THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME.
(JULY 14th—SEPTEMBER 6th 1916).
Early on the morning of July 10th the long troop trains carrying the
batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery drew into the stations of
Longueau and Sallieux, in the neighbourhood of Amiens, and began to
unload with every due speed. All ranks fully expected to march into
action forthwith, and therefore with something akin to dismay it was
learnt that the destination of the batteries was the area around Soues,
Arouves and Le Mesge, villages some miles _west_ of Amiens, and far away
from the battle lines. The 156th Brigade and half of the 162nd Brigade
marched first to Cardonette, but their stay there was only temporary,
and on the evening of the 10th, after a long and exceedingly dusty march
in great heat through Amiens, Ailly and Picquigny, the Divisional
Artillery was reported concentrated in the area allotted to it. There it
stayed during the whole of the 11th, resting, overhauling after the long
journey and generally making preparations for the great battle which all
realised was very near indeed at hand.
This was different country to the late surroundings of the batteries.
Hills and valleys, pleasant little villages with orchards and pastures
proved an agreeable change to the flat monotony of Flanders, and, keen
as the men were to prove their mettle in the great struggle being waged
over the far horizon, a day of rest in this quiet country proved very
welcome. On the 12th, however, all was hustle and stir once again, and
the four brigades marched together as a Divisional Artillery to the
Vecquemont-Daours area. The heat was tremendous, and several inches of
fine dust lay on the roads; the result of a column, many miles in
length, of horses and guns on the march under these conditions may well
be imagined, and on their arrival—the 156th Brigade at Corbie, the 162nd
Brigade at Daours, with the 166th and 167th Brigades at Vecquemont—all
were covered and half choked with a mixture of dust and perspiration
which nothing short of a dip in the neighbouring stream could remove.
Here the batteries bivouacked for the night, while battery commanders
were detached from the column to ride on at daybreak to reconnoitre the
front and generally to learn the tactical position into which they must
shortly lead their batteries; and from here at 8.0 A.M. on the 13th the
column, after the previous night's halt, continued the march to Treux
and the neighbouring Marette Wood, where the brigades waited and gained
such rest as was possible in view of the fact that they were ordered to
be prepared to move at thirty minutes' notice.
Not until 1.30 A.M. on the 14th were the expected orders to move
received, and even then for one and a half hours the batteries stood
tense and expectant, gunners by their guns, drivers at the horses'
heads, while in the distance the throb and roar of the great attack on
the second German line of defence came down to them. At last, at 3.0
A.M. in the half-light the 162nd, 166th and 167th Brigades moved off to
Becordel-Becourt, the 162nd Brigade proceeding in the first place to
Méaulte for a few hours, while the 156th Brigade moved off in the
afternoon of the same day to Méaulte, bivouacking on the spot which the
162nd Brigade had just vacated on completing the march to Becordel. Now
was the battle very close at hand indeed; the roads were choked with
infantry, guns and transport moving up, always moving up, with their
faces set towards the east where lay a mighty, seething cauldron, the
melting pot of two great armies in mortal conflict. Against this
never-ending stream came down, in a slowly moving column, the
fruits—fruits indeed, though often very bitter—of victory. Ambulances,
walking wounded, shattered guns, depleted and exhausted infantry
battalions coming out to rest, and, a sight more cheering to the
up-going troops, long lines of German prisoners. The appearance of this
highway, one of the main arteries to the actual front line, brought home
to the batteries, who were drawn up off the side of the road awaiting
orders, a very grim realisation of the ordeal they were about to
undergo, but detracted not one whit of eagerness from the minds of the
men to plunge into that struggle just as soon as circumstances should
permit.
At 4.30 P.M. on the 14th the brigade commanders of the three brigades at
Becordel rode on to reconnoitre positions; it was generally understood
that no move into action would take place until shortly before dawn of
the following morning, and preparations were accordingly made for a
night bivouac. It was a disturbed night; the road hummed and buzzed with
traffic unceasingly, the battery horse lines were twice shelled by a
4-in. high velocity gun—once so heavily that the horses had temporarily
to be withdrawn—and at 1.0 A.M. on the morning of Saturday, the 15th,
two brigades, the 162nd and the 166th, received orders to march into
action at dawn.
Independently at 3.0 A.M. the batteries of these two brigades moved off
in full fighting order, and, passing over the old front line system near
Fricourt, headed for the positions which had been reconnoitred on the
previous day on the slopes of the valleys running from Caterpillar Wood
to Montauban and Bazentin. Gas hung thickly in the valley east of
Fricourt and necessitated the wearing of P.H. helmets, while a thick fog
rendered progress of the utmost difficulty, but gradually the batteries
pushed their way up past the ruins of Mametz and, topping the ridge,
moved down the slopes into the ill-famed and deadly Caterpillar Valley
which, in the next few days, was destined to be subjected to the most
ruthless of shell-storms. Here certain of the batteries in their
innocence halted and prepared for action, and Providence for once smiled
upon them. A few stray shells pitched over Mametz Wood, a few fell on
the road ahead, but Caterpillar Valley at that particular hour remained
untouched, and the batteries, after a short halt, continued unharmed.
Signs of battle were now to be found everywhere; the dead, friend and
foe alike, lay all around, broken and twisted guns and transport,
discarded equipment, rifles, bombs, all the disorder of battle were
strewn about, while the shell-pocked ground offered that dead and
forbidding appearance which is a characteristic only to be found in
ground recently fought over.
Through the now clearing mist the batteries advanced and, as in open
fighting, manœuvred in the manner so often taught in the plains around
Bulford. A, B and C/162 took up positions on the northern slopes of the
Caterpillar Wood-Montauban valley several hundred yards north of
Montauban, as previously reconnoitred, but D/162, by an unfortunate
misunderstanding, dropped into action just short of the crest of the
slope four hundred yards north of Caterpillar Wood and about a mile to
the left of the 18-pdrs., instead of falling in practically alongside
them. This alteration was very regrettable, for, although for tactical
purposes the range was the same in either position, D Battery and its
teams almost immediately came under heavy fire directed at the cavalry
in the valley between it and Caterpillar Wood, and lost its battery
commander, Major W. P. Bennett, who was killed by a shell within the
first few minutes. The 166th Brigade at the same time came into action
two hundred yards east of Mametz Wood, and by 8.30 A.M. both brigades
were heavily bombarding that portion of Switch Trench which ran west
from High Wood. Of the remaining brigades the 156th marched through
Fricourt during the morning in rear of the 19th Infantry Brigade (33rd
Division), halted in reserve and reconnoitred the whole position, while
the 167th Brigade moved to a position of assembly midway between
Caterpillar and Bazentin-le-Grand Woods, experiencing great difficulty
_en route_ in getting past our heavy batteries which, in many cases,
were in action off the side of the road and firing directly across it.
These two brigades came into action on the night of the 15th/16th, with
the exception of A/167 which was not in action till 7.0 P.M. on the
16th, and took up positions at 1.0 A.M., the 156th Brigade just north of
Bazentin-le-Grand village, the 167th Brigade close together in line half
a mile north of Caterpillar Wood. The wagon lines of all batteries lay
immediately west of Becordel. Thus, by dawn on the 15th, two brigades
were in action, while at dawn on the 16th the whole of the 33rd
Divisional Artillery was in the very midst of the Battle of the Somme,
and was bombarding the enemy to the utmost of its ability.
ORDER OF BATTLE.
JULY—AUGUST 1916.
H.Q.R.A.
C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain.
Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G. Major H. K. Capt. T. C.
Sadler, M.C. Usher.
156th Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, D.S.O.
Adjutant: Lieut. E. H. Prior.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Capt. Lutyens. Capt. R. D. Capt. G. Lomer. Capt. M. A.
Russell Studd.
(_wounded_).
Lieut. W. G.
Pringle
(_temporarily_).
Capt. Mansell.
162nd Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O.
Adjutant: Lieut. Hill.
Lieut. B. R. Heape.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Capt. F. C. Major R. G. M. Capt. A. van Major W. P.
Packham. Johnston Straubenzee. Bennett
(_killed_). (_killed_).
Capt. Hill. Capt. V. Capt. T. St. P.
Benett-Stanford. Bunbury.
166th Brigade.
Colonel A. H. S. Goff, C.M.G.
Lieut.-Colonel Murray.
Adjutant: Lieut. S. M. Wood.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Capt. H. A. Major T. E. Capt. H. Freeman. Capt. W. A. T.
Littlejohn. Durie. Barstow, M.C.
(_wounded_).
Capt. Maxwell.
167th Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff.
Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O.
Adjutant: Lieut. H. C. Cory.
Lieut. J. S. Campbell.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery.
Capt. S. Talbot. Major D. Stewart. Capt. G.
Fetherston.
It is now necessary, in order to understand what follows, to turn our
attention from the affairs of the batteries, and to endeavour to grasp
the tactical situation as it presented itself at 4.0 A.M. on July 15th
1916. At dawn on July 14th the great attack had been launched on the
German Second Line from Contalmaison on the left to Longueval on the
right. This line covered the important villages of Bazentin-le-Petit,
Bazentin-le-Grand and Longueval, while to the rear of it lay the
sinister woods of Bazentin, High Wood and Delville Wood. The actual
assault was carried out by the 23rd, 7th, 3rd and 9th Divisions, the
23rd being on the left opposite the northern end of Bazentin-le-Petit,
while the 9th Division on the right faced the village of Longueval. At
3.25 A.M. the great attack began, and the German Second Line on a front
of three miles was broken; the flanks remained firm, however, and before
the advance could be carried further it was considered essential that
the gap should be widened by an attack towards Pozières on the left, and
against Ginchy and Guillemont on the right. In addition to this, certain
local operations had to be carried out upon the front from
Bazentin-le-Petit to Longueval, which embraced the zone covered by the
33rd Divisional Artillery, and it is with these operations that we must
necessarily concern ourselves.
[Illustration:
Scale 1:20,000.
]
By nightfall on the 14th the whole of Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, village
and windmill, Bazentin-le-Grand and the southern portion of Longueval
were in our hands, our line running just to the north of these places;
but High Wood, although reached and captured by a gallant charge of
cavalry supported by infantry, proved too tough a nut to crack, and
remained in German hands together with the still uncaptured Delville
Wood and the northern end of Longueval Village which was under the fire
of enemy machine guns in High Wood. To clear these two woods and the
remainder of Longueval was essential, and therefore, on the morning of
July 15th, an advance was ordered by the 98th and 100th infantry
brigades of the 33rd Division upon that portion of Switch Trench which
ran westwards from High Wood, while a South African brigade was ordered
up from Montauban to capture Delville Wood and the northern part of
Longueval which still lay in German hands. With the latter attack, which
indeed culminated into a battle of assaults and counter-assaults spread
over several days, we cannot concern ourselves now. This history aims at
perpetuating the deeds solely of one unit, and, to preserve the sequence
of events, it is manifest that the operations upon that unit's immediate
front must receive the closest attention; for this purpose we shall turn
to the attack on Switch Trench launched on the morning of the 15th by
the 98th and 100th infantry brigades covered by the guns of, amongst
others, the 162nd and 166th Brigades of the 33rd Divisional Artillery,
the first big attack in which these brigades took part.
From 8.30 A.M. for one hour the guns of both brigades bombarded Switch
Trench where it ran west from High Wood, and at the end of the hour
lifted on to Martinpuich, while the infantry assaulted the objectives
which had just undergone this short but intense shelling. On the left
the 98th infantry brigade reached its objective, but the 100th brigade
was held up by machine-gun fire on the flanks and, after suffering some
casualties, returned to its original line; the 98th brigade, with its
right flank left thus in the air, had to follow suit, and by ten o'clock
in the morning the battle had died down, leaving the guns free, apart
from the usual day firing and registration, to get slightly more settled
in their new surroundings. It should be remembered that the batteries
had been marching, travelling by train and marching, day in day out,
since the early morning of the 9th, and now, plunged into a great
battle, it might have been hoped that at least a few hours' rest could
have been obtained. This was not to be, however; no sooner had the
batteries ceased co-operating in the infantry operation above referred
to than they set to digging rough shelter trenches for the men in case
of bombardment, digging pits for ammunition, camouflaging the guns as
far as possible, getting up from the wagon lines heavy dumps of
ammunition, and generally trying to get the battery positions into such
a condition as would enable the guns to inflict the maximum of damage
upon the enemy with the minimum of casualties to themselves. Open
warfare was still the order of the day, and at any moment orders might
be received for a further advance by the batteries, but on the other
hand those orders might never come, and all ranks had already seen
sufficient of the fierceness of the enemy's barrage to give them will to
urge their already tired limbs to further efforts at self-protection.
As events turned out, no further assaults were made by the infantry on
the zone covered by the 33rd Division batteries till the 20th; for five
days the batteries were able to register accurately every outstanding
feature and point of importance on their zones, while communications
were elaborated and perfected from the somewhat rough and ready open
warfare methods which had been set up when first the brigades came into
action. O.P.'s were established in the old German second line between
Longueval and Bazentin, from which points very clear observation upon
High Wood and the ground lying to right and left thereof could be
obtained, although the ground, consisting as it did of open undulating
downs, offered but few salient objects upon which to register; there
were, however, one or two points—the corner of High Wood, the orchards
north of Longueval and the mysterious iron gate standing on the sky line
between High Wood and Delville Wood—which enabled every battery
commander to divide his zone up into areas each containing at least one
fairly clear reference point, while to the left of High Wood an odd bush
or tree and an occasional view of Switch Trench served the same purpose.
It must not be supposed, however, that because there was no infantry
assault the guns had little to do. From the 15th until the night of the
19th/20th every battery kept Switch Trench under continual fire, cutting
wire, bombarding the trench itself and generally rendering that line of
defence as difficult and as uninhabitable as possible to the enemy. By
night Switch Trench and Martinpuich were kept under intermittent bursts
of fire, and it is safe to say that at no moment between the dates given
above were all four batteries of any one brigade silent. This was no
trench fighting position; the enemy had been got on the move, he must be
kept on the move, and to do this every battery was firing more
ammunition in twenty-four hours than had been normally fired by a whole
brigade in a week on its late front opposite to La Bassée. On the 17th
C/156 (Captain Lomer) was forced to withdraw to Flatiron Copse, 800
yards south of Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, as part of High Wood was still in
German hands, and the battery, being under direct observation, was not
only subject to a galling fire but was in serious danger of being rushed
by a counter-attack on the part of the enemy. B (Captain Russell) and D
(Captain Studd) batteries of the same brigade stuck it out until the
early morning of the 21st, and then, the operations of the 20th which we
shall shortly describe being over, withdrew to south of
Bazentin-le-Petit Wood and Flatiron Copse respectively. As A/156
(Captain Lutyens) had in the first place dropped into action at the
northern end of the valley running from Caterpillar Wood to Bazentin,
the result of this movement was that the whole of the 156th Brigade was
now behind, that is south of, Bazentin-le-Grand Wood, and no longer in
the exposed position north of the village which it had hitherto
occupied.
It has already been stated that, from the O.P.'s in the old German
second line, a very fair view of the ground to the right and left of
High Wood could be obtained; this was indeed a fact, but with such skill
had the Germans sited their main front line—the ill-omened Switch
Trench—that it was exceedingly difficult to observe the actual effect
upon it of the shelling to which it had been subjected, nor was the
condition of the wire visible even through powerful field-glasses.
Accordingly it was ordered that one officer per artillery brigade should
advance from the outpost line of our infantry and make such examination
of the German wire by daylight as was possible at close range. The
opposing infantry were still in a condition of open fighting—sentry
groups and outposts being the order of the day, with the main front line
some distance behind them; shortly before dawn on July 19th, therefore,
the officers in question crawled out from our sentry groups and, passing
in some cases right through the line of German outposts, made an
examination, as careful and thorough as the proximity of the enemy in
broad daylight would permit, of the condition of the Switch Trench wire.
The examination was not reassuring; in many cases the wire stood firm
and untouched, and it was realised that further and strenuous efforts by
the batteries would be essential that day if the coming attack was to
have any chance of success. It is a regrettable duty to relate that one
of the officers (Lieut. Elliott) who made this reconnaissance never
returned; having passed beyond a German sentry group he was severely
wounded, and, although his orderly dragged him into a shell-hole and
left him in such shelter as it offered while he went for help to bring
him back into our lines, his body was never again found. The whole of
the day was, indeed, a bad one for the 33rd Divisional Artillery.
Colonel A. H. S. Goff (166th Brigade) was wounded and evacuated; all the
batteries were heavily shelled, in particular the batteries of 162nd
Brigade which wilted beneath a storm of shrapnel during the entire day,
while the headquarters of the same brigade received a three-hour
bombardment of lachrymose gas shell, making the carrying on of the
administration extremely difficult. None of this, however, was allowed
to cause any interruption of the day's work, and by nightfall all
batteries of the Division had received orders for the following day's
assault upon High Wood, and had made the necessary preparations.
At 3.25 A.M. on Thursday, July 20th, the first infantry operation took
place in this zone since the attack on the morning of the 15th.
Following on a half-hour bombardment by the 33rd and 21st Divisional
Artilleries (XV. Corps) which began at 2.55 A.M., the 19th infantry
brigade advanced to the assault of High Wood. Two thousand rounds of
18-pdr. and 500 rounds of 4·5 in. howitzer ammunition per brigade were
fired in support of the infantry, the target of the batteries being High
Wood until "zero" hour (3.25 A.M.), when the batteries lifted to the
northern or enemy edge of the wood, bombarding it for half an hour until
3.55 A.M. and then making the final lift to the far side of the wood.
The assault was successful, the wood was carried, but during the whole
day the infantry were subjected to the most intense and galling
artillery fire by the enemy guns, light and heavy. All day long our
batteries searched the roads and approaches from Flers, and the hollows
north of the wood—anywhere whence an enemy counter-attack might
develop—and, with the exception of one which was launched at 12.30 P.M.
and beaten back by artillery and infantry combined, this fire was
successful in keeping the enemy at bay.
The hostile artillery fire, however, was terrible; not one inch of the
wood but was torn and swept by high explosive shell, rent by shrapnel
and rendered completely uninhabitable to any human being. At 6 P.M. the
effect of this shell-storm came to a head, and for half an hour our
batteries put down a heavy barrage along the northern edge of the wood,
under cover of which the infantry retired to the southern half; it was
no hostile counter-attack which thus drove them back—it was the sheer
weight and force of the thousands of shells which, from all around, the
enemy poured into the wood, and which smashed and shattered the
unfortunate troops who were trying to hold what they had so gallantly
won. At first the report came through that the whole of the wood had
been evacuated and that the infantry were back in their original line in
front of Bazentin, but this was proved to be erroneous, and the southern
half of High Wood at any rate was retained in our grasp. At 9.30 P.M.
the enemy opened a vicious gas shell barrage on the ridge in front of
D/162 and on the batteries of the 167th Brigade, and at 11 P.M. followed
this up by a counter-attack on the scene of the morning's fight. After
three hours' firing the situation became quieter, and in the morning the
position on the whole had not changed since dusk the previous evening.
For the next two days there ensued another period of comparative
inactivity as far as infantry assaults were concerned. Both sides
paused, as it were, to draw breath, but not for one moment did this
cause a lull in artillery activity. The enemy, as well as our own Higher
Command, was beginning to realise more and more the immense importance
of counter-battery work, and these intervals between the attacks were,
from the gunners' point of view, almost more to be feared than the
attacks themselves. Morning, noon and night first one battery and then
another would be subjected to a sudden burst of intense fire, while at
other times a ponderous and deliberate bombardment of a fixed area in
which a number of batteries were in position would be carried out—a
system which had the most harassing effect upon the men, and to the
success of which an ever-lengthening casualty list of guns and gunners
bore eloquent testimony. July 21st was a typical day of this sort;
starting at 10 A.M., a prolonged and widespread enemy bombardment was
carried out during the whole day with 4·2 in. and 5·9 in. upon the
valley running from Longueval to Montauban, and its adjacent slopes. The
18-pdr. batteries of the 162nd Brigade, together with the headquarters
of the brigade itself, came heavily under fire, and a long casualty list
was only averted by the use of the shelter trenches which by this time
had been dug in all the battery positions. While this was in progress
the 167th Brigade, farther to the left, was also undergoing a severe
bombardment by 5·9 in. howitzers. Direct hits were obtained upon B/167
(Major Stewart), and in all the batteries, including D/162 which lay
just behind the 167th Brigade, a number of casualties were sustained.
Murderous fire was, at the same time, opened upon Caterpillar Valley,
from the fork between Mametz and Caterpillar Woods down the entire
length of the valley nearly to Mametz village itself, and at times
during the day it was almost impossible to see a single battery position
from which the smoke, flame and dust of bursting shells were not flying.
Nothing could be done; it was a case of "wait and see"—the hardest test
to which troops can be put—and to the eternal credit of the men it may
be said that they waited on this, as on all other similar occasions,
with quiet philosophy and with a stoicism which it would be hard to
equal.
Meanwhile, what of our friends the infantry? On the morning of the 21st
the hard-pressed 33rd Division was withdrawn from the line and was
succeeded by the infantry of the 51st Division (153rd, 154th, and 155th
infantry brigades). At the same time the zones of the 33rd Divisional
batteries side-slipped to the right and, coming under the 51st
Divisional Artillery for tactical purposes, covered the line to the
right (_i.e._ east) of High Wood. Day firing was carried out upon Switch
Trench, the new zones were registered and night firing, consisting of
500 18-pdr. and 75 4·5 in. howitzer rounds per brigade, was directed
upon the hollows in rear of and approaches to the divisional zone. At
10.15 P.M. Caterpillar Wood and the neighbouring localities were heavily
bombarded by gas shell and high explosive, and all communications of the
167th Brigade were cut; lamp signalling was immediately taken up,
however, and proved itself entirely reliable as a means of
communication, despite the gun flashes all around and in the sky.
The morning of July 22nd was devoted to further registration and short
bombardments. From 3.0 A.M. until 3.30 a general bombardment of Switch
Trench was ordered at the rate of 2 rounds per minute from the 18-pdrs.
and one round per minute from the howitzers, totalling upwards of three
thousand rounds fired by the fifteen batteries. At the end of the
bombardment the 162nd Brigade stood by to carry out a registration by
aeroplane, but no machine ever appeared and soon afterwards normal
firing for the day was continued, D/162 shortly after one o'clock
carrying out a destructive shoot on some machine guns and dug-outs to
the west of High Wood which were, by their enfilade fire, holding up the
whole situation and preventing an advance in the neighbourhood. Their
destruction was essential, for an advance had been ordered for the
following day, and at 7 P.M. in the evening the whole of the front burst
into flame in preliminary bombardment for the assault. At the rate of 80
rounds per battery per hour the guns of the XIII., XV. and III. Corps
bombarded the positions which troops of the 5th (on the right), 51st and
19th (on the left) divisions were to attack next day, the objective of
the 51st division, which was covered by the guns of the 33rd Divisional
Artillery, being the N.E. and N.W. edges of High Wood, together with a
portion of Switch Trench running E. and W. therefrom.
"Zero" was 1.30 A.M. on July 23rd, and seven minutes previous to that
hour the fire of the batteries was increased to intense rate. At
half-past one to the second the infantry went over the top, and the
batteries searched back by short lifts to a line 200 yards beyond the
objective. For half an hour was this searching fire continued, and at
two o'clock the batteries slowed down and set up a protective barrage
200 yards beyond the late German trench, under cover of which it was
hoped the infantry would be able to consolidate their position. Such,
however, was not the case. Although in places the attacking troops had
gained their objectives, at many points our men had been held up by
machine gun fire and, by their failure to advance, had compelled their
more successful comrades to retire to their starting place. All along
the line the assault failed, and when at 5 A.M. the enemy
counter-attacked fiercely the guns shortened their range and bombarded
Switch Trench once more. By 8.30 A.M. all was quiet again, the attack
was over—and our infantry were back holding the same line from which
they had advanced earlier in the morning.
From July 23rd-27th there ensued another of those lulls which have
already been described; for the moment our advance was checked and held
up while the Higher Command appeared to be seeking a solution to the
very determined and successful opposition which the enemy showed to our
troops in this sector, and during the interval which elapsed the usual
harassing was carried out night and day by the now rapidly wearying
batteries. Two thousand rounds by day and 700 by night were poured on to
the German defences by each brigade, and in return the German batteries
gave no peace to our guns, daily subjecting the area in which the
batteries were located to a vicious and effective bombardment. Mametz
and Caterpillar Woods, the valleys running from Caterpillar Wood to
Bazentin on the one hand and Montauban on the other were daily ploughed
from end to end by shells varying in calibre from 77 mm. to 12 in.,
while the valley running from Longueval to Montauban, together with the
ridge to the west thereof, became a veritable death trap. It was of no
use seeking to move the battery positions; one place was as bad as
another, and there was nothing to do but to sit tight and trust that,
before our batteries were completely wiped out, a further advance might
check the ever-increasing storm of German shells.
There was another, and a very serious, difficulty to be faced at this
time also; owing to the enormous strain placed upon the guns by the
incessant day and night firing, the running-out springs began to give
way and to fail, and great difficulty was found in obtaining new ones.
Previous to the war almost all these springs had come from Germany, and,
with this source of supply cut off, British manufacturers at home had
found it impossible as yet so to organise their output as to meet the
ever-increasing and insistent demands from the various theatres of war.
As an instance of the seriousness of this trouble it may be mentioned
that on July 26th only five guns of the 162nd Brigade were in action,
the remainder having no serviceable springs left, whilst of these five
two had to be pushed up by hand after the firing of each round. Such a
state of affairs, which cut down the volume of fire of the brigade by
over one half, was bound to reflect seriously upon the preliminary
bombardments and barrages in any attack, nor was the trouble confined to
the 162nd Brigade alone.
On July 24th the 33rd Divisional Artillery ceased to work in contact
with the infantry, and was put under direct orders of the XV. Corps to
carry out counter-battery work on the whole Corps front, searching
hostile battery positions, hollows and approaches, and in addition
answering any S.O.S. call when required upon all portions of the Corps
front. Such duties naturally incurred still more firing and work; two
batteries (A and B) of the 162nd Brigade were unable to get sufficient
right switch to cover the now wider front, and were forced to move
further up the slope, new O.P.'s in front of Longueval had to be
reconnoitred and linked up with the batteries by telephone, while the
new zone which stretched from the south of Martinpuich to Delville Wood
had to be registered before dusk. Hardly had this been done than, at
8.30 P.M., a report was received that the enemy were leaving their
trenches between High Wood and Delville Wood, and the batteries
immediately opened a rapid rate of fire to break up the expected
counter-attack which, surely enough, was launched at 8.45 P.M. under a
very heavy barrage. Both sides bombarded with the utmost fury, and
ultimately the counter-attack melted under our fire, but not till
midnight were the tired batteries able to report "all quiet," and even
then night firing was carried on in the usual way. The 51st Divisional
Artillery was at this time responsible for the direct support of the
infantry, and it was by way of co-operation that this bombardment of the
hostile trenches was carried out.
It has been previously stated that from the 23rd to the 27th a lull
occurred in the infantry operations. This, broadly speaking, is a fact,
but it must not be supposed that during that time our front line troops
were entirely inactive. Bit by bit each day they had been bombing their
way through Longueval, sometimes without artillery support, sometimes
assisted by the guns, as on the 26th when for one hour from dawn the
guns poured shells into the northern end of the village. It was slow
work, this gradual penetration, but by the evening of the 26th a very
appreciable advance had been made, and, when orders were received at 4
P.M. that a general assault on Delville Wood and the orchards north of
Longueval would take place next day (27th), our troops were in a far
more favourable position for "taking off" than they had been a week
earlier.
The assault was delivered at 7.10 A.M. on the morning of Thursday, the
27th, and was preceded by an artillery bombardment beginning at 5.30
A.M. For this bombardment 1,500 18-pdr. and 400 4·5 in. howitzer rounds
were fired by each brigade, and were directed mainly upon the trenches
to be assaulted and the back areas thereof. To the 5th Division was
entrusted the capture of the objectives on the front directly under the
guns of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, and the line of this ran from the
north-west edge of Delville Wood through the enclosures 150 yards north
of Longueval village, along the sunken road running west from these
enclosures to the High Wood-Longueval road. The chief interest of the
attack, however, lay in the fact that the creeping barrage, as already
practised in the opening days of the Somme battle, was now being more
and more carefully elaborated. It had not yet reached that high stage of
perfection which, in the offensives of Arras and Passchendaele in 1917,
enabled the gunners to provide what was almost an ever-moving curtain of
fire advancing yard by yard in front of the infantry, but it did even
now remain upon one point until the very last moment and then lift off,
but scarcely creep, to the next point to be attacked while the infantry
stormed the first.
All day long fierce fighting continued but, although on the right of the
line the 2nd Division gained their objectives, on the left the men of
the 5th Division were held up at points. The climax of the day was
reached at six o'clock in the evening, when a heavy counter-attack was
launched all along the line by the enemy, but this counter-attack, in
common with a similar one launched at 10.30 P.M. on the following night
(28th), broke up under the fire of our guns. During this attack green
flares were lighted all along the front by our foremost infantry at
specified times, and although it was difficult to persuade them to do
this, inasmuch as they considered that the flares would be equally
useful to the enemy as well as to our guns in showing up their position,
the information thus obtained of the progress of the assault was of very
great value.
During the 28th and 29th the batteries busied themselves in preparing
for future operations. Casualties in men and guns had been severe
throughout the fighting, vast quantities of ammunition had been
expended, and all this had now to be replaced. On the morning of the
27th a 5·9 in. shell had exploded directly in the pit where the men of
B/162 (Major Johnston) were getting their breakfasts, killing and
wounding every man in the pit, while on the afternoon of the 29th D/162
(Captain Bunbury) was heavily shelled and lost one and a half
detachments who were practically blown to pieces. A 5·9 in. shell burst
right upon a pile of ammunition beside one of its guns and exploded a
number of rounds; in addition to the wiping out of the detachments, the
gun itself was completely destroyed by the explosion, and only the piece
and a portion of the spade were ever found afterwards. It is curious to
note that the force of the explosion, which made a huge crater in the
ground, threw a complete wagon of ammunition so high into the air that
it came down some 150 yards from the battery, yet not a single round in
the wagon exploded. As, in addition to this, all the guns of C/167
(Captain Fetherston) were out of action and the other batteries had
suffered the usual daily casualties which now had become inevitable, it
will be seen that the Divisional Artillery was in a fairly serious
plight. However, the work had to be carried on, and on the afternoon of
the 29th the batteries set themselves to the now familiar task of
bombarding Switch Trench with 45 rounds per gun, in preparation for
another attack which was due to take place on the morrow.
The bombardment proper for this attack began at 4.45 P.M. on the 30th,
but previous to this there had been the short burst already referred to
and another similar effort in the early morning from 3.15 to 5.15. At
the same time our heavy artillery carried out a series of
destructive—or, at least, would-be destructive—shoots on the enemy
batteries; this was a most essential procedure, for the work of the
batteries had been greatly impeded all the morning by an intense hostile
gas shelling of the positions while, during the whole of the afternoon,
the batteries on the ridge north of Caterpillar Wood were raked from end
to end by high explosive. At last, however, the final bombardment
opened, and from 4.45 P.M. till 6.10 P.M. the German defences between
High Wood and Delville Wood were subjected to 800 rounds per 18-pdr.
battery and 400 rounds per 4·5 in. howitzer battery all along the front.
Seven minutes before zero, which was at 6.10 P.M., fire was quickened to
intense rate, and at zero hour troops of the XIII. and XV. Corps
advanced to the attack, having for their objectives the sunken road
running from the N.W. face of Delville Wood to the east corner of High
Wood. The XIII. Corps, who were on the right, reached their objectives
successfully, but the XV. Corps, advancing on the left of the XIII.,
were not so fortunate; enfilade machine gun fire from strong points near
the orchards north of Longueval held them up, while their left, although
successful in reaching the sunken road near the corner of High Wood, was
subjected to such a perfect hell of high explosive that it was shelled
out and forced to retire. Thus at 8 P.M., when firing was reduced to
normal, the situation was but little different to what it had been
before the attack.
The attack of the 30th was very typical of the tactics in practice at
this time in the Somme battle. The same thing had been seen in the
previous assaults of the 20th and 23rd, and the same thing was to be
seen in subsequent operations; small attacks on limited areas—perhaps
only on a two division front—were launched and, nine times out of ten,
were doomed to failure by their narrow scope. There is no doubt that
individual strong points were holding up the general advance and had to
be overwhelmed before any more ambitious plans were undertaken, but
there is also no doubt that, when these unfortunate battalions went over
the parapet upon some purely local undertaking, they were immediately
subjected to machine gun fire in enfilade from the flanks, where no
attack was taking place, and to overwhelming shell fire from batteries
on neighbouring zones, which, owing to the undisturbed state of their
own zone, were able to add to the already heavy volume of fire on the
front attacked. It may be that the Higher Command was right in its
handling of the situation, but for the men on the spot it was
heart-breaking to see battalions of the finest material launched to
certain death on an attack which, by the narrowness of its front, was
doomed to failure before it ever began.
July 30th and 31st contained nothing more of importance than three
S.O.S. calls from Delville Wood, and on Tuesday, August 1st, at 5.30
A.M. orders were received with dramatic suddenness for the 162nd and
166th Brigades to be relieved by the 78th and 79th Brigades of the 17th
Divisional Artillery. In a fever-heat of expectation the batteries of
the two brigades waited all day long for the orders to take effect; at
last, between four and seven o'clock in the afternoon, the incoming
units arrived, and with heartfelt thanks the batteries, taking their
guns with them, marched back to the wagon lines. It was unfortunate that
D/78 should have chosen the moment to relieve D/162 when four low-flying
German aeroplanes were right overhead, but choose it they did, and the
price had to be paid. The incoming battery was a little ahead of its
time, and, as a result, when the teams and limbers of D/162 appeared on
the scene the shell storm for which the aeroplanes had called was just
beginning. Whizz bangs, 4·2 in. and 5·9 in. shell poured down upon the
battery position and horses for over half an hour, and how the battery
escaped with such light casualties as it did, was a marvel. One gun and
one ammunition dump were destroyed, several drivers and horses were hit,
but in no way was the relief disorganised, and D/162, after manœuvring
under a hail of shells, ultimately withdrew towards the Montauban flank.
For the rest of the evening Caterpillar Valley all around and south-west
of Mametz Wood was deluged with shells, and the batteries who chose that
route for their outgoing march had an extremely unpleasant time. All got
away in the end, however, and after a short halt at the wagon lines
continued the march. Dernancourt, which was the destination of the
batteries, was reached at 2.30 A.M., and here they remained till the
11th resting, refitting and generally cleaning up after the ordeal of
the past eighteen days.
Only two brigades were now left in the line—the 156th and the 167th—and,
as Headquarters staff of the 33rd Divisional Artillery had gone into
rest at Dernancourt, these two were put under the command of the 51st
Division. The zone covered by the 156th Brigade extended along the High
Wood—Bazentin-le-Petit road southwards from the north-west corner of the
wood, while the 167th Brigade looked after the road running south-east
from the eastern edge of High Wood; D/156 (Captain Studd) carried out
counter-battery duties. From August 1st to August 11th little of
importance in the way of operations occurred. Hostile attacks on
Bazentin-le-Petit on the 2nd and against High Wood on the 10th were
repulsed by our fire, while on the 4th and the 7th minor infantry
engagements were carried out by our troops on the orchards and houses
along the north-west edge of Delville Wood and on High Wood
respectively.
Very heavy firing took place throughout this period, and during the week
ending August 17th the 156th Brigade fired no less than twelve thousand
rounds, while the German artillery must have flung something like the
same amount into our positions. B/167 (Major Stewart) was shelled out
and had to move on the 3rd to a position six hundred yards east of
Caterpillar Wood, where it was joined next day by Captain Fetherston's
battery (C/167) which had also undergone a severe gruelling at the hands
of the enemy. A/167 (Captain Talbot) proved no less unfortunate than the
other two batteries, and on the 5th, after a very heavy shelling which
lasted all day, it was compelled to move to a position alongside "B" and
"C," where it went to form two six-gun batteries instead of three
consisting of four guns each. At the same time the brigade was
temporarily handed over to the command of Major Stewart, for
Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff had on the previous day been evacuated sick to
England. Thus the two brigades remained shelling and being shelled, day
in day out, until August 11th, when the other two brigades (162nd and
166th) came up into the line from the Dernancourt rest area and relieved
them. The 156th and 167th had been in action continuously since July
16th under the most trying and harassing of conditions. They had been
subjected to shelling more severe than any yet experienced in the war,
and, when they marched out to rest on the evening of the 11th, they were
utterly exhausted, utterly worn out, a party of very tired and weary
men.
On returning to the line on the 11th the batteries of the 162nd Brigade
did not reoccupy their old positions but, after reconnaissance by
Lieut.-Colonel Harris, formed two six-gun 18-pdr. batteries under the
command of Major Johnston and Captain van Straubenzee, and took up
positions on the southern slopes bordering Caterpillar Valley, at a
point about three hundred yards N.N.W. of Montauban. At the same time
D/162, which from the 8th onwards had been sending parties up from
Dernancourt to dig gun-pits and prepare the place for occupation, came
into action under the northern bank of Caterpillar Valley about five
hundred yards to the right front of the other two batteries, which was
the position it had originally been intended to occupy on July 15th. The
166th Brigade took up positions 500 yards north of Caterpillar Wood.
While these two brigades had been out at rest a change had taken place
amongst the infantry, and the guns now covered the 33rd Division
(forming part of the XV. Corps), with the 14th Division on the right and
the 1st Division on the left, the tactical command of the batteries
being in the hands of the 14th Divisional Artillery. From the 11th until
the 18th the lull in infantry fighting, which had been noticeable in
this sector since the beginning of the month, continued, but the work of
the guns was as usual very heavy. In addition to counter-battery work
and minor bombardments, four hundred and fifteen 18-pdr. rounds by day
and five hundred by night had to be expended by each brigade on
searching and sweeping roads and hollows behind the brigade zone, while
the 4·5 in. howitzers carried out the same work to the extent of two
hundred and thirty-three rounds by day and one hundred and sixty-six by
night. The zone in question was the extreme right of the 33rd Divisional
front, along the enemy front line known as Wood Lane. Fortunately for
the batteries, hostile shelling upon the gun positions was far less
violent than had been the case before the two brigades went into rest,
and it was now possible to get through a very fair amount of
registration without interference from enemy shell fire; this was
important, for the guns had to be ranged upon a number of new points
owing to the change in position, while a wireless set which had been
installed at Brigade Headquarters enabled numerous "N.F." calls to be
picked up from our aeroplanes, all of which were acted upon by the
howitzer batteries of the respective brigades.
On the 16th orders were received for an attack to be delivered on
Friday, the 18th, and in preparation for this the ammunition allotted
for night firing was doubled on the nights of the 16th and 17th, while
by day the guns bombarded Wood Lane, cutting the wire and shelling not
only the trench but also No Man's Land in front thereof, lest the German
machine-gunners should creep out forward and thereby escape our barrage.
At 2.45 P.M. on the 18th the attack was launched by the 33rd Division,
with the 14th Division on its right. In addition to the preceding
two-days shelling, the whole of the morning of the attack, with two
short forty-minute intervals, was devoted to barrage firing on the enemy
trenches, the barrage of 18-pdrs. lifting at three given times to
suggest an impending assault, whereupon the 4·5 in. howitzers, a few
minutes after the "lift," dropped back on to Wood Lane (the enemy front
line) to catch such of the enemy as had manned the parapet to withstand
an attack. Immediately prior to zero hour there was no bombardment; it
was hoped to start the attack simultaneously along the whole front, and
the best means of achieving this was considered to be an opening of the
barrage at zero itself, without any bombardment during the preceding
five minutes.
The order of battle in this attack showed the XIII. Corps on the right,
the III. Corps on the left and the XV. Corps in the centre. The two
flank Corps successfully gained their objectives, as did also the right
of the XV. Corps, but the 33rd Division was held up partly by flank
machine-gun fire and partly by hostile machine guns which had, after
all, succeeded in pushing forward into shell holes in No Man's Land, and
had thus avoided our barrage. The objective of the 33rd had been Wood
Lane Trench, from about 150 yards north-west of its junction with
Orchard Trench to the cross-roads just outside the western corner of
High Wood; at 3.15 P.M., when the failure of the infantry to gain the
objectives was realised, the batteries of the 162nd and 166th brigades
dropped their range from the protective barrage they had established
four hundred yards beyond Wood Lane Trench, and put down a heavy barrage
along a line two hundred yards north-east of the trench. This was
maintained throughout the afternoon until, the position on the right
being somewhat obscure, the batteries were requested by the 14th
Division to lengthen their range by one hundred yards. A situation
report was received shortly afterwards, however, which entirely
justified the original shortening of the range, and this was resumed
till half-past seven in the evening when normal night firing was begun.
Once again the attack had been beaten off by the deadly and ubiquitous
machine guns, and once again our infantry looked at the grim and
forbidding Wood Lane Trench across a No Man's Land thick with dead and
wounded.
On the 19th the zones of the batteries side-slipped two hundred yards to
the right, and for two days registration, in addition to the usual
harassing fire, was carried out on the new zones. Teams were at work day
and night to replenish ammunition which the past few days had seen so
lavishly expended, and, thus reinforced, a further effort was made on
the 21st to advance our line in the neighbourhood of Wood Lane and Tea
Trench (running N.E. from Wood Lane), while the 14th Division advanced
to the capture of the last line of enemy defences in Delville Wood.
Once again we were defeated; after a short preliminary bombardment Wood
Lane was assaulted at 3.30 P.M., while at 1.30 A.M. on the following
morning (22nd) the attack on Tea Trench was carried out, but in neither
case were we able to advance. The enemy front line was stiff with men
and machine guns, and our troops were swept away by a blast of fire
before they were even able to get to grips with the enemy. Thus ended a
tragic series of short attacks on portions of the enemy trenches,
attacks which failed in their objects, which wore out our
troops—infantry and gunners alike—and which cost us many thousands of
lives that we could ill spare.
On the afternoon of August 22nd signs and portents were not lacking of a
new and great effort all along the line to continue the advance which
latterly had been so severely held up. The previous day Lieut.-Colonel
Harris (162nd Brigade) had been ordered to reconnoitre a position for a
forward gun which should be able, at a range of not more than 2,000
yards, to enfilade the new German trench running north-east from Wood
Lane, and such a position had, after taking bearings from various
O.P.'s, been chosen. Now, at 4 P.M. on the 22nd, the gun was ordered
into action, and was accordingly brought into position in a shell-hole
on the southern edge of the road which ran east and west due north of
Bazentin-le-Grand. Three hundred rounds were dumped alongside it, the
whole was placed under command of Lieutenant V. Benett-Stanford (C/162),
and a most satisfactory registration was obtained with seventy rounds
burst immediately over and into the enemy trench in true enfilade at a
range of 1,600 yards. Following on this, on the morning of the 23rd, the
156th Brigade came out of rest and went into action about half a mile
south-west of Montauban, as a group under Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd;
to this group was added A/167 which took up a position in the same area,
and later B/167 which, on the 25th, joined the 156th Brigade group in a
position near A/167. The 167th Brigade, now under the command of
Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart, did not come into action as a unit, but
kept its remaining battery out at rest to replace casualties as they
might occur.
On the 23rd the orders for the attack were received. This time it was to
be the biggest operation since July 14th, the order of battle showing
the French to attack on the right from the Somme itself to Maurepas, the
XIV. Corps from south of Guillemont to the western edge of Ginchy
Village, the XV. Corps from a point in the Longueval-Flers road north of
Delville Wood to the western edge of High Wood, and the III. Corps from
that point westwards to the extreme left of the attack.
On the immediate front of the batteries (of which the 156th group was
attached to the 7th Division, the 162nd and 166th to the 14th Division),
the right infantry brigade (100th) of the 33rd Division was to establish
itself in Wood Lane, while the 14th Division was to advance the right of
its line so as to connect up with the left of the XIV. Corps, to clear
the remainder of Delville Wood, to establish a line outside the wood
from the position already held by the Division in Beer Trench to the
Longueval-Flers road, and there to connect up with the right of the 33rd
Division. The bombardment began at 3.45 P.M. on Thursday, the 24th, and,
so far as the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery were concerned,
consisted in shelling New Trench (behind Wood Lane) and the ground in
rear thereof, Tea Trench, Tea Lane and Tea Support (west of the
Longueval-Flers road), but chiefly Tea Trench, while the advanced
enfilade gun of the 162nd Brigade was ordered to sweep New Trench in
enfilade from 5.45 P.M. until the moment of attack. The average rate of
fire was one round per gun per minute, but towards the close of the
bombardment the rate gradually quickened up until, at zero, the rate of
fire became intense.
Zero hour was at 6.45 P.M. on the 24th, and, two minutes after the
infantry had gone over the top, a general lift was started by the guns.
The howitzers lengthened their range straight away and bombarded the
Flers-Longueval road, while the 18-pdr. barrage gradually crept forward
by 25 yards at a time, until it finally came to rest along a line about
200 yards north-east of the infantry objective. At a quarter-past six
the rate of fire dropped to the original one round per gun per minute,
while at half-past ten the close barrage was terminated and intermittent
searching and sweeping of the enemy zone was adopted in its stead.
Meanwhile, how had the day gone with the infantry? On the extreme right
the French had won a great victory and had swept all before them; the
XV. Corps had gained all its objectives save the extreme eastern corner
of Delville Wood and a small portion of Beer Trench, while on our own
immediate zone the infantry had at last swept over the objectives they
had for so long striven to capture; the enfilade gun in particular did
tremendous damage, the infantry reporting numbers of the enemy found
dead in New Trench and thereby testifying to the great effects which may
be expected of field guns firing in true enfilade. All night long till
7.30 A.M. on the 25th the batteries stood by to answer S.O.S. calls, and
kept a slow rate of fire on their zones whilst the infantry consolidated
the position, but no counter-attack materialised, and in the morning we
still held firmly the ground we had captured the previous day. Great
praise accrued to infantry and gunners for the success of these
operations; in particular the G.O.C. R.A. 14th Division sent personal
congratulations to Lieut.-Colonel Harris (162nd Brigade) who, from his
observation station near Longueval whence all the battle could clearly
be viewed, sent back situation reports which reached the General Officer
commanding the 33rd Division before reports came in from any other
source, thereby enabling him to deal quickly with every new point as it
arose. There was only one disappointing feature in the whole of the
attack, and that was the enormous number of "dud" shells fired by our
heavy artillery. Not more than 40 per cent. of their shells burst
properly, whilst the German heavies obtained at least 95 per cent.
detonations which caused the most appalling destruction wherever they
occurred. It was a sidelight—but an important one—of the battle, nor,
for many months, did this serious state of affairs right itself.
Hitherto the enemy had not shown many signs of retaliation for the
operations of the past few days, but at 8 o'clock on the morning of
Friday, the 25th, the storm broke. Every battery position was heavily
bombarded throughout the day with shells of every calibre up to 8 in.,
and this at a time when it was essential that ammunition wagons should
be able to reach the guns to refill their depleted stocks. All day long
the storm raged so severely that in certain cases the detachments had to
be withdrawn from the guns. Major Johnston of B/162 was killed whilst
sending his men into cover—a loss which the brigade ill could suffer—and
many of the detachments were killed and wounded; so violent, indeed, was
the shell fire that the 18-pdr. battery positions of the 162nd Brigade,
churned up from end to end, were rendered quite uninhabitable, and
during that night and the following day new positions were taken up
about 500 yards further to the north-east.
While this was going on, the batteries of the 156th Brigade group were
also changing positions, but this time for tactical purposes. In order
to be able to bombard Ginchy, new positions 1,500 yards south-east of
Longueval and along the sunken road running from that village to
Bernafay Wood had been reconnoitred, and were now taken up, while the
zones of the other brigades at the same time side-slipped 800 yards to
the right and covered the ground immediately north-east of Delville
Wood. Fearful weather, moreover, broke over the whole battlefield. Rain
and wind in endless storms turned the countryside into a vast sea of
mud, and, catching the batteries of the 156th and 162nd Brigades in
their new and only partially prepared positions, caused them not merely
extreme discomfort but real difficulty in being able to fight their guns
at all. No roads led to the batteries, but merely dry weather tracks
across roughly beaten-down shell holes and trenches, and for a time it
seemed as though they must be cut off from all sources of ammunition
supply. Nevertheless, during the 27th and 28th the wagons of the
batteries, aided by our own D.A.C. and the Column of the 7th Division,
struggled through the mud with load after load, gunners and passing
infantry helping the teams to reach the positions, and by the evening of
the 27th not only had all the batteries refilled their normal gun-line
dumps, but the 156th Brigade had gone even further and had brought up
6,000 rounds per battery in conformation with an order they had only
received 24 hours previously! It had been intended on the 29th to resume
the offensive with the French and Fourth Armies, and indeed the 156th
Brigade group did actually carry out a seven-hour bombardment of Ginchy
before the order to stop reached them; the weather was too bad, no
infantry could have attacked with any hope of success, and accordingly
the operations were postponed until finer weather should supervene.
This lull was very welcome, for it gave the batteries an opportunity of
digging in and of draining their positions so as to render them slightly
more habitable. The infantry of the 14th Division had, on the 26th and
27th, bombed their way with only minor artillery support right through
the remaining corner of Delville Wood, and now held the entire wood
together with a portion of Beer Trench which hitherto had successfully
resisted capture. The position therefore seemed entirely favourable for
a renewal of the attack if only the weather would clear, but this it
showed no signs of doing.
As a matter of fact, the first renewal of hostilities came from the
German side. On the 30th the 33rd Division infantry had been relieved by
the 24th Division, and hardly had the latter settled into their trenches
when, at 1 P.M. on the 31st, the Germans launched a big attack along the
whole line from High Wood to east and south-east of Delville Wood. A
heavy barrage was immediately opened upon them, while Captain van
Straubenzee and Lieut. Body, who were at the O.P. at the time, got all
the guns of the 162nd Brigade to bear with tremendous effect upon a
large force of the enemy in Cocoa Lane, and the infantry on the front of
the 33rd Divisional batteries held their ground. For a long time the
situation was obscure and, indeed, extremely anxious; the final report,
however, showed that the part of Tea Trench lying west of the Flers Road
and a portion of Wood Lane had been evacuated by our infantry, but that
elsewhere no serious encroachment had occurred on our front, although
serious reports were heard of the state of affairs to the east of
Delville Wood.
So ended the month of August, and with September there came an
improvement in the weather, and a consequent promise of further
operations. On the afternoon of the 1st the expected orders were
received; once again the French and the Fourth Army were to attack, once
again was an attempt to be made to beat down the stubborn German
resistance. The bombardment was due to begin on the 2nd, but before this
could be done a slight rearrangement of the batteries had to be carried
out. On the night of August 31st, from 11 P.M. till 4 P.M. on the
morning of the 1st, thousands of lethal and lachrymose shells had been
poured down upon the batteries of the 156th Brigade group, and
especially upon A and B/167. Casualties from gas poisoning were
fortunately slight owing to the immunity offered by P.H. helmets, but
B/167 proved an exception and suffered so many casualties, including its
battery commander, that it had to be withdrawn immediately from the
line, its place being taken by C/167 which, it will be remembered, was
still out at rest. At the same time Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart took
over the command of the 166th Brigade in place of Lieut.-Colonel Murray,
who was evacuated also suffering from gas poisoning.
The bombardment for this new attack began at 8 A.M. on the 2nd,
operation orders showing that it was to be on a great scale, extending
along the whole of the Fourth Army front from Thiepval on the left to
Guillemont on the right, and from there being carried on by the French
to as far south as the Somme. The Fourth Army attack was to be carried
out by the XIV. Corps (on the right), the XV. (centre) and the III.
Corps (on the left), the objectives of the XIV. Corps being Falfemont
Farm and Guillemont, and from there to advance and establish a line
along the Wedge Wood-Ginchy road to as far north as the right of the XV.
Corps. The XV. Corps aimed at capturing Ginchy and its surrounding
trenches, also Vat Alley, Pint Trench to its junction with Ale Alley,
and Ale Alley itself. Further to the left the 24th Division were ordered
to capture Beer Trench from its junction with Ale Alley, or such
portions as had not been previously captured, to retake the portion of
Wood Lane which they had lost during the previous two days and to link
up with the 1st Division on their left, the objective of which was the
north-east half of Wood Lane and the German intermediate line both to
High Wood and to a point 200 yards west thereof. The 162nd and 166th
Brigades were supporting the 24th Division, while the 156th Brigade
group bombarded Ginchy.
All the day and night of the 2nd and during the morning of the 3rd the
guns bombarded their allotted targets—the enemy front and support line
and the hollows in which his reserves might congregate. Very special
injunctions had been issued by the Commander-in-Chief for every possible
step to be taken which would lead to success, and all ranks were to be
fully impressed with the necessity of knowing what was expected of them.
In addition, every care was to be taken to nurse guns and howitzers
during the bombardment, so that as many as possible might be in action
when the infantry assault took place.
Zero hour was noon on Sunday, September 3rd, and it is most satisfactory
to note that, as the infantry went over the top, every gun and howitzer
in the brigades was in action, firing at intense rate and none the
worse, owing to careful attention, for the heavy work of the previous
days. Lieut.-Colonel Harris observed and reported upon the battle during
the entire day from his observation station in an old German trench west
of Delville Wood, and from his position informed Divisional Headquarters
of the somewhat sensational events of the day, sensational in victory
upon most parts, in unexpected reverses around High Wood.
At first the attack swept forward unchecked; at 12.15 P.M. Cameron
Highlanders of the 1st Division were seen to advance into Wood Lane
almost without opposition; parties proceeded round the east corner and
along the north-east face of the trench[1] and reached, towards the
east, a point fifty yards beyond the enemy trench. At the same time
parties crossed Wood Lane and were seen to jump into the trench running
eastwards along the crest. At 12.30 P.M. a second infantry battalion
left Black Watch Trench, about three hundred yards south-west of Wood
Lane, and advanced towards the latter under heavy machine-gun fire from
the right flank; the Camerons were still seen to be advancing over the
sky-line east of High Wood, and seemed to be working towards New Trench
which ran at right angles to Wood Lane. At 1.25 P.M. these troops
appeared to be held up by parties of the enemy, but the Camerons
surrounded the latter to the north and bombing encounters took place;
the whole of the remainder of the Camerons then disappeared over the
sky-line towards Switch Trench, where they were stopped and suffered
heavy casualties. During all this time there was very little hostile
artillery activity except for a medium barrage of 5·9 in.'s upon
Delville Wood, and the infantry attack continued successfully and
uninterrupted, the depth of assault being small.
Footnote 1:
_The front-line here ran north-west and south-east._
At two o'clock in the afternoon, however, came the first hint of the
turn of the tide. A report was received that large numbers of the enemy
were collecting in Switch Trench along two hundred yards of its length
east of the Flers-Longueval road, and the howitzers opened a fifteen
minutes' intense bombardment for their dispersal. At twenty-five minutes
past three the enemy were seen to advance on Wood Lane, our infantry
retiring about two hundred yards in front of them. The Germans came from
a north-easterly direction, entered the east corner of High Wood, the
north-west portion of Wood Lane and the trench running east along the
crest; we still held the southern portion of Wood Lane. As soon as this
was seen, nine guns of the 162nd Brigade were pulled out and switched
round on to the enemy counter-attack which, however, did not advance
over the crest but halted on reaching the trench running along the
crest. At the same time small parties of the enemy were seen advancing
westwards from the gate which stood out on the sky-line midway between
High Wood and Delville Wood. By 3.35 P.M. the enemy were occupying the
whole of the sky-line from High Wood for three hundred yards eastwards,
and appeared to be unmolested by any artillery fire except that of the
nine guns already referred to. No other battery or brigade appeared to
get on to them or even to observe them, and this extraordinary and quite
inexplicable state of affairs lasted for a considerable time. Not till
very late was any sort of barrage put down upon them, and even then it
was a long way over the crest and very meagre in quality. In the
meantime the enemy dug themselves in again, and at ten minutes to six
about one hundred of our men were seen actually retiring from the
direction of Switch Trench.
Thus, on this front, the whole attack was rendered utterly fruitless by
the assaulting troops being apparently ignorant of the nature and
locality of their objective; consequently, finding little resistance,
they overran the points to be taken, and were cut up on retiring. The
attack itself in its initial stages was as fine as there ever has been,
and had the promise of a great victory, but the final result of the
whole day's operation was that our line at seven o'clock in the evening
between High Wood and Delville Wood was the same as before the attack,
while the sacrifice and loss of life had been appalling. It was all the
more difficult to bear this disappointment, moreover, when news of the
battle on the rest of the front was received. All along the line great
successes had been achieved both by our troops and by the French; the
roll of prisoners and captured guns was appreciably swelled, and a
considerable and important advance had been made. Only on the High
Wood-Delville Wood sector did the front remain unchanged; there the two
woods, black, forbidding and grim, shattered by shells and burnt by both
sides to clear the appalling stench of the dead, stood like two
sentinels barring all further progress, obstacles of the most deadly
type.
It was not granted to the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery to
see these two woods completely and permanently in our hands. On the
morning of the 5th the battery commanders of the 1st and 2nd New Zealand
Field Artillery Brigades came up with one section apiece, and began to
take over from the 33rd battery commanders. Next day, Wednesday the 6th,
the relief was complete; New Zealanders took over our positions together
with the support of the front, and the batteries wound their way wearily
back to the wagon lines, whence, after a short halt, they continued the
march to Bonnay (156th and 162nd Brigades) and to Neuville (166th and
167th Brigades).
Thus closed a chapter in the life of the 33rd Divisional Artillery. For
eight continuous weeks—with one rest of ten days in the middle—they had
been in action in the Battle of the Somme, the greatest offensive
undertaken up to that date. For eight weeks they had continuously
bombarded the enemy and had, as continuously, been raked by hostile
shell fire in return. It would be impossible to estimate the number of
shells—which ran into tens of thousands—which the batteries had fired in
that period; suffice it to say that in spite of nervous and physical
exhaustion, in spite of the fact that seldom could more than two hours'
sleep in twenty-four be obtained, that food was oft-times short, that
daily the men saw their comrades maimed, shattered, blown to pieces
before their eyes, and daily waited for their own turn to come; despite
all these trials and horrors not one single order was ever issued to the
batteries, not one single request was ever made by the infantry which
was not immediately acted upon by the guns. Eight different divisions
were covered by the batteries during the period July 15th to September
6th; fourteen separate attacks were carried out during that time and,
whether acting under the orders of their own C.R.A. or of the C.R.A. of
a strange division, the part allotted to the batteries was invariably
carried out to the letter.
From August 1st onwards the headquarters of the 33rd Divisional
Artillery had remained out at rest, and the tactical handling of the
brigades had, during all the remainder of the time and in all the
succeeding battles, been under the control of other and strange
divisions. In view of this, it would be impossible to praise too highly
the Brigade commanders who throughout the operations were responsible
for the handling of the batteries; to the battery commanders there was
always—even in the worst of times—the supreme comfort of knowing that
behind them was their own brigade headquarters, and that whatever
happened they were amongst friends; but to the brigade commanders there
was the great responsibility, the great burden of knowing, during the
final five weeks, that above them, watching them, relying upon them, was
a strange division with whom they had never co-operated before, whose
officers were, in many cases, unknown to them.
Yet the real and full measure of praise was due and was agreed by all to
be due entirely to—the men. No words can aptly describe their splendid
courage and endurance maintained right up to the end of these eight
weeks of continual battle; those men who, some of them twelve months
before, had been ordinary civilians, who in the early days of July had
marched from Cuinchy and Cambrin, full of enthusiasm and eagerness, up
to this their first battle, _they_ were the real victors. As they
marched back now to the wagon lines, a body of tired and weary men with
the strain of the past weeks writ deeply in their faces and in their
eyes; as they turned their backs upon the battery positions, where the
torn and shell-strewn ground held many a rough cross and many a mound to
bear silent but eloquent testimony to the sacrifices which had been
made, they presented a spectacle to silence for ever the pessimists and
pacifists at home who, by their whining and selfishness, were
undermining the morale of the nation. If the men of England,
half-trained, inexperienced, civilians of twelve months ago can perform
such deeds as these, then must England indeed live!