CHAPTER X.

PART I.

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN FLANDERS.

(APRIL-MAY 1918.)

Early on the morning of Tuesday, April 9th, there came to the batteries,

as they lay resting in their wagon-lines, the sound of tremendous

shelling to the south, a continuous thunder which was maintained

throughout the whole of that and the succeeding day (April 10th), giving

rise to considerable speculation and rumour. Clearly a great weight of

artillery was at work and almost certainly an attack was, if not already

begun, at least imminent, but what was happening and why did not the

batteries move up to take part in the battle? Of news or orders there

were none, and not for many hours did the men learn of the mighty German

thrust which even then was in progress, the thrust which, starting

between Givenchy and Bois Grenier on the 9th, spread northwards to

Messines on the 10th and marked the beginning of the greatest battle yet

seen on the Flanders front.

At last, on the afternoon of April 10th, news came to the 156th Brigade

that the Germans had attacked and advanced on a long front between

Ploegsteert Wood and Givenchy; that they had taken Armentières and had

advanced well in the direction of Bailleul, though Neuve Église was

still ours, and that the batteries were to move up into action

immediately to stop this onslaught. At 5.0 P.M. the march began, and the

brigade set out for its rendezvous, a point about one mile

west-north-west of Neuve Église, which it reached in pitch darkness

after many weary hours on roads greatly congested by traffic and by

refugees who, in the last stage of exhaustion, had scarcely strength to

get out of the way of our troops. Here the situation was found to be

very obscure; nobody knew where the infantry were, but warnings were

received that parties of Germans were believed to be little more than a

mile to the south, and at any moment the guns might be called upon to

open fire. Consequently the horses remained fully harnessed up all night

and practically alongside the guns, the latter having their trails

dropped in a position ready to fire, Lewis guns and guards were posted

in every battery position, and so the brigade stood awaiting information

which would clear up a little the prevailing chaos.

At three o'clock on the morning of Thursday, the 11th, the expected

orders arrived, and at half-past four began the march to Vierstraat,

where positions had been allotted to the brigade. By ten o'clock

Lieut.-Colonel Butler had completed his reconnaissance of Vierstraat

cross-roads, by half-past ten the four battery commanders were engaged

upon the same work, and midday saw the batteries in action bombarding

the enemy who had by then reached a line running just east of Wytschaete

and curving away thence towards the north-east. The battery positions

lay around Vierstraat and between that village and Kemmel, and from

observation stations north-east of Wytschaete the S.O.S. lines of the

guns were quickly registered.

Meanwhile the 162nd Brigade, farther back in the Poperinghe rest area,

had also received urgent orders to move into action. On the morning of

April 10th the batteries had paraded for a drill order of the whole

brigade and had moved off to some open country near by to begin the

exercise. While this was actually in progress a dispatch rider arrived

and brought the parade to an abrupt conclusion, for he carried with him

orders for the brigade to join the 19th Division at Dranoutre

immediately and to move into action without a moment's delay. Leaving

Captain Pavitt (the Adjutant) to collect the batteries and lead them to

the rendezvous, Lieut.-Colonel Skinner (O.C. 162nd Brigade) set off by

motor with his orderly officer to report for orders to the C.R.A. 19th

Division near Neuve Église. Owing to various difficulties on the way

these orders were not received until 2.0 P.M., but their effect was that

Colonel Skinner should bring his batteries into action immediately near

Spanbroekmolen. As no horses were available, the reconnaissance of these

positions had to be carried out on foot and took a long time, but when

the positions were finally chosen the orderly officer (Lieut.

Bartholomew) was sent back to Dranoutre to await the arrival of the

batteries and to guide them to their positions.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

APRIL—AUGUST 1918.

H.Q.R.A.

C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain.

Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., Major T. E. Capt. W. E.

D.S.O. Durie, D.S.O., Bownass, M.C.

M.C.

Brig.-Gen. G. H. W. Nicholson, Major W. A. T.

C.M.G. Barstow, D.S.O.,

M.C.

156th Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler, D.S.O.

Adjutant: Capt. H. W. Smail, M.C.

"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.

Major F. B. Major M. A. Major Barker, Major D. Jones,

Carrell. Studd, D.S.O., D.S.O., M.C. M.C.

M.C.

Capt. S. G.

Taylor, M.C.

Major W. G.

Sheeres, M.C.

162nd Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner, D.S.O. (_wounded_).

Lieut.-Colonel Ramsden.

Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Warren, D.S.O.

Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt, M.C.

"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.

Major G. Major H. C. Cory, Major M. M. I. Major F. L. Lee,

Fetherston, M.C. Body, M.C. M.C.

D.S.O., M.C.

Major R. D.

Russell, M.C.

Meantime Colonel Skinner set out to find the infantry Brigadier in that

part of the line, so that he might inform him of his plans. This was a

long and tedious business in an unknown place in a now dark and rainy

night, and, on finding the Brigadier, Colonel Skinner to his disgust, if

not surprise, was told that the positions he had chosen had, since he

had left them, practically fallen into the hands of the enemy. There was

only one thing to do, and that quickly. Setting out as fast as possible,

he covered the four miles to Dranoutre in pitch darkness and, arriving

there at the same time as the batteries, he stopped them and held a

consultation with the C.R.A. of the 19th Division, who had just been

shelled out of his headquarters. After a short discussion regarding the

general situation which, as can be judged by the foregoing narrative,

was very obscure, the batteries marched at once into action between

Rossignol Wood and Parrot Camp (North of Kemmel Village), and by 3.0

A.M. on Thursday, April 11th, were in action, Brigade Headquarters being

at Parrot Camp. Thus they found themselves after a seventeen-mile march

along roads congested with troops, transport, refugees and cattle, a

march which had been preceded by over an hour's work on drill order the

previous morning; unfavourable conditions, those, to usher in one of the

greatest battles yet fought.

From April 11th onwards the batteries were under the administration of

the 19th Division. Brig.-Gen. Stewart and his staff had, on April 9th,

handed over control of the artillery in the Passchendaele sector to

Colonel Paterson (119th Brigade R.F.A.), but had marched straight to

Dranoutre, and on the 11th remained with headquarters of the 33rd

Division. On that fateful day General Stewart commanded a composite

infantry brigade until the early morning of the 12th, when he took over

command of the artillery covering the infantry of the 33rd Division on

the Meteren front, south of the 156th and 162nd Brigades. The latter

were therefore left with the C.R.A. 19th Division.

During this period from the 11th onwards both brigades underwent the

severest trials. Great demands were made upon them; the batteries were

required to shoot on a big area whenever an enemy attack showed signs of

developing, yet never did the guns fail to carry out their work.

Attempts were daily made to man O.P.'s on Kemmel Hill, but although the

gallantry of observing officers and signallers always enabled

communication to be established, the heavy and continuous fire which the

enemy brought to bear upon the hill rendered it impossible for that

communication to be maintained. In the case of the 156th Brigade

observation was usually carried out from a point north-east of

Wytschaete, while the batteries of the 162nd Brigade were able to obtain

a very good view of the enemy from the ridge just in front of the guns.

From the moment that the batteries dropped into action they were shelled

almost continuously, but no infantry actions developed. This was in a

large part due probably to the efforts of the batteries, by which every

sign of concentration was smashed at the outset. Especially was this the

case on the 12th, when small bodies of the enemy were continually

advancing in the open, but were as continually broken up by the fire of

the guns. Every suspicion of movement was shelled and, whether movement

was visible or not, harassing fire was maintained night and day. On the

15th information was received that our line was to be withdrawn to

Vierstraat-Lindenhoek, but in the evening this retirement was cancelled,

and the fatal morning of April 16th dawned to find the batteries still

occupying the same positions.

[Illustration:

Scale. 1:20,000.

]

A dense fog hung over the ground on Wednesday, 16th April, blotting out

all vision and deadening sound. There was no suggestion of an enemy

attack on the front covered by the batteries, no preliminary

bombardment—other than the continuous shelling which had characterised

every day since the offensive began—no S.O.S. signals, yet early in the

morning of that day the enemy made a heavy attack from the south and,

advancing his line in a north-westerly direction, captured Wytschaete

Ridge, Wytschaete Village and Wood, together with the Hospice and

Peckham. Apparently the Germans, making use of the thick fog, advanced

without an artillery barrage, and the same fog hid the infantry S.O.S.

signals. The first intimation of an attack was obtained by the Forward

Observing officer of the 156th Brigade, who from his O.P. three hundred

yards north-east of Wytschaete suddenly saw Germans twenty-five yards

away. He opened rifle fire upon these at point-blank range, but needless

to say was unable to stop them. He then tried to get away in order to

warn the neighbouring batteries, but was shot in the stomach and later

died of his wounds. The batteries, however, were by now fully roused and

were pouring gun fire into the advancing troops to try and check their

onslaught. Those of the 156th Brigade were just able to remain in their

positions, and, as soon as dawn broke, set up O.P.'s on the ridge of the

Kemmel-Vierstraat road, the original O.P.'s being by then in enemy

hands. From this ridge observed fire was directed all day upon

Wytschaete Village and Ridge, and great havoc was wrought amongst the

Germans as they advanced in the open.

Meanwhile the 162nd Brigade was also enduring a deluge of shell similar

to that which was descending upon the 156th but, being further to the

right, was in more imminent danger of being captured, since the enemy

advance was, as already described, taking the form of a north-westerly

sweep from the south. Shorter and shorter grew the ranges of the guns,

until at last the necessity of a retirement became imperative;

reluctantly the withdrawal began, one section per battery at a time. In

this operation conspicuous gallantry was shown by all ranks, for the gun

positions were being torn and swept by a veritable tornado of shell

which rendered the approach of the teams well-nigh impossible. As an

instance of this, the retirement of a section of A/162 under Lieut. J.

R. B. Turner may well be quoted; such heavy fire was directed upon his

guns that the teams could not get near them, and guns and wagons had to

be manhandled out of action. Under a hail of shell each gun in turn was

saved, every temporary lull being taken advantage of for a team to dash

in, limber up and get clear, and ultimately the section was successfully

withdrawn. Similar deeds were enacted in every battery, and ultimately

the whole brigade was withdrawn, the leading sections coming into action

in fresh positions and covering the withdrawal of the remainder by their

fire. By this means every gun was saved, while the continuity of the

barrage covering our own infantry was never broken—a most gallant

performance by the personnel of the batteries, and a fine example of the

tactical handling of a brigade of artillery.

After the first rush the enemy advance slowed down and ultimately

stopped, there being no further attack on the evening of the 16th nor on

the night of the 16th/17th. Lieut. Bruce and Lieut. McDonald of the

156th Brigade went forward to Byron Farm and got good information

regarding the position of the infantry, and during the whole of the

night the batteries kept up a slow harassing fire upon all likely places

where the enemy might concentrate for a further assault. 162nd Brigade

Headquarters, which had been set up in the ruins of a small cottage a

short distance in front of the new positions occupied by the batteries,

was heavily shelled, although hitherto the spot had been more or less

immune; after losing the wireless operator and several men, together

with a great deal of stores destroyed, it moved out and was established

at dawn with D/162.

Thursday, April 17th, brought with it a heavy enemy bombardment of all

the battery positions. The 162nd Brigade, as a result of its retirement

on the previous day, lay east of the Millekruisse-Hallebast road,

between the road and Kemmel-Beek; Major Cory's battery (B/162) was on

the left, nearest Hallebast Corner, with C/162 (Major Body) next on the

right. A/162 (Major Fetherston) lay further to the right still, and then

came Major Lee's guns (D/162) on the Millekruisse-Kemmel road. The 156th

Brigade was still hanging on to the original positions held prior to the

enemy attack on the previous day, but the flashes of the more forward

batteries must have been clearly visible to the enemy on Wytschaete

Ridge, and the guns came in for a heavy gruelling. This did not prevent

them, however, from giving the utmost support to a counter-attack

launched by our infantry upon Wytschaete at 7.30 P.M., in which the guns

of the 162nd Brigade also took a large share. The counter-attack was

unsuccessful, and, with the enemy still on Wytschaete Ridge, the

necessity of a withdrawal of a portion of the 156th Brigade to a more

covered position became apparent. Next day (April 18th) a reconnaissance

was carried out and positions were chosen some one thousand yards

further west, behind the road known as Cheapside which ran parallel with

and about eleven hundred yards west of the Kemmel-Vierstraat road. On

the 19th these positions were occupied by two batteries and the guns

were registered from just in front, the whole Brigade except for Major

Carrell's battery (A/156) being now clustered around Lieut.-Colonel

Butler's headquarters in a line five hundred yards in length. A/156 lay

further to the north-east, little more than a quarter of a mile from

Ridge Wood.

From April 17th until the 25th the enemy did not make any considerable

advance, and, although the batteries were daily shelled, a fair amount

of opportunity offered itself for strengthening the gun line. A certain

readjusting of positions also took place about this time. D/162 sent

forward a section under Lieut. Bennet and Lieut. Garrod to a position

two hundred yards south of Siege Farm, near the old position which had

been held prior to the loss of the Wytschaete Ridge, and from which some

excellent harassing fire was carried out. On the 22nd Major Studd

(B/156), with only four serviceable guns left, moved two of them some

three hundred yards further south on the Kemmel-Ridge Wood road, and to

this latter position was added on the 23rd a third gun, received that

morning from the I.O.M. On April 24th A/156, who had been very heavily

shelled on the previous day, moved two guns to a position three hundred

yards north of Siege Farm; the remainder were to have moved thither on

the morning of the 25th, but the events of that day, as will presently

be shown, put an end to any such ideas. About the 23rd also Major Jones

(D/156) put one 4·5 in. howitzer two hundred yards to the north of the

A/156 "Siege Farm" section. Thus the batteries were more split up, each

brigade having a main line of guns with detached sections thrown out

slightly in front, from which latter the majority of the firing was

done.

Before the further operations on this front are described a word must

here be spoken of the battery wagon-lines. As a rule the wagon-lines

were looked upon as comparatively safe—a "cushy" job for those whose lot

it was to live there—but the wagon-lines during the German advance were

far from restful. True, they did not suffer the dense barrages which the

gun line had to face; but they were constantly shelled by high-velocity

guns at long range, a most disconcerting performance which meant that

day and night, at odd intervals, a shell would crash into the crowded

horse-lines or work havoc amongst the men's bivouacs, and even

occasional shells are terribly upsetting when they burst amongst a mass

of horses. In addition, enemy aeroplanes came nightly and scattered

bombs along the length and breadth of the lines, while daily the weary

drivers and teams had to make their way up to the batteries with

ammunition, usually being shelled all along the road. The consequent

strain upon horses and men may well be imagined.

Throughout this period the wagon-lines were kept in two portions—a

forward wagon-line, in which were kept the gun teams and such wagons as

were necessary to the batteries in a move of any emergency, and rear

wagon-lines where lived the main body of drivers and teams. From April

12th until the loss of Kemmel on April 25th the forward wagon-lines of

both brigades were situated between Hallebast Corner and Vierstraat, the

rear wagon-lines of the 156th Brigade being in the Reninghelst-Ouderdom

area, while those of the 162nd Brigade lay at first at Canada Corner,

north of Locre, moving on the 17th to the area between Reninghelst and

Busseboom. There they were all kept continually moving, sometimes in

Reninghelst, sometimes nearer Busseboom, every spot they inhabited being

shelled by the enemy and, after a very short period, rendered

uninhabitable. In both rear and advanced wagon-lines the casualties

amongst horses and men mounted rapidly, but it is safe to say that the

"emergency" teams at Hallebast Corner had far the worst time.

To return to the tactical situation, however. On April 19th both

brigades had been put under the command of the C.R.A. 9th Division, but

on the 22nd the French 28th Division came up into the line and the

French Artillery Commander took over control of the 162nd Brigade.

Headquarters of the latter moved over to Scherpenberg to be near the

French commander, but the distance from there to the batteries was too

great for any efficient control to be carried on, and permission was

obtained by Lieut.-Colonel Skinner to move his headquarters back to

Millekruisse so as to be near the batteries, and also near the commander

of a "groupe" of French artillery which had just come up and lay in

action to the east of and near the village. Lieut. Norton (C/162), who

could speak French fluently, was left as liaison officer with the

"C.R.A." of the French division.

The disposition of the two brigades on April 24th, therefore, was as

follows. The batteries of the 156th were grouped together about 1,800

yards due north of Kemmel, with an advanced section of 18-pdrs. (A/156)

and one advanced 4·5 in. howitzer (D/156) near Siege Farm and about 600

yards in front of the main line of guns. Lieut.-Colonel Butler's

headquarters were right amongst his guns, between "C" and B/156, but the

remaining two sections of A/156 were some 1,200 yards to the north-east

and were so far away that, when the battle began on April 25th, it was

found impossible to exercise command over them.

The 162nd Brigade also lay together between the Millekruisse-Hallebast

road and the Kemmel-Beek, and therefore slightly in rear of the 156th

Brigade. Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's headquarters were in Millekruisse, and

in this case one advanced section of 4·5 in. howitzers (D/162) was

thrown forward in a position just west of Rossignol Wood.

As far as communications were concerned, a party of scouts was kept on

the top of Mount Kemmel in visual signalling with the guns, while O.P.'s

were manned at Desinet Farm, at Vierstraat Cross-roads and elsewhere,

whence good observation of Wytschaete Valley and Wood and all the

country to Spanbroekmolen was obtainable; these O.P.'s were also in

visual communication with the guns, but the fog and smoke during the

battle of the 25th rendered all their work impossible. Each brigade had,

in addition, a liaison officer with the infantry battalion in the line,

and therefore the system of communication between infantry and

artillery, and the observation kept upon the enemy by the guns, was as

good as could be hoped for. Buried cables, however, were scarce, and it

needed but a few well-placed shells to cut off all connection of this

kind.

April 24th was an unusually quiet day, though prior to this date the

enemy counter-batteries had been very active, each of our batteries

being carefully and accurately registered. This may have been done by

sound-rangers, but stringent precautions to avoid being located by them

were taken, and the universal opinion, which was reported by Colonel

Butler to Corps Headquarters, was that the location of the batteries was

being carried out by expert observers in the German balloons. These had

come very close to the line and numbers of them were constantly in the

air, entirely unmolested either by the Flying Corps or by the R.G.A.

April 24th, therefore, gave little hint of what was coming, unless the

exceptional activity of the German anti-aircraft guns were taken as a

sign. The quietness, however, was soon to be broken; at 1.0 A.M. on

Friday the 25th a few of the batteries were warned that an enemy attack

might be expected at dawn, but the remainder were completely unaware

that any untoward events were impending until suddenly, at 2.0 A.M.,

there descended upon them with a roar and a crash the most appalling

barrage that they had ever yet undergone.

With a fairly extensive experience of shelling, it was acknowledged by

all ranks that never before had such a bombardment been endured. In the

battery positions it was hell, the gunners working their pieces in a

perfect hailstorm of shell fire, while, to add to this tremendous test

of endurance, a large proportion of the barrage consisted of gas shell

which necessitated the wearing of gas helmets by all ranks. How any of

the guns or gunners survived that terrible morning remains to this day a

mystery, yet survive it they did and to most excellent effect. The

barrage which enveloped the guns was also beating down upon the front

line system, and the batteries, in order to show the infantry that they

were not forgotten, opened fire on their S.O.S. lines. It was soon very

clear, however, that an attack was imminent, and accordingly

"counter-preparation" was begun and continued for several hours.

From 2.0 A.M. until 5.30 A.M. the barrage did not relax, but from 4.30

A.M. onwards high explosive gradually superseded gas shell until the

bombardment became one almost entirely of high explosive. Although this

change did even more to wreck the battery positions than had the

chemical shell, it at least dispersed the gas and enabled the men

ultimately to remove their respirators; they were by now almost dropping

with the physical exhaustion of firing their guns at top speed in gas

helmets, combined with the nervous strain of this terrific bombardment,

and a breath of fresh air came to them as a blessed relief.

At 5.30 A.M. a considerable bombardment was maintained on the battery

positions, but the full fury of the barrage dropped back on to the

infantry and, after resting on the trenches for about forty-five

minutes, began to creep forward towards the batteries once more. Under

cover of this creeping barrage the enemy infantry advanced to the

assault, and as it rolled up inexorably towards the guns again—who all

this time were being pounded and smashed by the enemy artillery—the

Germans advanced swiftly over the front line and began to approach the

battery area. Thick fog enveloped their movements, practically every

telephone wire was cut and, as the same fog prevented any visual

signalling at all, the situation became extremely obscure. With a

visibility of only fifty yards it was impossible for battery commanders

to know when the enemy might not be right up to and amongst the guns.

At 6.10 A.M. the infantry got through their last message to the guns; on

a buried cable to 156th Brigade Headquarters the company commander of a

front-line company stated that he was still being shelled, but that the

Germans had so far made no movement. Shortly afterwards the cable was

destroyed and a terrible silence, as far as information was concerned,

set in. It would appear that, very shortly after the despatch of that

last message, the enemy assault was delivered.

At about 7.0 A.M. Lieut.-Colonel MacCullock of the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. rode

up to the battery positions. His battalion had been lying in support in

the valley of the Kemmel-Beek, where it had been heavily gas shelled,

and he now decided to move up to a line of disused trenches on the

forward slopes of Hill 44, just in front of the guns. While his men were

settling down into position, Colonel MacCullock rode up along the main

road to find out what was happening towards Wytschaete, and, penetrating

as far as the Grand Bois, he discovered that this was still in our

hands, whereupon he returned to complete his dispositions for the

defence of Hill 44. While this was still in progress, Lieut. Phipps

(156th Brigade) returned from Desinet Farm at about 7.50 A.M. and

reported that the enemy's rifle fire had got very near. Owing to the fog

he had been unable to see any Germans, but there was no doubt but that

they were rapidly approaching; he further added that there were

practically no French troops to be seen in that area. Even while he was

making his report some French infantry retired through the line of guns,

shouting that the enemy were in Kemmel village and were coming on fast.

It was therefore clear that there now remained no infantry between the

guns and the enemy except for the K.O.Y.L.I. whose right flank

terminated in front of B/156, there being from there southwards an

ominous gap.

At 8.45 A.M. patrols sent out reported that there were no British troops

to be seen on the other side of the Kemmel-Vierstraat road, and

following almost immediately upon this news small parties of Germans

were seen coming across the road. These were immediately engaged by such

of the guns as were still serviceable, but by 10 A.M. the enemy had

pushed across the road and, although he did not appear to have made much

progress in the visible ground near Godizonne Farm, had got beyond Siege

Farm further to the south and was within five hundred yards of the

batteries.

Shortly before this last period a decision had had to be come to as to

the withdrawal of the guns. The only infantry in the neighbourhood were

the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. and some stragglers of the late front-line battalion

whom Major Barker (C/156) had collected to form an escort to his guns;

the line held by these troops ran about one hundred yards in front of

the batteries, but stopped on the right at Hill 44, and south of this

point no troops were to be seen at all. Northwards the left of the

K.O.Y.L.I. was continued by some other infantry, but the whole line was

terribly thin and could not hope to stop a determined rush by the enemy.

Lieut.-Colonel Butler and Lieut.-Colonel Skinner were therefore faced

with this problem:—Hill 44, a slight rise in the ground on the

Ridge-Wood—Kemmel road, had a surprisingly good command over the country

from Dickebusch Lake round by the west to the northern slopes of Mount

Kemmel; it was, therefore, very important to hold it. For this purpose

the only infantry available were the 9th K.O.Y.L.I., but they were in

the best of spirits. On the other hand, reconnaissance showed that,

whereas the Germans were only using volatile gas on Hill 44, they were

using mustard gas some 700 yards to the rear, and the natural deduction

was that Hill 44 was part of the enemy objective. If, therefore, the

enemy gained the hill he would capture the guns _en bloc_, and there

would be no further obstacle to impede his progress. It was accordingly

decided to withdraw, one by one, a proportion of those guns which were

still undamaged, but to keep the remainder in action in their present

positions until the retired guns, from a line further back, could open a

full volume of covering fire upon the enemy opposite Hill 44.

Hitherto the tactical continuity of the narrative has been maintained in

order to relate, as clearly as possible, the true story of the attack by

which the Germans captured Kemmel Hill, but now a digression must be

made so as to follow closely the action of the batteries in their

withdrawal. To do this, the story of each Brigade will be taken

separately, beginning with the 156th.

At 9.0 A.M., shortly after the first crossing of the Kemmel-Vierstraat

road by the Germans, the order to prepare for a withdrawal was issued

from Lieut.-Colonel Butler's headquarters. Since as early as 6.0 A.M.

A/156 had in its main position only one gun capable of firing, and by

8.45 A.M. this gun also had been silenced; therefore, on receipt of

Colonel Butler's message, the battery withdrew from its main position

and moved to a fresh line in the direction of Ouderdom. Shortly

afterwards a section of Major Barker's battery (C/156) was also

withdrawn.

By 11 A.M. practically all the ammunition in B/156 southern position had

been expended, and moreover the guns were unable, owing to trees, to

fire at ranges of less than 1,200 yards. Major Studd therefore removed

the breech-blocks and dial sights from these guns and, sending back a

portion of his detachments to the wagon-lines to hurry up the teams

which had already been sent for, concentrated his efforts on the two

guns which he had kept in a position 300 yards further north. Of these

two guns, one was taken away by a team belonging to C/156 to a

previously reconnoitred spot north of La Clytte; the other was run

forward by hand, with the assistance of nine men of the K.O.Y.L.I., for

a distance of some one hundred yards to the crest of the hill, whence

Major Studd and his four remaining gunners engaged the enemy over open

sights at a range of 300 yards.

By 11.15 A.M. the remaining two sections of C/156 were in full view of

the enemy, some five hundred yards away, and, as their ammunition was

running out, a withdrawal to a line north of La Clytte was decided upon.

From a position of assembly two hundred yards to the rear the limbers

were brought up, one at a time; the first gun got away without being

fired upon; the second and third escaped under heavy rifle fire, but the

lead driver of the fourth gun took it through a patch of soft ground

which made the pace so slow that all the horses and one of the drivers

were shot, and the gun had to be abandoned for the time. The withdrawal

of this battery was rendered very difficult by the fact that there were

only one sergeant and six men still unwounded; all the officers and the

remaining other ranks had been either killed or disabled, though Major

Barker continued to command his battery despite his wound. They had put

up a most brilliant fight, and the gallantry of all ranks was

unsurpassable, typical of every battery on this grim morning.

There remained now only the advanced section of A/156, D/156, and the

single gun of B/156. The advanced section of A/156 (Lieut. Blackwell in

charge) for a long time had been firing upon the enemy at point-blank

range; early in the morning teams were sent up to try and save these two

guns, but the rapid advance of the enemy had not been realised and,

fight to the last though they did with the enemy all around them, the

guns together with their teams were captured. The advanced gun of D/156

near by had been knocked out earlier in the day and had to be abandoned,

after the withdrawal of dial sights and breech-blocks. D/156 main

position had also to be abandoned temporarily.

Thus, by 11.0 A.M. the only gun in action in the forward positions was

the solitary 18-pdr. manned by Major Studd and his four men. This little

party was now joined by Colonel Butler who, by his quiet bearing and

confidence, greatly inspired both gunners and infantry. He collected and

controlled a party of machine gunners whose officer had just been

killed, and for some time remained with Major Studd's gun, the capture

of which was only prevented by the thin line of K.O.Y.L.I. in front.

Machine guns and a 5·9 in. howitzer worried this party considerably, but

steady harassing fire was kept upon the enemy and prevented them from

making any further advance.

At about 11.30 A.M. this single gun was switched round through 180° to

fire on some Germans who were making for La Clytte, almost directly in

rear. At first about twenty of the enemy were visible who, on being

fired at, ran back one hundred yards into some scrub. This movement,

however, caused some three hundred of the enemy to get up and bunch

round their officers. Major Studd turned his gun on these and obtained a

number of bursts right amongst them, with the result that they ran back

five hundred yards into a patch of dead ground.

So the morning wore on, the enemy making no considerable advance since

he had established himself well across the Kemmel-Vierstraat road. By

1.0 P.M. the ammunition of B/156 solitary gun had all been expended; as

its presence was drawing fire upon the K.O.Y.L.I., it was run back

behind the slope, and Major Studd, removing breech-block and dial sight,

set out with his four men to find out what had happened to the remainder

of his battery.

Thus, at 1.0 P.M., the last gun of the 156th Brigade ceased to operate

in the forward positions; all the remainder had either got away or been

silenced by 11.0 A.M., and it only remained to remove those which had

had to be abandoned. At 5.0 P.M. in the evening Captain S. G. Taylor

took up teams and attempted to save the guns of B/156, but was only able

to reach the single gun in the northern position as it was impossible in

the darkness to tell where the enemy was. During the night of 25th/26th

and the morning of the 26th the howitzers of D/156 (less the advanced

one, which had been hit) were removed from under the enemy's nose, as

was also the one gun of C/156 which had been abandoned, and on the

morning of the 26th also Captain Taylor brought up his teams and saved

the three guns of B/156 in broad daylight with the enemy only four

hundred yards away—a very fine performance.

So ended the doings of the 156th Brigade on April 25th; three guns had

fallen into the hands of the enemy, but all the remainder, although a

few had temporarily to be abandoned, were saved; in every case the guns

had been fought to the last, tremendous casualties being inflicted upon

the enemy. Let us now turn to the 162nd Brigade and follow their doings

also on this memorable day.

The four batteries of the 162nd Brigade had, in common with all the

other guns, been enveloped in the tremendous barrage which the enemy put

down at two o'clock in the morning. In spite of this terrific storm of

shell—the intensity of which may be judged from the fact that Lieut.

Squire of B/162 was killed by the concussion of the bursting shell all

around him, his body being otherwise unwounded—the detachments under

their battery officers' control maintained a steady rate of fire upon

the enemy. All communication between "A," "B" and C/162 and Brigade

headquarters completely broke down, and runners were either killed or

prevented by wounds from reaching their destination; to quote the words

of one who was a witness of the batteries' deeds:—"Standing on the

fringe of that barrage was hell enough for me; to think of Fetherston,

Body, Lee and Cory (the four battery commanders) and all the others

walking about in their batteries in the thick of it—I don't know how

they ever got out." Casualties came thick and fast amongst the

detachments, guns were disabled or completely knocked out, yet the fire

of the guns never faltered, and all through the morning they offered a

determined opposition to the enemy advance.

The first guns to move back were, of course, the forward section of

D/162 at Rossignol Wood. By great good fortune the wire between this

forward section and the main battery position remained intact, as did

also the wire from there on to Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's headquarters,

and the most useful information was thereby transmitted to the

Divisional Commander. At about 8.0 A.M., the enemy being then almost on

top of the two forward guns, orders were sent to Major Lee to withdraw

this section, and teams were immediately sent forward under Lieut.

Escott to carry this into effect. Making their way through the barrage,

the little party reached the forward section just as the latter, who had

been firing at intense rate the whole morning, had expended practically

all the ammunition. In front the enemy were only three hundred yards

away; on either flank they had worked right round until they had almost

closed in on the guns, yet the withdrawal was carried out successfully

under heavy rifle, machine-gun and shell fire, the gunners with their

officers walking beside the guns. It is impossible to say too much for

such a fine feat; the section, under two young officers (Lieut. Bennet

and Lieut. Garrod, and later Lieut. Escott who was in charge of the

teams), had been in a very exposed and advanced position; it came under

the most intense fire both prior to and during the retirement, every

horse in both teams—there were no wagons—was hit, yet the guns were

saved without the loss of a single small store, and all the wounded were

brought safely away. In recognition of this performance every driver of

both teams was awarded the Military Medal.

Shortly after the return of this advanced section to the main line of

guns, the withdrawal of the latter to previously reconnoitred positions

began. The batteries had now been firing for many hours in the face of a

perfect hail of shell, and, great as had been the tenacity and

determination shown by officers and men in keeping up a vigorous rate of

fire upon the enemy in spite of terrific retaliation, still greater

tenacity and courage was shown in the carrying out of the retirement.

For some time past not a single runner had succeeded in making the

double journey from Brigade Headquarters to the batteries and back, each

man in turn falling a victim to the intensity of the enemy barrage, but

finally Lieut. Stanley-Clarke of B/162, with much good fortune and

considerable gallantry, succeeded in conveying to the guns the order to

withdraw.

Gun by gun the retirement began, each battery retaining a proportion of

its guns in the forward position until the remainder had got safely

away. It was a performance on the part of the officers, gunners and

drivers which has never been surpassed; while other brigades were being

forced to abandon their guns, the 162nd Brigade retained practically its

full tactical powers. Only three guns, two of C/162 and one of A/162,

could not be removed until nightfall and were then got away with the

enemy only a few hundred yards distant, but not one single gun was lost

to the Germans by the 162nd Brigade on April 25th, and in this

achievement they stood practically alone. Many of the neighbouring

batteries of other Divisions had earlier been silenced or had been

forced to abandon their guns, and too much praise cannot be given to the

officers and men of this Brigade who, in the face of overwhelming

short-range fire, continued to serve their guns long after they might

reasonably have been expected to retire, and even then withdrew them in

an orderly manner.

On the withdrawal of the batteries being completed, Brigade Headquarters

moved back to a prearranged rendezvous on the Reninghelst-Ouderdom road.

No horses or transport could come up to assist in this, and the entire

equipment had to be carried by the Headquarters' staff under the

direction of Captain Pavitt (the Adjutant). A number of casualties were

suffered during the march from shell-fire and from low-flying

aeroplanes, but ultimately the new control-post was reached and command

of the batteries was carried out from there.

Thus has been described in detail the story of the two brigades and the

part they played in one of the great battles which threatened the

Channel ports. Before we return to the main narrative again and describe

the doings of the rest of that day, a word must be said of the officers

and men who put up such a wonderful fight. Names have already been

mentioned in connection with deeds of especial gallantry, and yet with

hesitation has this been done, for how can one name in one battery be

singled out from amongst the others when all behaved in such a

magnificent way? Every officer, every man on that day showed such

gallantry as can never be surpassed, and proud should be he who can say,

"I served with the 33rd Divisional Artillery on April 25th, 1918!"

Yet two names must be mentioned, for without them this narrative would

be incomplete. Through all the trials and horrors of the day, through

all the great strain of the whole of this period every battery was

inspired and encouraged by the presence of the two Brigade Commanders,

Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler and Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner. When

times were grim and depressing, when the enemy seemed to be pushing

remorselessly on, when the brigades, with their backs to the wall,

appeared to be forgotten by God and man, there was ever the presence of

those two to cheer up and hearten the weary spirits of their officers

and men. With the control of the artillery continually passing from one

Division to another, even from one nation to another, but little was

done for the gunners who were left to look after themselves. Orders from

above were few and far between, and in many cases came too late to be of

any use; communications from Division and Corps were seldom received,

and it remained with the two Brigade Commanders to discuss between

themselves the situation as it appeared to them, and to issue orders to

the batteries accordingly. The battery commanders and their officers and

men—wonderfully gallant fellows all—had behind them the moral support of

their Brigade Commanders, but Lieut.-Colonel Butler and Lieut.-Colonel

Skinner had no such comforting support from above. Yet they were for

ever calm, confident and cheerful, and bore the tremendous strain of

acting on their own initiative in a way which the batteries strove hard

to repay. Colonel Skinner was wounded on May 10th and taken away in an

ambulance; Colonel Butler met a soldier's death in the final British

advance in the autumn, but the names of both will ever bring to the

minds of those who served under them a sense of deep gratitude and a

happy memory of a very highly valued friendship.

The main narrative of the battle was broken off at the point where, at

10.0 A.M., the Germans had established themselves firmly across the

Kemmel-Vierstraat road and had pushed on past Siege Farm towards the

battery positions. It was about this time—shortly before it, to be

exact—that the withdrawal of the 156th Brigade had begun, and it was

about now that the culminating point of the battle was reached. Having

got past Siege Farm, the enemy advance seemed to slow down as though

requiring a breathing space, and for this the fire of the guns and of

the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. who were still on Hill 44 was largely responsible. At

11.30 A.M., as already recounted, a strong attempt was made by some five

hundred of the enemy to work round by the south to La Clytte so as to

cut off the retreat of our troops, but this manœuvre was defeated, and

Colonel MacCullock, taking the initiative, decided to counter-attack

without delay. As many guns as could be collected were warned of the

plan but, just as the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. prepared to launch their assault, a

counter-attack was delivered by fresh British troops from the direction

of La Clytte, with the result that Colonel MacCullock considered that

any movement on his part was unnecessary.

A condition of stalemate now ensued. Whenever the enemy showed himself

he was fired on, while he on his part began sniping very actively.

Artillery fire was slow, taking the form of occasional rounds thrown

about promiscuously and varied by five-minute barrages. The roads,

however, were kept under constant fire by enemy high-velocity guns,

while counter-battery work on both sides was maintained. About 3.30 P.M.

one section of A/162, still in action near Millekruisse, fired at the

request of the infantry on some Germans who were collected in huts on

the far side of Cheapside, and shortly afterwards our infantry

reinforcements arrived.

The situation now seemed well in hand, and during that night and the

following day no further enemy advance took place. The 162nd Brigade,

having succeeded in withdrawing all its guns except three, was able to

come into action again immediately, and indeed some of its guns were in

their fresh positions before the withdrawal of the remainder had begun.

Therefore in a very short time they were all bombarding the enemy from a

line east of the Zevecoten-Ouderdom road and, under the orders of the

9th Division, were covering an infantry brigade of the 49th Division

along the La Clytte-Millekruisse road. The 156th Brigade had fewer

serviceable guns and did not come into action again as a unit until next

day, when positions were taken up one mile north of La Clytte and were

occupied until the 28th. On the night of the 28th/29th the 156th Brigade

pulled out and began to march to the Winnezeele rest area; the German

attack on the 29th, about to be described, delayed this march for a few

hours, but ultimately Winnezeele was reached. Next morning (30th) this

brigade was again called up into action, but only for a few hours, and

ultimately returned to Winnezeele with the prospect of a few days of

rest ahead.

From April 26th to 28th the whole of the battery area was heavily

shelled by the enemy, while the roads and wagon-lines were searched by

high-velocity guns. The wagon-lines, indeed, came in for a very bad time

and, after being shelled out of different camps, came ultimately to rest

about one mile west-south-west of Poperinghe, with forward wagon-lines

between Ouderdom and Reninghelst. On the 26th Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's

headquarters were shelled out and forced to move to Reninghelst, and on

the 27th the whole of the 162nd Brigade changed positions; "A," "B" and

"C" batteries occupied an area near Goed Moet Mill, east-north-east of

Ouderdom, "D" battery moved 600 yards north of Ouderdom, while Brigade

headquarters went to De Drie Goen Farm.

On Tuesday, April 29th, even while the relief of the 156th Brigade was

still in progress, the combined effort of both brigades was called upon

to resist yet another German attack, for at 5.0 A.M. the enemy assaulted

with eleven divisions in mass formation, the density being from six to

eight bayonets to the yard. It was again the same story, from the

batteries' point of view, of terrific shelling resolutely borne, but

this time there was the satisfaction of knowing that the work of the

guns had been successful. The attack, after getting up to within one

hundred yards of the line held by the 49th Division, was repulsed, as

was also a second assault at 6.0 A.M.; the German effort to turn the

Ridge Wood flank proved a costly failure, and the enemy dead lay in rows

in front of our line.

The fight of April 29th was the last big episode of the German offensive

in Flanders. From that date onwards there were a number of local actions

but no large-scale attacks, nor was any serious penetration made by the

enemy. From May 1st until the 7th the 162nd Brigade continued to bombard

the enemy and to be heavily shelled in return. On the 6th

Brigadier-General Stewart and his Staff took over from the C.R.A. 9th

Division the control of the artillery covering the front, which extended

from Kruisstraathoek cross-roads on the north to just south of

Vierstraat. This artillery consisted of the 50th, 51st and 122nd

Brigades (9th Division), the 149th Brigade (30th Division) and the 162nd

Brigade. On the 7th/8th, however, one section of the 162nd Brigade was

relieved by the 121st and marched into rest at Winnezeele, while at the

same time the 156th Brigade came up from the back area and took over the

positions of the 149th Brigade, in the very area where the wagon-lines

had been when the batteries were in action at Passchendaele five short

weeks earlier.

April 29th had been the last large-scale operation which the enemy

undertook on the Lys front, but Thursday, May 8th, saw a most determined

local action, in which the 156th Brigade and the two sections per

battery of the 162nd Brigade still in the line took an active part. At

3.0 A.M. on the morning of the 8th the enemy put down a very heavy

barrage on the battery and back areas, to which was added, at 5.0. A.M.,

a severe bombardment on the front system. All the morning until 11.0

A.M. this barrage continued, and under cover of it the Germans attacked.

The right brigade front was penetrated, but the left brigade formed a

defensive flank from Hallebast Corner to the southern end of Dickebusch

Lake. All day long the batteries fired on their S.O.S. lines, a steady

rate being maintained until 6.15 P.M., when a quarter of an hour's

intense bombardment was followed by a counter-attack on the part of the

19th Infantry Brigade. By this counter-attack all objectives were

regained except on the extreme left where the situation remained

obscure, and, after a night of intermittent harassing fire with

counter-preparation fired at 3.30 A.M. in the morning (9th), the

remainder of the 162nd Brigade withdrew from the line and marched to

Winnezeele for a short period of rest.

SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY

BY

FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG, K.T., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E.,

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, BRITISH ARMIES IN FRANCE.

I wish to convey to all ranks of the Royal Regiment of Artillery my

deep appreciation of the splendid service rendered by them in all

stages of the Somme and Lys battles since the opening of the enemy's

attack.

The difficult conditions imposed by a defensive fight against

greatly superior numbers have been faced with the same skill,

courage and devotion to duty which characterised the work of all

branches of the Artillery throughout the offensive battles of 1917.

With less constant and loyal co-operation on the part of both field,

heavy and siege batteries, the great bravery and determination of

the infantry could scarcely have availed to hold up the enemy's

advance. The infantry are the first to admit the inestimable value

of the artillery support so readily given to them on all occasions.

The knowledge possessed by each arm, doubly confirmed by the severe

tests already passed through successfully, that it can rely with

absolute confidence upon the most whole-hearted and self-sacrificing

co-operation of the other is the greatest possible assurance that

all further assaults of the enemy will be met and defeated. I thank

the Artillery for what it has already done, and count without fear

of disappointment upon the maintenance of the same gallant spirit

and high standard of achievement in the future.

(Signed) D. HAIG, F.-M.,

British Armies in France.

General Headquarters.

_May 9th, 1918._

CHAPTER X.

PART II.

HOLDING THE ENEMY IN THE NORTH.

(MAY-AUGUST 1918.)

Following on the two checks which had been administered to the Germans

on April 29th and May 8th, there now set in a period of holding the line

and of taking every possible step to prevent the enemy from renewing the

offensive. From May 9th until the 12th counter-preparation was fired

morning and evening, and to the weight of artillery employed in this was

added, on the 10th, three groups of the French 47th Regiment of

Artillery together with the 107th French heavy battery. On the same day

also the 44th French Regiment relieved the 19th Infantry Brigade.

On May 12th the 162nd Brigade, after a very short three days' rest,

moved into action in the II. Corps area and relieved the 17th Brigade

R.F.A. in the vicinity of Salvation Corner, Ypres. A/162 relieved the

13th Battery, "B" the 26th, "C" the 92nd and "D" relieved D/17, and here

they remained under the command of the C.R.A. 29th Division until the

17th. On Friday, the 17th, after an uneventful period they were

themselves relieved by the 187th Brigade (41st Divisional Artillery) and

moved to their wagon-lines one and three-quarter miles E.N.E. of

Poperinghe, continuing the march next day to wagon-lines in fields one

mile north-east of Houtkerque. Previous to this the 156th Brigade had

come out of action on the 12th and had marched on the 15th to Clifford

Rest Camp, near Proven; the whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery,

therefore, was now concentrated in II. Corps Reserve.

From May 18th to the 31st a period of rest and training—very badly

needed by all ranks—was enjoyed. The two brigades were attached to the

49th Division, and were detailed to support with the latter the right

flank of the Belgian Army in case of enemy attack. This involved a

certain amount of reconnaissance of various battery positions to cover

the different lines of defence, but apart from this there was little to

do, and the blessed absence of shell-fire and of constant expectation of

attack came as a tremendous relief.

On the 20th General Sir Herbert Plumer inspected the 33rd Division, in

the following week all guns were recalibrated at Tilques, and on the

29th, as a final distraction, the 162nd Brigade held mounted and

dismounted sports at D/162 wagon-lines. A final distraction it was, for

on May 31st orders were received for the two brigades to relieve the

245th and 246th Brigades (49th Divisional Artillery) in the Ypres

sector, and on June 1st the march began.

The relief was spread over two days, but the morning of Tuesday, June

3rd, found the whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery in action just

south of Ypres—an area which the men were beginning to regard with an

air of regular proprietorship. Both brigades occupied positions midway

between Vlamertinghe and Ypres; with main wagon-lines just east and

north-east of Poperinghe, and forward wagon-lines in the vicinity and

north-west of Vlamertinghe, the batteries settled down to cover the

right brigade of the 6th Division opposite Voormezeele.

From June 3rd to the 7th the time was passed in harassing the enemy,

while he in return kept up a heavy shelling of the battery positions and

roads. On Saturday the 8th, at 4.57 A.M., the French 46th Regiment on

the right attacked Ridge and Scottish Woods under cover of a barrage, in

which the 33rd Divisional Artillery took part, and captured both places,

but counter-attacks at noon left Ridge Wood in enemy hands again. On the

8th also the 33rd Division relieved the 6th Division, and the two

brigades found themselves covering their own infantry once more.

During the rest of June little of any importance took place. On the 10th

Major Lee's battery (D/162) moved its position some 500 yards further

south to some old horse standings, and during the whole of this period

considerable counter-battery work was carried on by both brigades with

excellent effect. On June 13th the French attacked and captured Ridge

Wood for the second time, but again lost it in a counter-attack during

the afternoon. On the 20th two raids were carried out, one by the 1st

Middlesex on Lankhof Château, just north of Voormezeele, at 12.15 A.M.,

the other by the 2nd Worcesters at the same hour on Manor Farm, south of

Zillebeke. The latter was completely successful, but in the Middlesex

raid the British covering party met a German covering party in No Man's

Land at three minutes before "zero." Fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued

and the British covering party, reinforced by the raiders who were

forming up at the time, drove the enemy back to his trenches. No

identifications were, however, obtained.

Following this raid there was but little hostile retaliation. The enemy

activity had died down considerably of late, although from the 17th to

the 19th heavy area shell-storms occurred once more upon the guns, and

indeed it seemed that the enemy was devoting all his attention to the

battery and back areas. This, in fact, was hardly surprising. The chief

work of the 156th and 162nd Brigades at the time was the bombardment of

enemy roads and battery positions, and in the latter considerable

success had attended their efforts. Many explosions were caused amongst

the enemy batteries which were the targets, and it was only natural—a

compliment, in fact, to the accuracy of the British guns—that the

Germans should turn the chief blast of their hatred upon the originators

of this trouble.

Thus the month passed out uneventfully but uncomfortably, and July came

in to continue the conditions which had been prevailing. On June 30th a

slight change in the disposition of the brigades had been made, for on

that day the 11th Army Field Artillery Brigade withdrew from the line

and the 156th Brigade was left to cover the entire front of the left

infantry brigade, the 162nd looking after the right. To simplify this

"A," "B" and D/156 took over the positions of the 83rd, 85th and D/11

batteries respectively, and July found them in action in the Canal

sector. The policy of the batteries remained the same—harassing fire on

roads and tracks, constant counter-battery work and occasional responses

to infantry calls, while the enemy continued the practice of frequent

shell-storms on the batteries, with high-velocity guns looking after the

roads and back areas. In particular the forward gun positions at Groenen

Jager and the area around Vlamertinghe and Goldfish Château received

exceptionally heavy bombardment.

At the end of the first week certain alterations of the front covered by

the batteries were made; the infantry of the 33rd Division handed over

to the division on their left the front from Zillebeke Lake to the

Ypres-Comines Canal and, sideslipping to the right, took over from the

6th Division on the right (who had relieved the French 46th Division on

June 26th) the front to as far south as the Vijverhoek-Eizenwalle

railway. No infantry operations took place, however, until the 14th.

On Monday, July 14th, at 6.0 A.M. the right battalion, right brigade of

the 33rd Division (1st Middlesex), together with the 18th Infantry

Brigade of the 6th Division on the right, attacked under cover of the

guns to recapture the original front line east of Ridge Wood and from

there to Voormezeele, and succeeded in every detail. The enemy barrage

was not really strong, and only for short periods was it heavy. At first

it was confined to the forward area but later in the day spread to the

batteries, and during the afternoon the latter came in for a fairly

severe gruelling. All gains were held, and the Forward Observing

Officers dealt very effectively with small parties of the enemy who kept

dribbling up as though concentrating for a counter-attack. No such

concentration, however, was permitted by the guns to be carried out.

Counter-preparation was fired daily, morning and evening, and so the

British troops were able to boast of a successful advance on their part

on the scene of the late German offensive; the strategic initiative was

once more in our hands.

Following on this attack, hostile artillery activity greatly increased.

All battery positions were heavily shelled, Goldfish Château and

Vlamertinghe being bombarded with great severity, and C/162 forward

section had both its guns knocked out by direct hits. It was a typical

period of trench warfare, when the artilleries of both sides sought each

other out and pounded away at the opposing positions, keeping the while

a watchful and active eye on the doings of the infantry.

It was therefore a most suitable time for "new hands" to come and learn

the ropes, and fortunately come they did. On July 14th five American

artillery officers were posted to each brigade, to see what active

service was like and to learn British methods. They were the advance

party of a division shortly to come into the line, and for several days

they remained with the batteries before they returned to their own

units, there to expound to the latter the information and experience

they had gained. On July 25th a battalion of the 30th American Division

took over part of the front of the right infantry brigade, 33rd

Division, and thus the United States of America began to take a part in

the war in the north.

The only striking feature which presented itself during the month of

July on this sector was the constant fear of a renewed enemy offensive.

The German reserves, even as late as July 20th, numbered some

thirty-five divisions opposite this part of the front alone, and, with

the presence of such an enemy concentration, it was only natural that

there should be continued warnings and alarms of impending attacks. On

July 21st the wagon-lines of all batteries were ordered to "stand by"

throughout the night, with teams fully harnessed up; on July 24th a

message was received at 1 A.M. that the enemy would attack at dawn.

Again on the 26th the battery wagon-lines were rudely disturbed by a

warning that an enemy assault was hourly awaited, and once again the

drivers stood by their teams expecting at each moment to hear the

distant crash of the opening barrage. As a result of these rumours every

battery was called upon to reconnoitre tiers of positions to be occupied

in case of a successful enemy attack, but such an event never took

place, and the month drew to a close with no untoward affair to mark its

going.

Thus July passed out as its predecessor had gone—uneventfully, but with

considerable liveliness. With its going, however, the Division lost

Brigadier-General Stewart, who on July 29th handed over the command of

the Divisional Artillery to Brigadier-General G. H. W. Nicholson.

General Stewart had been with the Divisional Artillery for many months,

first as Colonel, later as Brigadier, and, although the exigencies of

war often took him away from the brigades to other sections of the front

where the infantry of the Division was being covered by artillery not of

its own, his presence was familiar and welcome to all ranks. His

departure was a cause of great regret to his many friends, but he left

behind him a unit of which any Commander might justly be proud.

August 1918, a month of great deeds amongst the troops farther south,

brought little change of conditions in Flanders, and the holding of the

line continued as before. On the 2nd the 156th and 162nd Brigades

assisted in a raid which gained identification of the 8th German

Division in this sector; the 8th Division, however, seemed to be

following a policy exactly similar to its predecessors, and life in the

batteries continued as before, with rather an unusual interlude on the

6th, when His Majesty the King inspected selected officers from the 33rd

Divisional Artillery at Lovie Château.

On August 7th the rear position of A/162 (Major Fetherston) was moved to

a point 500 yards north-east of Goldfish Château, midway between

Vlamertinghe and Ypres, and on the 10th C/162 took a similar step. At

this time two more American officers, Captain Westfeldt and Captain

Fields, were attached to the 156th and 162nd Brigades respectively,

while forty-eight hour visits of infantry officers to the batteries also

began—a most welcome interruption to the monotony of these days, and a

very interesting diversion for all concerned.

On Saturday, August 17th, the 119th and 120th Infantry Regiments of the

30th American Division relieved the infantry of the 33rd Division in the

line, and the 156th and 162nd Brigades found themselves under the

control of an American C.R.A. for the first time. It was a novel

experience; the 33rd Divisional Artillery had at different times covered

nearly half the British divisions in France; it had worked alongside the

Belgians, and had supported and been controlled by the French on various

occasions. Now the guns found themselves co-operating with the United

States Army whose troops they covered for the remainder of the month.

On August 28th came a sudden change. After a period of artillery duels,

of enemy bombardments on certain areas and of vigorous counter-battery

work by both sides, there appeared the advance parties of the 330th and

331st Brigades (66th Divisional Artillery) who came to relieve sections

of the 33rd Divisional Artillery. One section per battery moved out to

the wagon-lines on Wednesday the 28th, and on the 29th/30th the relief

was completed, the 156th Brigade marching back to wagon-lines in the

Haandehote area, the 162nd to a camp near Houtkerque. By August 30th the

concentration of the 33rd Divisional Artillery in the back area was

complete, and on the evening of that day there came the warning order to

prepare to entrain for the 3rd Army.

On August 31st-September 1st the brigades entrained—the 156th at Proven,

the 162nd at Heidebeke and Waayenburg—and left for ever the dismal

surroundings of the Ypres sector, where they had been for twelve long

months. Down in the south, whither they were now going, the British

offensive was in full swing; finished for ever was the stagnation of

trench warfare. The batteries, after manfully holding the gate of the

north, were about to be thrown into the great advance in the south which

thrust the enemy back on to his own frontier, and were to take part in

that wonderful pursuit which ended in victory for the Allied arms,

bringing to a close the world-wide struggle of over four weary years.

CHAPTER XI.

THE BRITISH OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER 1918.

FINAL ADVANCE TO VICTORY ON THE 3RD ARMY FRONT.

Before the doings of the 33rd Divisional Artillery in the 3rd Army

advance are followed, it will be wise to review the tactical situation

on this part of the front from the opening of the British offensive on

August 8th up to the point where the 156th and 162nd Brigades joined in

the battle. Accordingly, the movements of the batteries in question must

be left for a moment while the broad aspect of these operations is

considered.

On August 8th Rawlinson's (4th) Army had opened the offensive with a

brilliant victory between the Ancre and the Avre, and on the 21st Byng

(3rd Army) extended the zone of attack northwards to beyond Albert. A

succession of attacks from August 23rd onwards pushed the enemy back

over the old Somme battlefields until, on the 31st, our troops had

forced the crossing of the Somme at Clery and entered Péronne next day.

By September 6th, after constant attacks, Rawlinson's Army had

penetrated seven miles to the east of Péronne, while Byng had reached

the western edge of Havrincourt Wood. On the 7th the greater part of the

wood was in our hands, and three days later the 3rd Army was beyond our

original front line of March 21st. The result of these operations was

that the Germans were forced back to the Siegfried line—a great

defensive zone seven miles in depth and many times stronger than the

Hindenburg line—with a few strong positions still held in front thereof,

and, before the grand assault on the Siegfried line could take place, it

was necessary that these few strong positions should be captured. To

achieve this, Byng struck on September 12th with the IV. and V. Corps

between Trescault and Havrincourt, capturing both villages and clearing

the ground for the coming battle. On the 13th he made a further advance

on the 3rd Army front between Havrincourt and Gouzeaucourt, and there

now only remained the capture of certain strategical features, marked

down for assault on the 18th, before the 3rd Army front would be ready

to take part in Foch's supreme effort against the Siegfried line.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER 1918.

H.Q.R.A.

C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain.

Brig.-Gen. G. H. W. Nicholson, Major W. A. T. Capt. W. E.

C.M.G. Barstow, D.S.O., Bownass, M.C.

M.C.

Capt. S. D.

Graham.

Major C. E.

Boyce, D.S.O.

156th Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler, D.S.O. (_killed_).

Major W. G. Sheeres, M.C.

Adjutant: Capt. H. W. Smail, M.C.

"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.

Major F. B. Major W. G. Major Barker, Major D. Jones,

Carrell. Sheeres, M.C. D.S.O., M.C. M.C.

(_till end of

September_).

Major K. W. Capt. L. Vestey.

Milne, M.C.

162nd Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Warren, D.S.O.

Adjutant: Capt. D. Strachan.

"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.

Major G. Major H. C. Cory, Major J. R. Major R. D.

Fetherston, M.C. Barnes, M.C. Russell, M.C.

D.S.O, M.C.

Major S. G. Major

Taylor, M.C. Vaughan-Hughes,

M.C.

Thus matters stood when, on September 16th/17th, the 156th and 162nd

Brigades moved into action. They had not gone into the line directly on

arrival in the Army area but, on detraining at Petit Houvain, Frevent

and Bouquemaison, had marched to billets around Rebreuviette and Roziere

on the main Frevent-Avesnes-le-Comte road, where they remained for

thirteen days. This period was spent in training, in the carrying out of

tactical schemes and in general practising of open warfare, and on

September 14th/15th the march into action began. Great secrecy was being

maintained regarding the concentration of troops on any part of the

front, for the element of surprise was proving a tremendous factor in

the success of every attack; the march of the batteries up to the Line

was therefore conducted by night, the brigades leaving their billets at

evening on the 14th and, after an all-night march through Bouquemaison

and Doullens, arriving at Acheux (156th) and Louvencourt (162nd) at 5

A.M. on the 15th. Next night the performance was repeated and, passing

through Albert and Le Sars, the batteries reached Le Transloy in the

early morning of the 16th. From here positions were reconnoitred in the

V. Corps area around Heudecourt to support the 17th Division in an

attack on the Gouzeaucourt-Peizière line, and wagon-lines were

established on the afternoon of the same day in the neighbourhood of

Bus.

On the night of the 16th/17th the batteries advanced into action north

of Heudecourt in a tremendous thunderstorm; officers and men, after the

long marches of the preceding nights, were completely exhausted and, as

soon as the guns were unlimbered, literally dropped where they stood

while awaiting daylight. They were all worn out with bodily fatigue and

ached for rest, and a few hours they now obtained before, on the 17th, a

rapid but accurate registration was carried out. There was little time

for this latter to be achieved as the attack had been fixed for the next

day, but twelve hours of daylight sufficed for the essential

preparations to be made, and by nightfall on the 17th the batteries were

ready to fulfil their part of the programme in the coming battle,

despite the fact that the barrage table was not received until 11.0 P.M.

On September 18th at 5.20 A.M. the assault was delivered in heavy rain

along the whole Corps front, the 156th and 162nd Brigades covering the

infantry of the 17th Division, with the 38th Division on the left and

the 21st on the right. The division on the left was held up, but the

17th, after fierce fighting, gained their objectives and consolidated a

line north and east of Gauche Wood. Many prisoners and guns were

captured, and during the whole afternoon the batteries of the 33rd

Divisional Artillery were busy engaging numerous moving targets and

silencing hostile machine-guns and trench mortars. Two counter-attacks

were broken up by the fire of the guns, and at nine o'clock at night a

further creeping barrage was put down under cover of which the 17th

Division pushed north and consolidated a line just north of St. Quentin

Redoubt.

[Illustration:

Scale 1:40,000.

]

After three days of active artillery fire, during which the infantry of

the 33rd Division (which had relieved the 21st on the 20th) slightly

advanced its line, the batteries of the 156th and 162nd Brigades began

to move up. On the night of the 21st the wagon-lines had been brought to

the Equancourt area, and on the 23rd the guns themselves advanced, 156th

Brigade to an area about 1,700 yards north of Peizière, 162nd Brigade to

new positions about 2,000 yards S.S.E. This move was not carried out

without loss, for the advanced guns moving up in the afternoon were

subjected to the most intense shell-fire, but ultimately all guns

reached the new line and from there the harassing of the enemy was

continued.

It was on this day (23rd), or rather on the night of 23rd/24th, that a

serious calamity befell the 162nd Brigade. An intense enemy gas

bombardment put the whole of the Headquarters staff and "B" battery out

of action, reducing the personnel of the Brigade by nearly a quarter; it

was a very severe loss in view of the active operations which were being

conducted, but Major Fetherston (A/162) from his own battery position

commanded from midnight onwards the rest of the brigade in addition to

his own guns, despite the fact that since the 18th he had been suffering

from a severe wound in the back which had to be dressed twice a day. It

was, indeed, a great feat of endurance and devotion to duty on Major

Fetherston's part, for he carried on for a number of days in command of

the 162nd Brigade, and took no notice of a wound which, of itself

intensely painful, took a long time to heal when ultimately he was

forced to go into hospital.

The period 25th/28th was one of much front trench and outpost fighting,

bringing many calls for support to the batteries and keeping all guns

actively engaged day and night. Pigeon Trench, Targelle Ravine and

Honnecourt Wood were frequently bombarded at request of the infantry,

while concentrations were continuously fired upon all hostile

communications and approaches. On the 25th "A" and C/162 were

strengthened by the attaching to them of one gun each from B/162 which

owing to casualties on the 23rd was unable to man all its guns, while on

the 26th yet another addition, and a strange one at that, was made to

the same two batteries. Four captured German 77 mm. guns with a large

supply of German "Yellow Cross" gas shells were allotted to them; with

grim delight the detachments bombarded the enemy that very evening and

far into the night with his own gas, and a particularly deadly form of

it at that.

On the 29th the attack broke out afresh in conjunction with the whole of

the 3rd, 4th and Debeney's French Armies. On the previous day battery

commanders had reconnoitred the forward areas with a view to a possible

advance should the forthcoming operations prove successful, and at 3.30

A.M. the assault was delivered. Covered by the guns of the 156th and

162nd Brigades, the 98th Infantry Brigade moved forward to capture

Villers Guislain, one company working round on the north-west, one from

the south-east and one making a frontal attack up the centre. With each

company there went a Tank which latter, however, were all knocked out

very early in the day or were blown up in our own minefield, and in

front of the whole body an artillery barrage rolled through the village.

Villers Guislain was captured together with two hundred prisoners, but

unfortunately the various enemy machine-gun posts, strong points and

dug-outs were not mopped up, and the attacking troops found themselves

with parties of Germans behind them. From here onwards the situation

became very obscure; a second attack—a continuation of the first—was

launched at 5.50 A.M. when the 100th Infantry Brigade assaulted the

trenches east of Villers Guislain, the objective being the line Evett

Copse-Crawford Crater, an attack which was accompanied by the advance of

the 21st and 12th Divisions on the left and right respectively, but

progress by the infantry was very irregular. Owing to the presence of

Germans who had not been mopped up in the rear of the attacking

infantry, and as a result of stiff resistance put up by the enemy all

along the line, the day developed into one long hard fight, every

battery being heavily engaged. A company of the 1st Middlesex was

completely cut off by Germans whose dug-outs had been overlooked in the

first assault, and, when our troops ultimately succeeded in capturing

this ground next day, the whole of the company which had been surrounded

was found lying dead all around. Whether the Middlesex had been captured

and slaughtered in cold blood it was impossible to say, but their

general appearance gave grounds for such an idea, and little mercy was

shown to the enemy in the succeeding days' operations. By 2.30 P.M. the

right infantry brigade was back on its original front line and the enemy

had practically regained Villers Guislain, and by evening the whole of

the attacking troops had retired once more to their starting point.

Meanwhile, with the success of the earlier part of the day, orders had

come for the 162nd Brigade to advance to positions south and south-east

of Villers Guislain, and at 2.0 P.M. "A" and C/162 had begun to move

forward in accordance with these orders. Hardly had they started,

however, than they came under intense fire which continued all along

their line of advance, while later, in the intermediate positions which

they were compelled to take up owing to the retirement of the infantry,

they were heavily bombarded by 4·2 in. and 77 mm. B/156, another battery

to move up according to prearranged orders—which had been drafted on the

assumption that the attack would be a success—went right on to its

forward position and stayed there within four hundred yards of the

enemy, but it suffered heavily for its temerity.

The night of the 29th/30th passed quietly, and at 10.30 A.M. on the 30th

the enemy was reported to be evacuating the ground west of the Canal de

l'Escaut. Sunday's attack, although not a success on the batteries'

immediate front, had elsewhere pierced the mighty Siegfried line, the

effect of which was so great that the enemy was forced to carry out a

retirement along the whole front. As soon as information of this

withdrawal was received a general advance began, the batteries

reconnoitring the ground which covered the crossings of the canal and

the zone east thereof, while the infantry reached the line which had

been the objective of the 5.50 A.M. attack on the previous day and threw

out patrols to the western bank of the canal. Between 11.0 A.M. and 2.0

P.M. the 156th Brigade advanced to positions 2,000 yards east of

Peizière, while A/162 came into action just west of Villers Guislain.

During the night 31st/1st the 162nd Brigade brought forward its guns,

and by dawn on October 1st was in action 1,000 yards east of Villers

Guislain, while the 156th Brigade also advanced its guns to the vicinity

of Pigeon and Targelle ravines, 2,000 yards south of the village. From

3.30 A.M. to 7.0 A.M. such guns as had reached the forward position

fired a barrage in support of an infantry advance on the right, and for

the rest of the day were kept hard at work in engaging the many targets

and movement which presented themselves on the far side of the canal. At

the same time the batteries were subjected to intense area shoots by the

enemy who was trying desperately to cover his retreat.

These area shoots were undoubtedly extremely unpleasant, but just at

this time the batteries were given visible proof that counter-battery

work was not entirely confined to the German side. During the advance to

the Canal, four 5·9 in. enemy howitzers were found deserted, but still

in the firing position, along a road. On this road just behind them a

German field battery of four 77 mm. guns had apparently been

marching—_had_, it should be noticed, for it would never march again.

Whether it had been caught in a shell-storm directed upon the 5·9 in.

howitzer battery, or whether an aeroplane had seen it and had switched

some of our batteries round to catch it will never be known, but

whatever had occurred the work was most effectual. The entire battery,

personnel and guns, lay dead and smashed upon the ground; the battery

commander at the head of the column, behind him his trumpeter and the

whole of the battery staff, all lay dead beneath their horses. Every

team of every gun was still in its harness, all three drivers of each

team were still in their places, but all were dead, torn and riven by

our shells. It was a most uncanny sight, this battery complete in every

detail laid out along the road, and swift must have been the storm from

our guns which transformed it and its surroundings into a shambles.

October 1st/5th was a period of probing the enemy line and of trying to

force the pace of his retreat. Day and night his communications were

shelled, his front system bombarded and every sign of movement engaged.

Patrols pushed out to the edge of the canal on the 3rd found it still

held by machine-gun parties, and as a result certain batteries sent

forward sections so as better to engage Honnecourt and the numerous

targets which presented themselves in the neighbourhood. On one occasion

an aeroplane reported enemy transport to be on the move near Basket

Wood, and a storm of shell was immediately directed upon the area

involved. During the advance a couple of days later the batteries passed

the locality where this transport had been, and the sight of the smashed

and broken wagons and the dead drivers and horses who had been killed by

the batteries' own fire was most uplifting to the detachments who had

done the work. All this time gas concentrations were fired into La

Terrière and Basket Wood, and everything was done to render as difficult

as possible the retirement which the enemy was clearly carrying out.

At last, on the 5th, the line gave. Further to the right our troops had

captured Montbrehain and Beaurevoir, and their loss necessitated a

withdrawal by the enemy from the La Terrière Plateau. At dawn the 5th

Scottish Rifles, accompanied by forward observing officers from each

brigade, pushed patrols across the river and, meeting only slight

resistance, advanced to Franque Wood and on through La Terrière,

establishing themselves in Aubencheul by 3.0 P.M. As soon as it was

known that the enemy had retired to the east of the canal, the 156th and

162nd Brigades began to make rapid preparations for the crossing, the

repairing of bridges at Les Tranchées and elsewhere being taken in hand

without delay. By 4.0 P.M. the 156th Brigade had completed a rough

bridge in the southern end of Honnecourt, and an hour later both

brigades were ordered to move across the Canal in support of the

infantry. A/156 and a section of C/156 immediately effected a crossing

and dropped into action midway between Vendhuille and La Terrière. At

dusk D/156 went into action 1,000 yards south of La Terrière, and the

remainder of C/156 crossed the canal and took up a position of readiness

one thousand yards to the east thereof.

Thus the batteries pushed their way over one of the great barriers which

lay across the line of advance, and before night had fallen a proportion

of guns was firmly established on the eastern side. Darkness prevented

any further work from being done, but with the arrival of dawn on the

6th, B/156 and the remainder of the 156th Brigade crossed over and took

up positions covering Aubencheul from south of La Pannerie Wood. The

162nd Brigade, in the meantime, had been seriously held up at the lock

south of Honnecourt, as the bridge, although repaired once, had again

been broken, but at 4.0 P.M. on the 5th after several hours' delay the

crossing was successfully carried out by portions of the batteries; at

dawn on the 6th the remainder came into action in the vicinity of

Franque Wood and La Terrière after a perilous march along the east bank

of the canal, between the latter and a marsh, with only two inches of

clearance on either side of the wheels.

On October 7th the 162nd Brigade again advanced to Basket Wood, while

wagon-lines were brought forward to the vicinity of the Canal, and at

1.0 A.M. on October 8th all batteries put down a barrage in support of

an attack by the 115th Infantry Brigade of the 38th Division. This

Division had relieved the 33rd at 10.0 P.M. on the 5th, and now advanced

to the assault of the Beaurevoir Line and Villers Outreaux in

conjunction with a general attack on the last of the Siegfried zone by

Byng, Rawlinson and Debeney. After much opposition and very severe

fighting the final objectives were gained at 10.0 A.M., and

three-quarters of an hour later the 162nd Brigade again moved

forward—the third advance in three days—to the west of Mortho Wood,

while the 156th Brigade guns advanced to the southern edge of

Aubencheul. From here another barrage was fired at 11.30 A.M., almost in

fact before the guns had dropped their trails—"limber supply" being

adopted by certain batteries until the ammunition wagons, arriving at

the gallop, came up just in time to prevent a stoppage—and under cover

of it the 114th Infantry Brigade assaulted Malincourt and the

Malincourt-Serain road beyond.

At about noon it was clear that the enemy was in full retreat, and

accordingly the barrage was stopped, the infantry pushing on with little

opposition through Malincourt and reaching the final objective at three

o'clock in the afternoon. At two o'clock one section of B/156, and

shortly afterwards three howitzers of D/156, advanced until they were

almost up with the attacking infantry, and by shooting in close support

and co-operation with the latter did excellent work in the engaging of

hostile movement, machine-guns and strong points. At the same time the

whole of 156th Brigade advanced so as to keep touch with the infantry,

reaching by 4.0 P.M. the area just south of Malincourt.

At dawn on October 9th the advance was resumed. Tuesday's battle had

wiped out the whole of the Siegfried Line, the enemy was now well on the

run and the 19th Infantry Brigade (33rd Division) pushed on through the

114th, the C.R.A. 33rd Division taking over control of the guns, which

consisted of the 121st and 122nd Brigades in addition to the 156th and

162nd. Little resistance was met with until Clary was reached, but here

the infantry were held up by snipers and machine-gun fire. Two guns of

A/156 and three of B/156 together with some advanced sections of the

162nd Brigade, which had followed close on the heels of the infantry,

came into action immediately on the western outskirts of the village and

successfully engaged the enemy machine-guns over open sights. Shortly

afterwards the infantry established themselves on the eastern outskirts

of Clary, whereupon two of the advanced guns of B/156 were pushed

through the village and again came into action, shooting over open

sights with extremely good effect at a range of 800 yards. In the

meantime the rest of the 156th and 162nd Brigades had been advancing

rapidly and, after passing through Villers Outreaux and Malincourt, had

dropped into action just west of Clary to help the infantry in the

assault on the eastern outskirts. With the fall of Clary the advance

quickened and the infantry went right through Bertry unchecked and on to

La Fayte and Troisvilles, closely followed by the forward guns of the

156th and 162nd Brigades, which were shooting at very close ranges over

open sights all the afternoon and were successfully dealing with every

sign of enemy resistance. Keeping pace with the advance came on also the

main body of guns of the two brigades, which searched out and broke up

every sign of enemy movement and opposition. So rapid was the move

forward that the batteries took up three successive positions during the

day, night finding them in the vicinity of Bertry with forward guns on

the western edge of Troisvilles.

[Illustration:

Scale 1:40,000.

]

The speed of the advance, indeed, was now beginning to make itself felt;

ammunition and food supply became a most serious problem, and on this

day (October 9th) tremendous difficulty was met with by the wagon-lines

in keeping touch with their firing batteries without either crowding

upon or losing all sight of them. The day, with its eight mile advance

and the occupation of three successive positions, laid a heavy strain

upon all the wagon-lines which, unable to move in a direct line across

country, had to complete a long march before they joined up with their

guns at Bertry in the evening; yet throughout this period the guns and

detachments were never without ammunition and food, a fact which

compares very favourably with the batteries of the United States army

which in some cases, being without food, were completely unable to keep

up with the advance. There was another and most novel proof of the pace

at which the line was pushing forward; on entering Clary and Bertry the

infantry and guns were met by cheering French civilians who, in their

exultation at the departure of the enemy after so many weary years,

rushed to greet our troops with an outburst of joy—quite embarrassing!

Unable to cope with the rapidity of the attack the Germans had allowed

these people to stay behind, and in their excitement at this unexpected

relief they vented their delight upon the British troops in the most

amazing and whole-hearted manner.

Seven o'clock on the morning of the 10th saw all batteries on the move

again, supporting an advance by the 98th Infantry Brigade, assisted by

cavalry, upon the bridgeheads east of the River Selle between Neuvilly

and Montay. This was a great day for the guns and, indeed, for all the

troops concerned, for the advance was carried out according to the true

style laid down in the drill book for open fighting. Cavalry patrols in

front, infantry following on, batteries first in "battery column" and

then manœuvring into line, the whole countryside around Troisvilles

presented the amazing spectacle of vast masses of troops moving steadily

forward exactly as though on an Aldershot field day. The 156th Brigade

lay on the right of the 162nd, and together the two brigades manœuvred

up to the crest of the hill which commanded the crossing of the Selle.

By 8.0 A.M. the infantry were within 800 yards of the river, where they

halted until such time as the Divisions on the right and left had come

up into line, and by the same hour the batteries had pushed through

Troisvilles to a point midway between that village and Le Cateau, from

which positions they vigorously shelled hostile batteries and machine

guns.

In addition to the delay on the flanks, the enemy on the immediate front

was showing clear signs of increased resistance. Several field batteries

had come up and were firing over open sights at the infantry, while our

own batteries, as they neared the crest of the hill, came under very

heavy shell fire. With ammunition wagons detached, however, the guns

pressed on under severe fire and reached the crest whence, over open

sights, they were able to assist the infantry in no small measure, and

throughout the day continued to engage hostile troops and movement of

every description. At the same time the German batteries rendered our

positions very uncomfortable with 77 mm. and long-range fire, while the

teams which went back to Troisvilles to water found the village

congested with cavalry, artillery and infantry pack horses, all of whom

suffered severe casualties through being spotted by an enemy aeroplane

which called down a shell-storm upon the entire village.

The whole of the 10th was spent in registration, harassing fire and

counter-battery work, D/156 and D/162 engaging with great success four

hostile batteries in action on the forward slopes of the high ground

east of the River Selle. Many enemy machine-guns and snipers also

demanded the attention of the guns, and so, despite fairly active

artillery fire on the part of the enemy, the batteries were kept busy

until 5 P.M.; at that hour a barrage was fired to cover the 98th

Infantry Brigade in an attempt to cross the river and to form

bridgeheads on the crest of the hill to the north-east, in conjunction

with the 17th Division on the left.

This attack met with considerable opposition as the River Selle formed a

most important part of the enemy defensive line, and nowhere was an

advance made beyond the railway. Night fell with the enemy still holding

the high ground, and brought with it a most unpleasant time for the

batteries. Without cover of any sort or description, lying out in the

open and being consistently shelled with 77 mm. and 4·2 in., the

detachments awaited the dawn, when it was hoped that this stand on the

part of the enemy might be broken down.

Dawn, however, brought no further success, but on the contrary a

temporary reverse. The 98th Infantry Brigade at 10.15 A.M. reported that

it had been counter-attacked and now only had two posts on the eastern

side of the Selle; the 162nd Brigade was accordingly detailed to look

after the troops across the river, while the remainder of the artillery

covering the infantry were left to fire on observed targets and to

engage all movement and all possible hostile batteries. The latter

during the morning were quiet, but from 2.0 P.M. until 4.0 P.M. a very

considerable bombardment of 5·9 in., 4·2 in. and 77 mm., mainly from the

Ovillers direction, descended upon the whole area occupied by the

batteries.

No further move was now made until 5.0 A.M. on the 12th when the 100th

Infantry Brigade assaulted the high ground east of the river, the

objective being the line of the road running from Amerval to the

outskirts of Montay. No creeping barrage was utilised in this attack,

the batteries firing on selected and observed targets throughout the

day. By 8.0 A.M. the left battalion was reported to have gained its

objective in spite of strong enemy opposition, but the right battalion

was held up by machine-gun fire from the river. An early morning mist

rendered observed artillery fire—the only kind of any use at the

moment—impossible, and not till the middle of the day could anything be

done. Excellent work was then carried out by the batteries but came too

late, for by then the left battalion had been forced back to the railway

by strong enemy counter-attacks; evening found our troops, in spite of

stubborn fighting and most gallant resistance, back to the west of the

river whither they had been driven by superior numbers of the enemy,

only a few posts remaining on the eastern bank.

With S.O.S. lines along the railway, both brigades now began a period of

continuous harassing fire on all enemy strong points and communications,

with synchronised bombardments on areas of especial importance. A lull

in the infantry action had set in, but it was essential that the enemy

should have no chance of organising his front or improving his defences,

and to prevent this the full powers of the batteries were called upon.

From October 13th to the 20th under the control of the C.R.A. 38th

Division (which had relieved the 33rd on the 13th) the guns bombarded

the railway, the hostile trenches and batteries, the ravines east of the

Selle and every possible point which might be utilised by the enemy. Gas

was fired nightly into the ravines, every hostile effort to put out wire

was nullified, and two 6 in. trench mortars were brought into position

to help in the bombardment. The result of this firing, although not

apparent at the time, was clearly shown later when the batteries, on

advancing, found the railway embankment covered with the bodies of dead

Germans, all of whom had obviously, from their mangled state, been

killed by shell fire. Daily the enemy replied to this activity by

shelling the forward and battery areas, but the initiative had passed

for ever into the hands of the British Army, and the lull, although of a

week's duration, was but a temporary measure. On October 20th Byng

struck with seven divisions in an attempt to capture the Selle line

north of Le Cateau to Denain, five miles from Valenciennes, and the 38th

Division, covered by a barrage from the guns, assaulted and captured by

10.0 A.M. the high ground between Forest and the Selle as its share of

the operation; this, together with victories on other parts of the 3rd

Army front, left the way clear for a further general advance.

Next day (21st) the expected orders to resume the advance were received.

A general assault by the 3rd and 4th Armies was planned, the objectives

of the 33rd Division being Wagnonville and Poix-du-Nord; the attack was

to be on a grandiose scale, tanks assisting the infantry, while in

addition to the 156th and 162nd Brigades the whole of the 38th

Divisional Artillery and the 223rd Brigade R.F.A. (Naval Division) were

to form the creeping barrage behind which the infantry would move

forward. Two 6 in. trench mortars were allotted to each infantry

brigade, the 6 in. howitzers of the V. Corps Heavy Artillery were

detailed to bombard selected targets and engage in counter-battery work,

and one 18-pdr. battery of the 162nd Brigade was placed at the disposal

of the G.O.C. 19th Infantry Brigade.

In order to cover the Ovillers Slaughter House road for this attack the

156th Brigade moved to within 1,000 yards of the Selle, north-west of

Montay. From here all necessary points were registered during the

21st/22nd, and on the 22nd every battery sent forward a reconnoitring

party to examine the approaches to and crossings of the River Selle.

This was to be no local attack but an operation on the very largest

scale with tremendous issues hanging in the balance, for it marked the

beginning of the destruction of the new water front, the Scheldt and the

Sambre Canal, which the enemy was seeking to hold, and the start of the

last of the great conflicts in the west. No precaution was to be

overlooked, no step left untaken which in any way might assist in

bringing success to this great combined effort further to hurl the enemy

back towards his frontiers.

During the night of the 22nd/23rd the infantry of the 33rd Division

relieved the 38th, the C.R.A. 33rd Division taking over control of the

guns, and at 2.0 A.M. on the 23rd the attack was launched behind a

creeping barrage with the 98th Infantry Brigade on the right, the 19th

on the left. By 4.30 A.M. the 1st Middlesex were in Forest, and the 4th

King's had passed through their lines and were pushing on towards the

next objective; an hour later B/156 with one section of D/156 crossed

the Selle and followed up the leading battalion of the 98th Infantry

Brigade with whom they kept in close touch throughout the day, and by

6.45 A.M. both artillery brigades had crossed the Selle, the 156th

shortly afterwards taking up positions 1,000 yards west of Croix, the

162nd dropping into action west of Forest.

Meantime the infantry, in face of strong opposition, were pushing slowly

on, and by 10.30 A.M. were lining the Croix-Vendegies road ready for the

next advance. Before this took place the guns of the 162nd Brigade again

moved up, this time to Richemont, while C/156 pressed on nearly to

Croix. So successful was the attack, however, that the batteries found

themselves being left too far behind, and accordingly at 12.30 P.M. the

162nd Brigade again advanced its guns in close support of the infantry

and came into action 1,000 yards north of Croix. Here it remained

throughout the rest of the day, neutralizing machine-gun fire and

generally assisting in every possible way the infantry who were slowly

making their way through Vendegies Wood.

[Illustration:

Scale 1:40,000.

]

By 5.0 P.M. the British line ran approximately along the northern edge

of the wood, and here the advance was stayed for the night, the 156th

Brigade, who had occupied the same positions since before midday,

pushing up to an area 1,000 yards north of Croix where it remained

throughout the hours of darkness. The day had been a complete and

overwhelming success all along the line, and the batteries, after

sixteen hours of continuous fighting and advancing, were thankful to

snatch a short rest. The strain had been great, nor had the victory been

won without loss; all batteries had suffered to a more or less marked

extent, but in particular must be mentioned the tragic and yet glorious

death of Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler. While riding up from his

headquarters at Richemont to visit the batteries he was severely wounded

and died the same evening, a loss which the 156th Brigade could ill

afford. Elsewhere has been related the story of his gallantry during the

enemy offensive, and in the advance of the British line his courage and

example were no less marked. His death robbed the Brigade of a friend

and a leader than whom a better could not be found, and with victory

almost in sight it seemed doubly hard that he should not have survived

to share in it.

On the 24th at 4.0 A.M. the advance on Englefontaine was resumed, Major

W. G. Sheeres, M.C., taking over command of the 156th Brigade. Heavy

bursts of fire were put down in front of the infantry under cover of

which they moved forward towards Paul Jacques Farm and Wagnonville, and

at dawn, although all ranks were now very exhausted, the batteries began

to advance. At 6.0 A.M. the 162nd Brigade had reached the southern

outskirts of Vendegies and was directing fire upon the eastern outskirts

of Poix-du-Nord, where the enemy was reported to be retreating. By 8.0

A.M. the same brigade had again advanced to a position in observation

1,000 yards further on, the 156th Brigade reaching the edge of the Bois

de Vendegies one hour later. From here harassing fire was kept up on the

approaches to Englefontaine, while A/156 kept in close touch with the

leading battalion of infantry. News was then received that, after the

overcoming of strong opposition, Wagnonville had been captured and

Englefontaine itself was being rapidly threatened. Upon receipt of this

information further battery positions were hastily reconnoitred and all

the guns were moved up, the 156th Brigade coming into action between

Poix-du-Nord and Wagnonville, the 162nd Brigade in Poix-du-Nord itself.

As events turned out, the infantry were held up between Poix-du-Nord and

Englefontaine, and the latter was accordingly kept under the fire of the

guns. All through the night of the 24th/25th and during the day of the

25th the exits from the village were continually bombarded, and at 1.0

A.M. on the 26th an attack was carried out by both infantry brigades of

the 33rd Division under cover of a thick barrage in which ten per cent.

of gas shells were used. The programme for this barrage was worked out

almost entirely by Brig.-General G. H. W. Nicholson who, depleted of his

staff by "Spanish influenza" and other causes, tackled the work

single-handed and with such skill that the operation was a complete

success. Five hundred prisoners and many machine-guns were taken, and

with the fall of the village one battery of the 162nd Brigade pushed

forward to a previously reconnoitred position from which close support

of the infantry was possible.

From the 26th until the end of the month the batteries remained in the

same positions, and it was well that this was so, for the so-called

Spanish influenza was now raging in both brigades. It was believed that

this epidemic had been contracted through sleeping in dug-outs and barns

recently occupied by the enemy who was known to be suffering from it

very badly, but whatever the cause it handicapped the guns to a marked

extent. At one time the brigade commander and all four battery

commanders of the 162nd Brigade were down with the disease, but despite

this counter-preparations were fired morning and evening to break up any

would-be counter-attacks by the enemy, while frequent gas concentrations

were fired into the hostile lines. On the 29th a successful "mopping-up"

of houses on the Englefontaine-Bavai road was carried out by the 17th

R.W.F. (the 38th Division had relieved the 33rd on the evening of the

26th), and on the 29th/30th there came to the weary batteries a short

relief. On that night the 122nd Brigade R.F.A. "took over" from the

162nd who marched back to Bertry for a 72-hour rest, to be followed two

nights later by the 156th Brigade.

For over six long weeks the batteries had been fighting, advancing and

fighting again, covering in all a depth of 30 miles and never once

enjoying rest of any kind. Upon Brigade and Battery commanders there had

been the constant strain of dealing with the ever-arising fresh

situations, and of keeping in close touch with the infantry in every

stage of the advance; amongst all the battery personnel there had been

no rest, no respite from unending firing, marching and enemy shelling,

while the wagon-lines had been hard put to it each day to keep touch

with the gun lines in every move and to keep them fully supplied with

ammunition. It is scarcely surprising, then, that officers and men were

dropping with fatigue when the orders for a 72-hour rest were received,

yet so high was the morale of the troops at the time and so inflamed

were all with the sense of victory, that grudgingly did they give up

their share in the battle and move back to the quieter surroundings of

Bertry.

They need not have feared, however, that they would be long left out of

the line. The so-called 72-hour rest, although achieved by the 162nd

Brigade, was reduced in the case of the 156th to one of twenty-four

hours, and November 2nd saw both brigades back into action once more. A

great combined attack by the 1st, 3rd and 4th Armies, together with the

1st French Army, was about to be launched upon the formidable defences

of the Sambre, the great Mormal Forest and the fortifications of the

town of Le Quesnoy, and to take part in this the two brigades were

ordered to cover the line due east of Englefontaine from positions in

the western outskirts of Poix-du-Nord (156th Brigade) and from

Wagnonville (162nd Brigade). These positions they occupied in the

afternoon of November 2nd, Lieut.-Colonel C. E. Boyce temporarily

commanding the 156th Brigade, and Colonel Pim (who was wounded next day

and succeeded by Major Vaughan-Hughes) the 162nd in place of

Lieut.-Colonel Warren.

Before any further details of the fighting are entered upon, a word of

explanation is called for with regard to this chapter. Hitherto a

careful chronicle of the events of each day has been given, the

movements of the batteries being followed in detail. As a result,

perhaps, of this strict attention to tactics the personal element has

found itself excluded, the interest of the chapter being in the main

historical. Yet this is unavoidable; in one short chapter must be

described the whole of that brilliant advance from September 16th until

November 11th, with all its attacks, its changes of position and forward

marches. To digress from this and enter upon personal narratives must

inevitably destroy the continuity of the story, and moreover, another

difficulty has to be faced. In those days no battery had time to think

of the doings of any other guns save of its own; no battery had really

sufficient time to think and record what it was doing itself, and

therefore, were stories of individual exploits narrated in these pages,

only a particle could be put down and many as deserving of mention would

have to be left untold. On frequent occasions every battery of both

brigades performed brilliant exploits in galloping forward guns to a

level with the most advanced infantry and in shooting upon the enemy

over open sights at almost point-blank range; on frequent occasions

batteries had to pass through shell-storms to drop into the positions

chosen for them, and had to maintain effective covering fire under the

full weight of an enemy bombardment, but each and all did it in turn and

the singling out of any one in particular would be invidious. All eight

batteries took an equal share in this wonderful advance, and the valour

of their work can best be appreciated by an account of the battles in

which they were engaged.

On November 2nd the brigades had come back into action; November 3rd was

spent in reconnoitring advance positions and in maintaining close

co-operation between the infantry and the guns, and on November 4th

began the great attack on the Forêt de Mormal. At 6.15 A.M. under a

creeping barrage the 38th Division moved forward to the assault, and for

two hours the guns continued to maintain a curtain of fire in front of

the infantry as they pushed their way on towards the objective. At 8.15

A.M. both the 156th and 162nd Brigades began to advance, one battery at

a time, to positions already chosen east of Englefontaine, and by

adopting this procedure the continuity of the barrage was in no way

interrupted, the rear positions maintaining a brisk rate of fire until a

proportion of guns had reached the forward positions and had begun to

carry on the work from there. The 162nd Brigade successfully reached the

new positions, although heavily shelled on the way, but the 156th was

prevented from doing so by intense machine-gun fire, which mere fact

alone goes to show how closely the batteries were following up the

infantry. Only A/156 was able to get through, the remainder having to

drop into action temporarily to the west of the village, but after a

time the machine-gun fire slackened and the move was completed, the

whole of the 156th Brigade lying 1,000 yards south-east of Englefontaine

in the outskirts of the Forêt de Mormal and close alongside the 162nd

Brigade.

From here the barrage was continued until 3.0 P.M., when the final

objectives were reached. Positions were then reconnoitred 3,000 yards

further forward, and at dusk all batteries advanced again. Great

difficulty was now experienced as numerous trees had been felled across

the roads which had, in addition, been blown up, but by 8.0 P.M. all

batteries were in action again in the reconnoitred positions around a

_carrefour_ or meeting of roads in the forest. The state of the roads,

in point of fact, prevented the moving up of any heavy guns except the

60-pounders, the six-inch howitzers being compelled to remain halted far

behind until some sort of track had been repaired for them.

During the night of the 4th/5th the batteries again moved forward and

were deployed along the Sassegnies-Ribaumet-Sarbaras line, covering the

River Sambre, while the infantry of the 33rd Division relieved that of

the 38th. At 4.30 A.M. the advance began again, and each battery

immediately sent one section forward to keep in touch with the battalion

commanders. These sections pushed on through La Grande Pature and took

up positions east of Sarbaras which gave easy command of the crossings

of and ground beyond the River Sambre, and from which very successful

observed fire was carried out, much enemy movement being engaged. In the

meantime the remainder of the batteries hurried forward as fast as

possible, but great delay was caused by congestion on the roads and by

mine craters and felled trees. Not until noon had all the batteries, in

extremely wet weather, made their way through the Forêt de Mormal, but

by that time they were in action east of Sarbaras and bombarding the

ground beyond the Sambre with the utmost vigour.

This day, Tuesday, November 5th, marked the final breaking of the

enemy's resistance. With the two wings of his army separated, with the

Siegfried and Brynhild zones overrun, he was no longer in retreat but in

full flight, and during the afternoon of the 5th a careful

reconnaissance of the routes forward and of the crossings over the

Sambre was carried out, for the rout of the enemy might enable a

crossing to be effected at any moment. During the night of the 5th/6th

the enemy retired to the east of the river and the 162nd Brigade was

ordered to follow him, the 156th being told to remain in their present

positions to the west. Night and day the enemy kept the bridgeheads

under the most intense shell and machine-gun fire, and entirely

prevented the Sappers and the battery working parties from repairing the

bridges sufficiently for the guns to get across. Ultimately, at dawn on

the 7th, a rough structure had been thrown up, and the batteries began

to move over the river. On the previous evening a reconnaissance of the

approach to the bridge had been made by Major Taylor and Captain Heads,

and it was found that the proper approach had been hopelessly blocked.

The batteries, when they did advance, had to move down a steep, winding

and very narrow track, while the only route on the eastern side of the

river was a tortuous towing path and necessitated the cutting of gaps in

hedges and the manhandling of guns across rivulets and swamps—a very

difficult task.

D/162 was the first battery actually to cross the Sambre, but it was so

closely followed by A/162 that the latter got into action first,

dropping its gun trails just west of Pot de Vin at the moment when the

infantry were assembling along a sunken road for the attack on the

village. The gratitude of the infantry for this close support by the

artillery was very marked, and several of their officers came up to the

batteries to express their thanks, for they knew with what difficulty

and at what a cost this advance of the guns close under the enemy's nose

had been effected. "B" and C/162 were prevented for some time from

crossing the river, for an infantry wagon broke down right in the middle

of the bridge shortly after "A" battery had got over, but after a delay

of about two hours the whole brigade was across the last barrier and,

despite severe casualties suffered in the operation, was supporting the

infantry to the full extent of its power. November 7th was the last real

fighting day of the war on this part of the front, but it was none the

less a very nasty day, and in every battery a certain number of

casualties were suffered. The enemy was putting up a stiff resistance

for he was trying to bar to us the road to Namur, but his was only a

forlorn hope and did little more than to slow down slightly our rate of

advance.

From this date onwards the only batteries of the 33rd Divisional

Artillery to the east of the Sambre were those of the 162nd Brigade, as

the 156th Brigade had not been called upon to advance. In fact, the

162nd Brigade shared with the 169th Army Field Artillery Brigade the

distinction of being the only guns across the river on this section from

the 6th until the conclusion of hostilities.

On the 8th, even while a little group of men were sitting round a table

in the Forest of Compiègne discussing the terms of Armistice, the

infantry of the 38th Division advanced to the Maubeuge-Avesnes road and

later to the Bois de Beugnies, supported as far as possible by the 162nd

Brigade which pushed on beyond the cross-roads north-west of Dourlers.

On the 9th the enemy retreat became general; the infantry followed up as

far as Wattignies, and "B" and C/162 moved into action 1,000 yards west

of the village, "A" and "D" batteries remaining at Dourlers. Saturday,

the 9th, was in fact the last day of the war for the 33rd Divisional

Artillery. In the early morning of that day the 162nd Brigade fired upon

the enemy rearguards—the 156th were already out of the battle—and

reconnoitred forward as far as Wattignies where the infantry had halted.

Small patrols of cavalry pushed further on to try and establish contact

with the rearguard of the German army, and desultory machine-gun fire

could be heard every now and then away in the distance, but to all

intents and purposes the enemy had completely vanished and nowhere could

our troops get into contact with them.

On November 10th came orders for the wagon-lines to join up with the

guns and for all four batteries of the 162nd Brigade to remain in a

position of readiness between Dourlers and Ecuelin. To the east all the

bridges had been blown up by the retreating enemy, and pursuit by the

batteries was utterly impossible. Moreover, it was known by all ranks

that German plenipotentiaries had passed through our lines some days

before to sue for terms, and the knowledge of that fact, combined with

the utter rout of the enemy on the batteries' own front, prepared the

men for the news which was shortly to come.

At 9.0 A.M. on Monday, November 11th, 1918, came the news that the war

was over. In the Wattignies sector the order to break off hostilities

did not come, as many accounts strove to describe it, in the midst of

the battle, with raging gun-fire at one moment and our troops all

shouting and waving their helmets at the next. The orders merely

confirmed what already was known and anticipated, and although, when the

message from G.H.Q. was read out to the assembled batteries, there was

such cheering as comes from deep down in the heart, the occasion was far

too great to be grasped in a single moment, and the gunners, as soon as

the parade was over, set off to play a football match against the

infantry! Such an attitude of mind must have seemed inexplicable to

onlookers of other nationalities who could not understand the

temperament of the British soldier, yet in a way the action was only

natural. The Great Pursuit was over; nay, more, the war, the terrible

nightmare of four years, was finished. How could the realisation of such

a mighty event be grasped in a moment by men who for months and years

had been hourly awaiting death, and now saw death pass from them?

CHAPTER XII.

FINALE.

And so the work is done, the record finished. In all humbleness the pen

was taken up to chronicle the deeds of these men; in all humbleness it

is laid down again with the closing of the story. In mere bald words it

has been impossible to describe the wonderful gallantry, the grand

determination and the final success over insuperable difficulties which

typified the men of the 33rd Divisional Artillery. The true tale of

their heroism, of their suffering and sacrifice can never really be

understood by any save those whose privilege it was to be a witness

thereof, but the story of the battles in which they took part may

perhaps convey a small idea of the glory of their war record.