FIRST EXPERIENCES OF WAR IN THE LA BASSÉE SECTOR.
(DECEMBER 1915—JULY 1916).
On a foggy afternoon, typical of Flanders in December, there crept into
Aire station a long and heavy train obvious even to the lay mind as a
troop train, consisting as it did not only of ordinary passenger
coaches, but also of innumerable horse boxes and a line of long open
trucks crammed with guns and wagons. Every window was crowded with
faces—the faces of British soldiers surveying with interest this, to
most of them, new and strange land, listening with a thrill to the
distant mutter of guns, looking with eagerness for signs of war and for
a first view of the billets in which, for the next few days at any rate,
they were to live. At Hazebrouck and at Lillers similar trains were
pulling in, disgorging on to the track men, horses and guns in what
might appear to be indescribable confusion, but which had in it all a
method and a certain order. To the inhabitants there was nothing new in
this sight; scores of times had they seen the arrival of fresh units
from England in just this manner, but to the men themselves the affair
was one of the utmost significance. As a unit they were making their
first appearance within actual reach of the scene of war, and the unit
was that one whose history the ensuing pages will endeavour to record;
it was the 33rd Divisional Artillery once more, the batteries of which
for days had been swallowed up, not exactly in the fog of actual war,
but in the impenetrable maze of Lines of Communication. For days they
had been just a memory, a rumour, an entry on the time-tables of various
R.T.O.s, scattered about the railway line between Havre and Aire; for
days they had indulged in wanderings which at times made them wonder
exactly where the war was to be found, and at last in their estimation
they had found it.
It must not be supposed that the journey of the Division from Amesbury
to its billets in the "rest" area was one long, smooth, perfectly run
affair. Far from it! On arrival at Southampton it was found that two of
the transports were in the wrong berths, while the engines of a third
had broken down; as a result, one brigade had to disembark and be broken
up into small parties, each party going on to a different ship. On
arrival at Havre mistakes had been made with regard to the accommodation
of the men, and one wretched party which marched seven miles out to
Harfleur had to return again over the same weary road before a shelter
could be found. In fact, the journey in trucks marked "Hommes 40,
chevaux 8" (a phrase no less sinister in practice than in meaning)
marked the termination of a period of discomfort and homelessness which
few who shared therein will ever forget. When one remembers, however,
the mighty forces which during these months were moved from England to
France, the actual fresh units which came over railways overloaded with
ammunition and supplies for troops already in the Line, one cannot help
recognising the ability and organisation which enabled such work to be
carried out, and which moved a division of artillery to scheduled time
across a railway system already strained to breaking point.
It was on December 10th, it will be remembered, that the Divisional
Artillery disappeared so mysteriously from England; on December 16th, at
2.30 P.M., the concentration of the same Divisional Artillery was
reported to be complete in the Aire-Thiennes area. The cloud of mystery
was once more lifted: the batteries were known to be "somewhere in
France." Actually, the area in which they were billeted was the rest
area of the First Corps; they were attached to the division in reserve,
and were billeted in the villages of Mazinghem, Berguette, Guarbecque
and Mt. Bernanchon.
The first few days in France proved rather a disappointment. Everybody
(other than those who had been "out" before) had come full of ideas
about the war, mostly taken from picture papers and so-called war
stories; most of the men had somehow expected to find themselves well
within sight and hearing of the battle itself, with all the accompanying
thrills of aeroplane fights, shelling in the distance, ambulances and
what not, and what did they find? An ordinary village, rather dirty and
very muddy; a flat, uninteresting country and the usual routine of
stables, watering, exercise and gun drill—just a continuation of the
training which they had carried out at Bulford, with the difference that
away on the horizon there was that continuous giant thudding, that heavy
sullen muttering which betokened artillery at work, not now in mere
practice but in grim earnest.
However, it was not of much good being in France unless use was made of
the proximity of the war for instructional purposes, and so, two days
after the completed concentration, parties were sent from each of the
brigades to be attached to the 2nd Divisional Artillery, then holding
the line on the La Bassée front from Givenchy on the north nearly to
Fosse 8, the scene of such fierce fighting in the Loos offensive, on the
south. These parties were conveyed by motor-bus to Cambrin, Annequin and
Gorre, whence they were led on foot by guides to the positions of the
batteries to which they were attached. Six parties in all went up from
the brigades between December 18th and January 11th, the duration of
stay in the line being usually four days, so that by the end of the
second week in January all the officers, N.C.O.s, and gunners had had
their first look at the war, had seen their first glimpse of the enemy
lines, had had their first experience of shell fire.
About the middle of January the batteries were considered to have gained
sufficient experience to merit their taking a more strenuous part in the
war, and complete batteries were accordingly sent up in turn to take
over the positions of the 12th Divisional Artillery (63rd and 64th
Brigades R.F.A.) and of the 2nd Divisional Artillery (9th, 17th, 48th,
56th and 71st batteries), stretching from Givenchy down to Vermelles. As
a rule three batteries were sent up at a time for six days, the wagon
line work and ammunition supply being carried out by the batteries to
which they were attached, while those not in the line continued
training, with a few inspections and sudden wild rumours to help pass
the time. Of inspections there were two:—on January 20th C/166 was
reviewed by General Joffre, while on January 26th the 162nd, 166th and
167th Brigades were inspected by Lieut.-General Sir Hubert Gough, then
commanding the 1st Corps. As, prior to this, the 156th Brigade had lined
the route in December to bid farewell to Field-Marshal Lord French, the
whole Division in its early days had an opportunity of seeing three
great men whose names were to be connected so closely with the history
of the war.
The demon Rumour held widespread popularity at this time; rumours of
sudden moves to a different part of the line; rumours of a sudden
advance to support our infantry—anything, in fact, which billet gossip
could evolve on a quiet evening. Nor was this gossip entirely to blame
if it gave rise to so many rumours, for official orders and
counter-orders themselves gave plenty of scope for wonder to the average
brain. As an example of the continual uncertainty which prevailed
regarding future movements, the case of the Divisional Ammunition Column
might well be taken. On January 26th it was ordered to stand by, ready
for a sudden move; this order was cancelled at 1.30 A.M. on January
27th, was revived again at 5.30 the same evening with the additional
information that it must be ready to move at two hours' notice, and was
finally cancelled at 11.35 P.M. that night. Nothing immediate came of
these rumours, and all through February the same training, now grown
very tedious after the interest of a first visit to the Line, was
carried on. A somewhat ambitious plan of two-day manœuvres was carried
out in the First Army area around Estrée-Blanche and Therouane on the
last days of January by those batteries which were not at the time
undergoing training in the Line, but February 1st saw a resumption of
the old billet life again.
ORDER OF BATTLE.
DECEMBER 1915—MAY 1916.
H.Q.R.A.
C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain.
Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G. Major Sheppard. Capt. T. Usher.
156th Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel F. Hall, M.P. Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd,
(_till February_). D.S.O.
Adjutant: Lieut. W. Holden Lieut. W. G. Pringle.
(_till February_).
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Major Alcard Capt. R. D. Capt. G. Lomer. Capt. S. Talbot.
(_till January_). Russell.
Capt. L. R. Hill
(_after
January_).
162nd Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel J. F. Duncan.
Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O.
Adjutant: Lieut. T. D. Shepherd.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Capt. F. C. Major R. G. M. Capt. A. van Major D. Stewart.
Packham. Johnston. Straubenzee.
166th Brigade.
Colonel A. H. S. Goff.
Adjutant: Lieut. E. G. Lutyens.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Capt. D. M. Major T. E. Capt. H. Freeman. Capt. G.
Coffin. Durie. Fetherston.
167th Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel Du Plat Taylor.
Lieut.-Colonel Harpur.
Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff.
Adjutant: Lieut. W. D. Watson Lieut. H. C. Cory.
(_till January_).
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Capt. M. A. Major Barkworth. Major W. P. Capt. W. A. T.
Studd. Bennett. Barstow.
Three units, however, escaped the general air of boredom which was now
gradually pervading the Divisional Artillery—one at an early stage and
the others later. C/167 (Major Bennett), as far back as December 30th,
marched up to the Line and came permanently into action in a disused
battery position about 150 yards south of the La Bassée Canal, midway
between Vauxhall Bridge and Pont Fixe. It was attached to the 1st Corps
Heavy Artillery for counter-battery work, and, covering as it did the
wide front from Violaines on the north to Auchy on the south, with
observation stations in Givenchy ("N"), Cambrin, "King's Clere" and
"Mountain House," it had an excellent opportunity of learning accurately
the whole of the front which the Divisional Artillery was at a later
date to cover. The wagon lines were bad, but the battery position,
despite the fact that it had to be built while the guns were actually
there, was not too uncomfortable. An occasional shelling with
whizz-bangs at that early stage did nothing more than arouse interest
and teach a few healthy lessons, while the daily shelling of Pont Fixe,
about 300 yards away, by a 5·9 in. howitzer was regarded as a free
entertainment of great attraction.
A/162 (Captain Packham) and A/166 (Captain Coffin), the other two
batteries to go into action independently, were rather later than C/167;
they did not move into action until February 13th, when they were
attached to the 1st Corps Heavy Artillery for counter-battery work and,
having marched up through Béthune, Beuvry and Annequin, took up
positions covering, with C/167, the same wide front.
At last orders came, on February 15th, for the whole of the 33rd
Divisional Artillery to take over the line from the 12th Divisional
Artillery. The relief began on February 23rd, when the first sections of
the batteries relieved their opposite numbers in action; three batteries
(C/156, C/162, A/166) which were already in the line for training stayed
there, and on February 25th the remaining sections of the batteries came
into action. C/167 vacated its position at Cuinchy, marched to the wagon
line on the night of the 23rd/24th and was split up, the right section
going to D/167 (Captain Barstow) and the left to A/167 (Captain Studd)
to form six-gun batteries. B/167 (Major Barkworth) had on February 14th
been posted to the 1/4th London Brigade R.F.A. (T.F.), and was
permanently struck off the strength of the Division.
At noon on Saturday, February 26th, the relief was reported complete,
the 33rd Divisional Artillery under its C.R.A., Brig.-General C. F.
Blane, assumed responsibility for the artillery support of the front
covered by the 33rd infantry, and for the first time held the line
entirely on its own. The front extended from Boyau 1 to Boyau 53, that
is from Mad Point to just south of Givenchy. The four brigades,
commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, Lieut.-Colonel Duncan,
Colonel A. H. S. Goff and Lieut.-Colonel Harpur, were divided into two
groups, "Z," the Northern Group, being commanded by Colonel Goff, "A,"
the Auchy Group, by Colonel Harpur; the batteries of both groups were
dispersed all along the front from the La Bassée Canal to as far south
as Vermelles.
Here a slight digression may well be permitted. It will be noticed that
Lieut.-Colonel F. Hall is not mentioned above as one of the Brigade
Commanders. To the regret of all ranks he returned to England on
February 15th, handing over the command of the 156th Brigade to
Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd. It would be impossible to over-estimate
the work which Lieut.-Colonel Hall did in organising the recruitment of
the 33rd Divisional Artillery in Camberwell; without his work, and the
work of Lieut.-Colonel Duncan who was also lost to the Division in March
when he handed over the command of the 162nd Brigade to Lieut.-Colonel
O. M. Harris, the brigades could never have been formed so rapidly as
they were. In these pages, which perpetuate the history of the 33rd
Divisional Artillery, it is essential that there should also be recorded
the great effort made by Lieut.-Colonel Hall in raising the four
brigades, an effort which was appreciated by His Majesty the King at a
later date, when he bestowed upon him a Knighthood of the Order of the
British Empire.
To return, however, to the war. The trench system here, as everywhere on
the Flanders front, was situated in very flat ground, and O.P.'s in the
front line were of little use except for shooting on the enemy fire
trench. Providentially, along the rising ground a few hundred yards
behind the front line there were a number of ruined houses dotted about
at odd intervals, sometimes singly, sometimes in groups; all of these
were practically destroyed by shell fire, but had just enough left
standing to offer a precarious perch to anyone wishing to observe
therefrom, and to provide a screen for such sandbagging, strengthening
and revetting as an ingenious mind, coupled with no small influence with
the Sappers and a desire for greater comfort, might devise. "N" and
Artillery House in Givenchy were but little used as they were rather too
far to the north, but King's Clere and Mountain House (in Cambrin),
Braddell Castle, The Ruin and the Four Hundred on either side of the La
Bassée road, with Dead Man's House, Wilson's House, Ridge View and
Maison Rouge stretching along the line just south of the road, made
excellent spots from which, perched usually in the wreckage of the roof,
one could direct fire on to every spot in the zone. The Ruin and, before
it was rebuilt, the Four Hundred were trying in the extreme to the
nerves, for they hung together in a manner which might have appeared
impossible even to the ingenious mind of a Heath Robinson; moreover,
they were almost daily attended to by an ever-persistent German gunner
with an unlimited supply of 5·9 in. ammunition and a nice taste in house
removing, but King's Clere, a little further to the north, provided an
excellent view of all the front and back areas, and had been thoroughly
and effectively secured by means of cement and iron girders. This part
of the front was, indeed, a most fascinating one for shooting over,
provided a good O.P. was available. North of the canal had little of
interest, save the ruins of Violaines and Canteleux, but to the south,
and just on the bank, was the Railway Triangle with its mysterious tower
and mound. Auchy offered several moderately undamaged houses whence, in
the early morning, smoke could be seen issuing, while loopholes appeared
and disappeared, or were camouflaged, with extraordinary frequency. Les
Briques, with its dead trees and ruined house, struck a grim and
forbidding note, but, just south of it, the green fields around Lone
Farm were always full of possibilities. Many and varied were the ideas
as to the use which was made of Lone Farm; as a farm it had totally
disappeared and suggested nothing more than a few dead trees and a mound
of bricks, but underneath those bricks there must have been some
splendid cellars. Every morning, just as day broke, parties of twenty or
thirty Germans could be seen there, and every morning some battery or
other, with an unexpected burst of shrapnel, used to lengthen the German
casualty list in no small manner. It took the Germans an extraordinary
time to learn the lesson of Lone Farm, and for quite a considerable
period it was there that the newly-arrived battery officer from England
saw the first grey-clad figures of the enemy; there, as like as not,
that he first saw his shells actually bring death. South of Lone Farm
again came the Corons de Maron and the "Dump," or, to give it its
correct title, Fosse 8 de Béthune, but both of these were out of the
zone of the batteries and had, therefore, to be left undisturbed.
[Illustration:
Scale 1:20,000.
]
Behind Auchy and Lone Farm could be seen Indian Well House, Haisnes,
Douvrin and the road running up to La Bassée. For normal purposes this
area was out of range, but was none the less interesting in that it
afforded all manner of unexpected sights. A train, a lorry going along
the road, a couple of horsemen trotting down a bridle path are
commonplace sights in England, but when you are separated from that
train or lorry by a network of ditches containing death in a hundred
forms, when that train or lorry is carrying men who will probably
to-morrow be trying their best to kill you, and whom you may, with
considerable fortune, kill first, then the matter appears in a different
light, and you feel an intense interest in the objects visible.
Up to the present this chapter has been devoted to a description of the
front on which the Division was operating. It may be that too much space
has been given to what is, after all, merely of personal interest, but
it should be remembered that this was the first front upon which the
Divisional Artillery served as a unit, and therefore the memory of it
has been impressed upon the minds of both officers and men probably to a
far greater extent than has any other portion of the British Front in
France. Now, however, regard must be had for the tactical situation as
it presented itself in the winter of 1915-16.
It will be remembered that, since the battle of Loos in September and
October 1915, no attack on any large scale had been carried out by the
British troops. Heavy fighting continued throughout the winter along the
newly-formed salient at Loos, and this in itself proved such a drain
upon the forces of both sides that the remainder of the 1st Army front
was comparatively quiet. On December 19th the Germans launched a heavy
gas attack in the Ypres salient, and on February 13th, in the same area,
occurred the famous attack on the Bluff. The end of February saw the
beginning of the great battle of Verdun, and it was therefore a natural
result that the La Bassée front, situated as it was outside the zone of
these different operations, remained in a state of comparative quiet,
and was disturbed solely by the raids, mine explosions and artillery
activity which were the invariable régime of trench warfare.
This period of the campaign saw the arrival in France of a great number
of New Army divisions, and as far as possible these divisions, with one
or two noteworthy exceptions, were placed in a part of the line which
was not likely to be subjected to any large scale operations but which,
by the opportunities it offered of raiding, patrolling and the like,
formed an excellent training ground for troops not yet experienced in
modern warfare. No better part of the firing line could, in fact, have
been chosen than the La Bassée sector. The famous Brickstack area was a
centre of great mining activities; raids were the order rather than the
exception, and big trench minenwerfer were daily in action. The back
areas of the German zone were in full view of the artillery observation
stations whence practice could be obtained, day in day out, on every
possible type of target. Salient features presented themselves for
registration and calibration of the guns, and during these shoots the
accuracy and drill of the gun detachments could be fully and carefully
noted. Numerous houses, in a more or less advanced state of
dilapidation, gave all ranks a good idea of the effect of modern
artillery fire on fortifications, while working parties and moving
targets of all descriptions taught observing officers and gun
detachments the essential lesson of quick shooting without loss of
accuracy, and the absolute necessity of a familiarity with every inch of
the ground covered.
It has already been stated that the mining activities of both sides were
very marked. Although this would appear to concern the infantry rather
than the artillery, the effect on the latter was of great importance.
The explosion of a mine was in many cases followed by an infantry raid,
and for this reason gun detachments and officers on duty with the
infantry were kept up to a high pitch of speed and smartness in putting
down an immediate barrage. Moreover, this barrage shooting was most
effective in instilling confidence in the accuracy and good shooting of
gun detachments. It was a very strong but utterly fatal temptation to a
battery commander to add twenty-five or even fifty yards to the range of
his guns, to ensure that no shell fell short and inflicted casualties on
our own infantry. To withstand this temptation needed the most complete
confidence in the guns of the battery, but, on the other hand, to add
the margin of safety almost invariably meant that the barrage dropped
beyond its mark and inflicted no damage whatever upon the raiding party
or trench for which it was intended. Gradually did the infantry learn
completely to trust their gunners in barrage firing, and once and for
all did the battery officers realise that there was only one range which
would hit their target, and that any addition to that range, although
satisfying their own peace of mind, would effectually wipe out any good
which their efforts might have done, and would leave the infantry to the
mercies of a hand to hand encounter with the enemy.
On March 8th an important alteration was made in the disposition of
troops along the Divisional front. From this date two infantry brigades
were kept in the line, each brigade maintaining two battalions in the
front line. Each artillery section was divided into two sub-sections
composed of two 18-pdr. batteries apiece, and it therefore worked out
that each battalion of infantry in the front line had two 18-pdr.
batteries to provide it with direct artillery support. This system
appeared on paper excellent, and indeed from the point of view of
establishing close co-operation between the Divisional Artillery and its
own Infantry no fault in the plan could be found, but there was one
tremendous handicap which every day made itself felt more vitally
amongst gunners and infantry alike. Throughout this period the supply of
ammunition for daily firing was most closely limited, and on March 18th
the allowance was restricted to sixteen rounds per battery per day. It
is not intended here to enter into the great ammunition controversy.
Such a matter would be out of place in what is meant to be an historical
record of an artillery unit throughout the war, but it is mentioned in
view of certain remarks which will later be made concerning the mutual
relations of the infantry with the artillery, and is one of the chief
difficulties with which the artillery had to contend at this time.
March 18th saw the first attack of any dimensions which had so far taken
place in the neighbourhood of the 33rd Divisional zone. After a short
but very heavy artillery bombardment and the explosion of three mines,
the Germans made an attack upon the 12th Division which was at that time
on the right of the 33rd Division and was confronting the Hohenzollern
redoubt. Apart from a heavy bombardment of Annequin with gas shells and
the general searching with long range fire of all the roads leading up
to the front, no material effect was felt by the 33rd Divisional
Artillery. It gave the batteries, however, some idea of what would be
expected of them in the event of a hostile attack on their own front,
and, although conducted at a distance, enabled them by sight and hearing
to realise the weight of shell fire to which they would be subjected if
they were themselves attacked.
April 27th saw a much larger attack by the Germans, once again upon the
right of the 33rd Division, and this time on the 16th Division in the
Hulluch sector. Early in the morning of that day a very heavy
bombardment began on the Division's right, and shortly afterwards a call
for mutual support was received. A heavy mist lay upon the ground, but
through it could be heard the throb and roar of a battle in progress,
mingling with the nearer and more persistent thunder of our own guns and
of the German retaliation. Gradually the mist thickened instead of
clearing, and gradually did the firing become more intense; suddenly in
the distance was heard the wail of a siren which was taken up by one
closer at hand. The Division had never before been subjected to a gas
attack, and at first the true meaning of these sirens was only suspected
and not fully realised, but a certain pungency soon made itself felt in
the morning air. The men began coughing and sneezing, the atmosphere
became thick and unbreathable, and in a very few minutes all batteries
were working under the protection of their gas helmets. The battle was
over by the middle of the morning, and the batteries were able to return
to the ordinary routine of the day, but a lesson and a valuable lesson
at that had been learnt, and it was brought home even more clearly than
before that the detachments must be prepared to work under more
difficult conditions than they had as yet experienced. Whilst on the
subject of this gas attack it is important to note that, on the occasion
in question, so dense were the gas clouds that they were even felt at
the wagon lines as far back as Beuvry.
After this attack followed renewed trench activity and mutual
retaliation. On April 28th the wagon lines of the 166th Brigade at
Beuvry were heavily shelled by a long range gun, and numerous casualties
were suffered by horses and men. The shelling of wagon lines is at all
times most unsettling and likely to do great damage, but this particular
case, being the first of its kind of which the batteries of the Division
had had experience, created a great impression.
About this time a somewhat curious incident occurred between the German
Air Service and our Artillery. On April 28th a German aeroplane flew
over the battery position of A/167 (Captain Studd) and dropped a long
streamer to which was attached a message. This message stated that
German headquarters were aware that No. 1 Harley Street (a big building
used as a dressing station and situated in a road which derived its name
from the number of aid posts which lay along it) was a dressing station,
but that, owing to the great damage which was being done by the battery
of howitzers in action behind this particular house, they were
reluctantly compelled to destroy it by shell fire. Apart from anything
else, this was a considerable compliment to the work of A/167, the
battery referred to, but it did not say much for the observation powers
of the German aircraft. A/167 was then in action on the eastern end of
Tourbiers loop, and was at least 600 yds. from the dressing station in
question. Next day the bombardment of No. 1 Harley Street by aeroplane
observation began; a great number of direct hits were obtained, and,
although the Red Cross was clearly visible, the building was entirely
destroyed. It is pleasant to note, however, that this incident did not
pass unavenged. Early one morning a short time afterwards, the battery
commander of A/166 (Captain Coffin) saw a large convoy of German
ambulances proceeding along the road near Haisnes. A burst of high
explosive blocked the front and rear of the convoy, a steady and
destructive fire of high explosive and shrapnel swept the length and
breadth of the road, and in a short time the debt owing to the Germans
by the destruction of the dressing station in Harley Street was more
than wiped out. The shelling of dressing stations and ambulances was
not, at this time, a practice usually indulged in by our guns, but of
late the enemy had been consistently shelling all our aid posts, our
dressing stations and our field ambulances, and it was hoped that a
short sharp lesson such as that detailed above might tend to lessen in
the future the sufferings of our own wounded.
Quite soon after this incident another opportunity very fortunately
presented itself of impressing upon the Germans our intention of brisk
and immediate retaliation for any attacks on their part. Three big
minenwerfers had, of late, been harassing our infantry to an undue
extent every night from the vicinity of the Railway Triangle, Spotted
Dog and Ryan's Keep, and it was decided to organise a really efficient
shell storm to try and discourage the enemy from this particular form of
attack. Accordingly it was arranged that, at 3.25 on a certain morning,
a sudden and concentrated bombardment by 9·2 in., 6 in., 4·5 in.
howitzers and 18-pdrs. should take place on the area from which the
"Minnie" worked. By a great stroke of fortune, ten minutes before the
bombardment was due to begin, the minenwerfer in question started its
nightly bombardment. Hardly had it begun than from all sides there
poured down shells of every description, trench mortar bombs and rifle
grenades, and for upwards of twenty minutes the German trench system was
one vast mass of smoke, flame and dust. Not for many days afterwards did
that minenwerfer worry our troops, and the Germans must indeed have been
impressed by the organisation which in the space of a few minutes
brought down upon them such a concentrated and well-timed barrage.
On May 19th an important reorganisation of the Divisional Artillery took
place. When the 33rd Division embarked for France its artillery
consisted of four brigades:—the 156th, 162nd, 166th and 167th. Of these,
the first three brigades were made up of 18-pdr. batteries, while the
167th was a 4·5 in. howitzer brigade. By an order which now was issued,
the brigades were reconstituted to consist each of three 18-pdr.
batteries and one 4·5 in. howitzer battery. The effect of such an
organisation was that each Brigade Commander had a small but complete
tactical force under his direct command, and, in the event of open
warfare and a moving battle, was so disposed that he had a percentage of
both types of artillery under his control. Everything, in fact, was now
clearly indicating the early resumption of active operations, and June
18th might be considered to mark the first step in this direction in the
La Bassée sector.
On June 18th the 39th Division, then holding the line on the left of the
33rd, was withdrawn, and the 33rd extended its front northward as far as
Grenadier Road in Givenchy. For one division this was an extraordinarily
wide front, and necessitated the alteration and widening of gun pits,
the establishing of new observation stations in Givenchy, with the
consequent laying of telephone lines—a very heavy strain on the
batteries who were responsible for the support and protection of such a
widely spread body of infantry. The group system of batteries was
reorganised into two new groups—Givenchy and Cuinchy—and the late Auchy
group became a subsection of Cuinchy group. As an example of the width
of front to be guarded by the batteries, it may be stated that the
howitzers had to cover a front of 120°. In addition to the extension of
the front, preparations for operations on a large scale were ordered to
be taken. Every battery had to make accommodation for keeping around the
guns four times the amount of ammunition to what had previously been the
rule; all ranks were made acquainted with the forward zone and the best
lines of advance in case of a German withdrawal, advance positions were
selected and the whole front began to seethe with an undercurrent of
preparation and anticipation. To the inexperienced minds of the troops
this appeared to indicate an offensive on the La Bassée front. Never
before had the batteries been in a big battle; they did not know that,
had an attack been contemplated on their front, the activity would have
been multiplied tenfold. They did not know that, far away in the south,
preparations on a vast and unprecedented scale were being made; that
there were in the Somme area concentrations of artillery, infantry,
ammunition and material which exceeded anything yet seen in war. They
only saw their own preparations and formed their opinions accordingly.
ORDER OF BATTLE.
MAY 1916—JUNE 1916.
H.Q.R.A.
C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain.
Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G. Major H. K. Capt. T. Usher.
Sadler, M.C.
156th Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, D.S.O.
Adjutant: Lieut. W. G. Pringle.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Capt. L. R. Hill. Capt. R. D. Capt. G. Lomer. Capt. M. A.
Russell. Studd.
Capt. Lutyens.
162nd Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O.
Adjutant: Lieut. T. D. Shepherd.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Capt. F. C. Major R. G. M. Capt. A. van Major W. P.
Packham. Johnston Straubenzee. Bennett.
166th Brigade.
Colonel A. H. S. Goff, C.M.G.
Adjutant: Lieut. E. G. Lutyens.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Capt. D. M. Major T. E. Capt. H. Freeman. Capt. W. A. T.
Coffin. Durie. Barstow, M.C.
167th Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff.
Adjutant: Lieut. H. C. Cory.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery.
Capt. S. Talbot. Major D. Stewart. Capt. G.
Fetherston.
On June 24th these suspicions, already fostered by the Higher Command in
order to cover operations elsewhere, were more than doubled. On that day
the whole of the British line burst into flame. From Ypres to the Somme
a steady bombardment of the German trench system began, wire was cut and
kept open, repairs to damaged trenches were prevented by persistent
bursts of fire, and in every sector did it appear that an attack was
imminent; unless the German Headquarters could discover where the main
concentration was taking place it was impossible for them to gauge the
most probable place of assault. That they did discover it was realised,
and realised bitterly, on July 1st and the succeeding days, but there is
no doubt that the artillery activity along the whole front kept them in
a considerable state of apprehension, nor did they dare to dispatch
troops to the Somme in such a whole-hearted way as would otherwise have
been possible.
Naturally, with both sides in such a state of activity, it was
inevitable that a great deal of raiding should go on—raids by the
Germans to try and discover in what strength we were holding the line,
raids by our troops to determine the German order of battle and to
follow, by identification, the arrival or departure of troops to and
from the zone. On June 22nd, at 2 A.M., a tremendous mine was exploded
by the Germans near the Duck's Bill in Givenchy. So great was the mine,
which had been dug right underneath Company Headquarters of the 2nd
Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, that a complete company was almost
annihilated. Following the explosion, the Germans raided the trenches
under cover of a heavy barrage, and for several hours hand to hand
fighting of the fiercest nature was carried on. Every gun which could be
brought to bear upon that area gave such support to our harassed troops
as was possible, and eventually the position was more or less restored.
It is doubtful whether this raid had any connection with the forthcoming
Somme offensive. It was conducted on such a large scale, and the mine
shaft itself extended for such a distance, that preparations must have
been begun some long time previously.
On June 27th it was our turn to harass the enemy by one of the swiftest
and best planned raids which had yet been carried out. Two parties of
the 9th Battalion Highland Light Infantry went across No Man's Land at
Mad Point and, under cover of a barrage, entered the German front line
at two spots some 250 yards apart. The barrage in this case was a most
difficult one for the batteries to carry out, as not only had the two
parties to be covered on their front and flanks, but the reserve
trenches behind the gap which lay between the two parties had also to be
blocked. This, however, was only the beginning of the affair. Gradually
the Highlanders, having destroyed all the dug-outs, mine shafts and
hostile troops within their reach, began to bomb their way along the
trench inwards towards each other. Gradually such Germans as were not
bombed retreated before the hostile raiders and congregated in a herd in
the middle, with the raiding parties closing in on both sides and the
barrage roaring over their heads to cut off all retreat. And then, when
the Germans were crowded and wedged into one section of the front line,
unable to move either way and awaiting a bombing attack from both
flanks, the raiding parties suddenly ceased pressing on, a mine was
exploded right underneath the spot where the Germans were assembled, and
the raiding parties returned to our own trenches, all further work on
their part being unnecessary. It was a triumph of organisation and
accuracy, and fully merited the results it achieved.
On July 2nd the 2nd Battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment raided the
enemy lines for one hour and a half, and inflicted numerous casualties
on the enemy, and on July 5th the 2nd Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers
raided the enemy opposite the Duck's Bill and remained in their trench
system for over two hours. By now the German infantry were in an
advanced state of nerves. Although the news of the offensive on the
Somme had reached them and they realised that the main attack was to the
south, the continued bombardment on their own front and the nightly
raids gave them not one moment's peace of mind, nor dared they
materially weaken this part of the line. The raid by the Royal Welsh
Fusiliers on July 5th deserves rather more than a passing word. It will
be remembered that, on June 22nd, they had suffered heavily at the hands
of a German raid. On July 5th they were given a chance of retaliation,
and never has a raiding party gone over the top with such a thirst for
blood and revenge. Not only did the infantry attack, but with them went
a party of the Tunnelling Company who were sore at the thought that the
German miners had evaded their counter-mining and had managed to carry a
shaft so far beneath the British trenches. It was not their fault—in
that marshy ground the most up-to-date and scientific apparatus was
necessary to carry a shaft to any depth beneath the ground. That
apparatus the Germans possessed and we did not, and as a result they
carried their shaft far deeper than we could reach, and blew up a
company of British infantry with one touch of an electric contact. July
5th, however, proved an adequate revenge. For upwards of two hours the
infantry bombed and bayoneted, the sappers blew up all the mine shafts,
whilst the Cuinchy group of artillery alone fired 6,000 rounds, relays
of detachments keeping the guns firing at "gun fire" practically all the
time.
That operation proved to be the last carried out by the 33rd Divisional
Artillery on the La Bassée sector. No hint had been received by the
batteries of a move, no word of warning was given of an early departure,
but suddenly, at about five o'clock on the afternoon of Thursday, July
6th, there came a bolt from the blue. Orders were received that the 33rd
Divisional Artillery was to move down to the Somme, that it would be
relieved forthwith by the 39th, and that the first half-batteries would
march to the wagon lines at 2 A.M. on the 7th, _i.e._, in eleven hours'
time. Now the batteries had been in action in the same positions for
nearly five months, and a few hours was but scanty notice to give in
which to move out from long-inhabited trench positions, ready and
equipped for fighting of any sort. Yet the order was complied with, and,
when dawn broke the following day, all traces of the departure had
disappeared, and away in the wagon lines were to be found the guns and
men who, the previous evening, had been in action within, in some cases,
1,700 yards of the enemy.
Before the further activities of the batteries are followed, a word must
be spoken in summary of the doings of the Divisional Artillery on this
front during the five months in which they were in action. It may be
complained that the foregoing chapter deals too fully with the action of
the Division as a whole, and that not enough detailed information has
been given concerning the daily life of the batteries. The answer is,
that what concerned the Division vitally concerned the batteries, and
that it has been considered more desirable to give a general _résumé_ of
the work carried out by the Division, for in that work the Artillery
played a most active part. It would have been easy, and to a few people
interesting, to have recorded the shelling to which the batteries were
subjected, the difficulties and trials they had to undergo, and
individual cases in which particularly brilliant or destructive shoots
were carried out, but in so doing the general picture would have been
lost and the value of this record greatly reduced. The period spent on
the La Bassée front was a period of stationary warfare during which the
batteries were hardened and experienced, and, as such, lacked the
interest which the ensuing part of the campaign supplies. The
description which has been given of the type of fighting carried out
during this time will enable an idea to be gained of the work of the
batteries, but two points in particular are worthy of record.
When the batteries arrived in France they were raw and untrained as far
as actual fighting was concerned. The resulting strain upon all battery
commanders was tremendous, for no man knows, until he has been under
shell fire, the actual sensations of that experience, and no battery
commander knew exactly how his men would bear the very great trial to
which they were going to be put. In those five months every battery had
to suffer such shelling and bombardment, had to carry out such accurate
and wearying shooting, and to work under conditions of such difficulty
as to satisfy commanding officers that the 33rd Divisional Artillery was
indeed one of which to be proud, and that the men could be relied upon
to undergo any trial, to meet danger and death in any form without
deviating one inch from the work put before them. When the batteries
moved south to the Somme there was but one feeling which pervaded
officers and men alike, a feeling of complete confidence, of complete
determination and of keenness to take part in real active operations
which they fully realised, from the previous five months' experience,
they were well qualified to take.
And the other lesson learnt—what was that? It was the most valuable one
of co-operation and even of personal intimacy with the infantry. During
the whole of the La Bassée period, with one short exception, the 33rd
Divisional Infantry were holding the line. Day in day out, officers from
every battery were attached to battalion and company headquarters, and
the friendship of the infantry for the gunners and _vice versa_ became
very real. Even the N.C.O.s got to know each other by name, and the
resulting feeling of confidence and friendship was of the greatest
value. It was difficult to maintain this practice in later days when
casualties in the infantry and gunners increased by leaps and bounds,
when old friends were lost and new faces were ever appearing, and when
the batteries were continually being attached to strange divisions and
were covering infantry other than their own; but the lesson had been
learnt, and throughout the war the Divisional Artillery made it an aim
and object to get to know the infantry it was covering, to live and
fight with them, and to perfect that liaison which was so important, not
only by the teachings of the cold official text books, but by the
invariable lesson of human nature.
* * * * *
From the wagon lines to which they had marched on the night of July
6th-7th, the batteries moved to Mt. Bernanchon and Guarbecque, and there
the Divisional Artillery concentrated. One day it spent in overhauling,
refitting and inspecting, and on the 9th it entrained at Fouquereuil,
Chocques and Lillers, and moved to the Somme, a unit no longer raw,
inexperienced and untried, but a unit trained and hardened by five
months' trench fighting, now setting off to take part for the first time
in large scale operations, in pitched battle, open fighting and all the
trials and sufferings attendant thereto.