DAINVILLE, HEBUTERNE AND THE BATTLE OF THE ANCRE.
(SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER 1916.)
In the foregoing chapter the doings of the Divisional Artillery in the
Battle of the Somme have been chronicled, and, in view of the very heavy
strain undergone by all ranks, it might be expected that at least a
short rest would have been granted before the batteries went into action
again. This, however, was not to be, for the wastage of men was
tremendous at the moment, and so great was the necessary concentration
of guns for any attack that every available battery was kept in the
line. The nearest approach to a rest that could be hoped for was the
taking over of some part of the line which was quiet—changing places, in
fact, with batteries on some other portion of the front, and this is
practically what was done by the artillery whose doings we are
following.
On September 6th, as already noted, the brigades moved out of action and
spent the night around Bonnay and La Neuville (just north of Corbie). On
the 7th the whole Divisional Artillery, under orders to go into action
on the Arras front, marched northwards and, passing through La Houssoye,
Behincourt, Molliens-au-Bois and Villiers Bocage, spent the night at
Havernas (156th Brigade), Wargnies (162nd Brigade) and Flesselles (166th
and 167th Brigades). Next morning the march was resumed, and the night
of the 8th was passed at Le Meillard (156th and 162nd Brigades),
Outrebois (166th Brigade) and Occoches-le-Petit (167th Brigade). On and
on they went, stopping on the 9th at Grouches, Lucheux, Bout-des-Pres
and Le Marais Sec, and on the 10th at Hauteville, Wanquetin and
Montenescourt, the day's march as a rule beginning about 9.30 A.M. and
finishing shortly after two o'clock in the afternoon. A short halt was
called in the Wanquetin-Montenescourt area on the 10th, nor was any
further move made till the 13th, the time being occupied in a
reorganisation of the Divisional Artillery.
ORDER OF BATTLE.
SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER 1916.
H.Q.R.A.
C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain.
Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G. Major H. K. Capt. T. C.
Sadler, D.S.O. Usher.
156th Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd.
Adjutant: Lieut. E. H. Prior.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Major S. Talbot. Major M. A. Major G. Lomer, Capt. W. G.
Studd, M.C. D.S.O. Pringle (4-gun).
162nd Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O.
Adjutant: Lieut. T. D. Shepherd.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Major Hill. Major V. Major A. van Capt. T. St. P.
Benett-Stanford, Straubenzee, M.C. Bunbury.
M.C.
166th Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O.
Adjutant: Lieut. S. M. Wood.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Capt. H. A. Capt. Hon. T. P. Capt. Freeman. Capt. B.
Littlejohn. P. Butler. McCallum, M.C.
Capt. Dust.
167th Brigade.
Broken up.
It will be remembered that just before the Battle of the Somme a change
had been made in the formation of the brigades, and that the 167th
Brigade (until then a 4·5 in. Howitzer Brigade) was so split up that the
four brigades each had three 18-pdr. batteries and one 4·5 in. howitzer
battery, each battery consisting of four guns. Very early in 1916,
however, B/167 had been posted away to another division, and therefore,
after the reorganisation of the brigades before the Battle of the Somme,
the 167th Brigade consisted only of the three 18-pdr. batteries which it
had received from each of the brigades in return for the 4·5 in.
howitzer battery it had sent to them. It was now ordered that all
18-pdr. batteries should consist of six guns, and therefore from
September 11th the 167th Brigade ceased to exist. Sections of each of
its batteries were sent to the 156th and 162nd Brigades, Lieut.-Colonel
C. G. Stewart assumed command of the 166th Brigade, and on September
13th, with six-gun batteries of 18-pdrs. (except for the 166th Brigade),
but with the 4·5 in. howitzer batteries still consisting of only four
pieces each, the Divisional Artillery resumed its march and moved into
action once more on the Arras front near Dainville. One section per
battery went up on the first night and began taking over from the 37th
Divisional Artillery, and on the night of the 14th/15th the remaining
sections of the batteries moved in, assuming, from 6 A.M. on the morning
of Friday the 15th, responsibility for the artillery support of the
infantry on their front; the 156th Brigade covered the 35th Division,
the 162nd and 166th Brigades the 12th Division, each brigade for
fighting being under the control of the C.R.A. of the Division behind
whose infantry it lay. In addition, the artillery on the front was
divided up into groups, and Lieut.-Colonel Harris, from his headquarters
in the white house on the Arras-Doullens road, controlled not only his
own batteries but also C/63 and D/64 which, together with the 162nd
Brigade, went to form "G" group. "H" group was administered by
Lieut.-Colonel Stewart.
At the beginning of this chapter it was stated that, owing to the huge
concentration of artillery on the "live" sectors of the front, no
batteries could be spared to go into the rest area, and that therefore
the best which could be hoped for was a comparatively quiet time on a
peaceful part of the line. This was what the batteries at Dainville were
hoping for, and this was what they badly needed after the strenuous days
of the Somme fighting; it is therefore interesting to note what happened
to them in the following few days, for it will give a good idea of the
worry and hardship which thoroughly bad staff work can give, and which
it did give, to men already tired by fighting.
By their northward march the batteries had left the XV. Corps of the
Fourth Army and were now under the orders of the XVII. Corps, Third
Army. On the night of September 14th/15th, after six weeks' heavy
fighting and four days' marching to follow, the batteries moved into
action; at seven o'clock on the evening of the 15th, just eleven hours
after the batteries had assumed responsibility for the defence of the
front, orders were received to move out of action and to march south to
the VII. Corps area to cover the infantry of the 33rd Division, the 12th
Divisional Artillery taking over the Dainville sector. This in itself
was not so very bad; it is true that, as a result of the orders, leave
which had just reopened both for England and for the Boulogne rest camp
was stopped, and it was generally felt that the batteries might equally
as well have marched to the VII. Corps area in the first case. There was
the consolation of knowing, however, that once again the batteries were
to cover their own infantry, and occasional mistakes of this kind were
not altogether unusual.
This, unfortunately, was not all. On the night of the 15th/16th one
section per battery withdrew from action and moved to the
Coullemont-Warlincourt-Couturelle area, the remainder of the batteries,
except those of the 156th Brigade, following on twenty-four hours later.
The next night the leading sections marched into action as ordered on
the Gommecourt front, relieving the batteries of the 17th Divisional
Artillery, and twenty-four hours later, on the night of the 17th/18th,
they were joined by the remaining sections who had left the Dainville
positions vacant; at the same time the 156th Brigade marched to
Gaudiempré and came into action, on the morning of the 19th, north-east
of Sailly-au-Bois. Thus on September 19th all the batteries were in
action on the Gommecourt front, and wagon-lines had been established
around Gaudiempré and Pas.
So far, so good, but now chaos set in. On the 20th, after the batteries
had been in action just twenty-four hours, orders were received for the
162nd Brigade to sideslip and relieve the batteries of the 78th Brigade,
forming the northern group. This was done by one section per battery and
was to have been completed on the 21st, but was cancelled late on that
evening; instead of sideslipping, the batteries were ordered to return
to their old positions on the Arras front which they had quitted five
days previously, were relieved by the 46th Divisional Artillery and
retired to their wagon-lines at Pas, while at the same time
half-batteries of the 156th Brigade moved out of the line to wagon-lines
around Wanquetin and Montenescourt. At noon on the 22nd the remaining
sections of the 46th Divisional Artillery relieved what had been left in
the line of the 33rd, and the batteries of the latter returned to their
old wagon-lines around Wanquetin and Sombrin. Two sections per battery
(156th and 162nd Brigades) moved into action the same night (22nd/23rd)
in the Dainville sector and were joined by the remaining sections next
day, while on the 24th the 166th Brigade came into action between
Dainville and Arras, forming once again "H" Group of Artillery in the
Dainville sector. Thus after a general shuffle, numerous orders and
counter orders, general disturbance and three days' marching, the
batteries were in exactly the same positions which they had occupied ten
days before. They had marched all the way to Gommecourt for
nothing—merely to inhabit positions for twelve hours and then to return
to Arras and Dainville again. Yet these were tired men who ached for
rest and a little comfort.
It may be thought that at this stage the Higher Authority would have
been able to sort matters out and to run their administration on
slightly more efficient lines, but nothing of the sort was experienced.
On October 1st, six days later, the good game of battledore and
shuttlecock between XVII. and VII. Corps was continued, and orders were
again received to march to the VII. Corps area, the scene of the
previous excursion. On the 3rd the leading sections of the batteries set
out over the now well-known road and, after establishing themselves once
more in wagon-lines around Gaudiempré on the 4th, came into action on
the Gommecourt front on the 5th, where they were joined 48 hours later
by the remaining sections which had stayed behind at Arras to cover the
move. Thus, in order to carry out the apparently simple work of
transferring a Divisional Artillery from the Arras to the Gommecourt
front, somebody amongst the Higher Command had forced the unfortunate
batteries to march down from one front to the other, sideslip, return
along the road to their original Arras front, and then march all the way
down again to the zone they had been in after the very first march!
Strange to say, the batteries really did remain now on the Gommecourt
front, and, as they took part from there in operations connected with
the Battle of the Ancre, it will be well to examine their positions
carefully.
The 156th Brigade established itself around Sailly, the 162nd just south
of Fonquevillers, and the 166th Brigade north of the same village, the
advantage of these positions being that the hostile trenches west of
Gommecourt could be barraged in enfilade—the deadly effect of which had
already been proved in the Battle of the Somme—while the batteries could
also cut wire on various parts of the front east of Hebuterne to as far
as Rossignol Wood. This wire-cutting was, indeed, the main occupation of
the batteries, and every moment of good visibility was utilised to carry
out the tedious and extremely difficult work.
[Illustration:
Scale 1:40.000.
]
The 49th Division was holding the line at the time, and the batteries
working under 33rd Divisional Artillery Headquarters (who in its turn
was controlled by the 49th Division) covered the front from "The Z" to
the south-west corner of Gommecourt Park, wire-cutting being carried out
mainly just below and south of the Gommecourt-Fonquevillers road. From
the 7th till the 11th, when the wire-cutting was finished, the work went
on daily without interruption; on the 8th D/162 (Major Belgrave) had
exchanged positions with a battery of the 48th Division and had moved
into Hebuterne itself, while on the 9th the batteries were placed under
control of VII. Corps direct, and were relieved of the responsibility of
covering the 49th Divisional front as far as infantry support was
concerned, but apart from these small interruptions no distraction of
any importance was suffered. Hostile artillery was sufficiently active
to be rather troublesome—the tactics employed being occasional short
bursts of shelling and sniping rounds into the battery positions, a
procedure which kept all ranks unpleasantly on the _qui vive_, and it
was with a feeling of satisfaction that the report was made on the 11th
that wire-cutting was complete.
Here the batteries had a slight rest from the continual firing of the
previous days, but not so the brigade commanders. On the 12th orders
were received that the brigade commanders of the 33rd Divisional
Artillery should supervise the wire-cutting of the 79th Brigade, and no
sooner was this done than positions had to be reconnoitred for the
batteries on the neighbouring Serre front. The reconnaissance was
carried out on September 18th, and the following day the batteries moved
into positions from which they were destined to take part in the Battle
of the Ancre. The move in this case was of no magnitude whatever; the
batteries of the 156th Brigade lay east of Sailly-au-Bois, the 162nd
Brigade took up positions south of Hebuterne, with the exception of "D"
battery which was in Hebuterne itself, while the 166th Brigade shifted
to the north of the same village. Once again wire-cutting was the order
of the day. The front covered by the batteries, held at this time by
infantry of the 31st Division, extended from west of Puisieux to as far
south as Serre, and wire-cutting was concentrated on the zone stretching
from the cross roads south-east of The Point to 300 yards north-east of
John Copse, the batteries being under direct control of the XIII. Corps.
From October 20th until November 13th the batteries were kept in a state
of high activity. Every day wire-cutting was continued, and bursts of
fire were directed day and night upon the gaps cut in the wire to
prevent the repair thereof. At the same time all the hostile approaches,
communication trenches and trench junctions were constantly bombarded,
and here again every endeavour was made to prevent the enemy from
putting right such damage as had been done. These tactics naturally used
up a large amount of ammunition, and as naturally evoked swift
retaliation from the enemy. Every night, as the ammunition wagons toiled
up from the wagon-lines around Couin and St. Leger with supplies for the
guns, they met the blast of the German shells searching the approaches
around Sailly, Colincamps and Hebuterne. Nightly did the Germans take
their toll of men and horses engaged upon the work of ammunition supply,
while an ever-lengthening casualty list in the battery positions showed
that the enemy, provoked to wrath and apprehension by the obviously
deliberate and premeditated cutting of his wire, was not replying in
vain. He knew, from the destruction of his wire, that an attack was
imminent, and realising this he turned the full blast of his attention
upon the batteries; they were the chief danger at the moment, whereas
the infantry could be attended to later when the day of assault grew
nearer at hand.
The tactics of the enemy were as before; not usually long bombardments,
but sudden short bursts of fire upon the battery positions, catching men
unawares and making them dread even the narrow open spaces between the
guns. Every day these bursts—sometimes only a few sniping rounds—cut
down the effectives at the gun positions, until Hebuterne became a word
of ill omen to all. Still the work continued; the back areas of the
enemy system began to receive attention, Puisieux was bombarded on the
22nd in conjunction with the heavy artillery, and on the 26th the first
infantry raiding party went over to obtain identification of the troops
opposite and to examine the effect of the previous six days'
wire-cutting. After two half-hour bombardments, with an interval of two
hours between, a party of the 93rd Infantry Brigade set out to enter the
hostile lines, but an enemy better known almost than the Germans and in
its way equally deadly, the enemy Mud, prevented them from even reaching
the German parapet. So heavy was the going in No Man's Land that it
became a physical impossibility to get across, and after many efforts
the infantry returned to our own trenches.
Once again wire-cutting and trench bombardment were resumed, and now the
enemy became more violent still in his reply. Nightly did he pour
thousands of gas shells into the battery positions, forcing the men to
wear their box-respirators during what little rest they could achieve
and depriving them of their badly-needed sleep. Practically every day
the villages of Sailly and Hebuterne were shelled by 15 cm. and 10 cm.
howitzers, while a deliberate bombardment of batteries and brigade
headquarters was carried out during the last three days of the month. On
November 2nd another attempt was made by the 31st Division to raid the
enemy trenches east of Hebuterne, and throughout the night of the
2nd/3rd a heavy flank and covering barrage was kept up by the batteries
to support the infantry in their hazardous task. Once again, however,
failure had to be confessed. The utter impassability of No Man's Land,
owing to mud and water-filled shell-holes, combined with very brisk
enemy opposition forced the raiding parties back to their trenches
again, and once more were the batteries left in ignorance of the effect
of their work.
It was essential, however, that the enemy lines should be penetrated,
for the non-success of the previous two raids had led to a lack of
knowledge of the hostile troops opposite, and had prevented an
examination being made of the German wire. Accordingly, on November 6th,
a third and this time in part successful attempt was made. After a
20-minute bombardment during which three raiding parties crept into No
Man's Land, a hurricane barrage for six minutes was carried out, under
cover of which the raiders set out for the enemy trenches between The
Point and the Sunken Road. Heavy machine-gun fire was encountered and
the two raiding parties on the left were held up, but on the right the
party covered by the 162nd Brigade forced its way into the enemy line,
bombed dug-outs, examined the wire and returned safely to its own
trenches bringing with it, for purposes of identification, five
prisoners, of whom one died on arrival.
Matters now began to move rapidly. From the 7th to the 10th the enemy
bombarded Sailly and Hebuterne heavily, and on the night of the 9th
fired 4,000 gas shells into our battery positions; on the 10th also
began the final three-day bombardment by our batteries before the
launching of the assault to be known in history as the Battle of the
Ancre. The 10th, 11th and 12th, designated in the secret operation
orders as W, X and Y days, marked a doubling and trebling intensity of
bombardment on the enemy trenches; the German front and support lines
were pounded and flung in all directions, wire was cut, gaps and
breaches were kept under constant bursts of fire to prevent repair, and
when November 13th dawned it seemed that no more could be done, and
that, in view of the bad visibility and weather existing during these
days, every possible preparation had been made.
Zero hour on Monday, the 13th, was a quarter to six in the morning;
sharp to the second the guns roared forth the barrage, the infantry
advanced to the assault and the Battle of the Ancre, which for so long
had been fomenting, burst out in all its fury. The 33rd Divisional
Artillery was covering the extreme left of the battle line, its zone
extending from John Copse on the right through the Touvert Farm-La
Louverie Farm road to the left of the line of assault, and was
supporting the infantry of the 31st Division by whom the attack was to
be made. On the front of the batteries the wire was found to be
completely and successfully cut, the barrage proved entirely
satisfactory and the infantry, assaulting and passing over the German
front line, advanced to their next objective—the German second
line—along the whole of the front from Puisieux to as far south as
Serre.
On the whole the hostile barrage was not severe until noon, when No
Man's Land and our front system were very heavily bombarded. Every
morning from 5.45 till 6 A.M. for the previous three days a heavy
barrage had been fired on the German trenches so that, after the first
two occasions, the enemy grew used to these barrages and could not tell
whether an attack was coming or not. During the assault itself, which
was helped by a heavy fog, the chief casualties were suffered from rifle
and machine-gun fire coming from the German second line, while heavy mud
in No Man's Land made the advance extremely tedious. The German front
line, as already noted, was successfully captured in spite of these
difficulties, the enemy in most cases being caught by surprise and
surrendering on close fighting, and it was not until the advance on the
second line began that real trouble was met.
The 3rd Division, to whom had been allotted the capture of Serre, was
unable, owing to the mud and heavy enemy opposition, to reach its
objective, and the 31st Division found itself with its right flank in
the air. All day long fighting continued, our casualties being terribly
heavy, while the batteries barraged with all their might in the hope of
protecting the 31st Division until such time as the 3rd Division, by
advancing on the right, should secure the flank. It was all of no avail,
however; after twelve hours of raging battle orders were received from
Corps Headquarters to evacuate the captured ground, and this was done in
the evening under a protective barrage from the guns of the 33rd
Divisional Artillery. Thus on this particular front no advance was made,
while the casualties were so heavy that strong patrols had to be sent
out during the night to cover the bringing in of the wounded. It should
be remembered, however, that the operations described formed only the
extreme left of a great battle, and that, although the flank was held
up, the centre advanced with such success that Beaumont-Hamel was
captured together with 3,000 prisoners, while an advance was made on to
the outskirts of Beaumont village itself. Therefore, in considering the
results of the Battle of the Ancre, the foregoing narrative which
concerns only the batteries on the extreme flank must not be taken
alone, but in connection with the history of the rest of that day along
the whole front of assault.
Next day, after firing a dummy barrage in the early morning in
co-operation with an attack further to the south, the batteries of the
33rd Divisional Artillery gave up their part in the Battle of the Ancre
and began to retire to their wagon-lines. Two batteries per brigade—"C"
and D/156 with "B" and "D" of 162nd and 166th—moved out on the night of
the 14th/15th to the area around Couin and St. Leger, and on the
following night were joined by the rest of the brigades. Here they
remained till the 22nd, cleaning, reorganising and resting, with
occasional very unwelcome returns to their old battery positions to
remove ammunition; here with the most profound regret they bade farewell
to Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, whose gallantry and personality had won
for him a firm affection and friendship in the hearts of all ranks, and
who now, on handing the command of the 156th Brigade to Major Bridges,
went to take over a Horse Artillery Brigade with the 1st Indian Cavalry
Division (there to meet his death while directing the batteries in the
Cambrai offensive of 1917); and from here they marched on November 22nd
through Villers Bocage and Talmas to Airaines, to enjoy in this, the
middle of November 1916, the first rest which they had been granted,
with the exception of ten days during the Battle of the Somme, since
they had gone into action nine months previously.
At Airaines they remained till December 5th, when they set out once more
with their faces turned towards the east to relieve the French and to
hold, throughout the winter, the ground wrested from the Germans in the
Battle of the Somme. The story of that long and trying winter in bitter
cold and deep mud, the tale of how the Germans were so continually
harassed by artillery fire that they were forced to carry out the
retreat of February 1917 to the famous Hindenburg line, belongs to
another chapter in the life-story of the batteries, and as such must be
relegated thereto.