WINTER IN THE SALIENT.
(DECEMBER 1917—MARCH 1918.)
After the tremendous fighting of the autumn offensive at Ypres and the
smashing casualties which were suffered therein by the batteries, a full
month in the rest area was required to bring the 33rd Divisional
Artillery back to anything like its normal pitch of efficiency once
more. Every detachment in every battery had to be reorganised and built
up on the foundation of the few remaining gunners who had survived the
two months' battle; raw recruits from England needed instruction and
drilling, gaps in the non-commissioned ranks awaited filling,
newly-joined officers were watched and tested. From highest to lowest
the personnel of the two brigades were busily engaged in the tremendous
work of smartening up and training, of teaching and of learning, of
overhauling equipment and of filling up stores, of removing all traces
of the scorching fires through which the batteries had recently passed.
By November 3rd both brigades had completed the withdrawal to the
wagon-lines at Dickebusch; on the 4th the 156th Brigade marched to the
training area around La Nieppe, to be followed the next day by the 162nd
Brigade which moved into billets in Bavinchove, Zuytpanne and Trois
Rois, all in the neighbourhood of Cassel. Here for a week they remained,
at first resting and refitting, then beginning the more elementary forms
of training and gradually bringing the batteries back to something
approaching a state of efficiency once more.
On November 12th a move was made to the Bouvelinghem area, still further
from the line. The 156th Brigade found billets in Bas Loquin and Warlez,
the 162nd in Alquines, Le Buisson and Haute Planque. Billets were none
too good and horse lines had to be set up in the open, but the
surrounding country was more suitable for the advanced training which
now became possible, and in real earnest did the instruction and
drilling of the batteries set in. Gun drill and driving drill became a
daily affair, while battery staff work and manœuvring in the open were
added to the curriculum. Training of every description, combined with
sports, races and concerts, kept the men busy and contented, with the
result that efficiency and smartness appeared once more and the havoc of
the autumn became almost completely effaced. As the month wore on and
time for a return into action drew near the condition of the batteries
grew daily better, and by the end of November it could fairly be said
that both brigades had very nearly reached their old high standard once
more.
It had been generally understood that a bare four weeks of rest could be
hoped for, and that the end of the month would see a return into action.
On November 22nd Brigadier-General Stewart and his staff had moved up to
the Menin Gate at Ypres to take over command of the artillery covering
the infantry of the 33rd Division, then holding the line at
Passchendaele, and daily the order was expected for the batteries to
follow. Semi-officially it had been stated that the brigades would be in
action by December 3rd, but night set in on November 30th without any
warning order having been received, and the line was distant a full
three days' march. It was difficult to believe that, with so much time
to spare for the issuing of warning orders, any sudden move could be
contemplated, yet that was actually what took place. At five o'clock on
the evening of Saturday, December 1st, orders were received for the
batteries to march at 8.0 A.M. on the following morning and, moreover,
to be in action by the evening of December 3rd.
Such haste, such rushing and such short notice seemed strange, in view
of the fact that for over a week the batteries might have had the
preliminary notice; yet fourteen hours, and fourteen hours of darkness
at that, was all the warning that was received, and far into the night
the detachments laboured by the light of lanterns, packing the vehicles
and getting ready to move at daybreak. To reach the line in two days
meant a very considerable march table for each day, and Zermezeele had
accordingly been fixed as the billeting area of the batteries for the
night of December 2nd/3rd. Late in that evening and in darkness the
brigades, after a long day of trekking, laboured in to the lines
allotted to them and hastily settled for the night, as an early start
was ordered to be made on the following day.
ORDER OF BATTLE.
DECEMBER 1917—MARCH 1918.
H.Q.R.A.
C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain.
Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., Major T. E. Capt. W. E.
D.S.O. Durie, D.S.O., Bownass, M.C.
M.C.
156th Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler, D.S.O.
Adjutant: Capt. H. W. Smail, M.C.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Major F. B. Major M. A. Major Barker, Major D. Jones,
Carrell. Studd, M.C. D.S.O., M.C. M.C.
Capt. S. G.
Taylor.
162nd Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner, D.S.O.
Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Major W. G. Major H. C. Cory, Major M. M. I. Major F. L. Lee,
Pringle, M.C. M.C. Body, M.C. M.C.
Major G.
Fetherston, M.C.
At daybreak on December 3rd the march was resumed, and now further rush
tactics were adopted. The personnel of one section per battery was
conveyed to Ypres by motor lorry while the remainder of the batteries
continued the march by road, for it was intended to take over a portion
of the battery positions that very night in the line, so that on the
following morning the 33rd Divisional Artillery would be able to assume
responsibility for the artillery support of the zone without further
delay. By midday these advance parties had "debussed" at Potijze
Château, where guides were waiting for them, and by three o'clock in the
afternoon control of one section per battery had been taken over, while
every battery commander was busying himself in learning from his
"opposite number" the zone to be covered and the general characteristics
of the battery position itself. Thus the programme had been adhered to,
and by the evening of the 3rd a portion of the relief was carried out;
just forty-eight hours after the receipt of the warning order, and
thirty-six hours since the beginning of the march from a training area
so far distant as to be within ten miles of Boulogne, two guns per
battery of both brigades were in action once more.
While all this had been going on at the gun line, the remainder of the
brigades had marched to the wagon-lines which they were to occupy during
such time as the batteries were in action—the 156th Brigade taking over
an area 1,200 yards south-east of Vlamertinghe, where permanent huts and
stables were being built on either side of the road, while to the 162nd
Brigade had been allotted an open area half a mile west of Ypres,
between Goldfish Château and Belgian Battery Corner. These lines were
reached late on the evening of the 3rd and were extremely difficult to
get into, in the case of the 162nd Brigade, owing to the fact that the
approaches from the road were rendered quite impassable by mud. A most
uncomfortable night was spent on the side of the road, and not until
daylight came was there any chance of getting horses and men into their
permanent "billets"—mud lines and tents in the month of December! Longer
notice, less rushing and a spreading of the march over three days would
have meant much to both horses and men, yet the programme had been
organised and ordered by some Higher Command which was for ever
impressing upon Divisional Artilleries the importance of the care of
horses and the need of avoiding any unnecessary overwork or strain!
On Tuesday, December 4th, the remaining two sections per battery marched
up to the gun line, led by guides from the advance parties, and
completed the relief of the outgoing units, the 26th and 311th Army
Field Artillery Brigades. The 156th Brigade together with D/162 formed
No. 1 Group of the artillery covering the divisional front and was
placed under the command of 158th Brigade Headquarters, while
Lieut.-Colonel Skinner (162nd Brigade) commanded No. 2 Group which
comprised the 18-pdr. batteries of his own brigade. This was, however,
only a temporary arrangement, for on December 17th Lieut.-Colonel Butler
(156th Brigade) took over command of No. 1 Group which was enlarged to
contain the whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, while Colonel
Skinner and his headquarters moved out to the wagon-line, leaving the
186th Brigade to form No. 2 Group.
[Illustration:
Scale 1:20,000.
]
As matters now stood, the whole of the 33rd Division was concentrated
together, the artillery covering for once its own infantry on the
Passchendaele Ridge-Crest Farm-Meetcheele Line. The batteries of the
156th Brigade all lay along the Langemarck-Zonnebeke road north-west of
Zonnebeke, between Windmill Cabaret and Kansas Cross, and covered the
right of the zone, while the 162nd Brigade supported the left zone from
positions around Gravenstafel. "A" and B/156, however, moved their guns
to the vicinity of Otto Farm on the 12th and 14th respectively.
Infantry action was at a standstill, for the mud and general condition
of the ground precluded movement of any sort; in few places, indeed, was
there any fire-trench at all, fortified shell-holes linked together in
groups and half-full of water offering the only possible cover to the
front-line troops. The forward system was almost completely cut off by a
vast sea of mud which extended back to and beyond the battery positions
and was traversed at intervals by narrow duckboard tracks, the sole
means of communication from front to rear. Any smashing of those tracks,
any detour from them to avoid shell-fire meant hours of struggling
through the slime, while the wretched men who got wounded while crossing
the morass were, as likely as not, engulfed in the mud and never seen
again.
Infantry operations, it has been said, were at a standstill, but the
same could by no means be recorded of the artillery. From dawn till dusk
the enemy was for ever pounding away at our lines, raking battery
positions from end to end and destroying the wooden roads which offered
the only possible route for the supply of ammunition and rations.
Gravenstafel, Kansas Cross and the road right back to Wieltje were in a
continual state of eruption, while devastating shell-storms daily
descended upon the battery area between Gravenstafel and Zonnebeke. It
was a grievous time for the gunners; dug-outs were impossible, as water
was met only eighteen inches below the surface, and pill-boxes were few
and far between. Even the latter, with their doors facing towards the
east, were by no means sure refuges, and it was while actually standing
inside such an one that Captain Gallie, who had distinguished himself so
wonderfully in the autumn fighting, was killed on December 14th. The
only way to minimise casualties was to scatter a number of little
shelters all around the battery positions and, by keeping the men thus
separated, to reduce the damage which one direct hit alone could do. Yet
even so the strain of being eternally wet and cold, of being for ever
soaked with mud and under continuous shell-fire was tremendous, and, as
far as was possible, detachments at the guns were relieved every four
days.
There was, indeed, little for the men to do except to keep the gun-pits
and ammunition serviceable, and to try to keep themselves alive. Firing
was reduced to the minimum of registration, calibration and response to
infantry calls, for it needed a full day's work by every man to keep the
guns clean, to rebuild the gun-pits after their daily destruction by
hostile shell-fire and to keep dry the ammunition which, even when it
was not blown up by enemy bombardment, used to sink of its own accord in
that bottomless mud which rendered almost any form of foundation
useless. Moreover, every round fired necessitated the bringing up of
fresh supplies from the wagon-lines, and this was work not lightly to be
undertaken. As late as September 1920 the road from Wieltje to
Gravenstafel was still but a faint track of ploughed-up earth winding
across the shell holes and literally paved with the skeletons of horses
and, in some cases, of men; it was one of the main arteries—and there
were but few in that wilderness of mud—from the wagon-lines to the
batteries, and, to the terrible cost of the drivers and teams, well the
enemy knew it.
Thus, from December 4th, the batteries just barely existed; they had had
a month's rest in the back area and knew that, for gunners, this would
be considered sufficient to keep them going for a long time to
come—hopes of relief, therefore, were not even entertained. At intervals
the guns were registered on the Gasometers east of Passchendaele; at
intervals they bombarded enemy positions around Moorslede, but mostly
the detachments contented themselves with preparing for emergencies by
keeping the guns as serviceable as was possible. It was a nightmare
existence from which all ranks hoped that they might one day awaken, but
the awakening was not yet expected.
It seemed, therefore, scarcely credible to the 162nd Brigade when, on
December 19th, orders were received to march out next day to the
wagon-lines. Foul as were the conditions in the line, a mere seventeen
days of continuous action was never regarded by Higher Authority as
sufficient to entitle a battery to a rest, and neither officers nor men
had in their wildest dreams hoped to spend Christmas out of the line;
yet such was now to be the case. On Thursday, December 20th, all
batteries of the brigade had reached their wagon-lines in safety, and on
December 23rd they marched back to Divisional reserve in a camp on the
Poperinghe-Busseboom road, leaving their less fortunate comrades of the
156th Brigade to carry on the war in their absence. Less fortunate the
latter certainly were, for they were destined to spend Christmas in
action, but on the other hand the positions they were occupying were not
so bad as those of the 162nd Brigade, nor had they been subjected to
such violent shell-storms.
December 23rd to the 26th were spent by the 162nd Brigade in overhauling
kit and equipment, in helping to build permanent standings in the camp
they were occupying, and in celebrating the unexpected luxury of a
Christmas in rest. On Christmas night a dinner for the officers was
given at "Skindles" in Poperinghe, while on Boxing Night the batteries
organised dinners for their men. On this day, also, the 156th Brigade
was relieved by the 48th Army Field Artillery Brigade and came down to
the wagon-lines, with the result that the whole of the 33rd Divisional
Artillery was able to see out in peace the old year which held for it
such mighty, such proud and such undying memories.
In peace the old year went out, but by no means in idleness. On Boxing
Day orders had come for the preparation of ten reserve battery positions
to cover the Army defence zone and to be occupied in the event of a
German offensive on the Ypres sector, and every day before dawn working
parties from each battery set out in motor lorries to Potijze Château,
between which spot and Oxford Road the proposed positions lay. From
December 26th to January 7th the work was carried out during every hour
of daylight, for orders, inspired possibly by the fears of a German
Spring offensive, were imperative that the work should be pushed on as
hard as possible.
On January 7th the work ceased temporarily and one section per battery
of each brigade went into the line again, relieving the 250th and 251st
Brigades of the 50th Divisional Artillery. January 8th saw the relief
complete, and once more the brigades were back in action, the 162nd
occupying the same positions around Gravenstafel, the 156th remaining as
before round Windmill Cabaret, Otto Farm (the pill-box where Captain
Gallie of A/156 was killed) and Van Issacker's Farm, but with two guns
of B/156 (Major Studd) and two 4·5 in. howitzers of D/156 (Major Jones)
in forward positions for use as anti-tank guns. The front to be covered
remained unchanged, while the "grouping" of the batteries showed but
little alteration—Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler commanding No. 1 Group
which consisted of the whole of the 156th Brigade and B/119, while No. 2
group (162nd Brigade) was controlled by Major N. G. Jervis from a
pill-box east of Frezenburg. Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner commanded the
whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery group which was made up of the
156th, 162nd and 119th Brigades.
The organisation and allocation of the brigades were therefore but
little changed since the previous tour of duty in the line before
Christmas, but a great difference showed itself in the attitude of the
enemy. Hostile artillery activity had died down in an extraordinary way,
and comparative quiet reigned in the battery area after the shell-storms
of the earlier period. Roads were only occasionally searched, battery
positions were subjected merely to a few sniping rounds or at most to
short neutralising bursts of fire, and the long concentrated
bombardments which previously had been the order of the day were now
exceptional events. "Quiet day," "light shelling of tracks,"
"intermittent bursts of fire on Zonnebeke Road and Windmill Cabaret"
appear frequently in the official diaries of that period, and only on
two days—January 13th and 20th—did the hostile artillery show any marked
activity. On those two days the Zonnebeke-Windmill Cabaret area and the
Crest Farm-Meetcheele line were bombarded respectively, the latter very
heavily indeed, but these two outbursts marked isolated exceptions to
the quietness which had now set in and were not of long duration.
On January 29th, after a most uneventful period in the line, one section
per battery of each brigade was relieved by the 50th Divisional
Artillery and marched again to the wagon-lines. Next day the relief was
completed and the batteries marched to the Oudezeele area, the gun line
parties handing over their guns in action and moving by lorry to the
first night's halting place, there to join up with the wagon-line
personnel who had marched by road in the ordinary way. The next day saw
a continuation of the move to Zudrove and Le Bas, and on February 1st
the ultimate rest billets were reached in Thiembronne, Merck St. Lievin
and Bout de la Ville. Here the batteries carried out the usual
overhauling and training, rejoicing at the quite phenomenal number of
"rests" which they had of late been enjoying.
It was, indeed, most unusual for artillery to reach the rest area so
often as had the 156th and 162nd Brigades of late. Gunners were usually
kept in the line almost continuously, staying on after the infantry of
their division had been relieved and covering the incoming troops. A
scheme was now in practice by which the whole of the 33rd
Division—infantry and gunners alike—held the line together and went into
rest together, the 50th Division acting as their "opposite number," and
by this scheme the two brigades were benefiting. It could not last for
long—it was too good for that; but while it lasted it was wondrously
pleasant!
There came an interruption in the ordinary routine of training on
February 12th; the 18-pdr. batteries of the 156th Brigade were ordered
to march to Tilques, there to have their guns calibrated by the
Sound-ranging Section, after which they were attached to the 98th
Infantry Brigade for tactical exercises. On the 14th the 18-pdrs. of
162nd Brigade were also calibrated, so that, by the 15th, all guns were
ready for the return into action which had been ordered for February
22nd. Before this march took place, however, C/162 (Major Hill) was
detached from the Divisional Artillery for special duties. On February
18th it marched to Tilques to join the 2nd Army Artillery School as a
training battery, and there it was left when once more the move to the
line was made.
On February 19th the 156th Brigade moved to the Elnes area and on the
20th to La Nieppe, the 162nd Brigade reaching Renescure on the same day.
On the 21st advance parties from each brigade moved by rail to
Vlamertinghe to take over the wagon-lines of the 50th Divisional
Artillery, while the batteries continued their march to Zermezeele and
Rietveld—D/162, which had gone round by Tilques to calibrate its guns,
rejoining the rest of the brigade on this day. February 22nd saw the
arrival of the batteries at their wagon-lines east and south-east of
Vlamertinghe, the same which they had occupied on the return to action
in early January; A/162, however, remained near Goldfish Château, and
B/156 went to Ypres Asylum. On the 22nd also lorries took one section
per battery direct to the forward area, the 156th Brigade this time
relieving No. 2 Group (251st Brigade), the 162nd Brigade No. 1 Group
(250th Brigade).
The relief was complete by Saturday, February 23rd, and on the next day
33rd Divisional Artillery Headquarters took over the control, at Menin
Gate, of the artillery covering the infantry of the 33rd Division on a
two thousand yard front opposite Passchendaele and due west of
Moorslede. On this occasion the 162nd Brigade took over the positions
previously held by the 156th along the Langemarck-Zonnebeke road, "A"
and D/162 (Major Fetherston and Major Lee) at Windmill Cabaret, some six
hundred yards north-west of Zonnebeke, B/162 (Major Cory) about two
thousand yards also to the north-west of the village, while Brigade
headquarters were situate in a pill-box one thousand yards north-east of
Frezenburg. The 156th Brigade positions, with the exception of Major
Carrell's battery (A/156) which remained at Otto Farm, were those which
had previously been held by the 162nd Brigade at Gravenstafel.
The policy adopted by the batteries on their return into action now was
to remain quiet, only registration and calibration being carried out.
The enemy on the whole were also inactive until the end of the month;
one or two attempts were made to rush our advanced posts, and a large
raid was executed—unsuccessfully, however—upon the division on the
right. Apart from this, and from a certain amount of activity with
high-velocity guns upon our back areas, the enemy attitude was very
similar to ours.
March saw a change in the general policy of the Germans holding this
part of the line. An ever-increasing volume of artillery fire began to
be directed upon our battery positions, while high-velocity guns were
continually searching the roads and back areas. On the 2nd nearly all
our batteries were heavily shelled, while severe bombardments were
carried out upon both flanks of the division; on the 3rd enemy
aeroplanes were very active and continued so for several days,
especially on the 7th when low-flying machines appeared everywhere. On
the 6th a big shoot was carried out on the Windmill Cabaret area N.W. of
Zonnebeke, and on the 9th the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery
were bombarded with gas shell. The front was indeed gradually boiling up
to a state of high enemy activity, and, with the fine weather which
supervened and the knowledge that an enemy offensive was almost
inevitably coming on some part of the front, the plan of action to deal
with such an emergency was continually tested. On March 10th in the
early morning all batteries fired "counter-preparation," a slow barrage
which was to be used in the event of an enemy attack being expected. On
this and the succeeding days fire was also directed upon special
targets, upon machine guns, dug-outs and likely places for the
concentration of hostile troops, while all batteries constantly
practised the drill of pulling their guns out of the pits at short
notice and of engaging targets on the flanks and at short ranges.
On the 14th a heavy German raid was repulsed, a prisoner who had been
taken beforehand having given information concerning it, and on the 17th
all batteries again fired in response to an S.O.S. call at 4.40 A.M.,
but in this case no infantry action took place. All this time the enemy
long-range guns were for ever bombarding Ypres, Wieltje, St. Jean,
Potijze and every road leading up from the back area, as many as one
thousand high-velocity shells being poured into the neighbourhood of
Ypres each day. At the same time battery positions, and especially the
area between "Seine" and Abraham Heights, were continually shelled, gas
at night being the usual practice.
Thursday, March 21st, 1918, was a comparatively quiet day in the Ypres
sector. The batteries had not been worried much, and for their own
part had not done more than to direct bursts of fire upon enemy
dug-outs and machine guns which were annoying the infantry. About 1.0
P.M., just as the detachments were sitting down to their midday meal,
came the first message, telephoned up from Divisional Headquarters, of
the beginning of the great German offensive in the south. Little news
was given beyond the fact that the attack had been launched and that
our troops, after giving up the advanced system, "were holding the
enemy on the main Army Defence Line." Every few hours further messages
came in, admitting certain losses of ground but stating that the enemy
was being held in the main, and that the day was going in our favour.
Such reports were certainly encouraging to the men, and in no way gave
any suggestion of defeat; bit by bit, however, names of villages which
had been captured by the enemy began to appear, and reference to a map
disclosed the disquieting fact that a deep penetration into our lines
had been made, a penetration which must necessarily become deeper
still owing to the loss of certain tactical points. Information was
very sparse and rumours immediately became rife everywhere, so that a
fair idea of the situation could hardly be obtained. It was, indeed,
of little use to worry; the batteries had their own share of the front
to look after and knew that, sooner or later, they would be plunged
into the battle themselves—"sufficient unto the day ..." then, for in
France it was not good to worry about troubles before they came.
On March 25th the front covered by the 33rd Divisional Artillery was
extended some five hundred yards further to the south, S.O.S. lines
being rearranged accordingly, and on March 28th/29th one section each of
"B," "C" and D/156 moved out to alternate positions S.E. of Kansas
Cross, S.E. of Bostin Farm and east of Kansas Cross respectively. During
the preceding weeks the enemy had been constantly shelling the Abraham
Heights area with gas and had rendered it quite untenable, B/156 having
as many as forty gas casualties in one week; the change of position
described above had therefore become an urgent necessity. Although the
enemy artillery activity had died down since the 21st it was still
fairly vigorous, especially upon roads, back areas and wagon-lines—the
latter suffering considerably.
A further extension of the brigade zones to the south was made on March
29th, and on the same day another section of "B," "C" and D/156 moved
back to the alternative positions described above. Next day Major Hill's
battery (C/162), which had left Tilques on the 27th and had marched up
via Godewaersvelde to wagon-lines at Goldfish Château, sent one section
into action at Bostin Farm, one thousand yards west of Zonnebeke Church,
to be joined by the rest of the battery on the night of March 31st/April
1st; by the end of March, therefore, the 33rd Division had its guns well
distributed in depth, and could be certain of giving adequate protection
to the infantry even should the latter be forced back behind the line of
forward guns.
Thus the batteries remained for the first week of April. March had made
its exit with a heavy enemy bombardment on the evening of the 31st upon
the forward, battery and back areas, with a heavy gas concentration upon
the Frezenburg line, to all of which the batteries had at infantry
request responded. April came in, bringing with it little news save an
ever-increasing expectation of attack on the Divisional sector, and so
the first week passed while everybody held his breath, as it were, in
anticipation.
On Sunday, April 7th, portions of the 156th and 162nd Brigades were
relieved by the 28th Army Field Artillery Brigade (Colonel Paynter) and
marched out to their wagon-lines near Vlamertinghe. On the 8th the
relief was completed and the batteries were all resting in the
wagon-lines, hourly expecting orders to move down south to the aid of
the hard-pressed 5th Army, for thither they all believed they were to
go, nor is it too much to say that considerable despondency was felt in
both Brigades at not being engaged in the battle then in progress.
Before any such orders were issued, however, an enemy offensive was
suddenly launched upon them from much nearer at hand, and, although the
162nd Brigade marched to the Peselhoek-Poperinghe area on April 9th,
there was to be neither for them nor for the 156th Brigade any rest. The
Germans were about to start their great attack in the north which grew
into a drive for the coast, and every man, every gun, every available
round of ammunition was needed in the great struggle shortly to begin.