, riches, and virtue (for as for the fourth, rank, it is

an attendant on two of the others, for virtue and riches are the origin

of family), it is evident, that the conjuncture of the rich and the poor

make up a free state; but that all three tend to an aristocracy more

than any other, except that which is truly so, which holds the first

rank.

We have already seen that there are governments different from a

monarchy, a democracy, and an oligarchy; and what they are, and wherein

they differ from each other; and also aristocracies and states properly

so called, which are derived from them; and it is evident that these are

not much unlike each other.

CHAPTER IX

We shall next proceed to show how that government which is peculiarly

called a state arises alongside of democracy and oligarchy, and how it

ought to be established; and this will at the same time show what are

the proper boundaries of both these governments, for we must mark out

wherein they differ from one another, and then from both these compose

a state of such parts of each of them as will show from whence they were

taken.

There are three different ways in which two states may be blended and

joined together; for, in the first place, all those rules may be adopted

which the laws of each of them have ordered; as for instance in the

judicial department, for in an oligarchy the rich are fined if they do

not come to the court as jurymen, but the poor are not paid for their

attendance; but in democracies they are, while the rich are not fined

for their neglect. Now these things, as being common to both, are fit

to be observed in a free [1294b] state which is composed of both. This,

then, is one way in which they may be joined together. In the second

place, a medium may be taken between the different methods which each

state observes; for instance, in a democracy the right to vote in the

public assembly is either confined by no census at all, or limited by a

very small one; in an oligarchy none enjoy it but those whose census is

high: therefore, as these two practices are contrary to each other, a

census between each may be established in such a state. In the third

place, different laws of each community may be adopted; as, for

instance, as it seems correspondent to the nature of a democracy, that

the magistrates should be chosen by lot, but an aristocracy by vote, and

in the one state according to a census, but not in the other: let, then,

an aristocracy and a free state copy something from each of them; let

them follow an oligarchy in choosing their magistrates by vote, but a

democracy in not admitting of any census, and thus blend together the

different customs of the two governments. But the best proof of a happy

mixture of a democracy and an oligarchy is this, when a person may

properly call the same state a democracy and an oligarchy. It is evident

that those who speak of it in this manner are induced to it because both

these governments are there well blended together: and indeed this

is common to all mediums, that the extremes of each side should be

discerned therein, as at Lacedaemon; for many affirm that it is a

democracy from the many particulars in which it follows that form of

government; as for instance, in the first place, in the bringing up of

their children, for the rich and poor are brought up in the same manner;

and their education is such that the children of the poor may partake of

it; and the same rules are observed when they are youths and men, there

is no distinction between a rich person and a poor one; and in their

public tables the same provision is served to all. The rich also wear

only such clothes as the poorest man is able to purchase. Moreover, with

respect to two magistracies of the highest rank, one they have a right

to elect to, the other to fill; namely, the senate and the ephori.

Others consider it as an oligarchy, the principles of which it follows

in many things, as in choosing all their officers by vote, and not by

lot; in there being but a few who have a right to sit in judgment on

capital causes and the like. Indeed, a state which is well composed of

two others ought to resemble them both, and neither, Such a state ought

to have its means of preservation in itself, and not without; and when I

say in itself, I do not mean that it should owe this to the forbearance

of their neighbours, for this may happen to a bad government, but to

every member of the community's not being willing that there should be

the least alteration in their constitution. Such is the method in which

a free state or aristocracy ought to be established.

CHAPTER X

It now remains to treat of a tyranny; not that there is [1295a] much

to be said on that subject, but as it makes part of our plan, since

we enumerated it amongst our different sorts of governments. In the

beginning of this work we inquired into the nature of kingly government,

and entered into a particular examination of what was most properly

called so, and whether it was advantageous to a state or not, and what

it should be, and how established; and we divided a tyranny into two

pieces when we were upon this subject, because there is something

analogous between this and a kingly government, for they are both of

them established by law; for among some of the barbarians they elect a

monarch with absolute power, and formerly among the Greeks there were

some such, whom they called sesumnetes. Now these differ from each

other; for some possess only kingly power regulated by law, and

rule those who voluntarily submit to their government; others rule

despotically according to their own will. There is a third species of

tyranny, most properly so called, which is the very opposite to kingly

power; for this is the government of one who rules over his equals and

superiors without being accountable for his conduct, and whose object is

his own advantage, and not the advantage of those he governs; for which

reason he rules by compulsion, for no freemen will ever willingly submit

to such a government. These are the different species of tyrannies,

their principles, and their causes.

CHAPTER XI

We proceed now to inquire what form of government and what manner

of life is best for communities in general, not adapting it to that

superior virtue which is above the reach of the vulgar, or that

education which every advantage of nature and fortune only can furnish,

nor to those imaginary plans which may be formed at pleasure; but to

that mode of life which the greater part of mankind can attain to,

and that government which most cities may establish: for as to those

aristocracies which we have now mentioned, they are either too perfect

for a state to support, or one so nearly alike to that state we now

going to inquire into, that we shall treat of them both as one.

The opinions which we form upon these subjects must depend upon one

common principle: for if what I have said in my treatise on Morals is

true, a happy life must arise from an uninterrupted course of virtue;

and if virtue consists in a certain medium, the middle life must

certainly be the happiest; which medium is attainable [1295b] by

every one. The boundaries of virtue and vice in the state must also

necessarily be the same as in a private person; for the form of

government is the life of the city. In every city the people are divided

into three sorts; the very rich, the very poor, and those who are

between them. If this is universally admitted, that the mean is best, it

is evident that even in point of fortune mediocrity is to be preferred;

for that state is most submissive to reason; for those who are very

handsome, or very strong, or very noble, or very rich; or, on the

contrary; those who are very poor, or very weak, or very mean, with

difficulty obey it; for the one are capricious and greatly flagitious,

the other rascally and mean, the crimes of each arising from their

different excesses: nor will they go through the different offices

of the state; which is detrimental to it: besides, those who excel in

strength, in riches, or friends, or the like, neither know how nor are

willing to submit to command: and this begins at home when they are

boys; for there they are brought up too delicately to be accustomed to

obey their preceptors: as for the very poor, their general and excessive

want of what the rich enjoy reduces them to a state too mean: so that

the one know not how to command, but to be commanded as slaves, the

others know not how to submit to any command, nor to command themselves

but with despotic power.

A city composed of such men must therefore consist of slaves and

masters, not freemen; where one party must hate, and the other

despise, where there could be no possibility of friendship or political

community: for community supposes affection; for we do not even on the

road associate with our enemies. It is also the genius of a city to be

composed as much as possible of equals; which will be most so when the

inhabitants are in the middle state: from whence it follows, that that

city must be best framed which is composed of those whom we say are

naturally its proper members. It is men of this station also who will be

best assured of safety and protection; for they will neither covet what

belongs to others, as the poor do; nor will others covet what is theirs,

as the poor do what belongs to the rich; and thus, without plotting

against any one, or having any one plot against them, they will live

free from danger: for which reason Phocylides wisely wishes for the

middle state, as being most productive of happiness. It is plain, then,

that the most perfect political community must be amongst those who are

in the middle rank, and those states are best instituted wherein these

are a larger and more respectable part, if possible, than both the

other; or, if that cannot be, at least than either of them separate;

so that being thrown into the balance it may prevent either scale from

preponderating.

It is therefore the greatest happiness which the citizens can enjoy to

possess a moderate and convenient fortune; for when some possess too

much, and others nothing at [1296a] all, the government must either be

in the hands of the meanest rabble or else a pure oligarchy; or, from

the excesses of both, a tyranny; for this arises from a headstrong

democracy or an oligarchy, but very seldom when the members of the

community are nearly on an equality with each other. We will assign a

reason for this when we come to treat of the alterations which different

states are likely to undergo. The middle state is therefore best, as

being least liable to those seditions and insurrections which disturb

the community; and for the same reason extensive governments are least

liable to these inconveniences; for there those in a middle state are

very numerous, whereas in small ones it is easy to pass to the two

extremes, so as hardly to have any in a medium remaining, but the

one half rich, the other poor: and from the same principle it is that

democracies are more firmly established and of longer continuance than

oligarchies; but even in those when there is a want of a proper number

of men of middling fortune, the poor extend their power too far, abuses

arise, and the government is soon at an end.

We ought to consider as a proof of what I now advance, that the best

lawgivers themselves were those in the middle rank of life, amongst whom

was Solon, as is evident from his poems, and Lycurgus, for he was not

a king, and Charondas, and indeed most others. What has been said will

show us why of so many free states some have changed to democracies,

others to oligarchies: for whenever the number of those in the middle

state has been too small, those who were the more numerous, whether the

rich or the poor, always overpowered them and assumed to themselves the

administration of public affairs; from hence arose either a democracy

or an oligarchy. Moreover, when in consequence of their disputes and

quarrels with each other, either the rich get the better of the poor, or

the poor of the rich, neither of them will establish a free state;

but, as the record of their victory, one which inclines to their own

principles, and form either a democracy or an oligarchy.

Those who made conquests in Greece, having all of them an eye to the

respective forms of government in their own cities, established either

democracies or oligarchies, not considering what was serviceable to the

state, but what was similar to their own; for which reason a government

has never been established where the supreme power has been placed

amongst those of the middling rank, or very seldom; and, amongst a few,

one man only of those who have yet been conquerors has been persuaded

to give the preference to this order of [1296b] men: it is indeed an

established custom with the inhabitants of most cities not to desire an

equality, but either to aspire to govern, or when they are conquered, to

submit.

Thus we have shown what the best state is, and why. It will not be

difficult to perceive of the many states which there are, for we have

seen that there are various forms both of democracies and oligarchies,

to which we should give the first place, to which the second, and in

the same manner the next also; and to observe what are the particular

excellences and defects of each, after we have first described the best

possible; for that must be the best which is nearest to this, that worst

which is most distant from the medium, without any one has a particular

plan of his own which he judges by. I mean by this, that it may happen,

that although one form of government may be better than another, yet

there is no reason to prevent another from being preferable thereunto in

particular circumstances and for particular purposes.

CHAPTER XII

After what has been said, it follows that we should now show what

particular form of government is most suitable for particular persons;

first laying this down as a general maxim, that that party which desires

to support the actual administration of the state ought always to be

superior to that which would alter it. Every city is made up of quality

and quantity: by quality I mean liberty, riches, education, and family,

and by quantity its relative populousness: now it may happen that

quality may exist in one of those parts of which the city is composed,

and quantity in another; thus the number of the ignoble may be greater

than the number of those of family, the number of the poor than that of

the rich; but not so that the quantity of the one shall overbalance the

quality of the other; those must be properly adjusted to each other; for

where the number of the poor exceeds the proportion we have mentioned,

there a democracy will rise up, and if the husbandry should have

more power than others, it will be a democracy of husbandmen; and the

democracy will be a particular species according to that class of

men which may happen to be most numerous: thus, should these be the

husbandmen, it will be of these, and the best; if of mechanics and those

who hire themselves out, the worst possible: in the same manner it may

be of any other set between these two. But when the rich and the noble

prevail more by their quality than they are deficient in quantity, there

an oligarchy ensues; and this oligarchy may be of different species,

according to the nature of the prevailing party. Every legislator in

framing his constitution ought to have a particular regard to those in

the middle rank of life; and if he intends an oligarchy, these should

be the object of his laws; if a democracy, to these they should be

entrusted; and whenever their number exceeds that of the two others, or

at least one of them, they give [1297a] stability to the constitution;

for there is no fear that the rich and the poor should agree to conspire

together against them, for neither of these will choose to serve the

other. If any one would choose to fix the administration on the widest

basis, he will find none preferable to this; for to rule by turns is

what the rich and the poor will not submit to, on account of their

hatred to each other. It is, moreover, allowed that an arbitrator is the

most proper person for both parties to trust to; now this arbitrator is

the middle rank.

Those who would establish aristocratical governments are mistaken not

only in giving too much power to the rich, but also in deceiving the

common people; for at last, instead of an imaginary good, they must feel

a real evil, for the encroachments of the rich are more destructive to

the state than those of the poor.

CHAPTER XIII

There are five particulars in which, under fair pretences, the rich

craftily endeavour to undermine the rights of the people, these are

their public assemblies, their offices of state, their courts of

justice, their military power, and their gymnastic exercises. With

respect to their public assemblies, in having them open to all, but in

fining the rich only, or others very little, for not attending; with

respect to offices, in permitting the poor to swear off, but not

granting this indulgence to those who are within the census;

with respect to their courts of justice, in fining the rich for

non-attendance, but the poor not at all, or those a great deal, and

these very little, as was done by the laws of Charondas. In some

places every citizen who was enrolled had a right to attend the public

assemblies and to try causes; which if they did not do, a very heavy

fine was laid upon them; that through fear of the fine they might avoid

being enrolled, as they were then obliged to do neither the one nor the

other. The same spirit of legislation prevailed with respect to their

bearing arms and their gymnastic exercises; for the poor are excused if

they have no arms, but the rich are fined; the same method takes place

if they do not attend their gymnastic exercises, there is no penalty on

one, but there is on the other: the consequence of which is, that the

fear of this penalty induces the rich to keep the one and attend the

other, while the poor do neither. These are the deceitful contrivances

of oligarchical legislators.

The contrary prevails in a democracy; for there they make the poor a

proper allowance for attending the assemblies and the courts, but give

the rich nothing for doing it: whence it is evident, that if any one

would properly blend these customs together, they must extend both the

pay and the fine to every member of the community, and then every one

would share in it, whereas part only now do. The citizens of a free

state ought to [1297b] consist of those only who bear arms: with respect

to their census it is not easy to determine exactly what it ought to be,

but the rule that should direct upon this subject should be to make it

as extensive as possible, so that those who are enrolled in it make up

a greater part of the people than those who are not; for those who are

poor, although they partake not of the offices of the state, are willing

to live quiet, provided that no one disturbs them in their property: but

this is not an easy matter; for it may not always happen, that those who

are at the head of public affairs are of a humane behaviour. In time

of war the poor are accustomed to show no alacrity without they have

provisions found them; when they have, then indeed they are willing to

fight.

In some governments the power is vested not only in those who bear arms,

but also in those who have borne them. Among the Malienses the state was

composed of these latter only, for all the officers were soldiers who

had served their time. And the first states in Greece which succeeded

those where kingly power was established, were governed by the military.

First of all the horse, for at that time the strength and excellence of

the army depended on the horse, for as to the heavy-armed foot they were

useless without proper discipline; but the art of tactics was not known

to the ancients, for which reason their strength lay in their horse: but

when cities grew larger, and they depended more on their foot, greater

numbers partook of the freedom of the city; for which reason what we

call republics were formerly called democracies. The ancient governments

were properly oligarchies or kingdoms; for on account of the few persons

in each state, it would have been impossible to have found a sufficient

number of the middle rank; so these being but few, and those used to

subordination, they more easily submitted to be governed.

We have now shown why there are many sorts of governments, and others

different from those we have treated of: for there are more species of

democracies than one, and the like is true of other forms, and what are

their differences, and whence they arise; and also of all others

which is the best, at least in general; and which is best suited for

particular people.

CHAPTER XIV

We will now proceed to make some general reflections upon the

governments next in order, and also to consider each of them in

particular; beginning with those principles which appertain to each: now

there are three things in all states which a careful legislator ought

well to consider, which are of great consequence to all, and which

properly attended to the state must necessarily be happy; and according

to the variation of which the one will differ from the other. The first

of these is the [1298a] public assembly; the second the officers of the

state, that is, who they ought to be, and with what power they should be

entrusted, and in what manner they should be appointed; the third, the

judicial department.

Now it is the proper business of the public assembly to determine

concerning war and peace, making or breaking off alliances, to enact

laws, to sentence to death, banishment, or confiscation of goods, and to

call the magistrates to account for their behaviour when in office. Now

these powers must necessarily be entrusted to the citizens in general,

or all of them to some; either to one magistrate or more; or some to

one, and some to another, or some to all, but others to some: to entrust

all to all is in the spirit of a democracy, for the people aim at

equality. There are many methods of delegating these powers to the

citizens at large, one of which is to let them execute them by turn, and

not altogether, as was done by Tellecles, the Milesian, in his state. In

others the supreme council is composed of the different magistrates,

and they succeed to the offices of the community by proper divisions of

tribes, wards, and other very small proportions, till every one in his

turn goes through them: nor does the whole community ever meet together,

without it is when new laws are enacted, or some national affair is

debated, or to hear what the magistrates have to propose to them.

Another method is for the people to meet in a collective body, but

only for the purpose of holding the comitia, making laws, determining

concerning war or peace, and inquiring into the conduct of their

magistrates, while the remaining part of the public business is

conducted by the magistrates, who have their separate departments, and

are chosen out of the whole community either by vote or ballot. Another

method is for the people in general to meet for the choice of the

magistrates, and to examine into their conduct; and also to deliberate

concerning war and alliances, and to leave other things to the

magistrates, whoever happen to be chosen, whose particular employments

are such as necessarily require persons well skilled therein. A fourth

method is for every person to deliberate upon every subject in public

assembly, where the magistrates can determine nothing of themselves, and

have only the privilege of giving their opinions first; and this is the

method of the most pure democracy, which is analogous to the proceedings

in a dynastic oligarchy and a tyrannic monarchy.

These, then, are the methods in which public business is conducted in a

democracy. When the power is in the hands of part of the community

only, it is an oligarchy and this also admits of different customs; for

whenever the officers of the state are chosen out of those who have a

moderate fortune, and these from that circumstance are many, and

when they depart not from that line which the law has laid down, but

carefully follow it, and when all within the census are eligible,

certainly it is then an oligarchy, but founded on true principles of

government [1298b] from its moderation. When the people in general do

not partake of the deliberative power, but certain persons chosen for

that purpose, who govern according to law; this also, like the first,

is an oligarchy. When those who have the deliberative power elect each

other, and the son succeeds to the father, and when they can supersede

the laws, such a government is of necessity a strict oligarchy. When

some persons determine on one thing, and others on another, as war and

peace, and when all inquire into the conduct of their magistrates, and

other things are left to different officers, elected either by vote or

lot, then the government is an aristocracy or a free state. When some

are chosen by vote and others by lot, and these either from the people

in general, or from a certain number elected for that purpose, or if

both the votes and the lots are open to all, such a state is partly an

aristocracy, partly a free government itself. These are the different

methods in which the deliberative power is vested in different states,

all of whom follow some regulation here laid down. It is advantageous to

a democracy, in the present sense of the word, by which I mean a state

wherein the people at large have a supreme power, even over the laws, to

hold frequent public assemblies; and it will be best in this particular

to imitate the example of oligarchies in their courts of justice; for

they fine those who are appointed to try causes if they do not attend,

so should they reward the poor for coming to the public assemblies:

and their counsels will be best when all advise with each other, the

citizens with the nobles, the nobles with the citizens. It is also

advisable when the council is to be composed of part of the citizens, to

elect, either by vote or lot, an equal number of both ranks. It is also

proper, if the common people in the state are very numerous, either not

to pay every one for his attendance, but such a number only as will make

them equal to the nobles, or to reject many of them by lot.

In an oligarchy they should either call up some of the common people to

the council, or else establish a court, as is done in some other states,

whom they call pre-advisers or guardians of the laws, whose business

should be to propose first what they should afterwards enact. By this

means the people would have a place in the administration of public

affairs, without having it in their power to occasion any disorder in

the government. Moreover, the people may be allowed to have a vote

in whatever bill is proposed, but may not themselves propose anything

contrary thereto; or they may give their advice, while the power of

determining may be with the magistrates only. It is also necessary to

follow a contrary practice to what is established in democracies,

for the people should be allowed the power of pardoning, but not

of condemning, for the cause should be referred back again to the

magistrates: whereas the contrary takes place in republics; for the

power of pardoning is with the few, but not of condemning, which is

always referred [1299a] to the people at large. And thus we determine

concerning the deliberative power in any state, and in whose hands it

shall be.

CHAPTER XV

We now proceed to consider the choice of magistrates; for this branch of

public business contains many different Parts, as how many there shall

be, what shall be their particular office, and with respect to time how

long each of them shall continue in place; for some make it six months,

others shorter, others for a year, others for a much longer time; or

whether they should be perpetual or for a long time, or neither; for

the same person may fill the same office several times, or he may not be

allowed to enjoy it even twice, but only once: and also with respect to

the appointment of magistrates, who are to be eligible, who is to choose

them, and in what manner; for in all these particulars we ought properly

to distinguish the different ways which may be followed; and then to

show which of these is best suited to such and such governments.

Now it is not easy to determine to whom we ought properly to give the

name of magistrate, for a government requires many persons in office;

but every one of those who is either chosen by vote or lot is not to be

reckoned a magistrate. The priests, for instance, in the first place;

for these are to be considered as very different from civil magistrates:

to these we may add the choregi and heralds; nay, even ambassadors are

elected: there are some civil employments which belong to the citizens;

and these are either when they are all engaged in one thing, as when as

soldiers they obey their general, or when part of them only are, as in

governing the women or educating the youth; and also some economic, for

they often elect corn-meters: others are servile, and in which, if they

are rich, they employ slaves. But indeed they are most properly called

magistrates, who are members of the deliberative council, or decide

causes, or are in some command, the last more especially, for to command

is peculiar to magistrates. But to speak truth, this question is of

no great consequence, nor is it the province of the judges to decide

between those who dispute about words; it may indeed be an object of

speculative inquiry; but to inquire what officers are necessary in a

state, and how many, and what, though not most necessary, may yet be

advantageous in a well-established government, is a much more useful

employment, and this with respect to all states in general, as well as

to small cities.

In extensive governments it is proper to allot one employment to one

person, as there are many to serve the public in so numerous a society,

where some may be passed over for a long time, and others never be in

office but once; and indeed everything is better done which has the

whole attention of one person, than when that [1299b] attention is

divided amongst many; but in small states it is necessary that a few of

the citizens should execute many employments; for their numbers are so

small it will not be convenient to have many of them in office at the

same time; for where shall we find others to succeed them in turn? Small

states will sometimes want the same magistrates and the same laws as

large ones; but the one will not want to employ them so often as the

other; so that different charges may be intrusted to the same person

without any inconvenience, for they will not interfere with each

other, and for want of sufficient members in the community it will be

necessary. If we could tell how many magistrates are necessary in every

city, and how many, though not necessary, it is yet proper to have, we

could then the better know how many different offices one might assign

to one magistrate. It is also necessary to know what tribunals in

different places should have different things under their jurisdiction,

and also what things should always come under the cognisance of the same

magistrate; as, for instance, decency of manners, shall the clerk of the

market take cognisance of that if the cause arises in the market, and

another magistrate in another place, or the same magistrate everywhere:

or shall there be a distinction made of the fact, or the parties? as,

for instance, in decency of manners, shall it be one cause when it

relates to a man, another when it relates to a woman?

In different states shall the magistrates be different or the same?

I mean, whether in a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a

monarchy, the same persons shall have the same power? or shall it

vary according to the different formation of the government? as in an

aristocracy the offices of the state are allotted to those who are well

educated; in an oligarchy to those who are rich; in a democracy to the

freemen? Or shall the magistrates differ as the communities differ?

For it may happen that the very same may be sometimes proper, sometimes

otherwise: in this state it may be necessary that the magistrate have

great powers, in that but small. There are also certain magistrates

peculiar to certain states--as the pre-advisers are not proper in a

democracy, but a senate is; for one such order is necessary, whose

business shall be to consider beforehand and prepare those bills which

shall be brought before the people that they may have leisure to

attend to their own affairs; and when these are few in number the state

inclines to an oligarchy. The pre-advisers indeed must always be few

for they are peculiar to an oligarchy: and where there are both

these offices in the same state, the pre-adviser's is superior to

the senator's, the one having only a democratical power, the other an

oligarchical: and indeed the [1300a] power of the senate is lost in

those democracies, in which the people, meeting in one public assembly,

take all the business into their own hands; and this is likely to happen

either when the community in general are in easy circumstances, or when

they are paid for their attendance; for they are then at leisure often

to meet together and determine everything for themselves. A magistrate

whose business is to control the manners of the boys, or women, or who

takes any department similar to this, is to be found in an aristocracy,

not in a democracy; for who can forbid the wives of the poor from

appearing in public? neither is such a one to be met with in an

oligarchy; for the women there are too delicate to bear control. And

thus much for this subject. Let us endeavour to treat at large of the

establishment of magistrates, beginning from first principles. Now, they

differ from each other in three ways, from which, blended together,

all the varieties which can be imagined arise. The first of these

differences is in those who appoint the magistrates, the second consists

in those who are appointed, the third in the mode of appointment; and

each of these three differ in three manners; for either all the citizens

may appoint collectively, or some out of their whole body, or some out

of a particular order in it, according to fortune, family, or virtue, or

some other rule (as at Megara, where the right of election was amongst

those who had returned together to their country, and had reinstated

themselves by force of arms) and this either by vote or lot. Again,

these several modes may be differently formed together, as some

magistrates may be chosen by part of the community, others by the whole;

some out of part, others out of the whole; some by vote, others by lot:

and each of these different modes admit of a four-fold subdivision; for

either all may elect all by vote or by lot; and when all elect, they may

either proceed without any distinction, or they may elect by a certain

division of tribes, wards, or companies, till they have gone through the

whole community: and some magistrates may be elected one way, and others

another. Again, if some magistrates are elected either by vote or lot

of all the citizens, or by the vote of some and the lot of some, or

some one way and some another; that is to say, some by the vote of all,

others by the lot of all, there will then be twelve different methods

of electing the magistrates, without blending the two together. Of

these there are two adapted to a democracy; namely, to have all the

magistrates chosen out of all the people, either by vote or lot, or

both; that is to say, some of them by lot, some by vote. In a free state

the whole community should not elect at the same time, but some out of

the whole, or out of some particular rank; and this either by lot, or

vote, or both: and they should elect either out of the whole community,

or out of some particular persons in it, and this both by lot and vote.

In an oligarchy it is proper to choose some magistrates out of the whole

body of the citizens, some by vote, some by lot, others by both: by lot

is most correspondent to that form of government. In a free aristocracy,

some magistrates [1300b] should be chosen out of the community in

general, others out of a particular rank, or these by choice, those

by lot. In a pure oligarchy, the magistrates should be chosen out of

certain ranks, and by certain persons, and some of those by lot, others

by both methods; but to choose them out of the whole community is not

correspondent to the nature of this government. It is proper in an

aristocracy for the whole community to elect their magistrates out of

particular persons, and this by vote. These then are all the different

ways of electing of magistrates; and they have been allotted according

to the nature of the different communities; but what mode of proceeding

is proper for different communities, or how the offices ought to be

established, or with what powers shall be particularly explained. I mean

by the powers of a magistrate, what should be his particular province,

as the management of the finances or the laws of the state; for

different magistrates have different powers, as that of the general of

the army differs from the clerk of the market.

CHAPTER XVI

Of the three parts of which a government is formed, we now come to

consider the judicial; and this also we shall divide in the same manner

as we did the magisterial, into three parts. Of whom the judges shall

consist, and for what causes, and how. When I say of whom, I mean

whether they shall be the whole people, or some particulars; by for what

causes I mean, how many different courts shall be appointed; by how,

whether they shall be elected by vote or lot. Let us first determine how

many different courts there ought to be. Now these are eight. The

first of these is the court of inspection over the behaviour of the

magistrates when they have quitted their office; the second is to punish

those who have injured the public; the third is to take cognisance of

those causes in which the state is a party; the fourth is to decide

between magistrates and private persons, who appeal from a fine laid

upon them; the fifth is to determine disputes which may arise concerning

contracts of great value; the sixth is to judge between foreigners, and

of murders, of which there are different species; and these may all be

tried by the same judges or by different ones; for there are murders

of malice prepense and of chance-medley; there is also justifiable

homicide, where the fact is admitted, and the legality of it disputed.

There is also another court called at Athens the Court of Phreattae,

which determines points relating to a murder committed by one who has

run away, to decide whether he shall return; though such an affair

happens but seldom, and in very large cities; the seventh, to determine

causes wherein strangers are concerned, and this whether they are

between stranger and stranger or between a stranger and a citizen. The

eighth and last is for small actions, from one to five drachma's, or a

little more; for these ought also to be legally determined, but not to

be brought before the whole body of the judges. But without entering

into any particulars concerning actions for murder, and those wherein

strangers are the parties, let us particularly treat of those courts

which have the jurisdiction of those matters which more particularly

relate to the affairs of the community and which if not well conducted

occasion seditions and commotions in the state. Now, of necessity,

either all persons must have a right to judge of all these different

causes, appointed for that purpose, either by vote or lot, or all of

all, some of them by vote, and others by lot, or in some causes by vote,

in others by lot. Thus there will be four sorts of judges. There [1301a]

will be just the same number also if they are chosen out of part of the

people only; for either all the judges must be chosen out of that part

either by vote or lot, or some by lot and some by vote, or the judges in

particular causes must be chosen some by vote, others by lot; by which

means there will be the same number of them also as was mentioned.

Besides, different judges may be joined together; I mean those who are

chosen out of the whole people or part of them or both; so that all

three may sit together in the same court, and this either by vote,

lot, or both. And thus much for the different sorts of judges. Of these

appointments that which admits all the community to be judges in all

causes is most suitable to a democracy; the second, which appoints that

certain persons shall judge all causes, to an oligarchy; the third,

which appoints the whole community to be judges in some causes, but

particular persons in others, to an aristocracy or free state.

BOOK V

CHAPTER I

We have now gone through those particulars we proposed to speak of; it

remains that we next consider from what causes and how alterations

in government arise, and of what nature they are, and to what the

destruction of each state is owing; and also to what form any form of

polity is most likely to shift into, and what are the means to be

used for the general preservation of governments, as well as what are

applicable to any particular state; and also of the remedies which

are to be applied either to all in general, or to any one considered

separately, when they are in a state of corruption: and here we ought

first to lay down this principle, that there are many governments, all

of which approve of what is just and what is analogically equal; and yet

have failed from attaining thereunto, as we have already mentioned; thus

democracies have arisen from supposing that those who are equal in one

thing are so in every other circumstance; as, because they are equal

in liberty, they are equal in everything else; and oligarchies, from

supposing that those who are unequal in one thing are unequal in all;

that when men are so in point of fortune, that inequality extends to

everything else. Hence it follows, that those who in some respects are

equal with others think it right to endeavour to partake of an equality

with them in everything; and those who are superior to others endeavour

to get still more; and it is this more which is the inequality: thus

most states, though they have some notion of what is just, yet are

almost totally wrong; and, upon this account, when either party has not

that share in the administration which answers to his expectations, he

becomes seditious: but those who of all others have the greatest right

to be so are the last that are; namely, those who excel in virtue;

for they alone can be called generally superior. There are, too, some

persons of distinguished families who, because they are so, disdain to

be on an equality with others, for those esteem themselves noble who

boast of their ancestors' merit and fortune: these, to speak truth, are

the origin and fountain from whence seditions arise. The alterations

which men may propose to make in governments are two; for either they

may change the state already established into some other, as when

they propose to erect an oligarchy where there is a democracy; or a

democracy, or free state, where there is an oligarchy, or an aristocracy

from these, or those from that; or else, when they have no objection

to the established government, which they like very well, but choose to

have the sole management in it themselves; either in the hands of a few

or one only. They will also raise commotions concerning the degree in

which they would have the established power; as if, for instance, the

government is an oligarchy, to have it more purely so, and in the same

manner if it is a democracy, or else to have it less so; and, in like

manner, whatever may be the nature of the government, either to extend

or contract its powers; or else to make some alterations in some parts

of it; as to establish or abolish a particular magistracy, as some

persons say Lysander endeavoured to abolish the kingly power in Sparta;

and Pausanias that of the ephori. Thus in Epidamnus there was an

alteration in one part of the constitution, for instead of the philarchi

they established a senate. It is also necessary for all the magistrates

at Athens; to attend in the court of the Helisea when any new magistrate

is created: the power of the archon also in that state partakes of the

nature of an oligarchy: inequality is always the occasion of sedition,

but not when those who are unequal are treated in a different manner

correspondent to that inequality. Thus kingly power is unequal when

exercised over equals. Upon the whole, those who aim after an equality

are the cause of seditions. Equality is twofold, either in number or

value. Equality in number is when two things contain the same parts or

the same quantity; equality in value is by proportion as two exceeds

one, and three two by the same number-thus by proportion four exceeds

two, and two one in the same degree, for two is the same part of four

that one is of two; that is to say, half. Now, all agree in what is

absolutely and simply just; but, as we have already said they dispute

concerning proportionate value; for some persons, if they are equal in

one respect, think themselves equal in all; others, if they are superior

in one thing, think they may claim the superiority in all; from whence

chiefly arise two sorts of governments, a democracy and an oligarchy;

for nobility and virtue are to be found only [1302a] amongst a few;

the contrary amongst the many; there being in no place a hundred of

the first to be met with, but enough of the last everywhere. But to

establish a government entirely upon either of these equalities is

wrong, and this the example of those so established makes evident,

for none of them have been stable; and for this reason, that it is

impossible that whatever is wrong at the first and in its principles

should not at last meet with a bad end: for which reason in some things

an equality of numbers ought to take place, in others an equality in

value. However, a democracy is safer and less liable to sedition than an

oligarchy; for in this latter it may arise from two causes, for either

the few in power may conspire against each other or against the

people; but in a democracy only one; namely, against the few who aim

at exclusive power; but there is no instance worth speaking of, of

a sedition of the people against themselves. Moreover, a government

composed of men of moderate fortunes comes much nearer to a democracy

than an oligarchy, and is the safest of all such states.

CHAPTER II

Since we are inquiring into the causes of seditions and revolutions

in governments, we must begin entirely with the first principles from

whence they arise. Now these, so to speak, are nearly three in number;

which we must first distinguish in general from each other, and

endeavour to show in what situation people are who begin a sedition;

and for what causes; and thirdly, what are the beginnings of political

troubles and mutual quarrels with each other. Now that cause which of

all others most universally inclines men to desire to bring about a

change in government is that which I have already mentioned; for those

who aim at equality will be ever ready for sedition, if they see those

whom they esteem their equals possess more than they do, as well as

those also who are not content with equality but aim at superiority, if

they think that while they deserve more than, they have only equal with,

or less than, their inferiors. Now, what they aim at may be either just

or unjust; just, when those who are inferior are seditious, that they

may be equal; unjust, when those who are equal are so, that they may

be superior. These, then, are the situations in which men will be

seditious: the causes for which they will be so are profit and honour;

and their contrary: for, to avoid dishonour or loss of fortune by

mulcts, either on their own account or their friends, they will raise

a commotion in the state. The original causes which dispose men to the

things which I have mentioned are, taken in one manner, seven in number,

in another they are more; two of which are the same with those that

have been already mentioned: but influencing in a different manner;

for profit and honour sharpen men against each other; not to get the

possession of them for themselves (which was what I just now supposed),

but when they see others, some justly, others [1302b] unjustly,

engrossing them. The other causes are haughtiness, fear, eminence,

contempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the state. There are

also other things which in a different manner will occasion revolutions

in governments; as election intrigues, neglect, want of numbers, a too

great dissimilarity of circumstances.

CHAPTER III

What influence ill-treatment and profit have for this purpose, and how

they may be the causes of sedition, is almost self-evident; for when the

magistrates are haughty and endeavour to make greater profits than their

office gives them, they not only occasion seditions amongst each other,

but against the state also who gave them their power; and this their

avarice has two objects, either private property or the property of the

state. What influence honours have, and how they may occasion sedition,

is evident enough; for those who are themselves unhonoured while they

see others honoured, will be ready for any disturbance: and these things

are done unjustly when any one is either honoured or discarded contrary

to their deserts, justly when they are according to them. Excessive

honours are also a cause of sedition when one person or more are greater

than the state and the power of the government can permit; for then

a monarchy or a dynasty is usually established: on which account the

ostracism was introduced in some places, as at Argos and Athens: though

it is better to guard against such excesses in the founding of a state,

than when they have been permitted to take place, to correct them

afterward. Those who have been guilty of crimes will be the cause of

sedition, through fear of punishment; as will those also who expect an

injury, that they may prevent it; as was the case at Rhodes, when the

nobles conspired against the people on account of the decrees they

expected would pass against them. Contempt also is a cause of sedition

and conspiracies; as in oligarchies, where there are many who have

no share in the administration. The rich also even in democracies,

despising the disorder and anarchy which will arise, hope to better

themselves by the same means which happened at Thebes after the battle

of Oenophyta, where, in consequence of bad administration, the democracy

was destroyed; as it was at Megara, where the power of the people was

lost through anarchy and disorder; the same thing happened at Syracuse

before the tyranny of Gelon; and at Rhodes there was the same sedition

before the popular government was overthrown. Revolutions in state will

also arise from a disproportionate increase; for as the body consists

of many parts, it ought to increase proportion-ably to preserve its

symmetry, which would otherwise be destroyed; as if the foot was to

be four cubits long, and the rest of the body but two palms; it might

otherwise [1303a] be changed into an animal of a different form, if it

increase beyond proportion not only in quantity, but also in disposition

of parts; so also a city consists of parts, some of which may often

increase without notice, as the number of poor in democracies and free

states. They will also sometimes happen by accident, as at Tarentum, a

little after the Median war, where so many of the nobles were killed in

a battle by the lapygi, that from a free state the government was turned

into a democracy; and at Argos, where so many of the citizens were

killed by Cleomenes the Spartan, that they were obliged to admit several

husbandmen to the freedom of the state: and at Athens, through the

unfortunate event of the infantry battles, the number of the nobles was

reduced by the soldiers being chosen from the list of citizens in

the Lacedaemonian wars. Revolutions also sometimes take place in

a democracy, though seldomer; for where the rich grow numerous or

properties increase, they become oligarchies or dynasties. Governments

also sometimes alter without seditions by a combination of the meaner

people; as at Hersea: for which purpose they changed the mode of

election from votes to lots, and thus got themselves chosen: and by

negligence, as when the citizens admit those who are not friends to

the constitution into the chief offices of the state, which happened

at Orus, when the oligarchy of the archons was put an end to at the

election of Heracleodorus, who changed that form of government into a

democratic free state. By little and little, I mean by this, that very

often great alterations silently take place in the form of government

from people's overlooking small matters; as at Ambracia, where the

census was originally small, but at last became nothing at all, as if a

little and nothing at all were nearly or entirely alike. That state

also is liable to seditions which is composed of different nations, till

their differences are blended together and undistinguishable; for as a

city cannot be composed of every multitude, so neither can it in every

given time; for which reason all those republics which have hitherto

been originally composed of different people or afterwards admitted

their neighbours to the freedom of their city, have been most liable

to revolutions; as when the Achaeans joined with the Traezenians

in founding Sybaris; for soon after, growing more powerful than the

Traezenians, they expelled them from the city; from whence came the

proverb of Sybarite wickedness: and again, disputes from a like cause

happened at Thurium between the Sybarites and those who had joined with

them in building the city; for they assuming upon these, on account of

the country being their own, were driven out. And at Byzantium the new

citizens, being detected in plots against the state, were driven out of

the city by force of arms. The Antisseans also, having taken in those

who were banished from Chios, afterwards did the same thing; and

also the Zancleans, after having taken in the people of Samos. The

Appolloniats, in the Euxine Sea, having admitted their sojourners to

the freedom of their city, were troubled with seditions: and the

Syracusians, after the expulsion of their tyrants, having enrolled

[1303b] strangers and mercenaries amongst their citizens, quarrelled

with each other and came to an open rupture: and the people of

Amphipolis, having taken in a colony of Chalcidians, were the greater

part of them driven out of the city by them. Many persons occasion

seditions in oligarchies because they think themselves ill-used in not

sharing the honours of the state with their equals, as I have already

mentioned; but in democracies the principal people do the same because

they have not more than an equal share with others who are not equal

to them. The situation of the place will also sometimes occasion

disturbances in the state when the ground is not well adapted for one

city; as at Clazomene, where the people who lived in that part of the

town called Chytrum quarrelled with them who lived in the island, and

the Colophonians with the Notians. At Athens too the disposition of the

citizens is not the same, for those who live in the Piraeus are more

attached to a popular government than those who live in the city

properly so called; for as the interposition of a rivulet, however

small, will occasion the line of the phalanx to fluctuate, so any

trifling disagreement will be the cause of seditions; but they will not

so soon flow from anything else as from the disagreement between virtue

and vice, and next to that between poverty and riches, and so on in

order, one cause having more influence than another; one of which that I

last mentioned.

CHAPTER IV

But seditions in government do not arise for little things, but from

them; for their immediate cause is something of moment. Now, trifling

quarrels are attended with the greatest consequences when they arise

between persons of the first distinction in the state, as was the

case with the Syracusians in a remote period; for a revolution in the

government was brought about by a quarrel between two young men who were

in office, upon a love affair; for one of them being absent, the other

seduced his mistress; he in his turn, offended with this, persuaded his

friend's wife to come and live with him; and upon this the whole city

took part either with the one or the other, and the government was

overturned: therefore every one at the beginning of such disputes ought

to take care to avoid the consequences; and to smother up all quarrels

which may happen to arise amongst those in power, for the mischief lies

in the beginning; for the beginning is said to be half of the business,

so that what was then but a little fault will be found afterwards to

bear its full proportion to what follows. Moreover, disputes between men

of note involve the whole city in their consequences; in Hestiaea,

after the Median war: two brothers having a dispute about their paternal

estate; he who was the poorer, from the other's having concealed part

of the effects, and some money which his father had found, engaged the

popular party on his side, while the other, who was rich, the men of

fashion. And at Delphos, [1304a] a quarrel about a wedding was the

beginning of all the seditions that afterwards arose amongst them; for

the bridegroom, being terrified by some unlucky omen upon waiting

upon the bride, went away without marrying her; which her relations

resenting, contrived secretly to convey some sacred money into his

pocket while he was sacrificing, and then killed him as an impious

person. At Mitylene also, a dispute, which arose concerning a right

of heritage, was the beginning of great evils, and a war with the

Athenians, in which Paches took their city, for Timophanes, a man

of fortune, leaving two daughters, Doxander, who was circumvented in

procuring them in marriage for his two sons, began a sedition, and

excited the Athenians to attack them, being the host of that state.

There was also a dispute at Phocea, concerning a right of inheritance,

between Mnasis, the father of Mnasis, and Euthucrates, the father of

Onomarchus, which brought on the Phoceans the sacred war. The government

too of Epidamnus was changed from a quarrel that arose from an intended

marriage; for a certain man having contracted his daughter in marriage,

the father of the young person to whom she was contracted, being archon,

punishes him, upon which account he, resenting the affront, associated

himself with those who were excluded from any share in the government,

and brought about a revolution. A government may be changed either into

an oligarchy, democracy, or a free state; when the magistrates, or any

part of the city acquire great credit, or are increased in power, as the

court of Areopagus at Athens, having procured great credit during the

Median war, added firmness to their administration; and, on the other

hand, the maritime force, composed of the commonalty, having gained the

victory at Salamis, by their power at sea, got the lead in the state,

and strengthened the popular party: and at Argos, the nobles,

having gained great credit by the battle of Mantinea against the

Lacedaemonians, endeavoured to dissolve the democracy. And at Syracuse,

the victory in their war with the Athenians being owing to the common

people, they changed their free state into a democracy: and at Chalcis,

the people having taken off the tyrant Phocis, together with the nobles,

immediately seized the government: and at Ambracia also the people,

having expelled the tyrant Periander, with his party, placed the

supreme power in themselves. And this in general ought to be known,

that whosoever has been the occasion of a state being powerful, whether

private persons, or magistrates, a certain tribe, or any particular part

of the citizens, or the multitude, be they who they will, will be the

cause of disputes in the state. For either some persons, who envy them

the honours they have acquired, will begin to be seditious, or they,

on account of the dignity they have acquired, will not be content with

their former equality. A state is also liable to commotions when those

parts of it which seem to be opposite to each other approach to an

[1304b] equality, as the rich and the common people; so that the part

which is between them both is either nothing at all, or too little to be

noticed; for if one party is so much more powerful than the other, as

to be evidently stronger, that other will not be willing to hazard the

danger: for which reason those who are superior in excellence and virtue

will never be the cause of seditions; for they will be too few for that

purpose when compared to the many. In general, the beginning and the

causes of seditions in all states are such as I have now described, and

revolutions therein are brought about in two ways, either by violence or

fraud: if by violence, either at first by compelling them to submit to

the change when it is made. It may also be brought about by fraud in

two different ways, either when the people, being at first deceived,

willingly consent to an alteration in their government, and are

afterwards obliged by force to abide by it: as, for instance, when the

four hundred imposed upon the people by telling them that the king

of Persia would supply them with money for the war against the

Lacedaemonians; and after they had been guilty of this falsity, they

endeavoured to keep possession of the supreme power; or when they are

at first persuaded and afterwards consent to be governed: and by one of

these methods which I have mentioned are all revolutions in governments

brought about.

CHAPTER V

We ought now to inquire into those events which will arise from these

causes in every species of government. Democracies will be most subject

to revolutions from the dishonesty of their demagogues; for partly, by

informing against men of property, they induce them to join together

through self-defence, for a common fear will make the greatest enemies

unite; and partly by setting the common people against them: and this is

what any one may continually see practised in many states. In the island

of Cos, for instance, the democracy was subverted by the wickedness

of the demagogues, for the nobles entered into a combination with

each other. And at Rhodes the demagogues, by distributing of bribes,

prevented the people from paying the trierarchs what was owing to them,

who were obliged by the number of actions they were harassed with to

conspire together and destroy the popular state. The same thing was

brought about at Heraclea, soon after the settlement of the city, by

the same persons; for the citizens of note, being ill treated by them,

quitted the city, but afterwards joining together they returned and

overthrew the popular state. Just in the same manner the democracy

was destroyed in Megara; for there the demagogues, to procure money by

confiscations, drove out the nobles, till the number of those who were

banished was considerable, who, [1305a] returning, got the better of the

people in a battle, and established an oligarchy. The like happened at

Cume, during the time of the democracy, which Thrasymachus destroyed;

and whoever considers what has happened in other states may perceive the

same revolutions to have arisen from the same causes. The demagogues,

to curry favour with the people, drive the nobles to conspire together,

either by dividing their estates, or obliging them to spend them on

public services, or by banishing them, that they may confiscate the

fortunes of the wealthy. In former times, when the same person was both

demagogue and general, the democracies were changed into tyrannies; and

indeed most of the ancient tyrannies arose from those states: a reason

for which then subsisted, but not now; for at that time the demagogues

were of the soldiery; for they were not then powerful by their

eloquence; but, now the art of oratory is cultivated, the able speakers

are at present the demagogues; but, as they are unqualified to act in

a military capacity, they cannot impose themselves on the people as

tyrants, if we except in one or two trifling instances. Formerly, too,

tyrannies were more common than now, on account of the very extensive

powers with which some magistrates were entrusted: as the prytanes at

Miletus; for they were supreme in many things of the last consequence;

and also because at that time the cities were not of that very great

extent, the people in general living in the country, and being employed

in husbandry, which gave them, who took the lead in public affairs, an

opportunity, if they had a turn for war, to make themselves tyrants;

which they all did when they had gained the confidence of the people;

and this confidence was their hatred to the rich. This was the case of

Pisistratus at Athens, when he opposed the Pediaci: and of Theagenes in

Megara, who slaughtered the cattle belonging to the rich, after he

had seized those who kept them by the riverside. Dionysius also, for

accusing Daphnseus and the rich, was thought worthy of being raised to a

tyranny, from the confidence which the people had of his being a popular

man in consequence of these enmities. A government shall also alter from

its ancient and approved democratic form into one entirely new, if

there is no census to regulate the election of magistrates; for, as the

election is with the people, the demagogues who are desirous of being in

office, to flatter them, will endeavour with all their power to make the

people superior even to the laws. To prevent this entirely, or at least

in a great measure, the magistrates should be elected by the tribes, and

not by the people at large. These are nearly the revolutions to which

democracies are liable, and also the causes from whence they arise.

CHAPTER VI

There are two things which of all others most evidently occasion a

revolution in an oligarchy; one is, when the people are ill used, for

then every individual is ripe for [1305b] sedition; more particularly if

one of the oligarchy should happen to be their leader; as Lygdamis, at

Naxus, who was afterwards tyrant of that island. Seditions also which

arise from different causes will differ from each other; for sometimes

a revolution is brought about by the rich who have no share in the

administration, which is in the hands of a very few indeed: and this

happened at Massilia, Ister, Heraclea, and other cities; for those who

had no share in the government ceased not to raise disputes till they

were admitted to it: first the elder brothers, and then the younger

also: for in some places the father and son are never in office at the

same time; in others the elder and younger brother: and where this is

observed the oligarchy partakes something of a free state. At Ister it

was changed into a democracy; in Heraclea, instead of being in the

hands of a few, it consisted of six hundred. At Cnidus the oligarchy

was destroyed by the nobles quarrelling with each other, because the

government was in the hands of so few: for there, as we have just

mentioned, if the father was in office, the son could not; or, if there

were many brothers, the eldest only; for the people, taking advantage of

their disputes, elected one of the nobles for their general, and got the

victory: for where there are seditions government is weak. And formerly

at Erithria, during the oligarchy of the Basilides, although the state

flourished greatly under their excellent management, yet because the

people were displeased that the power should be in the hands of so

few, they changed the government. Oligarchies also are subject to

revolutions, from those who are in office therein, from the quarrels of

the demagogues with each other. The demagogues are of two sorts; one

who flatter the few when they are in power: for even these have their

demagogues; such was Charicles at Athens, who had great influence over

the thirty; and, in the same manner, Phrynichus over the four hundred.

The others are those demagogues who have a share in the oligarchy,

and flatter the people: such were the state-guardians at Larissa, who

flattered the people because they were elected by them. And this will

always happen in every oligarchy where the magistrates do not elect

themselves, but are chosen out of men either of great fortune or certain

ranks, by the soldiers or by the people; as was the custom at Abydos.

And when the judicial department is not in the hands of the supreme

power, the demagogues, favouring the people in their causes, overturn

the government; which happened at Heraclea in Pontus: and also when

some desire to contract the power of the oligarchy into fewer hands; for

those who endeavour to support an equality are obliged to apply to the

people for assistance. An oligarchy is also subject to revolutions

when the nobility spend their fortunes by luxury; for such persons are

desirous of innovations, and either endeavour to be tyrants themselves

or to support others in being so, as [1306a] Hypparinus supported

Dionysius of Syracuse. And at Amphipolis one Cleotimus collected a

colony of Chalcidians, and when they came set them to quarrel with

the rich: and at AEgina a certain person who brought an action against

Chares attempted on that account to alter the government. Sometimes they

will try to raise commotions, sometimes they will rob the public, and

then quarrel with each other, or else fight with those who endeavour

to detect them; which was the case at Apollonia in Pontus. But if the

members of an oligarchy agree among themselves the state is not very

easily destroyed without some external force. Pharsalus is a proof of

this, where, though the place is small, yet the citizens have great

power, from the prudent use they make of it. An oligarchy also will be

destroyed when they create another oligarchy under it; that is, when the

management of public affairs is in the hands of a few, and not equally,

but when all of them do not partake of the supreme power, as happened

once at Elis, where the supreme power in general was in the hands of a

very few out of whom a senate was chosen, consisting but of ninety, who

held their places for life; and their mode of election was calculated to

preserve the power amongst each other's families, like the senators at

Lacedaemon. An oligarchy is liable to a revolution both in time of

war and peace; in war, because through a distrust in the citizens the

government is obliged to employ mercenary troops, and he to whom they

give the command of the army will very often assume the tyranny, as

Timophanes did at Corinth; and if they appoint more than one general,

they will very probably establish a dynasty: and sometimes, through fear

of this, they are forced to let the people in general have some share in

the government, because they are obliged to employ them. In peace,

from their want of confidence in each other, they will entrust the

guardianship of the state to mercenaries and their general, who will

be an arbiter between them, and sometimes become master of both, which

happened at Larissa, when Simos and the Aleuadae had the chief power.

The same thing happened at Abydos, during the time of the political

clubs, of which Iphiades' was one. Commotions also will happen in an

oligarchy from one party's overbearing and insulting another, or

from their quarrelling about their law-suits or marriages. How their

marriages, for instance, will have that effect has been already shown:

and in Eretria, Diagoras destroyed the oligarchy of the knights upon the

same account. A sedition also arose at Heraclea, from a certain person

being condemned by the court; and at Thebes, in consequence of a man's

being guilty of adultery; [1306b] the punishment indeed which Eurytion

suffered at Heraclea was just, yet it was illegally executed: as was

that at Thebes upon Archias; for their enemies endeavoured to have them

publicly bound in the pillory. Many revolutions also have been brought

about in oligarchies by those who could not brook the despotism which

those persons assumed who were in power, as at Cnidus and Chios. Changes

also may happen by accident in what we call a free state and in an

oligarchy; wheresoever the senators, judges, and magistrates are chosen

according to a certain census; for it often happens that the highest

census is fixed at first; so that a few only could have a share in

the government, in an oligarchy, or in a free state those of moderate

fortunes only; when the city grows rich, through peace or some other

happy cause, it becomes so little that every one's fortune is equal to

the census, so that the whole community may partake of all the honours

of government; and this change sometimes happens by little and little,

and insensible approaches, sometimes quicker. These are the revolutions

and seditions that arise in oligarchies, and the causes to which they

are owing: and indeed both democracies and oligarchies sometimes alter,

not into governments of a contrary form, but into those of the same

government; as, for instance, from having the supreme power in the law

to vest it in the ruling party, or the contrariwise.

CHAPTER VII

Commotions also arise in aristocracies, from there being so few persons

in power (as we have already observed they do in oligarchies, for in

this particular an aristocracy is most near an oligarchy, for in both

these states the administration of public affairs is in the hands of

a few; not that this arises from the same cause in both, though herein

they chiefly seem alike): and these will necessarily be most likely to

happen when the generality of the people are high-spirited and think

themselves equal to each other in merit; such were those at Lacedasmon,

called the Partheniae (for these were, as well as others, descendants

of citizens), who being detected in a conspiracy against the state, were

sent to found Tarentum. They will happen also when some great men are

disgraced by those who have received higher honours than themselves, to

whom they are no ways inferior in abilities, as Lysander by the kings:

or when an ambitious man cannot get into power, as Cinadon, who, in the

reign of Agesilaus, was chief in a conspiracy against the Spartans:

and also when some are too poor and others too rich, which will most

frequently happen in time of war; as at Lacedaemon during the Messenian

war, which is proved by a poem of Tyrtaeus, [1307a] called "Eunomia;"

for some persons being reduced thereby, desired that the lands might

be divided: and also when some person of very high rank might still be

higher if he could rule alone, which seemed to be Pausanias's intention

at Lacedaemon, when he was their general in the Median war, and Anno's

at Carthage. But free states and aristocracies are mostly destroyed from

want of a fixed administration of public affairs; the cause of which

evil arises at first from want of a due mixture of the democratic and

the oligarchic parts in a free state; and in an aristocracy from the

same causes, and also from virtue not being properly joined to power;

but chiefly from the two first, I mean the undue mixture of the

democratic and oligarchic parts; for these two are what all free

states endeavour to blend together, and many of those which we call

aristocracies, in this particular these states differ from each other,

and on this account the one of them is less stable than the other, for

that state which inclines most to an oligarchy is called an aristocracy,

and that which inclines most to a democracy is called a free state; on

which account this latter is more secure than the former, for the wider

the foundation the securer the building, and it is ever best to live

where equality prevails. But the rich, if the community gives them rank,

very often endeavour to insult and tyrannise over others. On the whole,

whichever way a government inclines, in that it will settle, each party

supporting their own. Thus a free state will become a democracy; an

aristocracy an oligarchy; or the contrary, an aristocracy may change

into a democracy (for the poor, if they think themselves injured,

directly take part with the contrary side) and a free state into an

oligarchy. The only firm state is that where every one enjoys that

equality he has a right to and fully possesses what is his own. And what

I have been speaking of happened to the Thurians; for the magistrates

being elected according to a very high census, it was altered to a

lower, and they were subdivided into more courts, but in consequence of

the nobles possessing all the land, contrary to law; the state was too

much of an oligarchy, which gave them an opportunity of encroaching

greatly on the rest of the people; but these, after they had been well

inured to war, so far got the better of their guards as to expel every

one out of the country who possessed more than he ought. Moreover, as

all aristocracies are free oligarchies, the nobles therein endeavour to

have rather too much power, as at Lacedaemon, where property is now in

the hands of a few, and the nobles have too much liberty to do as they

please and make such alliances as they please. Thus the city of the

Locrians was ruined from an alliance with Dionysius; which state was

neither a democracy nor well-tempered aristocracy. But an aristocracy

chiefly approaches to a secret change by its being destroyed by degrees,

as we [1307b] have already said of all governments in general; and this

happens from the cause of the alteration being trifling; for whenever

anything which in the least regards the state is treated with contempt,

after that something else, and this of a little more consequence, will

be more easily altered, until the whole fabric of government is entirely

subverted, which happened in the government of Thurium; for the law

being that they should continue soldiers for five years, some young

men of a martial disposition, who were in great esteem amongst their

officers, despising those who had the management of public affairs,

and imagining they could easily accomplish their intention, first

endeavoured to abolish this law, with a view of having it lawful to

continue the same person perpetually in the military, perceiving that

the people would readily appoint them. Upon this, the magistrates who

are called counselors first joined together with an intention to oppose

it but were afterwards induced to agree to it, from a belief that if

that law was not repealed they would permit the management of all other

public affairs to remain in their hands; but afterwards, when they

endeavoured to restrain some fresh alterations that were making, they

found that they could do nothing, for the whole form of government was

altered into a dynasty of those who first introduced the innovations. In

short, all governments are liable to be destroyed either from within or

from without; from without when they have for their neighbour a state

whose policy is contrary to theirs, and indeed if it has great power the

same thing will happen if it is not their neighbour; of which both

the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians are a proof; for the one,

when conquerors everywhere destroyed the oligarchies; the other the

democracies. These are the chief causes of revolutions and dissensions

in governments.

CHAPTER VIII