THE AUTUMN BATTLES OF YPRES AND PASSCHENDAELE.
(SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER 1917.)
In and around the Salient of Ypres there are to be found the graves of
more gunners than in any portion of the line, and even those graves
represent a mere particle only of the many thousands to whom Ypres
brought death. That much discussed, much described and oft-portrayed
area will never and can never be properly comprehended by any man who
has not fought there, for, before the real meaning of the Salient can be
understood, the picture of destruction which it offered must be
accompanied by the realisation of the dread, the feeling of utter
desolation and misery, the terrible haunting horror which seized all men
as they stepped out through the Lille or Menin Gates with their faces
set towards the east. No man, be he ever so brave, was without fear in
that place, while the majority were in constant terror, a terror so
rending, so utterly shattering that death came often as a merciful
release. Yet of that fear no man need be ashamed; it was a terror
entirely within and invisible, and to outward appearances there were no
signs thereof; in the which there is not shame but honour.
The 33rd Divisional Artillery had yet to undergo these trials, but their
beginning was not long delayed. On the night of September 5th/6th,
twenty-four hours after the conclusion of the march, one section of each
of the 18-pdr. batteries of the 156th Brigade went into action and
relieved portions of the 11th, 12th and A/298 batteries; "A" and B/156
occupied positions south-west of Fosse Wood, C/156 lay north of Maple
Copse, and on the two succeeding nights, one section at a time, the
remainder of the batteries came up. The 162nd Brigade was not so rushed
as it had no "opposite numbers" to relieve, but on the other hand the
batteries had to prepare the positions they were to inhabit, and this,
in view of the appalling state of the ground, was extremely difficult.
To begin with, the finding of any patch of ground which guns could
possibly reach, and from which they would be able to fire more than two
or three rounds without sinking into the mud, proved an arduous task,
while the work of preparing platforms and shelters on the positions,
when chosen, involved not only great labour but a still greater
patience.
ORDER OF BATTLE.
SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER 1917.
H.Q.R.A.
C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain.
Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., Major T. E. Capt. W. E.
D.S.O. Durie, M.C. Bownass, M.C.
156th Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler.
Adjutant: Capt. W. G. Sheeres
Capt. H. W. Smail.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Major H. McA. Major M. A. Major Barker, Major W. A. T.
Richards, M.C. Studd, M.C. M.C. Barstow, M.C.
(_wounded_).
Capt. W. G.
Sheeres, M.C.
162nd Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner, D.S.O.
Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Major W. G. Major Walker, Major L. Hill, Major W. P.
Pringle. D.S.O. M.C. Colfox, M.C.
(_gassed in (_wounded_).
September_).
Major H. C. Cory, Major Beerbohm
M.C. (_killed_).
Major F. L. Lee.
The enemy, fully alive to the indications of a renewed offensive on our
part, swept the whole of the battery positions with shell storms of
increasing density, inflicting casualties amongst the working parties
and wrecking the work they had done, so that at times it appeared as
though nothing would be ready for the remaining guns of the division
when they were ordered up into action. No sooner was one platform in a
position prepared, with a few sandbags thrown up around it for the
protection of the detachments, than a 5·9 in. shell would blow the whole
thing to pieces, and the work had to be begun all over again. Day after
day the working parties, reinforced by men from the D.A.C. and from the
Trench Mortar batteries, toiled unceasingly not only at their own
positions but at the two positions they had been ordered to prepare for
the 23rd Divisional Artillery, for they saw, after a very few hours of
the Salient, that without protection of some sort or other no detachment
could possibly survive a single barrage.
At length, after eight days' work, some reward for the labours of the
working parties showed itself, and it was well that this was so for now
the remaining batteries were ordered to move up into action. On the
night of the 13th/14th "A," "B" and C/162 took up the positions marked
out for them, to be followed on the next night by D/162, and by the
early morning of Saturday the 15th the whole of the Divisional Artillery
was in action and registered on the zones to be covered.
Already severe casualties had been suffered by the 156th Brigade
south-east of Zillebeke, who since September 5th had been in action
under the 24th Divisional Artillery, while the 162nd Brigade working
parties had also borne the weight of the hostile fire. From the 15th
onwards, however, conditions became far more severe, for on that day
began the organised bombardment by our guns prior to the forthcoming
attack, and the resulting increase of counter-battery work by the enemy.
On September 13th the 156th was put under the control of the 23rd
Divisional Artillery on the relief by the latter of the 24th, and with
A/103 formed part of the right group under Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B.
Butler (O.C. 156th Brigade) whose headquarters were at Tor Top. On its
arrival in the line on the 14th the 162nd Brigade was also controlled by
the 23rd Divisional Artillery, but, with the exception of C/162 which
was placed in the right group, the batteries went to form part of the
left group, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Groves (O.C. 103rd Brigade)
whose own batteries less A/103 made up the rest of the group. "A," "B"
and D/162 lay on the northern, southern and western edges of Maple Copse
(due east of Zillebeke) while C/162 was in action just south of Fosse
Wood; the positions of the 156th Brigade have already been noted.
[Illustration:
Scale 1:20,000.
]
It will be remembered that throughout July and August, 1917, a
succession of big attacks was carried out by the British troops in the
Ypres Sector, with the object of driving the enemy back from the
semi-circle of low-lying hills which overlooked our trenches in the
Salient. The proposed coastal operations of the foregoing chapter had,
indeed, been planned in connection with the Ypres offensive, and with
the breaking off of the former the batteries were sent down to take part
in further undertakings against the Passchendaele-Gheluvelt ridge. The
ill-omened autumn offensive against the Passchendaele ridge was, in
fact, about to begin, and the first battle of the series was fixed for
September 20th. For this, the limits of the zone covered by the
Divisional Artillery were Clapham Junction on the north and Dumbarton
Lakes on the south, the 162nd taking the left portion of the zone, that
is from the northern limit for 700 yards southwards to Polderhoek
Château, the 156th the right portion of the zone from Dumbarton Lakes
700 yards northwards; the middle gap was covered by the centre group of
which the 33rd Divisional Artillery formed no part. It had been
extraordinarily hard to find any marked feature upon which to range the
guns, but Gheluvelt Mill, situated as it was upon a small mound, offered
a tolerably clear feature for registration purposes, and this was
utilised by the majority of the battery commanders prior to the barrages
which now began.
The whole barrage table for the forthcoming attack had, by the 15th,
been issued to the batteries, and the practice barrages which now began
to be carried out consisted sometimes of portions of this table,
sometimes of the complete barrage fired in its entirety. As a rule these
"rehearsals" were fired at half the rate which would be used on the day
of the attack, but the same proportions of shrapnel, H.E. and smoke
shell were adhered to, and therefore if only a part even of the barrage
were fired—such as the portion behind which the infantry would advance
from the first to the second objective—the curtain of fire as it
appeared on the ground would offer an exact model of the real attack
barrage, except for a certain diminution of density. This fact was
important, for it was realised that the bad state of the ground to be
attacked over would force the infantry to advance very slowly, and that
therefore a great deal depended upon the barrage to keep enemy
machine-gun fire down until our infantry could get to grips with their
assailants. Every day one and sometimes two practice barrages were
fired, and on each occasion one officer of considerable experience was
sent up from every artillery group to observe the effect thereof. In
particular, reports were rendered dealing with the density of the
barrage, whether all batteries opened fire simultaneously, whether there
were any gaps or rounds falling short, whether the average height of the
shrapnel bursts was correct and whether the barrage crept forward
uniformly. After every barrage these reports were examined and
collected, and before the next practice was carried out the necessary
alterations had been made.
The first practice barrage began at 4.0 P.M. on September 15th and was
carried out along the whole Corps front; followed certain minor
adjustments, and at 5.30 A.M. on the 16th it was fired again. At 10.0
A.M. on the same day an "Army barrage," _i.e._, a barrage on the whole
of the Army front, was fired, to be followed on the afternoon of the
17th by another Corps barrage. On September 18th the last two Army
barrages were fired, one at 6.0 A.M. and one at 8.30 P.M., and at 11.0
A.M. on the 19th the Corps had its last rehearsal. It was a relief when
these practices were over; they invariably called down heavy retaliation
from the enemy who, as soon as he saw an infantry attack was not
pending, turned the full blast of his guns on to our batteries. It was
impossible to cease firing and put the detachments under cover, for this
action would have resulted in gaps appearing in the barrage and
confusing the observers who, unaware of what was happening, would have
reported that the barrage was uneven and full of "holes." The programme
had to be carried out from start to finish whatever the enemy did, and
if the batteries lost heavily in these days it was all that was to be
expected of the Salient. Lose heavily they did, both in officers and
men, and as the latter stood around their guns in the small hours of the
20th, ready to begin this time the real barrage covering the assault,
there was not one detachment which had not already been seriously
depleted in numbers, which had not been compelled to call up
considerable reinforcements from the wagon-lines.
It was on September 18th that the orders had been received which fixed
the 20th as the day of attack, and on the last two nights, the 18th/19th
and 19th/20th, the howitzers of both brigades busied themselves with
prolonged gas bombardments of the enemy batteries. The only hope of
salvation for the guns lay in silencing some of those batteries, and
they knew that their chances of surviving the long all-day barrage which
they were to carry out on the day of the attack rested almost entirely
on the efforts of the two preceding nights, and on the work of the heavy
artillery which, by intense counter-battery work on the 20th, would try
to keep down the enemy fire.
Twenty minutes to six in the morning of Thursday, the 20th, had been
fixed for the delivery of the assault, and some thirty minutes before
this the detachments of all batteries manned their guns and stood by,
ready for the signal to go. Very feverish were those last few minutes of
waiting, for nearly every battery was being heavily shelled, and it was
probable that, as soon as the attack was launched, the enemy guns which
were causing all the trouble would come under the counter-fire of our
own "heavies," and would at any rate diminish the now alarmingly heavy
fire which they were directing upon the wretched detachments.
With terrible slowness and deliberation the minutes passed; 5·9 in. and
4·2 in. shell were crashing every moment into the battery positions,
ammunition was exploding, men were being knocked out and a number of
direct hits were destroying the guns, killing and wounding every single
man of the detachments. In some of the batteries a few more minutes of
this would have put every gun out of action, but mercifully zero hour
was at last reached, a sheet of flame lit up the entire countryside and
with a great roar the barrage began. The batteries of the 33rd Division
poured forth a curtain of fire in front of the advancing infantry, the
heavy artillery bombarded the enemy batteries and roads, and, whatever
happened all round them, whatever bombardment they suffered, the
detachments were now fully occupied and took heed of nothing but their
work. The assault had begun!
The infantry who were even now advancing under cover of the guns of,
amongst others, the 156th and 162nd Brigades were, as already stated,
troops of the 23rd Division. On the right the attack was continued by
the 41st Division, on the left by the 2nd Australian Division, and
together the long line advanced slowly through the mud towards the enemy
trenches. The ground was very bad; it was estimated that the infantry
advancing across No Man's Land could not cover one hundred yards in less
than six minutes, and accordingly the barrage was so timed as to move
forward twenty-five yards every minute and a half. Even at this slow
pace the infantry were hard put to keep up with it, while the work of
the gunners was rendered exceedingly heavy; for the ultimate objectives
were fairly deep within the enemy lines, and with the barrage moving so
slowly the infantry were not due to reach their farthest goal till a
late hour, while an intense rate of fire had to be maintained over their
heads the whole time. Moreover, there was not one battery which by now
had not had some of its guns knocked out, and the speed of the remainder
had, of necessity, to be increased in order to keep up the full volume
of fire.
From 5.40 A.M. onwards the batteries roared forth at intense rate;
slowly the barrage crept on ahead of the infantry till it reached and
covered the first objective; halted there for fifty minutes while the
assaulting troops reorganised themselves, and at 7.8 A.M. moved off to
the second objective, now at the slower rate of one hundred yards in
eight minutes. At 7.40 A.M. the second objective was reached and
covered, and for two hours and thirteen minutes a protective barrage was
maintained what time both infantry brigades in the forward line brought
up their reserve battalions for the attack on the 3rd and last
objective. At 9.53 A.M. the last phase of the attack began and, moving
forward now at only ten yards per minute, the barrage started to creep
towards the third objective, reached it at twenty-five minutes past ten
and, passing over it, put up a protective curtain of fire beyond while
the infantry established themselves in the newly won trenches. This
protective barrage, covering as it did the ultimate objective of the
day's fighting, had to be maintained until well on in the afternoon;
since it was fired at a slower rate, however, it now became possible to
relieve some of the detachments at the guns and to set about clearing up
the battery positions.
As already described, nearly all the batteries were heavily shelled just
before the launching of the attack early in the morning. Shortly after
the earlier phases of the barrage this hostile bombardment had eased off
under the counter-battery work of our own heavy artillery, but
throughout the morning—and, in fact, during the whole of that day and
night—every one of the battery positions was searched and swept at
intervals by 5·9 in. and 4·2 in. howitzers, the resulting damage to
personnel and equipment being very great. With gun muzzles pointed now
to a high elevation, small detachments maintained a protective barrage
at a slow rate of fire while the remainder of the men—after eating a
hasty meal—began to repair and reorganise the positions.
Yawning holes gaped everywhere; guns had been knocked out and had to be
dragged from the pits on to the road; ammunition, buried or scattered by
hostile fire, was dug up; the dead were removed and placed away near the
road, whither presently a wagon would come for them, while the gun pits
themselves required to be rebuilt so as to be fit for the new guns which
the wagon-lines had already been ordered to bring up. It was gloomy
work, this, and was rendered all the more depressing by the certain
knowledge that presently the enemy would open fire and would wreak the
same havoc all over again, but the outstanding necessity presented
itself of keeping every gun and every battery fully ready at a moment's
notice to support the infantry and prepared to open fire on any target
within range.
All this time news at the batteries had been scarce. A Captain from the
right and left artillery groups had been attached to the two infantry
brigades (68th and 69th) covered by the guns, and, in addition,
subalterns from the same artillery groups had accompanied the two
assaulting battalions in the attack on the third objective. Their duty,
however, was to report straight to Group headquarters, and therefore it
was left to the batteries only to surmise from the continuity of the
progress of the barrage that the attack must have, at any rate at first,
succeeded. The primary objective—the "Red Line"—ran from Fitzclarence
Farm through Herenthage Château to the eastern edge of Dumbarton Wood,
while the second objective—the "Blue Line"—extended from a point midway
between Black Watch Corner and Cameron House down east of Veldhoek to
the eastern edge of Bass Wood, and, as the weight of artillery forming
the barrage on the divisional front alone consisted of 84 18-pdrs., 30
4·5 in. howitzers and 42 heavier guns and howitzers, not counting the
batteries detailed for special work, it was hoped that these two
objectives at least might be overrun with comparative ease. It was in
the advance to the "Green Line," the final objective of the day's
battle, which ran from Carlisle Farm due south for eleven hundred yards,
bending back slightly to the west of Gheluvelt Wood but embracing Tower
Hamlets, that trouble might be forthcoming, for by then the enemy should
have recovered from his first surprise and might offer very considerable
resistance.
At last news was received. A short message stated that all objectives
had been taken but that very heavy fighting had occurred in the advance
upon the last objective, and only the excellence of the creeping barrage
had made success possible. The official report written later by the 23rd
Division stated: "The barrages were very punctual and effective.
Prisoners seemed dazed and utterly demoralised. The creeping barrage
from the second to the third objective and the protective barrage beyond
the latter are deserving of special mention. Replies to S.O.S. were both
prompt and effective, rapidly dispersing any attempts at concentration
or counter-attack. This instilled great confidence into our infantry."
These last remarks were not received till a later date; at the time
there came only the bare news that all objectives had been taken and
that a large part of the success gained was owed to the excellence of
the barrage. It was good to learn that the day was won, that success had
been achieved, and it offered some slight comfort to know that the
service of the guns, which had involved such heavy losses amongst the
detachments, had been of avail. Only on the right had non-success been
met with, and there the left brigade of the 41st Division had been
unable to advance beyond the second objective. The troops covered by the
33rd Divisional Artillery, however, threw out a protective flank; the
S.O.S. barrage was so arranged as especially to protect the right of the
23rd Division which was in the air except for the thin defensive flank
already referred to, and gunners and infantry set themselves to watch
for the inevitable counter-attacks.
All through the afternoon the batteries had been busy breaking up
concentrations of the enemy, and hitherto had been successful in keeping
them at bay. The valley of the Reutelbeek and the area around Reutel
Village offered some cover, and continued calls from the infantry kept
the guns at work on these areas. A determined counter-attack launched
shortly after 7.0 P.M. was beaten off under our artillery fire; all
night intermittent bursts from every battery swept the enemy hollows and
approaches, and at 4.30 A.M. on the 21st a special barrage was fired
with the object of breaking up any enemy operation which might have been
planned for daybreak. By these means, and by continuing these methods
throughout the day of the 21st, the infantry were able to maintain all
their gains, and by the evening of the 21st were assured of their
position. Two furious counter-attacks by the enemy, delivered after an
artillery bombardment lasting one and a half hours in each case, were
broken up at 3.0 P.M. and at 7.0 P.M. by our artillery fire, and gunners
and infantry alike now set themselves to try and repair the wreckage of
their positions before offensive operations should break out anew.
The heavy firing which preceded the attack, the all-day barrage which
had been maintained on the 20th and the wastage of ammunition incurred
through enemy shells blowing up the dumps around the guns necessitated
very heavy work all through the 21st and 22nd in bringing up ammunition
from the wagon-lines. The lines of the 162nd Brigade were a great deal
too far back for carrying out so much gun-line work, and, as early as
the 15th, forward wagon-lines composed of one section per battery had at
first been maintained on the eastern outskirts of Dickebusch; later,
after being heavily shelled on the night following the attack, they had
been moved across the road to the neighbourhood of Dickebusch church.
From here, and from the 156th Brigade lines a little farther back,
parties of pack horses came up on the 21st to carry ammunition from the
nearest dumps to the battery positions, for it was impossible in the
majority of cases to bring ammunition wagons and teams anywhere near the
guns. Light railway tracks had been run as far forward as possible, and,
from the termini at Valley Cottages, Verbrandenmolen and other points
which the little petrol-driven trucks were able to reach about once in
four days, the pack animals carried the ammunition to the batteries.
During the whole of the two days following the attack this transport of
ammunition was carried out, although continually interrupted by hostile
shell storms which inflicted many casualties amongst men and horses, and
by the 23rd not only were dumps at the guns completely up to strength
again, but further new guns had come up from the Corps gun "pool" on the
Reninghelst-Steenvoorde Road, and had in the majority of cases replaced
all the guns knocked out during the previous week's fighting.
It was well that the guns had succeeded in replenishing their ammunition
on the 21st and 22nd, for on the 23rd began preparations for a fresh
attack. Throughout the two preceding days the enemy had pounded and
smashed every battery position in the attempt to prevent as far as
possible any further operations, but as fast as the guns were damaged
repairs were executed, and at seven o'clock in the morning of the 23rd
every battery was able to take part in the Corps practice barrage which
had been fixed for that hour. Like its predecessors it was fired at a
reduced rate to that at which the real attack barrage was to be fired,
and like its predecessors it called down severe hostile retaliation.
C/162 (Major Hill) was so heavily shelled that it was compelled to move
out to a fresh position three hundred yards to the left flank, and every
battery received the usual searching which now had come to be regarded
as inevitable, while the rest of the day saw shell storms of increasing
violence delivered upon every area where any of our batteries were to be
found.
On the night of September 24th/25th the infantry of the 33rd Division
relieved the 23rd Division, and General Stewart, moving up to
Burgomaster Farm in Dickebusch, assumed command of the artillery
covering the front. The whole of the 25th marked a day of intense
activity amongst the guns. At 5.40 A.M., while the infantry relief was
still in progress, a strong counter-attack was launched by the enemy,
preceded by a heavy barrage. For one and a half hours our batteries
maintained a rapid rate of fire on their S.O.S. lines, but were unable
to prevent the right of the 100th Infantry Brigade astride the Menin
Road and the whole of the 98th Brigade from being driven back to the
support line. At 11.35 A.M. the S.O.S. signal was again sent up by the
100th Brigade, and again the guns burst forth in their support—this time
with success.
At 2.15 P.M. a Corps practice barrage was fired, and at 3.30 P.M.,
before the practice was over, devastating bombardment by guns of all
calibres was opened upon our battery positions. For upwards of half an
hour this bombardment continued, inflicting considerable damage upon the
battery positions, and then for a short time the weary detachments had a
rest. Not for long, however! At 5.30 P.M. the storm broke out afresh,
this time upon gunners and infantry alike, and once again, now under
heavy shell fire, the batteries responded to the S.O.S. signal sent up
an hour later by the left brigade and by the Australians further to the
left. This counter-attack was also repulsed, and by midnight it was
found that the right brigade held their line intact except for a small
portion of trench north of Menin Road, but that the left brigade north
of the Reutelbeek had been beaten back three hundred yards, though
possibly some posts were still held 150 yards in front.
Such a day as the 25th was not very favourable for preceding an attack,
yet when Wednesday, the 26th, dawned it found the infantry of the 33rd
Division assembling for the assault which had been fixed for 5.50 A.M.
It will be remembered that just prior to the attack on the 20th the
field batteries were all subjected to an intense bombardment, while the
infantry were allowed to assemble in the front line almost untouched.
Now the positions were reversed; at 5.0 A.M. the enemy put down an
intense barrage on the infantry, just as the latter were forming up for
the attack, and inflicted very heavy casualties upon them. For fifty
minutes the hostile bombardment tore them and shook them, and it was in
greatly diminished numbers that the infantry advanced across No Man's
Land when, at 5.50 A.M., the guns blazed out in the assault barrage.
For this attack one hundred and two 18-pdrs., thirty-six 4·5 in.
howitzers and a large number of heavy guns were covering the divisional
front, which stretched from the southern edge of the Polygon de
Zonnebeke on the north to a point three hundred yards short of Gheluvelt
on the south. Dumps of eight hundred and thirty rounds per 18-pdr. gun
and seven hundred and fifty rounds per 4·5 in. howitzer were maintained
at the guns for, as previously, the barrage was to move at the very slow
rate of one hundred yards in six minutes to the first objective, and one
hundred yards in eight minutes to the final line to be taken. Moreover,
a protective barrage was to be maintained beyond the final objective for
half an hour after its capture (8.40 A.M.), and from then until 2.15
P.M. was to continue at a reduced rate searching all the ground beyond
the infantry to a depth of one thousand yards. From this it will be seen
that allowance had to be made for a very heavy expenditure of
ammunition.
At 5.50 A.M. the infantry went over the top, and at 7.45 A.M. came the
first news. A captain from the right and left artillery groups (between
which two groups the 33rd Divisional Artillery was split up) had been
attached to the headquarters of the two infantry brigades delivering the
attack, while a subaltern from each group accompanied the battalions
assaulting the final objective, and from them came the information. The
39th Division on the right and the 5th Australian Division on the left
had captured the Red Line—the first objective—but the 33rd Division had
been held up. The first objective on the front of the latter ran from
Joist Farm past Jut Farm and through Polderhoek to the northern edge of
Gheluvelt Wood, and had proved too strong for the troops who, during the
previous twenty-four hours, had been fighting hand to hand in numberless
counter-attacks and had endured the most intense bombardments. At 8.40
A.M. the trench which had been lost in the previous day's fighting just
north of the Menin Road was recaptured, and at 11.55 A.M., after calling
back the barrage, a fresh attack under the creeping fire of the
batteries was launched upon the first objective. For twenty minutes the
guns carried out this new programme, but at 12.15 P.M. a message was
received asking the batteries to keep up a protective barrage beyond the
Red Line until further notice, as a heavy barrage was being maintained
by the enemy upon our assaulting troops. This protective barrage was
continued for upwards of an hour, which fact indicated that no further
progress had been made by the infantry, and throughout the afternoon
intermittent fire was directed upon the enemy beyond the first objective
until such time as orders should be received for a fresh attack.
In the middle of the afternoon a severe enemy shell storm descended upon
all the batteries and inflicted serious casualties. At the same time a
heavy bombardment of our infantry was reported, and at 5.0 P.M. our
guns, themselves heavily shelled by the enemy, opened fire on their
S.O.S. lines until 6.30 P.M. when they slowed down. At 6.40 P.M. the
S.O.S. signal was again sent up, and again for one and a quarter hours
the batteries put down a barrage. Scarcely had they stopped than the
enemy launched yet another counter-attack, and not till nine o'clock at
night did the gun detachments cease the barrage firing which they had
begun shortly before 6.0 A.M. that morning. With the arrival of night
matters became quieter and no further operations were attempted. From
information received it was gathered that the infantry of the 33rd
Division held the original line from which they had been driven on the
preceding day, and had established advanced posts in the first objective
although not occupying it in force. The casualties were reported to have
been terribly heavy.
On the morning of the 27th a resumption of the advance was carried out.
Ammunition was running low but, with pack horses hard at work bringing
up fresh supplies, the batteries kept a covering fire over the infantry,
and by 9.45 A.M. the latter had established themselves in force in the
first objective of the previous day's fighting and had pushed out posts
beyond. At midday the left brigade were very heavily shelled and asked
for covering fire from the batteries, and half an hour later the 5th
Australian Division on the left reported that they could see the enemy
massing in Polderhoek Château Wood. On hearing this the guns of the
156th and 162nd Brigades were immediately turned on to this area,
searching and sweeping it for upwards of three-quarters of an hour, and
the threatened counter-attack was broken up. At 2.15 P.M., however, it
developed again, and for an hour the guns of the 162nd Brigade
maintained a medium rate of fire on their S.O.S. lines, at the end of
which time all was reported quiet.
So the day wore on; the guns in continual action, the detachments,
depleted by hostile shell fire and weary almost to death, seizing what
opportunities they could of getting a few moments' rest. At a quarter to
seven in the evening the never-ending S.O.S. call was sent out again,
and for another hour the batteries fired on the lines indicated,
breaking up the attempted counter-attack and assisting our troops to
advance slightly upon the Blue Line—the final objective of the previous
day's battle—towards which they had been working gradually the whole day
long. When this barrage was finished night firing began and was
continued throughout the night, two calls for support from the infantry
being responded to at 1.15 A.M. and 5.10 A.M. respectively, and at
twenty minutes past five on the morning of the 28th such gunners as
still survived pulled themselves together to fire a Corps practice
barrage.
This practice barrage had a threefold object. In addition to further
shattering the enemy's defences and upsetting his morale, it was so
timed as to coincide with any enemy counter-attack which might have been
fixed for dawn, and which would therefore be dispersed by the fire of
our guns before it could come to a head. Moreover, it also helped our
front line troops under cover of its fire further to improve their
position, and so well did it succeed in this respect that, at 8.0 A.M.,
the infantry reported that they had consolidated their front only one
hundred yards short of the Blue Line. This operation, apart from an Army
barrage at 5.15 A.M. on the 29th which coincided with and broke up a
pending enemy counter-attack, proved the last combined operation between
infantry and gunners to take place in the month of September; with the
two brigades now engaged in the usual harassing fire which was the order
of the day on this front, we must turn our attention to the life of the
batteries and, leaving their tactical operations alone for a few
moments, see how they had fared during the previous four days' battle.
The losses amongst the detachments had been cruel. In all the fighting a
very heavy portion of the enemy's fire had been directed in
counter-battery work upon the gun positions, and the batteries, being
almost continually engaged with S.O.S. calls and unable to take any form
of cover, had been shot down time and again. Moreover, the work had been
desperate; with weakened detachments an incessant fire had had to be
kept up almost without a break, and such intervals as offered themselves
were necessarily utilised in rebuilding damaged gun platforms and in
restocking with ammunition. The men were in an advanced stage of
fatigue, and as yet no signs were forthcoming of any possibility of a
rest. On September 27th B/162 (Major Cory) was relieved by B/102 and
marched down to St. Hubertshoek, near Hallebast Corner, whither the
162nd Brigade wagon-lines had moved on September 25th, and here this one
battery remained in rest until October 7th, but for the remainder there
was no relief. With men from the D.A.C. and from the Trench Mortar
batteries the guns were kept in action, but this course involved the use
of many unskilled numbers, and few detachments had more than one man who
could safely be trusted to lay the piece in a barrage.
On September 28th two moves took place which brought home to the
batteries the fact that, for the present at any rate, they were not to
be relieved. On that day General Stewart and his Staff, on the relief of
the 33rd Division infantry by the 23rd Division, handed over control of
the artillery to the incoming C.R.A. and moved out to rest at Boeschepe,
where the headquarter staff remained until the batteries themselves at a
later date were ultimately relieved. Simultaneously, Lieut.-Colonel E.
J. Skinner, commanding the 162nd Brigade, came up and took over the
control of the Left Group from Lieut.-Colonel Groves (103rd Brigade) and
set up his headquarters first at Dormy House but later, on October 1st,
at Bedford House, one thousand yards south of Shrapnel Corner. The zone
covered by the two brigades was very slightly altered and now ran from
Gheluvelt on the Ypres-Menin road to a point about 1,700 yards
northwards, but the battery positions remained the same, and October
came in to find them preparing for offensive operations again.
On October 1st an Army practice barrage had been fixed to begin at 5.15
A.M., and, just as the gunners were assembling to fire the opening
rounds, a furious shell-storm was opened by the enemy upon our own front
line and the whole area up to one thousand yards in rear of it. It was
manifest, from hostile aeroplane activity and the weight of artillery
fire which was being brought to bear, that a big counter-attack was
impending, and the Army barrage accordingly came down at a very
opportune moment. At 5.50 A.M., while it was at its height, the enemy
were seen advancing in a series of waves upon our front line, and with
that action there began a day of the most intense fighting. All
communications with the front line were cut, not even pigeons succeeded
in finding a way through the dense hostile barrage, and until the
evening every battery was kept in almost continuous action answering the
numerous S.O.S. rockets which appeared, and replying to the enemy
bombardment which, even without the evidence of rockets, called by its
weight for active reply. Not until midnight did the situation ease, and
then it was found that the infantry had maintained their whole front
except for the left which had been bent back very slightly. To the
extraordinary heroism of the infantry the G.O.C. 23rd Division ascribed
the defeat of the hostile attack—and with this the gunners very heartily
agreed—but he added in his report that the field batteries had
maintained such splendid protective fire that the enemy had, on frequent
occasions, been broken up before they could get to grips with the
garrison of our front line.
Although the Army barrage on October 1st had coincided with and had
helped to defeat an enemy counter-attack, its primary object was to
prepare for a renewed offensive on our part, and this offensive now took
definite shape. After firing another practice barrage on October 2nd and
maintaining throughout the 2nd and 3rd a destructive fire upon the enemy
system—the while long strings of pack horses refilled the
ever-diminishing dumps of ammunition around the guns—the batteries in
the early morning of October 4th set range-drum and dial sight to the
opening elevation of yet another barrage, this time no practice but as a
definite and vital protection to infantry moving forward to the assault.
Despite the rain and the ever deepening mud the offensive was ordered to
be continued.
At 6.0 A.M. on Thursday, October 4th, on the zone covered by the 33rd
Divisional Artillery the infantry of the 5th Division advanced to the
attack, supported by one hundred and eight 18-pdrs., thirty-six 4·5 in.
howitzers, sixteen 6 in. howitzers and an assortment of heavier
howitzers and 60-pdrs. Their right lay upon the northern edge of
Gheluvelt Wood and their left upon Juniper Cottages, and, with the
barrage moving ahead of them at the rate of one hundred yards in six
minutes, they essayed the capture of the high ground south-west of
Reutel together with the eastern slopes of the Polderhoek spur. The
actual line of their one and final objective ran from a point 500 yards
south of Reutel, past the south-west corner of Juniper Wood and east of
Polderhoek Château to the northern edge of Gheluvelt Wood, the holding
of which line would cover the communications of the 21st Division across
Polygon Beek on the left in their attempt to capture Reutel; the
objective of the 5th Division, in fact, was the southward continuation
of the first objective of the 21st Division, and formed the right flank
of an attack which, further north, was intended to penetrate deeply into
the enemy lines. On the right of the troops covered by the 33rd
Divisional Artillery the infantry of the 37th Division were to advance
their left slightly to conform with the line of attack.
Throughout the night of the 3rd/4th the enemy had carried out an intense
bombardment of our front line system and had, from time to time, swept
the battery positions with shell-storms from 5·9 in. and 4·2 in.
howitzers. To this hostile bombardment the batteries had, at the request
of the infantry, energetically replied at intervals during the night,
but the opening rounds of the barrage at six o'clock in the morning
smashed their way into the beginnings of an enemy counter-attack which
was concentrating on the front of our own attack. Fortunately the
barrage dropped before the enemy concentration was complete, and the
fire of our guns at zero broke up the enemy attempt before it could come
to a head. Notwithstanding this, however, very considerable opposition
was met with, and only on those parts of the front where the infantry
managed to keep right close under the barrage fire of the batteries was
complete success achieved.
The barrage, as already stated, had been arranged to move forward at the
rate of sixteen yards per minute until it should reach a line two
hundred yards beyond the objective. Here it was to halt, fire a round of
smoke shell from every alternate gun as a warning that the protective
line had been reached, and be maintained at a slow rate to cover the
infantry while they were digging in. In addition, moreover, to this
standing barrage, it was arranged that every now and then the batteries
should search by short lifts for one thousand yards beyond the line of
the protective barrage; while at 8.10 A.M., by which time the objective
of the 5th Division should have been fully secured, the barrage was to
move on towards Gheluvelt in conformation with the fire covering the
21st Division further north in their advance on the second objective,
thereby suggesting a resumption of the advance on the 5th Division
front. In point of fact, however, no further advance beyond the first
objective on the front covered by the 33rd Divisional Artillery was
intended; the batteries, when they reached the extreme limit of their
range, were to drop back to the protective barrage line again, their
work of drawing attention away from the 21st Divisional front being
finished.
As events turned out, the operations of the 5th Division were not
entirely successful. The 13th Infantry Brigade, under the guns of
Lieut.-Colonel Butler's Group (the right group), reached the final
objective with the right battalion in the afternoon, after being held up
for a time by a strong point north of Lewis House. The left battalion of
the same brigade, however, encountered strong opposition at Polderhoek
Château and was unable to keep up with the barrage. Survivors of the
assaulting troops actually reached Polderhoek Château and even
penetrated beyond it, but after severe hand to hand fighting a line was
taken up two hundred yards west of the Château. The left infantry
brigade (95th), covered by the guns of Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's Group,
was also unable in places to keep up with the barrage. The right
battalion found that the ground between the Reutelbeek and the company
on the southern edge of Cameron Covert was so sodden as to be absolutely
impassable; a detour to the right and left was accordingly made, and a
line consolidated in the 13th Brigade area and between Cameron Covert
and the stream. The left battalion of this brigade at the same time did
actually reach its final objective, but so heavy was the hostile fire
coming from the high ground around Poezelhoek that the position became
untenable, and a line was taken up in the area of the 21st Division on
the left, running from Reutel westward and facing south, while the 21st
Division formed a defensive flank by continuing this line to Cameron
Covert.
By three o'clock in the afternoon the right brigade disentangled the
muddle and formed a general line running from the northern edge of
Gheluvelt Wood north-north-east to the Scherriabeek and then on to a
point fifty yards short of Polderhoek Château; here there was a gap of
some 150 yards, and the line then continued due north for another
hundred yards, to be carried on northwards through Polderhoek Wood to
Cameron Covert by the left brigade. It was well that even this rough
line was organised, for throughout the afternoon infantry and gunners
alike were hotly engaged by the enemy in numerous counter-attacks. In
all, five attacks were launched by the enemy on the right brigade front
during the afternoon, and three more in the evening, and in each case
every gun which could be brought to bear was switched round to help the
exhausted infantry. After the most severe fighting, and after continuous
firing by the batteries throughout the remainder of the day, the
infantry were able to report that all gains were held; rifle and
artillery fire had smashed every enemy attempt to advance, and our new
line was securely held. During the night of October 4th/5th the left
battalion of the left brigade, under cover of the guns, withdrew from
the 21st Divisional area and took up a line through the middle of
Cameron Covert, and so on the morning of the 5th the line stood solid.
On this part of the front the objective had not been captured except
upon the extreme right, and the casualties had been tremendous. Further
to the left, however, success had been met with, and Reutel Village,
Abraham Heights and Gravenstafel were now in our hands.
It may be complained that this chapter has dealt too fully with the
infantry operations, and has not sufficiently recorded the daily life of
the batteries and their experiences during the attacks. The answer to
this complaint is, briefly, that the batteries had no daily life but
rather a daily death, while their experiences—day in, day out—were
invariably the same. Morning, noon and night the men were splashing
about in mud, trying to keep their ammunition clean and their guns
serviceable; daily they were shelled, sometimes with long deliberate
bombardments, sometimes in hurricane shell-storms which descended upon
them for forty minutes or so two or three times a day. They were always
wet, always cold; they continually saw the guns and ammunition, which
they had spent hours in cleaning and preparing, blown to bits in the
passing of a second; they helped to bring up more guns, more ammunition,
and saw, in the serving of these new guns, their mates blown to pieces,
shattered, torn. They grew to believe that relief would never come, that
for all time they must exist in the grim shadows of Maple Copse, of
Fosse Wood and of Armagh Wood. They felt, as they saw the shells
crashing down all around them, that they were forgotten by God and man.
There _is_ no daily history of the batteries to record save the success
or failure of the operations in which they took part, and for the
supporting of which they paid this heavy price. There lies the true
history of the batteries, and that it is which in these pages must be
recorded.
From October 5th there ensued a pause during which the batteries
strained every nerve to get up more ammunition from the dumps, to clear
up their shell-wrecked positions and to sort out the gun line personnel
into some sort of workable detachments. B/162 came up into action again
from the wagon-lines on the 7th and took over its old position from
B/242, and for a few days such registration and reconstruction of
positions was carried out as was possible, having regard for the heavy
enemy fire which continually swept the entire area in which the
batteries were located. Only for a short time was there a lull, however,
for a fresh attack had been ordered to be carried out on October 9th.
On Tuesday, the 9th, the 5th Division attempted to complete the capture
of the Polderhoek ridge and, by extending its left to Polygon Beek, to
form connection with the 17th Division. For this purpose the weight of
artillery, the pace of the creeping barrage and the formation of the
standing barrage were to be identical with those of the 4th, but the
objective in this case was to include the whole of Polderhoek Château
and Wood together with Cameron Covert, and was to bend back to the then
front line at Joist Farm on the north. The 15th Infantry Brigade was
responsible for the attack on the right, while on the left the 95th
Infantry Brigade was ordered to pivot on a stationary left flank and,
clearing all the ground east of Cameron Covert to as far south as the
Reutelbeek and as far eastwards as the line of the objective, was to
form the connection between the left of the 15th Brigade and the right
of the 17th Division.
Zero hour was shortly after 6.0 A.M., and three minutes after the
beginning of the barrage the infantry advanced to the assault. The
ground, already a sea of mud, was churned up yet more by the intensity
of the barrage, and the troops forming the extreme right of the 5th
Division, by their efforts to avoid portions of ground which were
utterly impassable, lost direction and moved towards the south-east. The
mistake was presently discovered, but too late to catch up the barrage,
and a line was taken up a little in advance of the previous front line
immediately north of the Scherriabeek. Simultaneously the left and
centre companies of the right battalion advanced on their proper course,
but came under intense fire from Gheluvelt and Polderhoek Château, and
only one platoon—themselves all wounded—reached the Château; ultimately,
owing to heavy casualties, they withdrew to their original front line.
Loss of direction was responsible also for the failure of the left
battalion of this brigade to reach its objective. Moving too much
towards the right it came under heavy fire from some houses north of the
Château and, suffering many casualties, was held up. By ten o'clock in
the morning, despite the fiercest efforts by the batteries to beat down
the opposition, the whole brigade was back in its old line. The left
brigade, having no forward movement on the right to which to conform,
did not advance at all.
The state of the ground was now becoming appalling, and, with two
successive attacks rendered failures by the mud, a lull set in on this
part of the front—a lull during which each of the batteries in turn
managed to seize a few days' rest at the wagon-lines. The news that
these short rests were to be granted was received with mixed feelings;
clearly, if it was thought necessary to send each battery in turn for a
short spell at the wagon-lines, the brigades were not destined to move
right out of the line yet awhile, but on the other hand this new plan
did assure a short interruption of the nerve-racking conditions of the
gun line, and for this reason at any rate it was welcome. On October
13th Lieut.-Colonel Butler and Lieut.-Colonel Skinner handed over the
control of their groups to the commanding officers of the 27th and 103rd
Brigades respectively and, accompanied by the personnel of one battery
from each brigade (A/156 and D/162), moved out to the wagon-lines. On
the 17th these two batteries moved back into action again after a
four-day rest, and on the 18th three more batteries moved out. Each
battery in turn had four days at the wagon-lines of comparative rest and
quiet, and then moved up into action again, and by the 24th all the
batteries except C/162 were back in the line once more, slightly
refreshed, slightly reorganised, but still suffering greatly from an
almost complete lack of trained men. C/162 (Major Hill) had been left at
the wagon-lines owing to the fact that the severe casualties sustained
by the battery just prior to moving out had rendered it unfit to go back
into action again.
On October 24th 162nd Brigade Headquarters moved back into the line
also, and took over command of "C" Group at Bedford House under the 7th
Divisional Artillery. This group consisted of "A" and D/162, "B" and
C/156, and also of the 46th, 47th and 112th Australian batteries. The
front covered by the group and held by the infantry of the 7th Division
was, at the same time, changed from north of Gheluvelt to just south of
it, as the batteries could reach this new zone at a slightly shorter
range; with the new front allotted and registered, orders were received
for this group and also for the 156th Brigade to cover an attack by the
7th Division to be launched on the 21st. It seemed madness for any such
attack to be contemplated, for the weather had been wet and stormy since
October 9th and the ground was even more impassable, even more
treacherous than it had been earlier in the month. The only hope of
salvation for the infantry lay in the putting down by the batteries of
such a curtain of fire as would completely cover the assaulting troops
while they waded through the mud, and this the batteries now prepared to
do. D/162 (Major Lee), its position at Maple Copse being almost
completely untenable owing to the searching fire which the enemy
continually directed upon it, moved eight hundred yards northwards on
the 24th to a position just west of Zouave Wood. D/156 (Major Barstow)
moved forward to the middle of what had been Sanctuary Wood, dropping
the trails just off the road under the shelter of the slopes in the
western half of the wood, and at dawn on Friday, the 26th, all batteries
manned their guns to support this, as it seemed to them, desperate
venture.
The actual front of the attack by the 7th Division, which the guns of
the 33rd Divisional Artillery were to cover, included Gheluvelt and the
ground for six hundred yards north and south of it, and the assault was
supported by one hundred and forty-four 18-pdrs., forty-eight 4·5 in.
howitzers, thirty-two six-inch and twenty heavier howitzers. Two
objectives were fixed, the first including the whole of Gheluvelt except
the extreme eastern outskirts and running down south-west to Berry
Cottages, while the final objective reached from the lake north-west of
Gheluvelt down to Reigate farm, running one hundred yards east of
Gheluvelt Village, the object of the operation being to capture
Gheluvelt and some ground along the Zandvoorde Spur, and so to secure
the hold on Tower Hamlets. "C" Group covered the 20th Infantry Brigade
on the left, while "A" and D/156 with B/162 were acting under the orders
of Lieut.-Colonel Marriott, commanding "B" Group, and covered the 91st
Infantry Brigade on the right.
At 5.40 A.M. the barrage began, the nearest fringe of it dropping one
hundred and fifty yards in front of the infantry as they formed up for
the attack. There it remained for six minutes, and then started
gradually to creep forward at the rate of twelve yards per minute; after
traversing two hundred yards at this pace the speed of advance was
slackened down to ten yards per minute for another two hundred yards,
and then, at a uniform pace of seven yards per minute, it moved on to
the protective line beyond the first objective. Here it remained from
7.4 A.M. until 7.50 A.M. to give the infantry time to reorganise and
prepare for the next attack; at 7.50 A.M. it moved forward again, after
four minutes' intense fire to warn the assaulting troops that the time
to advance had come, and so forward at the same slow rate to the
protective line beyond the final objective; this it reached at 8.46 A.M.
and there remained as a protective barrage to allow the infantry to
consolidate the ground won.
Thus moved the barrage, but what of the infantry who should have been
close behind it? Already attention has been called to the bog-like
nature of the ground across which they were to attack, and, even had it
not, the extraordinarily slow rate of the barrage—twelve yards per
minute—should be sufficient evidence of the opinion formed by the Higher
Command of the sort of conditions with which the infantry would have to
contend. As events turned out it was this very mud which denied success
to our troops. Enemy artillery fire on the forward system had been light
up till zero, and not for seven minutes after our barrage dropped did
the enemy put down any sort of reply with his guns. The cause of the
infantry's undoing was the machine-guns which played upon them and swept
them while they struggled helplessly in the mud—machine-guns safely
ensconced in concrete pill-boxes while our men were in the mud up to
their waists. By twenty minutes to eight the 91st Brigade was held up at
Lewis House and forced back to its original line; at half-past eight
elements of the 20th Brigade had reached Gheluvelt, but were stopped by
the enemy pill-boxes and ultimately had to come back. Throughout the
morning the gunners maintained a protective barrage beyond the infantry
to try and assist them in their now almost hopeless task, but at 2.35
P.M. the barrage was called off and the battle ceased.
All along the line of the 7th Division, and further to the right, the
assaulting troops had been beaten back to their original positions and
in some cases even west thereof. Machine-gun fire from Lewis House and
Berry Cottages had stopped the 91st Infantry Brigade, while the men of
the 20th Brigade had been beaten by the mud itself. They had fought
their way right through to Gheluvelt but, on reaching it, had been
unable to ward off counter-attacks as they were up to their waists in
mud and every rifle was clogged and smothered with the same substance. A
message sent that afternoon to headquarters urged that the advanced
battalions should instantly be relieved "owing to heavy officer
casualties, disorganisation and the condition of the rifles," and that
sentence in itself very aptly summed up the conditions. Disorganisation
there had been, and very considerable at that, but such was the
condition of the ground that nothing else could have been expected. Thus
the day ended in failure on this particular portion of the front; under
normal circumstances, and with anything like firm ground over which to
attack, success might well have been achieved, but the weather
conditions stepped in and tilted the balance in favour of the enemy with
overwhelming effect.
This was the last infantry operation in which the 33rd Divisional
Artillery took part. On October 28th "A" and C/156 moved out to the
wagon-lines; three days later they were followed by D/156, which had
been very heavily gas shelled on the night of the 29th/30th. B/156 was
relieved on November 2nd, and next day the whole of the 162nd Brigade
withdrew from the line and marched back to Dickebusch, this time with
the promise before them of a real period of rest in the back areas.
The losses of the batteries in this autumn fighting had been appalling.
For fifty-one days they had been in continuous action under the worst of
conditions, covering attack after attack and undergoing interminable
shell fire from enemy guns of every calibre. The smallest possible
personnel was kept at each position, and seldom did the total strength
at the gun line of any one battery exceed thirty-six officers and men.
Yet the battle casualties of the 162nd Brigade numbered three hundred
and fifteen for this period, while those of the 156th Brigade were
almost as great. A/156, a six-gun battery, had twenty-six guns disabled
during the time it was in the line, while D/162, which had suffered the
loss of one hundred and six casualties including six officers, had had
nineteen guns put out of action by the enemy. The batteries had, in
fact, been practically wiped out, and it was a mere remnant of their
former selves which reached the wagon-lines. They had marched up to the
Salient a fine fighting weapon, the outcome of many months' training and
experience, hardened and versed in all the methods of war. They came
away from that murderous spot smashed, depleted, worn out, their work
accomplished but at a tremendous cost. Ypres was no longer to them a
legendary spot, but a plain, ghastly reality, a grim and deadly place
where the batteries learnt, as they had never learnt before, the full
horror of war. In trench fighting it is the infantry who look more
closely into the depths of Hell than do any other branches of the
Service; but at Ypres the field guns share this deadly privilege, and
the price of it is high, higher than can be bought with anything save
human life itself. The 33rd Divisional Artillery had shared that
privilege, had paid that price, and the account thereof may be seen
to-day in the cemeteries which cluster round Reninghelst, Dickebusch and
La Clytte, in the nameless graves lying amid the shell holes of Maple
Copse, Sanctuary Wood and Armagh Wood.