CHAPTER XVII

Probably what we have said may be true of some persons, but not of

others; for some men are by nature formed to be under the government of

a master; others, of a king; others, to be the citizens of a free state,

just and useful; but a tyranny is not according to nature, nor the other

perverted forms of government; for they are contrary to it. But it

is evident from what has been said, that among equals it is neither

advantageous nor [1288a] right that one person should be lord over all

where there are no established laws, but his will is the law; or where

there are; nor is it right that one who is good should have it over

those who are good; or one who is not good over those who are not good;

nor one who is superior to the rest in worth, except in a particular

manner, which shall be described, though indeed it has been already

mentioned. But let us next determine what people are best qualified

for a kingly government, what for an aristocratic, and what for a

democratic. And, first, for a kingly; and it should be those who are

accustomed by nature to submit the civil government of themselves to a

family eminent for virtue: for an aristocracy, those who are naturally

framed to bear the rule of free men, whose superior virtue makes them

worthy of the management of others: for a free state, a war-like people,

formed by nature both to govern and be governed by laws which admit the

poorest citizen to share the honours of the commonwealth according

to his worth. But whenever a whole family or any one of another shall

happen so far to excel in virtue as to exceed all other persons in the

community, then it is right that the kingly power should be in them, or

if it is an individual who does so, that he should be king and lord of

all; for this, as we have just mentioned, is not only correspondent

to that principle of right which all founders of all states, whether

aristocracies, oligarchies, or democracies, have a regard to (for

in placing the supreme power they all think it right to fix it to

excellence, though not the same); but it is also agreeable to what

has been already said; as it would not be right to kill, or banish, or

ostracise such a one for his superior merit. Nor would it be proper

to let him have the supreme power only in turn; for it is contrary to

nature that what is highest should ever be lowest: but this would be

the case should such a one ever be governed by others. So that there can

nothing else be done but to submit, and permit him continually to

enjoy the supreme power. And thus much with respect to kingly power in

different states, and whether it is or is not advantageous to them, and

to what, and in what manner.

Politics: A Treatise on Government · 第 17 / 20 章