CONFEDERATE PROSPECTS AFTER THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE--THE
MILITARY SITUATION--PRIMARY OBJECTS OF THE CONFEDERATES--AFFAIRS IN
THE WEST--A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF SEVERAL PLANS OF CAMPAIGN SUGGESTED
TO THE CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES--VISIONARY STRATEGY--AN OFFENSIVE
CAMPAIGN ADOPTED--THE INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA JUSTIFIED--CONDITION OF
THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA AT THIS PERIOD--THE MOVEMENT FROM THE
RAPPAHANNOCK--LEADING FEATURES OF THE CONFEDERATE PLAN--LEE'S STRATEGY
AGAIN ILLUSTRATED--GETTYSBURG--A FATAL BLOW TO THE SOUTH--LEE RETURNS
TO VIRGINIA--THE SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG--OTHER REVERSES--EXULTATION OF
THE NORTH--THE CONFEDERATE ADMINISTRATION AGAIN ARRAIGNED BY ITS
OPPONENTS--THE CASE OF GENERAL PEMBERTON--POPULAR INJUSTICE TO A
GALLANT OFFICER--A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE SUBJECT--PEMBERTON'S
APPOINTMENT RECOMMENDED BY DISTINGUISHED OFFICERS--HIS ABLE
ADMINISTRATION IN MISSISSIPPI--HIS RESOLUTION TO HOLD VICKSBURG, AS
THE GREAT END OF THE CAMPAIGN--HIS GALLANTRY AND RESOURCES--NOBLE
CONDUCT OF THIS PERSECUTED OFFICER--A FURTHER STATEMENT--THE MISSION
OF VICE-PRESIDENT STEPHENS--ITS OBJECTS--PRESIDENT DAVIS SEEKS TO
ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERINGS OF WAR--MAGNANIMITY AND HUMANITY OF THE
OFFER--PROUD POSITION IN THIS MATTER OF THE SOUTH AND HER RULER--THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DECLINES INTERCOURSE WITH MR. STEPHENS--EXPLANATION
OF ITS MOTIVES--CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MESSRS. DAVIS AND STEPHENS.
The situation of affairs, so eminently favorable to the Confederacy, after
the victory of Chancellorsville, admitted no doubt that the opportune
occasion would be promptly seized, for the delivery of a telling blow,
which should hasten an acknowledgment of Southern independence. A brief
summary of the military situation, at the opening of summer, 1863, will
show the simple and judicious policy, by which the Confederate
administration proposed to make efficient use of its advantages.
The battle of Chancellorsville, followed by the disorganized retreat of
the largest force yet consolidated for the capture of Richmond, and the
signal failure of an attempt, which, at its outset, the North declared to
be conclusive of the fate of the Confederacy, secured the safety of the
Confederate capital, at least, until another campaign could be organized.
Moreover, it tendered to the Confederate authorities the choice of a
vigorous offensive, holding out tempting inducements; or a detachment of a
portion of Lee's army for the relief of other sections of the Confederacy.
With two-thirds of his own force, Lee had repulsed and crippled the
enormous army of Hooker, and it appeared reasonably certain, that the same
force could maintain a successful defensive, while the segment, or its
equivalent, which was absent at Chancellorsville, might be sent, for a
temporary purpose, to Bragg, in Tennessee, or to the relief of Pemberton
in Vicksburg.
At the opening of spring the primary objects of the Confederacy were the
safety of Richmond, the safety of Vicksburg--the key to its tenure of the
Mississippi Valley--and the holding of its defensive line in Middle and
East Tennessee, the barrier between the enemy and the vitals of the
Confederacy. The first of these objects was amply secured by the victory
of Chancellorsville, leaving to the main Confederate army, its own choice
of the field of future operations.
In the Western Department, commanded since December, 1862, by General
Joseph E. Johnston, the situation was less promising, though by no means
forbidding hope of a favorable solution. General Bragg maintained a
somewhat precarious defensive against Rosecrans, who confronted the
Confederate commander, with an army much larger than that with which he
had fought the battle of Murfreesboro'. General Pemberton, after a series
of actions, had retired within the lines of Vicksburg, where he was
closely besieged by General Grant with a numerous army--the Federal fleet
in the river, meanwhile, continuing its bombardment. The characteristic
stubbornness of Grant, aided by his ample force, made evident the ultimate
fate of Vicksburg and Pemberton's army, either by famine, or the assaults
of the enemy, unless succor should come in the shape of a demonstration
against the besieging army, with which the garrison might be expected to
coöperate. Not long after Pemberton's retirement into Vicksburg, General
Johnston reached Mississippi and began the collection of a force, by which
it was expected that the besieged stronghold and its garrison would be
relieved.
But while the situation in the West thus seemed to invite the presence of
a portion of the army of Northern Virginia, relieved of any immediate
danger from its antagonist, there were cogent considerations in behalf of
another policy which was adopted. Two weeks, at least, would have been
required, in the indifferent condition of the Southern railroads, for the
transportation of a force from Virginia, competent to enable Bragg to
assume the aggressive. A much longer period would have been required to
transfer to Jackson, such a force as General Johnston would have deemed
sufficient to justify an attack upon Grant. Besides, the government was
fully satisfied, that the reënforcements sent to Johnston would soon
enable him to make an effective demonstration against the besieging army,
which, sustained by a simultaneous attack by Pemberton in front, would
have a reasonable prospect of success.
The project of a direct reënforcement to Johnston, from Lee's army, was
speedily abandoned, and the more practicable plan of reënforcing Bragg was
also dismissed. Nothing whatever was to be expected from a victory by
Bragg over Rosecrans, unless it could be made a _decisive_ victory,
ensuring either the destruction of the Federal army, or the complete
abandonment of its advanced line in Tennessee, for which it had paid such
heavy toll. Such a result, necessitating the reënforcement of Rosecrans
from Grant, meanwhile, after the victory had been won, troops being sent
to Johnston from Bragg, was indeed brilliant to contemplate. Or there was
another prospect equally agreeable. When Rosecrans had been defeated
troops might be sent to capture Fort Pillow, on the Mississippi, which,
cutting off Grant's supplies from the North, as did Port Hudson from the
South, would compel the Federal army at Vicksburg to fight for its
subsistence, and under most discouraging circumstances. In addition to
these prospects, there was also the choice of a movement for the complete
redemption of Kentucky and Tennessee.
These brilliant designs of a visionary and vaporing strategy, abundant in
the Confederacy during the war, and now ostentatiously paraded by the
cheap wisdom of retrospection, lacked, however, the essential feature of
practicability. To have reënforced Bragg sufficiently from Lee's army, to
have enabled him to undertake the offensive, with any prospect of the
complete success necessary, would have weakened the army in Virginia to
such an extent, as to seriously endanger Richmond. Even though Bragg were
thus sufficiently reënforced to defeat a numerous army, led by an able
commander, and occupying a position of great strength, a full month would
have been required to accomplish the results indicated. Waiving all
consideration of the incertitude of battle, and assuming that success
would attend every movement of the Confederate army, what reasonable
calculation would enable Bragg to have gotten his forces in readiness, and
marched them either into Kentucky to Fort Pillow, or to Jackson, in time
to have saved Vicksburg? But, apart from the folly of so weakening Lee, as
to endanger Richmond (which would have been immediately assailed by
Hooker, with his command of ninety thousand men, in coöperation with the
forces at Suffolk, Fortress Monroe, and Winchester--an aggregate of more
than forty thousand more), to undertake operations so doubtful and
hazardous, was the consideration of the promising inducements for an
offensive campaign in the East.
President Davis and General Lee were concurrent in their convictions of
the wisdom of a campaign which should drive the enemy from Virginia,
locate the army in an abundant and hostile country, and compensate for any
disasters which might be sustained in the West, by an overwhelming defeat
in the enemy's country of his main army, which at once covered his capital
and the approaches to his large cities.
This bold and brilliant conception was equally justified by the situation,
and consistent with that able military policy which was throughout
characteristic of the Confederate authorities, and based upon the only
theory on which a weak power can be successfully defended against
invasion.
The strategic theory which dictated the invasion of Pennsylvania was that
of the "defensive, with offensive returns," made forever famous by its
triumphant practice by Frederick the Great--the favorite theory of
Napoleon--not less signally illustrated by Jackson's Valley campaign, and
grandly executed by Lee in his irresistible onset upon Pope.
Twitted by the newspapers for their infatuation with the defensive
attitude, and condemned by the voice of the public, for the maintenance of
a policy which continually subjected the soil of the South to the
devastations of the enemy, the Confederate authorities, neither in the
invasion of Maryland, in 1862, nor in the invasion of Pennsylvania,
yielded merely to public clamor. In both instances President Davis and
General Lee were governed by the sound military considerations, which in
each case justified the assumption of the offensive. Nothing is more
universally conceded than the ultimate subjection of a people who permit
themselves to be forced always on the defensive. On the other hand, no
blows have been so telling in warfare, as those delivered by an antagonist
who, lately on the defensive, at the opportune moment, when the foe is
stunned by defeat, assumes a skillful and vigorous offensive.
It was now the third year of the war, and for more than twelve months no
considerable success had rewarded the enormous sacrifices and expenditures
of the North. The fluctuating sentiment, characteristic of that section,
had settled down into a feeling of indifference and distrust, beyond which
there was but one step to the abandonment of the war as a hopeless
experiment. The evident apprehension, by the Federal Government, of an
invasion of Pennsylvania, attended by a ruinous defeat of Hooker's army, a
result which both sides considered probable, plainly demonstrated, that
the virtual termination of the war would be the reward of a successful
assumption of the offensive by the Confederates.
A more favorable conjuncture, for a final trial with its old antagonist,
could not have been desired by the Army of Northern Virginia. The
invincible veterans of Longstreet, oftener victors than the Tenth Legion
of Cæsar, had rejoined their companions, who boasted the additional
honors of Chancellorsville. Reënforcements from other quarters were
added,[61] and the Army of Northern Virginia, a compact and puissant
force, seventy thousand strong, which had never yet known defeat,
instinctively expected the order for advance into the enemy's country.
Never was the _morale_ of the army so high, never had it such confidence
in its own prowess, and in the resources of its great commander, and never
was intrusted to its valor a mission so grateful to its desires, as that
tendered by President Davis, "to force the enemy to fight for their own
capital and homes."
Under Lee were trusted lieutenants, whose fame, like that of their
followers, was world-wide, and whose laurels were a part of the unnumbered
triumphs of the matchless valor of that noble army. Longstreet, the Lannes
of the South, was again at the head of his trained corps--the assembled
chivalry of the South, in whose exploits every State of the Confederacy
claimed a glory peculiarly its own. The bronzed veterans of Jackson, who
had shared the glory of their immortal leader from Manassas to
Chancellorsville, now followed Ewell, the maimed hero, whom Jackson had
named as his successor. Under Hill, the youngest of the corps commanders,
were men worthy of a leader who, in twelve months, had filled the
successive grades from Colonel to Lieutenant General. The cavalry was
still intrusted to Stuart, that bold, able chief, and "rarely gallant and
noble gentleman, well supporting by his character the tradition that royal
blood flowed in his veins." With such leaders, and with thoroughly tried
and efficient subordinate officers, improved transportation, equipment and
clothing, and with numbers approaching nearer an equality with the
Federal army, than at any other period, the Army of Northern Virginia no
more doubted, than did its commander and the Government, that it was at
the outset of a campaign brilliant and decisive beyond parallel in its
history.
About the middle of May, General Lee visited Richmond, when the general
features of the campaign were determined. The movement from the camps near
Fredericksburg and the Rapidan, commenced early in June. The incipient
feature of General Lee's plan was a flank movement, while still confronted
by the army of the enemy--perhaps the most delicate and difficult problem
in war--by which, leaving the south bank of the Rappahannock, he sought to
draw the Federal army away from its position. To meet the contingency of a
movement by the enemy in the direction of Richmond, A. P. Hill, with his
_corps d'armée_, was left near Fredericksburg. That skillful officer ably
executed his instructions, checking the Federal demonstrations near his
lines, and concealing the absence of the main body of the army until the
advance was well under way. General Stuart fully performed his important
part of covering the movements of the infantry, by seizing the mountain
passes, and detaining the advance of the enemy, in the execution of which
he fought several fierce cavalry engagements, winning them all with
inferior forces. The army was marched through an abundant country, not
desolated by war, and affording good roads. Important incidents of the
advance were the capture of Winchester, Berryville, and Martinsburg, by
the forces of Ewell, with their garrisons, aggregating seven thousand men,
and considerable material of war.
These brilliant results of Lee's strategy were accomplished with wonderful
regularity and promptitude, and were attended with inconsiderable loss.
Crossing the Potomac, the second stage of the campaign was the occupation
of Western Maryland--the least friendly section of the State--where the
army could be abundantly supplied, and the important objects of destroying
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the Cumberland Canal, so valuable to
the enemy, could be accomplished. The next step was to advance into
Pennsylvania, capturing large supplies much needed by the army, occupying
several large towns of that State, and destroying communications--meanwhile
the army living on the enemy, and kept well in hand for a general
engagement, _whenever battle could be advantageously offered_. In the
execution of this portion of the plan, an extensive and fertile section of
Pennsylvania was occupied, strong detachments were pushed far into the
interior, and a movement against Harrisburg was in preparation, when the
advance of the Federal army induced General Lee to concentrate his forces
for battle.
The consummate strategy of Lee had now made him apparently master of the
situation, and gave him the option of tendering or declining a grand and
decisive engagement. It is impossible to overestimate the generalship,
which, within twenty-five days, had transferred an army, in the presence
of the enemy, from the Rappahannock to the interior of Pennsylvania,
making large captures _en route_, and inflicting heavy damage upon the
Federal communications, without being even momentarily arrested. Never
once had been relaxed the grasp of that master-hand which controlled the
army in all its movements. Its various parts, within easy supporting
distance, were clearly so disposed, as to be readily assembled, to meet
the exigency that was inevitable. When Lee drew in his several columns
around Gettysburg, the South confident in the invincibility of the army,
and in the genius of its leader, never doubted the issue of the grand
trial of arms which was at hand. With more than apprehension the North
awaited the fate of the army, upon which its last hope of security rested.
A defeat of the Army of the Potomac now would signify, not a check in a
boastful advance upon Richmond, but the capture of Washington, the
presence of the avenging columns of Lee upon the banks of the
Delaware--perhaps of the dreaded Stuart upon the Hudson.
It was contemplated that the invasion of Pennsylvania would result in a
decisive battle. Indeed, that result was inevitable, unless the Federal
authorities should unresistingly submit to the invasion--an event not for
a moment to be anticipated. But a vital feature in the theory of the
invasion was that the position of Lee would necessitate an advance against
him by the Federal commander, leaving to Lee the choice of time and place
for giving battle. The calculation was that Lee would be master of the
situation at all times, as indeed he undoubtedly was until the engagement
of Gettysburg was joined. We are not here at liberty to discuss the
details of that battle, or to consider how far it was a departure from, or
in pursuance of the original design of the Confederate campaign.[62] If
competent criticism shall condemn the tactics of Lee at Gettysburg, he
has yet disarmed censure by the surpassing magnanimity with which he
assumed the responsibility.
The great joy of the North did not exaggerate the terrible blow sustained
by the Confederacy in the failure of the Pennsylvania campaign. It was the
last serious demonstration upon Federal soil undertaken by the South--all
movements of an offensive character subsequently undertaken being merely
raids or diversions, designed to give relief to the sorely-pressed
Confederate capital. It imposed upon the South the cruel necessity of a
continuation of the war upon its own soil--a precarious defensive, with a
capacity of resistance greatly diminished.
Gettysburg marked the most serious step in that decline of Confederate
fortunes which the fall of Jackson, in the moment of his greatest triumph,
so ominously presaged.[63]
Yet the condition of Lee's army was far from desperate on the morning of
the 4th of July, when it still confronted its antagonist, neither
evincing a disposition to attack. Retiring in perfect order, and bringing
off his extensive trains and seven thousand prisoners, he tendered the
enemy battle at Hagerstown, while making preparations to recross the
Potomac. General Meade, an able and prudent soldier, made as vigorous a
pursuit as the crippled condition of his army would permit. In a short
time General Lee was once more upon the lines of the Rapidan, and General
Meade soon took position upon the Rappahannock. Here the campaign
terminated, and the two armies, like giants exhausted by a mighty wrestle,
gladly availed themselves of a season of repose.
But Gettysburg did not complete the agony of the South. The disastrous
failure of the most prodigious and promising enterprise, undertaken by its
largest, and heretofore invincible army, was simultaneous with an event
hardly less fearful in its consequences. On the fourth of July, the
garrison of Vicksburg, reduced to the point of starvation, surrendered to
the persevering and indomitable Grant. This event signified the loss of an
army of twenty-five thousand men, the possession by the enemy of the
Confederate Gibraltar of the Mississippi Valley, the loss of all tenure
upon the great river by the South, and the severance of the Confederacy.
Port Hudson, with its garrison of five thousand men, being no longer
tenable, after the fall of Vicksburg, was immediately surrendered to the
besieging army of General Banks. The sum of Confederate disasters in the
summer of 1863, was completed by the failure of the attempt to capture
Helena, Arkansas, followed by the capture of Little Rock, and Federal
control of the important valley in which it is situated.
Within ninety days the South was brought from the hope of almost instant
independence to the certainty of a long, bitter, and doubtful struggle.
Its armies terribly shattered, its resources in men and means apparently
almost exhausted, it seemed for a time doubtful whether the Confederacy
was capable of longer endurance of the terrible ordeal. The exultation of
the North was proportionate to the extent of its victories. A new lease
was given to the war. Confidence was fully restored, and the Federal
Government could now make no demand, that would be thought extravagant,
upon the energies of the North, for the promotion of the object it had so
much at heart. But a few months sufficed to show that the constancy and
fortitude of the South was still capable of a desperate struggle with the
power and determination of the North.
This period of misfortune and apprehension was signalized by a most
determined arraignment of the Confederate administration. It is worthy of
remark, however, that in all the embittered censure visited upon President
Davis, for his alleged responsibility for the crushing reverses of the
summer campaign, there was avowed but little censure of the most fatal of
those disasters--the failure of the movement into Pennsylvania. The
privilege of assailing Mr. Davis with or without reason, did not include
the privilege to condemn Lee and his army.
In the case of Vicksburg circumstances were assumed to be different.
Without even waiting for the facts, or for any explanation of that
terrible calamity, General Pemberton was accused of having betrayed his
command. He was of Northern birth, and he had surrendered on the fourth of
July--such was the evidence of Pemberton's treason. Despite the fact that
Johnston was known to be in the neighborhood with a force collected for
the relief of Vicksburg, and though it had been plain to the country for
weeks, that Vicksburg could not be saved, except by a successful
demonstration by that force, it was not admitted among the possibilities
of the case, that Johnston[64] shared the responsibility for the disaster.
When, however, the Federal accounts revealed the gallant defense made by
Pemberton, and thus put to shame the unworthy insinuation of treachery,
the censure of that unfortunate commander and the President assumed
another direction. Pemberton, it was asserted, was notoriously
incompetent, so proven, and so represented to the President before his
assignment to command in Mississippi; and the indignation of the country
was invoked upon the most signal instance of favoritism yet exhibited. The
extent to which this censure of Mr. Davis was successful, may be
estimated, when it is stated that no act of his administration so
imperiled his popularity as did the appointment of General Pemberton. Yet
it is undeniable that this was the result of the unfortunate sequel at
Vicksburg, and dictated by popular passion in a moment of terrible
disappointment, rather than by any sufficient reason ever urged to show
that the appointment was unwise and undeserved.
Sustained by the recommendations of several of the first officers in the
Confederate army, President Davis made Pemberton a Lieutenant-General, and
assigned him to the command of the Department of Mississippi. The command
was one of vital importance to the country, and within its limits were
the home and all the possessions of Mr. Davis. In October, 1862, General
Pemberton took charge of his department, finding it in a most disordered
and embarrassing condition. His administration was of a character to give
great satisfaction to the Government, and its fruits were speedily
realized in the thorough and efficient reorganization of an army, but
lately defeated, the improved efficiency of its various departments, and
the successful defense of an extensive district, with forty thousand men,
against the armies of Grant and Banks, the smallest of which nearly
equaled the entire force of Pemberton. Indeed, it can hardly be alleged
that the administration of General Pemberton, previous to the siege of
Vicksburg, was faulty or unsatisfactory. With what justice, then, can it
be charged that Mr. Davis retained in command an officer proven to be
incompetent?
In the reports of Generals Johnston and Pemberton, written from different
stand-points, and each with the object of vindicating its author, the
operations which led to the retirement of the latter within the lines of
Vicksburg were elaborately discussed. It is at least safe to state that
General Pemberton's reasons are as forcibly stated in explanation of his
own conduct, as are General Johnston's in demonstration of the errors of
his subordinate. Pemberton was controlled in all his movements by the
paramount purpose of holding Vicksburg, the last obstruction to the
enemy's free navigation of the Mississippi, and the connecting link
between the two great divisions of the Confederacy. If he had abandoned
Vicksburg, with a view to save his army, and refused to stand a siege, can
it be reasonably supposed that his assailants would have been more
merciful? His mission was to save Vicksburg and the Valley of the
Mississippi, and, when forced back by the overwhelming numbers of Grant,
he preferred even to risk his army, rather than to surrender the objects
of the whole campaign without an effort.
During the siege, the engineering skill of General Pemberton, and his
fertility of expedients were conspicuously displayed. Works, which, under
the unceasing and concentrated fire of hundreds of guns, were demolished,
re-appeared, in improved forms, which only consummate ingenuity could have
devised. Works built to withstand guns used in ordinary warfare were found
wholly inadequate to resist the heavy metal of the enemy; and, subjected
to the incessant and galling fire of musketry, the artillery could with
difficulty be worked. But the energy and resources of General Pemberton
met even these difficulties. The position of the pieces was constantly
changing; embankments disappeared under the enemy's fire; but the
Confederate artillery would still be found in position, and stronger than
before.
But the skill of the commander and the heroic endurance of the garrison
were unavailing. From the first, relief from without was expected. For
forty-eight days this hope stimulated the commander and the garrison, and
General Pemberton subsequently declared that he "would have lived upon an
ounce a day, and have continued to meet the assaults of all Grant's army,
rather than have surrendered the city, until General Johnston had realized
or relinquished that hope." When the hope of aid was finally abandoned,
the surrender of Vicksburg was simply a question of time and honor. The
alternative was either to capitulate or attempt to cut through the enemy's
lines. In a council of his officers, Pemberton favored the latter plan,
but yielded to the views of the majority.
The case of General Pemberton was a striking instance of public
ingratitude. Vindicating his devotion to the cause of the South, by
surrendering his commission in the Federal service, turning his back upon
his kindred, and leaving a large property in the country of the enemy, he
was stigmatized by the very people in whose cause he had made these
sacrifices. His loyalty, capacity, and fidelity were questioned, even
while he was in the front of death. His noble reply to these accusations
can never be forgotten. Said he to his troops: "You have been told that I
was disloyal and incompetent, and that I would sell Vicksburg. _Follow
me_, and you shall see _at what price_ I shall sell it." The story of the
devotion shown at Vicksburg is no mean one in the history of the
Confederacy. But the great qualities of this abused man have even a nobler
testimony than the gallantry of that defense. Convinced that the cloud of
prejudice and misrepresentation which followed him, rendered useless to
the cause his services in high position, he tendered his resignation as a
Lieutenant-General, and requested to be ordered to duty with his original
rank of Lieutenant-Colonel of Artillery.[65]
When the facts belonging to the unfortunate campaign in Mississippi were
made known, the censure of Pemberton was rather for what he _failed to
do_, than _what he had done_. But suppose the same test should be applied
to General Johnston; would there not be found an equal wanting of
_results_? If Johnston was powerless to make even a diversion with more
than twenty thousand men, (his force at the time of Pemberton's
surrender,) how much more helpless was Pemberton to check Grant?
A dispassionate and careful inquiry will demonstrate that the operations
of General Pemberton, antecedent to the siege of Vicksburg, are far less
censurable than was assumed by his assailants. There can be no manner of
doubt, that if worthy of blame, he should not be visited with the whole
responsibility. It is difficult to imagine how Pemberton could have
adopted a different course, consistently with the main purpose of the
campaign--which was to prevent the capture of Vicksburg. It is certain
that he would have been doubly condemned, if he had executed a safe
retreat, and abandoned the stronghold without an effort to save it.
A sufficient reply to the statement that Pemberton was appointed without
the desirable evidence of fitness, is that the occasion was one precluding
the employment of any officer whose capacity for such a command had been
proven by ample trial. Every officer of established merit was then in a
position from which he could not be spared. The presence of Lee in
Virginia was deemed necessary by the whole country. The most popular of
his lieutenants (Longstreet) was then freely criticised for an assumed
failure in a recent independent command; and, besides, he was obviously
needed in the Pennsylvania campaign. Beauregard was also thought to be in
his appropriate place, in charge of the coast defenses; and, indeed, it
was next to impossible to avoid the employment of a comparatively untried
commander in some important position. The confidence of Mr. Davis in
Pemberton, too, was amply sustained by the testimony of officers, in whose
judgment the country confided.
But Pemberton _failed_, and it was the misfortune of the President to
have conferred distinction upon an unsuccessful commander. Waiving all
discussion of the extent to which Pemberton may be justified, and even
conceding the appointment to have been a bad one, let us remember how few
really capable commanders are produced by even the greatest wars. Was
President Davis to call twenty into existence, fit to command armies, when
Napoleon declared his armies did not afford half a dozen? Let it be
remembered, too, that it was his penetration that sustained Lee, Sidney
Johnston and Jackson, in the face of popular clamor; that _he_ rewarded,
with suitable acknowledgment, the skill and gallantry of Ewell, Early,
Stuart, Gordon, Longstreet, and Hood; of Breckinridge, Cleburne, Magruder,
Morgan, and others whose names make up the brilliant galaxy of Confederate
heroes.[66]
That President Davis was tenacious of his opinions is unquestionably true,
and his firm grasp of his purposes was the explanation of his ascendancy
over other minds, and a leading attribute of his fitness for his position.
But this strenuous adhesion to a settled aim, characteristic of all men
born for influence, is a very different quality from that unreasoning
zealotry which belongs to weak minds. If, indeed, the favoritism of Mr.
Davis _lost_ Vicksburg, with equal justice, it may be claimed that it
_won_ the Seven Days' victories, Manassas, Fredericksburg, and
Chancellorsville.
An interesting event in the history of this period of the war, was the
unsuccessful mission of Vice-President Stephens, to the Federal
authorities, designed, as explained by President Davis, "to place the war
upon the footing of such as are waged by civilized people in modern
times." The annexed correspondence requires hardly a word of explanation.
Consistent with the forbearance and humanity, with which Mr. Davis had
endeavored to prevent war, by negotiation, was this effort to soften its
rigors and to abate the bitterness which it had then assumed.
Recent atrocities of the Federal authorities[67] had compelled the
Confederate Government to seriously entertain the purpose of retaliation.
Reluctant to adopt a course which would remove the last restraint upon the
spirit of cruelty and revenge, making the war a system of unmitigated
barbarism upon both sides, President Davis determined to make an earnest
appeal to the humanity of the Federal authorities. In addition to this
object the mission of Mr. Stephens sought the arrangement of all disputes
between the governments, respecting the cartel of exchange, upon a
permanent and humane basis, by which the soldiers of the two armies should
be sent to their homes, instead of being confined in military prisons.
To make the mission more acceptable to the Federal Government, President
Davis removed every obstacle to intercourse upon terms of equality, and
selected a gentleman of high position, of known philanthropy and
moderation, and from several reasons likely to obtain an audience of the
Federal authorities. The choice of time was not less indicative of the
magnanimity of Mr. Davis. The Confederate army was then in Pennsylvania,
apparently upon the eve of a victory already assured, and which, if
gained, would have placed it in possession of the Federal capital and the
richest sections of the North. At such a moment, so promising in
opportunity of ample vengeance for the ravages and desolation, which
every-where marked the presence of the Federal armies, the Confederate
President tendered his noble plea in behalf of civilization and humanity.
With rare justice has it been said, that this position of Mr. Davis
"merited the applause of the Christian world."
Mr. Stephens was contemptuously denied even a hearing. The sequel soon
revealed the explanation of the conduct of the Federal Government, by
which it became doubly chargeable for the sufferings of a protracted war,
in declining to aid in the abatement of its horrors, and by abruptly
closing the door against all attempts at negotiation. General Meade had
repulsed General Lee at Gettysburg, while Mr. Stephens was near Fortress
Monroe. Flushed with triumph and insolent in the belief that Lee's army
could not escape destruction, the Federal authorities declared such
intercourse with "rebels" to be "inadmissable." In other words, detention
of the Confederate prisoners, and outrages upon the Southern people, were
part of a political and military system at Washington, and _would be
persisted in_. At subsequent stages of the war were seen the objects of
this policy, which the Federal Government virtually proclaimed, and which
it persistently adhered to.
The correspondence between President Davis and Vice-President Stephens
proudly vindicates the humanity and magnanimity of the South. It is alone
a sufficient reply to the cant of demagogues and the ravings of
conscience-stricken fanatics, over the falsely-called "Rebel barbarities."
OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE.
RICHMOND, July 2, 1863.
_Hon. Alexander H. Stephens, Richmond, Va._--
SIR: Having accepted your patriotic offer to proceed, as a military
commissioner, under flag of truce, to Washington, you will receive
herewith your letter of authority to the Commander-in-chief of the
army and navy of the United States.
This letter is signed by me as Commander-in-chief of the Confederate
land and naval forces.
You will perceive, from the terms of the letter, that it is so worded
as to avoid any political difficulties in its reception. Intended
exclusively as one of those communications between belligerents, which
public law recognizes as necessary and proper between hostile forces,
care has been taken to give no pretext for refusing to receive it, on
the ground that it would involve a tacit recognition of the
independence of the Confederacy.
Your mission is simply one of humanity, and has no political aspect.
If objection is made to receiving your letter, on the ground that it
is not addressed to Abraham Lincoln, as President, instead of
Commander-in-chief, etc., then you will present the duplicate letter,
which is addressed to him as President, and signed by me, as
President. To this latter, objection may be made, on the ground that I
am not recognized to be President of the Confederacy. In this event,
you will decline any further attempt to confer on the subject of your
mission, as such conference is admissable only on the footing of
perfect equality. My recent interviews with you have put you so fully
in possession of my views, that it is scarcely necessary to give you
any detailed instructions, even were I, at this moment, well enough to
attempt it.
My whole purpose is, in one word, to place this war on the footing of
such as are waged by civilized people in modern times; and to divest
it of the savage character which has been impressed on it by our
enemies, in spite of all our efforts and protests.
War is full enough of unavoidable horrors, under all its aspects, to
justify, and even to demand, of any Christian rulers who may be
unhappily engaged in carrying it on, to seek to restrict its
calamities, and to divest it of all unnecessary severities.
You will endeavor to establish the cartel for the exchange of
prisoners on such a basis as to avoid the constant difficulties and
complaints which arise, and to prevent, for the future, what we deem
the unfair conduct of our enemies, in evading the delivery of the
prisoners who fall into their hands; in retarding it by sending them
on circuitous routes, and by detaining them, sometimes for months, in
camps and prisons; and in persisting in taking captives
non-combatants.
Your attention is also called to the unheard-of conduct of Federal
officers, in driving from their homes entire communities of women and
children, as well as of men, whom they find in districts occupied by
their troops, for no other reason than because these unfortunates are
faithful to the allegiance due to their States, and refuse to take an
oath of fidelity to their enemies.
The putting to death of unarmed prisoners has been a ground of just
complaint in more than one instance, and the recent execution of
officers of our army in Kentucky, for the sole cause that they were
engaged in recruiting service in a State which is claimed as still one
of the United States, but is also claimed by us as one of the
Confederate States, must be repressed by retaliation, if not
unconditionally abandoned, because it would justify the like execution
in every other State of the Confederacy; and the practice is
barbarous, uselessly cruel, and can only lead to the slaughter of
prisoners on both sides--a result too horrible to contemplate, without
making every effort to avoid it.
On these and all kindred subjects, you will consider your authority
full and ample to make such arrangements as will temper the present
cruel character of the contest; and full confidence is placed in your
judgment, patriotism, and discretion, that while carrying out the
objects of your mission, you will take care that the equal rights of
the Confederacy be always preserved.
Very respectfully,
[Signed] JEFFERSON DAVIS.
RICHMOND, 8th July, 1863.
_His Excellency Jefferson Davis_--
SIR: Under the authority and instructions of your letter to me of the
2d instant, I proceeded on the mission therein assigned, without
delay. The steamer Torpedo, commanded by Lieutenant Hunter Davidson,
of the navy, was put in readiness, as soon as possible, by order of
the Secretary of the Navy, and tendered for the service. At noon, on
the 3d, she started down James River, hoisting and bearing a flag of
truce after passing City Point. The nest day, the 4th, at about one
o'clock P. M., when within a few miles of Newport News, we were met by
a small boat of the enemy, carrying two guns, which also raised a
white flag before approaching us. The officer in command informed
Lieutenant Davidson that he had orders from Admiral Lee, on board the
United States flag-ship Minnesota, lying below, and then in view, not
to allow any boat or vessel to pass the point near which he was
stationed, without his permission. By this officer, I sent to Admiral
Lee a note, stating my objects and wishes, a copy of which is hereto
annexed, marked A. I also sent to the admiral, to be forwarded,
another note, in the same language, addressed to the officer in
command of the United States forces at Fort Monroe. The gunboat
proceeded immediately to the Minnesota with these dispatches, while
the Torpedo remained at anchor. Between three and four o'clock P. M.,
another boat came up to us, bearing the admiral's answer, which is
hereunto annexed, marked B. We remained at or about this point in the
river until the 6th instant, when, having heard nothing further from
the admiral, at 12 o'clock M., on that day, I directed Lieutenant
Davidson again to speak the gunboat on guard, and to hand the officer
in command another note to the admiral. This was done. A copy of this
note is appended, marked C. At half past two o'clock P. M., two boats
approached us from below, one bearing an answer from the admiral to my
note to him of the 4th. This answer is annexed, marked D. The other
boat bore the answer of Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Ludlow, to my
note of the 4th, addressed to the officer in command at Fort Monroe. A
copy of this is annexed, marked E. Lieutenant-Colonel Ludlow also came
up in person in the boat that brought his answer to me, and conferred
with Colonel Ould, on board the Torpedo, upon some matters he desired
to see him about in connection with the exchange of prisoners.
From the papers appended, embracing the correspondence referred to, it
will be seen that the mission failed from the refusal of the enemy to
receive or entertain it, holding the proposition for such a conference
"inadmissable."
The influences and views that led to this determination, after so long
a consideration of the subject, must be left to conjecture. The reason
assigned for the refusal by the United States Secretary of War, to
wit: "that the customary agents and channels are considered adequate
for needful military communications and conferences," to one
acquainted with the facts, seems not only unsatisfactory, but very
singular and unaccountable, for it is certainly known to him that
these very agents, to whom he evidently alludes, heretofore agreed
upon in a former conference, in reference to the exchange of
prisoners, (one of the subjects embraced in your letter to me,) are
now, and have been for some time, distinctly at issue on several
important points. The existing cartel, owing to these disagreements,
is virtually suspended, so far as the exchange of officers on either
side is concerned. Notices of retaliation have been given on both
sides.
The efforts, therefore, for the very many and cogent reasons set forth
in your letter of instructions to me, to see if these differences
could not be removed, and if a clearer understanding between the
parties, as to the general conduct of the war, could not be arrived
at, before this extreme measure should be resorted to by either party,
was no less in accordance with the dictates of humanity than in strict
conformity with the usages of belligerents in modern times. Deeply
impressed as I was with these views and feelings, in undertaking the
mission, and asking the conference, I can but express my profound
regret at the result of the effort made to obtain it; and I can but
entertain the belief, that if the conference sought had been granted,
mutual good could have been effected by it; and if this war, so
unnatural, so unjust, so unchristian, and so inconsistent with every
fundamental principle of American constitutional liberty, "must needs"
continue to be waged against us, that at least some of its severer
horrors, which now so eminently, threaten, might have been avoided.
Very respectfully,
ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS.