OPERATION'S OF GENERAL TAYLOR IN LOUISIANA--THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY
IRRECOVERABLY LOST TO THE CONFEDERACY--FEDERALS FOILED AT
CHARLESTON--THE DIMINISHED CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH--FINANCIAL
DERANGEMENT--DEFECTIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEM OF THE SOUTH--MR. DAVIS'
LIMITED CONNECTION WITH IT--THE REASONS FOR THE FINANCIAL FAILURE OF
THE CONFEDERACY--INFLUENCE OF SPECULATION--ANOMALOUS SITUATION OF THE
SOUTH--MR. DAVIS' VIEWS OF THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE SOUTH AT THE
BEGINNING OF THE WAR--MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE--BRAGG RETREATS
TO CHATTANOOGA--MORGAN'S EXPEDITION--SURRENDER OF CUMBERLAND
GAP--FEDERAL OCCUPATION OF CHATTANOOGA--BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA--BRAGG'S
EXPECTATIONS--GRANTS OPERATIONS--BRAGG BADLY DEFEATED--PRESIDENT
DAVIS' VIEW OF THE DISASTER--GENERAL BRAGG RELIEVED FROM COMMAND OF
THE WESTERN ARMY--CENSURE OF THIS OFFICER--HIS MERITS AND SERVICES--
THE UNJUST CENSURE OF MR. DAVIS AND GENERAL BRAGG FOR THE REVERSES IN
THE WEST--OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA IN THE LATTER PART OF 1863--CONDITION
OF THE SOUTH AT THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR--SIGNS OF EXHAUSTION--PRESIDENT
DAVIS' RECOMMENDATIONS--PUBLIC DESPONDENCY--THE WORK OF FACTION--ABUSE
OF MR. DAVIS IN CONGRESS--THE CONTRAST BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS
ASSAILANTS--DEFICIENCY OF FOOD--HOW CAUSED--THE CONFEDERACY EVENTUALLY
CONQUERED BY STARVATION.
Though indicating that stage of the war, when began the steady decline of
the Confederacy, the summer of 1863 was not wholly unredeemed by
successes, which, however transient in significance, threw no mean lustre
upon Southern arms.
A series of brilliant operations marked the career of General Richard
Taylor in Lower Louisiana. Preceded by a successful campaign in the
Lafourche region, an expedition was undertaken by General Taylor against
Brashear City, in the latter days of June. A strong and important position
was carried, and eighteen hundred prisoners, with over five millions of
dollars worth of stores, were captured. For some time the hope was
indulged, that this success of General Taylor would compel the abandonment
of the Federal siege of Port Hudson, and that Taylor could also make a
successful diversion in favor of Vicksburg. This hope was disappointed,
and Taylor, not having the strength to cope with the large force of the
enemy sent against him, after the fall of the Mississippi strongholds, was
forced to abandon the country which he had so gallantly won. The valley of
the Mississippi was irrecoverably in Federal possession, and the
Confederacy was able at no subsequent stage of the war, to undertake any
serious enterprise for its redemption.
At Charleston the Federal fleet and land forces continued, during the
summer, their fruitless and expensive attacks. The skill of General
Beauregard, and the firmness of his small command, made memorable the
siege of that devoted city, so hated and coveted by the North, yet among
the last prizes to fall into its hands.
But momentary gleams of hope were insufficient to dispel the shadow of
disaster, which, by midsummer, seemed to have settled upon the fate of the
Confederacy. The violent blow dealt the material capacity of the South by
the surrender of Vicksburg; the diminished prestige, from the serious
check at Gettysburg, in its wondrous career of victory, and the frightful
losses of the Army of Northern Virginia, were immediately followed by a
marked abatement of that unwavering confidence in the ultimate result,
which had previously so stimulated the energy of the South.
The material disability and embarrassment resulting from the possession,
by the enemy, of large sections of the Confederacy, and consequent
contraction of its territorial area; the destruction of property; the
serious disturbance of the whole commercial system of the South, by the
loss of Vicksburg; and the diminished confidence of the public, were
attended by a fatal derangement of the already failing Confederate system
of finance.
In the American war, as in all wars, the question of finance entered
largely into the decision of the result. At an early period many sagacious
minds declared that the contest would finally be resolved into a question
as to which of the belligerents "had the longer purse." In acceptance of
this view, the belief was largely entertained that the financial distress
in the South, consequent upon the heavy reverses of this period, clearly
portended the failure of the Confederacy.
President Davis, since the war, has avowed his appreciation of the
financial difficulties of the South, as a controlling influence in the
failure of the cause. By unanimous consent, the management of the
Confederate finances has been declared to have been defective. The
universal distress attendant upon a depreciated currency, which rarely
improved in seasons of military success, and grew rapidly worse with each
disaster, rendered the financial feature of Mr. Davis' administration,
peculiarly vulnerable to the industry of a class ever on the alert for a
pretext available to excite popular distrust of the President. With entire
justice, we might dismiss this subject, claiming for Mr. Davis the benefit
of the plea which always allows a ruler some exemption from responsibility
for the errors of a subordinate. We have rarely sought to fasten
culpability upon those who differed with him, in some instances, perhaps
where it would have more clearly established his own exculpation. No act
or utterance of Mr. Davis could be urged to show that _he_ ever claimed
for himself the benefit of such a plea. Fidelity to his friends is a trait
in his character, not less worthy of admiration than magnanimity and
forbearance to his foes. His ardent and sympathetic nature doubtless often
condoned the errors of those whose motives he knew to be good; but his
friends can testify that he far more frequently overlooked the asperities
of his enemies.[68]
We have elsewhere explained the appointment of Mr. Memminger, as having
been dictated by other considerations than that of a reliance upon his
special fitness. But while doubting his capacity for his difficult and
anomalous situation, we are not so sure that he exhibited such marked
unfitness as should have forbidden his retention in office, and called for
the appointment of another, with the expectation of a more satisfactory
administration. In the end, yielding to the vast pressure against him, Mr.
Memminger left the cabinet, and Mr. Davis appointed, as his successor, a
gentleman unknown to himself, but recommended as the possessor of
financial talents of a high order. When Mr. Trenholm became Secretary of
the Treasury, the opportunity for reform had long since passed, if,
indeed, such an opportunity existed after the repulse at Gettysburg and
the surrender of Vicksburg. It is hardly within the range of probability,
that, after those reverses, any conceivable ingenuity could have arrested
the downward tendency of Confederate finances. In the history of
Confederate finance, before those disasters, is to be found much
extenuation, if not ample apology, for a system which was imposed by the
force of circumstances and the novelty of the situation, rather than by
the errors of one man, or a number of men.
In his message of December, 1863, Mr. Davis reviewed the subject in all
its phases, as it had been presented up to that period, and sketched the
plan, afterwards adopted by Congress, but without the result hoped for of
increasing the value of the currency, by compulsory funding and large
taxation. His discussion of this subject was always characterized by
perspicuity and force, but finance was that branch of administration with
which he affected the least familiarity, and which he least assumed to
direct. Knowing the profound and unremitting attention which the subject
required, he sought the aid of others competent for the inquiry, which he
had little leisure to pursue.
This subject, during the entire war, was a fruitful theme for the
disquisitions of charlatans. Finance is a subject confessedly intricate,
and but few men in any country are capable of able administration of this
branch of government. Yet the Confederacy swarmed with pretenders,
advocating opposing theories, which their authors, in every case, declared
to be infallible. The Confederate administration neither wanted for
advisers, nor did it fail to seek the advice of those who were reputed to
have financial abilities. Its errors were, to a large degree, shared by
the ablest statesmen of the South.
Criticism is proverbially easy and cheap, after the result is ascertained,
and we now readily see the leading causes of the depreciation of
Confederate money. In the last twelve months of the war, the rapid and
uninterrupted depreciation was occasioned by the want of confidence in the
success of the cause, on the part of those who controlled the value of the
money. Such was the alarm and distrust consequent upon the disasters of
July, 1863, that the Confederate currency is stated to have declined a
thousand per cent., within a few weeks. Previous to that period the
decline was gradual, but far less alarming in its indications. The plan
adopted by the Government, partly in deference to popular prejudice
against direct taxation by the general Government, and partly as a
necessity of the situation--that of credit in the form of paper issues,
followed by the enormous issues necessary to meet the expenses of a war,
increasing daily in magnitude--pampered the spirit of speculation, which,
by the close of the second year, had become almost universal. This latter
influence may safely be declared to have greatly accelerated the
unfortunate result, and the extent of its prevalence reflects an
unpleasant shadow upon the otherwise unmarred fame of the South for
self-denying patriotism.
It is customary to speak of the financial management of the Confederacy in
especial disparagement, when contrasted with that of the North. The
injustice of this contrast, however, is palpable. We are not required to
disparage the Federal financial system--which was, indeed, conducted with
consummate tact and ingenuity--to extenuate the errors, in this respect,
of the Confederacy. The circumstances of the antagonists were altogether
different; the position of the South financially, as in other respects,
was peculiar and anomalous. Completely isolated, with a large territory,
with virtually no specie circulation,[69] hastily summoned to meet the
exigencies of the most gigantic war of modern times, the South had no
alternative but to resort to an entirely artificial, and, to some extent,
untried system of finance. From the outset, the basis of the Confederate
system was the patriotism and the confidence of the people. The first was
nobly steadfast, but the second was necessarily dependent upon military
success. When at last the virtual collapse of the credit indicated the
increasing public despondency, it was plain that a catastrophe was near at
hand.
It has been generally agreed that the only scheme by which the South could
have assured her credit, was to have sent large amounts of cotton to
Europe, during the first year of the war, while the blockade was not
effective. This plan, if successfully carried out, would have given the
Confederacy a cash basis in Europe of several hundred millions in gold, in
consequence of the high prices commanded by cotton afterwards. With even
tolerable management, the Confederacy would thus have been assured means
to meet the necessities of the war. The merit of this plan depended
largely upon its practicability. Mr. Davis approved it, but it is easy to
imagine how--engrossed with his multifarious cares, and occupied in
meeting the pressing exigencies of each day--he lacked opportunity to
mature and execute a measure of so much responsibility.
While the campaign in Mississippi, which terminated so disastrously, was
still pending, General Bragg continued to occupy his position in Southern
Tennessee. Too weak to attack Rosecrans, because of the reduction of his
army, by the reinforcements sent to the Mississippi, Bragg was able merely
to maintain a vigilant observation of his adversary. After the fall of
Vicksburg General Rosecrans received reënforcements sufficient to justify
an advance against the Confederates. After an obstinate resistance the
Confederate commander was flanked by a force, which the superior strength
of his antagonist enabled him to detach, and abandoned a line of great
natural strength, and strongly fortified. This was an important success
to the enemy, who were hereafter able, with much better prospects, to
undertake expeditions against the heart of the Confederacy. General Bragg
extricated his army from a perilous position, and made a successful
retreat to Chattanooga. Auxiliary to the retreat of Bragg was the
diversion made by General John Morgan, which occasioned the detachment of
a portion of Burnside's forces from East Tennessee, which threatened
Bragg's rear. The expedition of Morgan was pushed by that daring officer
through Kentucky and across the Ohio, to the great alarm of the States
upon the border of that river, but ended in the capture of Morgan and
nearly all his command.
A most painful surprise to the South was the surrender of Cumberland Gap,
early in September. This was a serious blow at the whole system of defense
in Tennessee and the adjacent States. A Richmond newspaper declared that
the possession of Cumberland Gap gave the enemy the "key to the back-door
of Virginia and the Confederacy." The officer in command of the position
was severely censured by the country, and though he has since explained
his conduct in terms, which appear to be satisfactory, the impression
prevailed until the end of the war, that the loss of this most important
position was caused by gross misconduct. The comment of President Davis
explains the serious nature of this affair: "The entire garrison,
including the commander, being still held prisoners by the enemy, I am
unable to suggest any explanation of this disaster, which laid open
Eastern Tennessee and South-western Virginia to hostile operations, and
broke the line of communication between the seat of government and Middle
Tennessee. This easy success of the enemy was followed by the advance of
General Rosecrans into Georgia, and our army evacuated Chattanooga."
Thus the coöperating movements of Rosecrans in Middle Tennessee, and of
Burnside in East Tennessee, had the ample reward of expelling the
Confederates from their strong lines of defense in the mountains.
Cumberland Gap controlled the most important line of communication in the
Confederacy. Chattanooga was the portal from which the enemy could debouch
upon the level country of the Gulf and Atlantic States. The capture of
Vicksburg and seizure of the Mississippi Valley, by which the Confederacy
was sundered, was the first stage of conquest. Chattanooga was now the
base from which was to be attempted the next great step of Federal
ambition--the second _bisection_ of the Confederacy.
When Rosecrans advanced into Georgia, after his occupation of Chattanooga,
the aspect of affairs was exceedingly threatening, and it became necessary
to strengthen Bragg sufficiently to enable him to give battle, and thus
check the advance of the enterprising Federal commander. With this view
the corps of Longstreet was temporarily detached from Lee, and sent to
Bragg. This accession to his forces gave General Bragg the opportunity of
winning one of the most brilliant victories of the war. The signal defeat
of Rosecrans was followed by his precipitate retreat into Chattanooga,
closely pressed by Bragg.
For weeks the Federal army was besieged with a good prospect for its
ultimate surrender. The imperiled position of Rosecrans had the effect of
relieving the pressure of invasion at other points, forcing the
concentration, for his relief, of large bodies of troops withdrawn from
the armies in the Mississippi Valley and in Northern Virginia. General
Bragg made an able disposition of his forces in the neighborhood of
Chattanooga, and awaited with confidence the surrender of Rosecrans. He
subsequently said: "These dispositions, faithfully sustained, ensured the
enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage.
_Possessed of the shortest road to his depot, and the one by which
reënforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his
destruction was only a question of time._"
The situation fully justified this statement. So crippled was Rosecrans by
his defeat at Chickamauga, that an attack upon Bragg was out of the
question. The alternative of starvation, or retreat, seemed forced upon
the Federal army. The roads in its rear were in a terrible condition, and
the distance over which its supplies had to be drawn, was sixty miles. At
this critical moment, General Grant, whose command had been enlarged,
after his success at Vicksburg, and now embraced the three main Federal
armies in the West, reached the field of operations. Grant immediately
executed a plan of characteristic boldness, by which he effected a
lodgment on the south side of the Tennessee River, and secured new lines
of communication, thus relieving the beleaguered army. General Longstreet,
to whom the holding of this all-important route was confided, made an
unsuccessful night attack designed to defeat Grant's movement.
Having relieved the Federal army of the apprehension of starvation or a
disastrous retreat, Grant now meditated operations, which, however
hazardous, or however in violation of probability may have been their
success, were fully vindicated by the result. Waiting until he thought his
accumulation of forces sufficient to justify an assault upon the strong
positions of the Confederates, Grant finally made a vigorous and
well-planned attack with nearly his entire force. The result was a
disastrous defeat and retreat of Bragg's army. General Grant claimed, as
the fruits of his victory, seven thousand prisoners and nearly fifty
pieces of artillery.
There were circumstances attending this battle peculiarly discouraging to
the South. These circumstances were thus commented upon by President
Davis:
"After a long and severe battle, in which great carnage was inflicted
on him, some of our troops inexplicably abandoned positions of great
strength, and, by a disorderly retreat, compelled the commander to
withdraw the forces elsewhere successful, and finally to retire with
his whole army to a position some twenty or thirty miles to the rear.
It is believed that if the troops who yielded to the assault had
fought with the valor which they had displayed on previous occasions,
and which was manifested in this battle on the other parts of the
line, the enemy would have been repulsed with very great slaughter,
and our country would have escaped the misfortune, and the army the
mortification of the first defeat that has resulted from misconduct by
the troops."
With this disastrous battle terminated the connection of General Bragg
with the army, which he commanded during a large portion of its varied
career. Fully acknowledging his defeat, General Bragg candidly avowed to
the Government the extent of a reverse, which he declared disabled him
from any serious resistance, should the Federal commander press his
success. At his own request he was relieved, and, seeking recuperation for
his shattered health, was not assigned to duty until February, 1864, when
President Davis ordered him to the discharge of the duties of "Commanding
General," at Richmond, the position held by General Lee before his
transfer to the command of the Army of Northern Virginia.
No commander was more harshly criticised than Bragg, and the unfortunate
career of the Western army, under his command, was an inexhaustible theme
for diatribe and invective from the opponents of the Confederate
administration. Bragg was often declared to be, at once the most
incompetent and unlucky of the "President's favorites." Yet nothing is
more certain than that an impartial review of his military career will
demonstrate General Bragg to have been a soldier of rare and superior
merit. It certainly can not be claimed that his campaigns exhibited the
brilliant and solid achievements of several of those conducted by Lee, or
of the Valley campaigns of Jackson. The great disparity of numbers and
means of the two sections, enabled few Confederate commanders to achieve
the distinction of unmarred success, even before that period of decline
when disaster was the rule, and victory the exception with the Confederate
forces.
But Bragg can not justly be denied the merit of having, with most
inadequate means, long deferred the execution of the Federal conquest of
the West. At the time of his assumption of command, in June, 1862, the
armies of Grant and Buell, nearly double his own aggregate of forces, were
overrunning the northern borders of the Gulf States, and threatening the
very heart of the Confederacy. His masterly combinations, attended by loss
altogether disproportioned to the results accomplished, recovered large
sections of territory, which had been for months the easy prey of the
enemy, and transferred the seat of war to Middle Tennessee. Here he
maintained his position for nearly a year, vigorously assailing the enemy
at every opportunity, constantly menacing his communications, and firmly
holding his important line, in the face of overwhelming odds, while the
Confederate armies in every other quarter were losing ground. Finally,
when forced back by the concentration of Federal forces, released by their
successes elsewhere, Bragg skillfully eluded the combinations for his
destruction, and, at an opportune moment, delivered Rosecrans one of the
most timely and stunning blows inflicted during the war. No fact of the
war is more clearly established than Bragg's exculpation from any
responsibility for the escape of the Federal army from the field of
Chickamauga. His positive commands were disobeyed, his plan of battle
threatened with entire derangement by the errors of subordinates, and the
escape of Rosecrans secured by the same causes. But still more cruel was
the disappointment of Bragg's well-grounded expectation of a successful
siege of Chattanooga. So clear is his exculpation in this case, that no
investigation of facts, severely reflecting upon others, is required.
While the controversy between Bragg and Longstreet was pending, some
disposition was manifested to censure the former for his rejection of a
plan of campaign proposed by Longstreet after the victory of Chickamauga.
The latter officer suggested crossing the Tennessee above Chattanooga, and
then moving upon the enemy's rear, with a view to force him back upon
Nashville. The pregnant criticism of General Bragg quickly disposes of the
suggestion. Said he: "The suggestion of a movement by our right,
immediately after the battle, to the north of the Tennessee, and thence
upon Nashville, requires notice only because it will find a place on the
files of the department. Such a movement was utterly impossible for want
of transportation. Nearly half our army consisted of reënforcements just
before the battle, without a wagon or an artillery horse, and nearly, if
not quite, a third of the artillery horses on the field had been lost. The
railroad bridges, too, had been destroyed to a point south of Ringgold,
and on all the road from Cleveland to Knoxville. To these insurmountable
difficulties were added the entire absence of means to cross the river,
except by fording at a few precarious points too deep for artillery, and
the well-known danger of sudden rises, by which all communication would be
cut off, a contingency which did actually happen a few days after the
visionary scheme was abandoned." General Bragg continues a recitation of
cogent considerations in support of his objections to a plan which he
declares utterly wanting in "military propriety."
The culmination of Bragg's unpopularity was his defeat at Missionary
Ridge. No officer, save Lee, could, by any possibility, have hoped for a
dispassionate judgment by the public, at this desperate stage of the war,
of an affair so calamitous. The real explanation of that battle was
unquestionably contained in the extract from President Davis' message
previously given. Although Bragg could oppose but little more than thirty
thousand troops to the eighty thousand which Grant threw against him, the
strength of his position would have compensated for this disparity, had
his troops fought with the usual spirit of Confederate soldiers.
It was not to be anticipated that the enemies of the President in Congress
and the hostile press would fail to find a pretext upon which to throw the
responsibility upon Mr. Davis. The disaster was declared to have resulted
from the detachment of Longstreet for an expedition into East Tennessee.
It is only necessary to state the facts of the case to show the falsity
and injustice of this criticism. In the first place, as we have already
stated, Bragg's force was sufficient to hold his tremendously strong
position without Longstreet, should his army fight with its usual spirit.
Secondly, Longstreet's corps was a part of Lee's army, detached for a
purely temporary purpose with Bragg, and its absence was a source of
constant anxiety to General Lee. This temporary purpose was well served at
the battle of Chickamauga, which Bragg designed to be a destructive blow,
and which failed in a part of its purpose, through no fault of that
commander.
It was never intended to leave Longstreet in the West any longer than was
necessary to relieve Bragg in his great exigency after the evacuation of
Chattanooga. That result being accomplished, Longstreet was detained for a
few weeks, in the expectation that Rosecrans, driven to desperation by his
necessities, would attempt to retreat, in which event, Longstreet could
perform valuable service in aiding to destroy the Federal army. When
Grant, however, opened the Federal communications, and Longstreet was
foiled in his effort to prevent it, there was no longer a sufficient
reason for his detention so far from Lee. Accordingly, he was sent through
East Tennessee, with the double design of opening communication with
Virginia, where, at any moment, he might be needed, and of clearing East
Tennessee of the forces of Burnside.
Had Longstreet's expedition been successful, it can not be doubted that
the pressure against Bragg would have been immediately relieved, and a
vital section restored to the Confederacy. We can not pause, however, to
review the incidents of General Longstreet's movement, nor to revive the
controversy between himself and a subordinate, evoked by an expedition
whose results exhibited few features of success.
President Davis, better acquainted with the facts of the war than the
critics who so often mislead the public, held General Bragg in that high
estimation to which his unquestioned patriotism and his military qualities
entitled him. Of General Bragg it may be fairly said that he made the most
of his opportunities and his means. If he made retreats, they were always
preceded by bloody fights, and marked by obstinate resistance. If his
constrained and sullen retreats lost territory, they were not comparable
in that respect with that mysterious "strategy" of other commanders in
high favor with the opponents of Mr. Davis, which eventually threatened to
"toll" the enemy to the Atlantic coast, or the Gulf of Mexico, without
once bringing him to a general engagement.
Bragg never feared to stake his fame on the gage of battle, and, if he
sustained reverses, he won many more victories. An educated soldier, he
was also a rigid disciplinarian, and had little toleration for the
demagogism so conspicuous in volunteer armies. This was the occasion of
much of the personal enmity by which he was embarrassed both in and out of
the army. But, whatever the justice of the public condemnation of Bragg,
his period of usefulness in the Western army was at an end. Very soon
afterwards General Joseph E. Johnston took command of the army in Northern
Georgia.
The two armies in Virginia, weakened by the detachments from each sent to
the West, continued inactive until autumn. In October, General Lee
prepared a brilliant campaign, the object of which was to place his army
between General Meade and Washington. Meade, though forced back to the
neighborhood of Manassas and Centreville, had become apprized of Lee's
movement in time to prevent the consummation of the strategy of the
Confederate commander. An incident of the expedition was the severe
repulse of a part of General Hill's command, attended with considerable
loss. Meanwhile, General Imboden, coöperating with the movements of the
main army, captured several hundred prisoners and valuable stores in the
Shenandoah Valley. Early in November, nearly two thousand Confederates
were captured at Rappahannock Station by a movement marked by skill and
gallantry on the part of General Sedgwick. The campaign in Northern
Virginia terminated with a handsome success by the division of General
Edward Johnson over a large detachment from Meade's army at Mine Run. In
December, General Averill, with a force of Federal cavalry, made a
destructive raid into South-western Virginia, and destroyed portions of
the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.
At the close of 1863, there were many signs of the approaching exhaustion
of the South, yet there was good reason to hope that, by a vigorous use of
means yet remaining, the war might be brought to a favorable conclusion.
The peace party of the North, despite the increased strength and
popularity of Mr. Lincoln's administration, resulting from the Federal
successes of the summer, was evidently becoming more bold and defiant. The
whole North, too, was disappointed at the prospect of an indefinite
resistance by the South. Gettysburg and Vicksburg were not followed, as
had been anticipated, by the immediate collapse of the Confederacy. Under
such circumstances, the South had much to anticipate from a bold and
defiant front at the opening of the next campaign. Unquestionably its
resources were less adequate than before, but there was evidently capacity
to prolong the war for an almost indefinite period. Thus, while the
Confederacy could not cherish the hope of daring exploits at the opening
of the campaign, which should again make the enemy apprehensive for his
own homes, there was a well-grounded anticipation of a successful
defensive, which should wear out the enemy's ardor, and again present
opportunities for bold enterprise.
The message of President Davis to Congress, which met early in December,
was one of his ablest productions. Reviewing the entire field of the war,
in its more important phases, it was equally remarkable for its frank
statement of the situation, and for the energetic policy recommended.
There could be no difficulty in comprehending the needs of the Confederacy
at this distressing period. The three great elements of war--men, money,
and subsistence--were now demanded to a greatly increased extent. In
nothing was the campaign of 1863 more fatal, than in the terrible losses
inflicted on the armies of the Confederacy. At the close of the year, the
Army of Northern Virginia, including the absent corps of Longstreet, was
weaker, by more than a third of the force carried into Pennsylvania. The
losses of the Western army had fearfully diminished its strength, and its
frequent disasters had greatly impaired its _morale_. Measures were now
required which should repair the losses, and, if possible, increase the
army beyond its strength at the opening of the previous campaign, in order
to meet the enormous conscription preparing at the North.
President Davis indicated the following methods of adding to the army:
"Restoring to the army all who are improperly absent, putting an end to
substitution, modifying the exemption law, restricting details, and
placing in the ranks such of the able-bodied men now employed as wagoners,
nurses, cooks, and other employés as are doing service, for which the
negroes may be found competent."
These were evidently the last expedients by which the Confederate armies
could be recruited from the white population. By successive enactments
Congress had empowered the President to call into the field all persons
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. The exigency consequent upon
the reverses of the summer had necessitated the requisition of the last
reserves provided by Congress--the class between forty and forty-five.
Conscription had failed to give the effective strength calculated upon.
Each extension of the law exhibited, in the result, an accession of
numbers greatly below the estimate upon which it was based. This was
largely due to the inefficient execution of the law, and to the opposition
which it encountered in many localities. But the results also indicated a
most exaggerated estimate of the available arms-bearing population of the
South. In the latter part of 1863, the rolls of the Adjutant-General's
office in Richmond showed a little more than four hundred thousand men
under arms; and Secretary Seddon stated that, from desertions and other
causes, "not more than a half--never two-thirds--of the soldiers were in
the ranks."
The message of Mr. Davis indicated defective features in the system of
conscription, and suggested improvements as follows:
"On the subject of exemptions, it is believed that abuses can not be
checked unless the system is placed on a basis entirely different from
that now provided by law. The object of your legislation has been, not
to confer privileges on classes, but to exonerate from military duty
such number of persons skilled in the various trades, professions, and
mechanical pursuits, as could render more valuable service to their
country by laboring in their present occupation than by going into the
ranks of the army. The policy is unquestionable, but the result would,
it is thought, be better obtained by enrolling all such persons, and
allowing details to be made of the number necessary to meet the wants
of the country. Considerable numbers are believed to be now exempted
from the military service who are not needful to the public in their
civil vocation.
"Certain duties are now performed throughout the country by details
from the army, which could be as well executed by persons above the
present conscript age. An extension of the limit, so as to embrace
persons over forty-five years, and physically fit for service in
guarding posts, railroads, and bridges, in apprehending deserters,
and, where practicable, assuming the place of younger men detailed for
duty with the nitre, ordnance, commissary, and quartermaster's bureaus
of the War Department, would, it is hoped, add largely to the
effective force in the field, without an undue burden on the
population."
The message further recommended legislation replacing "not only enlisted
cooks, but wagoners, and other employés in the army, by negroes." From
these measures the President expected that the army would be "so
strengthened, for the ensuing campaign, as to put at defiance the utmost
efforts of the enemy."
But the meagre results of conscription revealed not only an excessive
calculation of the numerical strength of the Confederacy; they indicated
the reluctance with which the harsh necessities of the war, in its later
stages, were met. As the war was protracted, popular ardor naturally
waned, and in the presence of losses and reverses, the spirit of voluntary
sacrifice gradually disappeared. Draft and impressment were now required
to obtain the services and the means, which, in the beginning, were
lavishly proffered.
Partially the result of a natural popular weariness of the increasing
exactions of a long and exhaustive struggle, these were also the
legitimate fruits of the distrust so assiduously inculcated by the
fault-finders. When reverses to their armies came with appalling rapidity,
and, in many instances, in spite of the exertions of their ablest and most
popular leaders, the people saw confidence and industry only in their
Government, and that Government they were constantly taught to believe
grossly incompetent and unworthy. Under such circumstances, how could
there be that unity and coöperation, without which the cause was
preordained to failure? In that industry which sought every possible
occasion for censure, that ingenuity which exaggerated every error, that
intemperance which filled the halls of Congress with denunciation, and the
land with clamor and discontent, the North at last found allies which ably
assisted its armies.
More violent, intemperate, and unscrupulous than ever, were the assaults
upon the administration, in that long period of agony which followed the
disasters in Mississippi and Pennsylvania. Such was an appropriate
occasion, when a grief-stricken country implored the unanimity which alone
could bring relief, for agitation, revenge, and invective. In Congress Mr.
Davis was assailed with furious vituperation, because he had refused, at
the instance of a member, to remove Bragg, and place Johnston in command
of the Western army. Yet General Johnston, after a visit to Tennessee,
earnestly advised the President _not_ to remove Bragg, as the _public
interests would suffer by that step_. Almost daily Mr. Davis was assailed
for not having properly estimated the war, in the diatribes of an able
editor, who himself, but a few weeks before hostilities opened, declared
_there would be no war_. Of such a character were the accusers and the
accusations.
If Jefferson Davis courted revenge, he could find ample satisfaction in
the contrast between himself and some of his foremost accusers, which the
sequel has drawn. _He_ fell at last, but only when that cause was lost,
which he unselfishly loved, and which his heart followed to its glorious
grave. His name is already immortal--the embodiment of the heroism, the
virtues, the sufferings, the glory of a people who revere him and scorn
his persecutors. Nor can the South forget that many, who, during her
arduous struggle, constantly assailed her chosen ruler, have since taken
refuge in the camp of those who first conquered, and now seek to degrade
her people.
A source of universal alarm in the South, at this period, was the
deficiency of food. We have elsewhere quoted freely the admonitions of
President Davis respecting the question of supplies, and indicating the
cause which led to so much suffering in the armies of the Confederacy.
Ever since the loss of large sections of Tennessee, in the spring of 1862,
this subject had occasioned anxiety. Without entering into details, it may
be briefly stated, that, with the loss of Kentucky and the larger portion
of Tennessee, the Confederacy lost the main source of its supplies of
meat. As other sections were occupied by the enemy, and communications
were destroyed, the area of the Confederacy became more and more
contracted, and its sources of supply still more limited. Even when
supplies were abundant in many quarters, the armies in the field suffered
actual want, in consequence of the want of transportation, and of the
remoteness of the supplies from the lines of the railroads.
But while the meat in the Confederacy was rapidly diminishing in quantity,
as the Federal armies advanced, and seized or destroyed every thing in the
shape of subsistence, the army was still deprived of supplies which should
have been made available. The unpatriotic practice of hoarding
supplies--a temptation suggested by the rife spirit of speculation,
arising from a redundant and depreciated currency--necessitated the
passage of impressment laws. These laws were practically rendered nugatory
by the inadequate provisions for their execution. In no respect was the
timid and demagogical legislation of the Confederate Congress, so
illustrated as by its adoption of a system of impressment, which
aggravated the very evil it was designed to remedy.
Various expedients were attempted, with partial success, for obtaining
subsistence beyond the limits of the Confederacy. It will be readily seen,
however, how precarious was this dependence. It was impossible for the
Confederacy to maintain its armies, while its resources in every other
respect were rapidly reaching the point of exhaustion. In the end the want
of food proved the most efficient adversary of the South. The final
military catastrophe made the Federal army master of a country already
half conquered by starvation.[70]