RESPECT OF MANKIND FOR THE SOUTH--THE MOST PROSPEROUS PERIOD OF THE
WAR--HOW MR. DAVIS CONTRIBUTED TO THE DISTINCTION OF THE SOUTH--
FACTION SILENCED--THE EUROPEAN ESTIMATE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS--HOW HE
DIGNIFIED THE CAUSE OF THE SOUTH--HIS STATE PAPERS--HIS ADMINISTRATION
OF CIVIL MATTERS--THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS--MR. DAVIS'
OBSERVANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS--ARBITRARY ADMINISTRATION OF
MR. LINCOLN--MR. DAVIS' MODERATION--HE SEEKS TO CONDUCT THE WAR UPON
CIVILIZED IDEAS--AN ENGLISH CHARACTERIZATION OF DAVIS--COLONEL
FREEMANTLE'S INTERVIEW WITH HIM--MR. GLADSTONE'S OPINION--THE PURELY
PERSONAL AND SENTIMENTAL ADMIRATION OF EUROPE FOR THE SOUTH--
INCONSISTENT CONDUCT OF THE EUROPEAN GREAT POWERS--THE LONDON "TIMES"
BEFORE M'CLELLAN'S DEFEAT--THE CONFEDERACY ENTITLED TO RECOGNITION BY
EUROPE--ENGLAND'S SYMPATHY WITH THE NORTH--DIGNIFIED ATTITUDE OF
PRESIDENT DAVIS UPON THE SUBJECT OF RECOGNITION--HIS EARLY PREDICTION
UPON THE SUBJECT--FRANCE AND ENGLAND EXPOSED TO INJURIOUS SUSPICIONS--
TERGIVERSATIONS OF THE PALMERSTON CABINET--THE BROAD FARCE OF "BRITISH
NEUTRALITY"--ENGLAND DECLINES TO UNITE WITH FRANCE IN AN OFFER OF
MEDIATION BETWEEN THE AMERICAN BELLIGERENTS--ENGLAND'S "POLICY"--SHE
SOUGHT THE RUIN OF BOTH SECTIONS OF AMERICA--CULMINATION OF THE
ANTISLAVERY POLICY OF THE NORTH--MR. LINCOLN'S CONVERSATION WITH A
KENTUCKY MEMBER OF CONGRESS--THE WAR A "CRIME" BY MR. LINCOLN'S OWN
SHOWING--VIOLATION OF PLEDGES AND ARBITRARY ACTS OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT--THE MASK REMOVED AFTER THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM--THE REAL
PURPOSE OF EMANCIPATION--MR. DAVIS' ALLUSION TO THE SUBJECT--
INDIGNATION OF THE SOUTH AT THE MEASURE--MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TEXAS
AND MISSISSIPPI--VICKSBURG--PORT HUDSON--LOSS OF ARKANSAS POST--
FEDERAL FLEET REPULSED AT CHARLESTON--PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN--
UNITY AND CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH--MR. DAVIS' ADDRESS TO THE
COUNTRY--IMPORTANT EXTRACTS--GENERAL LEE PREPARES FOR BATTLE--HIS
CONFIDENCE--CONDITION OF HIS ARMY--BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE--
JEFFERSON DAVIS' TRIBUTE TO STONEWALL JACKSON.
There is much justice in the sentiment that declares that there can be
magnificence even in failure. Men often turn to the contemplation of
rôles enacted in history, ending in disaster and utter disappointment of
the originating and vitalizing aspiration, with far more of interest than
has been felt in following records marked by the palpable tokens of
complete success.
It may well be doubted, whether the Confederate States of America, even
had victory crowned their prolonged struggle of superhuman valor and
unstinted sacrifice, could have commanded more of the esteem of mankind,
than will be awarded them in the years to come. Retrospect of the most
prosperous period of the fortunes of the Confederacy--the interval between
the battle of Fredericksburg, December, 1862, and the ensuing
midsummer--reveals a period in which there was wanting no element of
glory, of pride, or of hope. Many a people, now proudly boasting an
honored recognition at the council-board of nations, might envy the fame
of the meteor power which flashed across the firmament, with a glorious
radiance that made more mournful its final extinguishment.
A notable feature of the distinction which the South, at that time
especially, commanded in the eyes of the world, was the enthusiastic and
universal tribute of mankind to the leader, whose genius, purity, dignity,
and eloquence so adorned the cause of his country. The North sought to
console its wounded national pride by accounting for the crushing and
humiliating defeats of the recent campaign, by contrasts between the able
leadership of its antagonist, and its own imbecile administration. At the
South faction was silenced, in the presence of the wondrous results
achieved in spite of its own outcries and prophecies of failure.
Demagogues, in such a season of good fortune, ceased their charges of
narrowness, of rash zealotry, of favoritism, of incompetency, seemingly
conscious, for once, of the praise which they bestowed upon the
Executive, whom they accused of usurping all the authority of the
Government, in ascribing such results to his unaided capacity.
From Europe, in the beginning, so prejudiced against the South and its
cause, so misinformed of Southern motives, and unacquainted with Southern
history, came the tribute of disinterested eulogy, the more to be valued,
because reluctantly accorded, to the Confederacy and its ruler. To Europe
the South was now known not only through a series of unparalleled
victories; as a people who had successfully asserted their independence
for nearly two years, against such odds as had never been seen before; as
a land of valiant soldiers, of great generals, and of large material
resources. If possible, above these, the statesmen and politicians of
Europe admired the administrative capacity, which, they declared, had
given a superior model and a new dignity to the science of statesmanship.
To the educated circles of Europe the new power was introduced by State
papers, which were declared to be models, not less of skilled political
narration and exposition, than of literary purity and excellence.
Accustomed to hear the South twitted as a people dwarfed and debased by
the demoralization of African slavery, the educated classes of England
acknowledged the surprise and delight they experienced from the powerful
and splendid vindications of the cause of the Confederacy, in the messages
of Mr. Davis. It has been truthfully remarked that there could be no
better history of the war than that contained in his numerous state
papers. They are the exhaustive summary, and unanswerable statement of the
imperishable truths which justify the South, and overwhelm her enemies
with the proof of their own acts of wrong and violence.
Under the new light given to mankind, as to the origin, nature, and
purposes of the American Union, which Mr. Davis so lucidly explained,
Europe soon recognized his position as something else than that of a ruler
of an insurgent district. But not only as the chosen Executive of eleven
separate communities, several of which European governments had previously
recognized as sovereign; as one who had organized great armies, maintained
them in the field, and selected leaders for their command already
illustrious in the annals of war; not for these and other features of
enduring fame, alone, was Jefferson Davis admired in Europe. The contrast
between the civil administrations of the hostile sections was viewed as,
perhaps, the chiefly remarkable phase of the struggle.
President Lincoln, beginning the war with usurpation, had committed, in
its progress, every possible trespass upon the Federal Constitution, and
was now under the influence of a faction whose every aim contemplated the
overthrow of that instrument. President Davis, supported by a confiding
people, and an overwhelming majority of every Southern community, ruled in
strict conformity with the laws of the land and its Constitution. In the
midst of a revolution, unexampled in magnitude, in fierceness, and
vindictiveness on the part of the enemy, and of difficulties in his own
administration, he furnished an example of courage, humanity, and
magnanimity, together with the observance of order, civil freedom, and
legal and constitutional restraints unexampled in history. In the
Confederacy, the Roman maxim, _Inter arma silent leges_, universally
recognized and practiced among nations, had an emphatic repudiation, so
far as concerned the exercise of power by the executive department.
Whatever may have been the exceptional cases of unauthorized oppression or
violence, there was always redress in the judiciary department of the
Government, which continued in pure and dignified existence until the end.
The President, obeying the dictates of exalted patriotism--acting always
for the public good, if not always with unimpeachable wisdom, at least
with incorruptible integrity--made no attempt at improper interference
with Congress, nor sought to exercise undue influence over its
deliberations. The press, usually the first bulwark of the public
liberties to attract the exercise of despotism, so trammeled at the North,
was free in the South every-where; in some instances, to the extent of
licentiousness, and to the positive injury of the cause.
In marked contrast with these exhibitions were the evidences of coming
despotism at the North. The Federal judiciary was rapidly declining from
its exalted purity, before the exactions of military power; the Federal
Congress was charged by the press with open and notorious corruption, and
was aiding Mr. Lincoln in usurpations which startled the despotisms of
Europe, and have since led to the annihilation of the republican character
of the Government.
Conspicuous, too, was the desire of Mr. Davis to conduct the war upon a
civilized and Christian basis. His forbearance, his moderation, and stern
refusal to resort to retaliation, under circumstances such as would have
justified its exercise in response to the cruelties and outrages of the
enemy, amazed the European spectator, and at times dissatisfied his own
countrymen. "Retaliation is not justice," was his habitual reply to urgent
demands, and again and again did he decline to "shed one drop of blood
except on the field of battle." Never forgetting the dignity of the
contest, he, up to the last moment of his authority, redeemed the pledge
which he had made in the first weeks of the war: "to smite the smiter
with manly arms, as did our fathers before us."
There have been few spectacles presented to the admiring gaze of mankind,
more worthily depicted than that union of capacities and virtues in
Jefferson Davis, which so eminently qualified him, in the opinion of
foreigners, for the position he held. An English writer has eloquently
sketched him as "one of the world's foremost men, admired as a statesman,
respected as an earnest Christian, the Washington of another generation of
the same race. A resolute statesman, calm, dignified, swaying with
commanding intellect the able men that surrounded him; eloquent as a
speaker, and as a writer giving state papers to the world which are among
the finest compositions in our time; of warm domestic affections in his
inner life, and strong religious convictions; held up by vigor of the
spirit that nerved an exhausted and feeble frame--such was the chosen
constitutional ruler of one-fourth of the American people."
Colonel Freemantle, a distinguished English officer, whose faithful and
impartial narrative of his extended observations of the American war,
commended him to the esteem of both parties, thus concludes an account of
an interview with President Davis, in the spring of 1863:
"During my travels many people have remarked to me that Jefferson
Davis seems, in a peculiar manner, adapted to his office. His military
education at West Point rendered him intimately acquainted with the
higher officers of the army; and his post of Secretary of War, under
the old Government, brought officers of all ranks under his immediate
personal knowledge and supervision. No man could have formed a more
accurate estimate of their respective merits. This is one of the
reasons which gave the Confederates such an immense start in the way
of generals; for, having formed his opinion with regard to appointing
an officer, Mr. Davis is always most determined to carry out his
intention in spite of every obstacle. His services in the Mexican war
gave him the prestige of a brave man and a good soldier. His services
as a statesman pointed him out as the only man who, by his unflinching
determination and administrative talent, was able to control the
popular will. People speak of any misfortune happening to him as an
irreparable evil too dreadful to contemplate."
Mr. Gladstone, a member of the British cabinet, the eminent leader of a
party in English politics, and a sympathizer with the objects of the war
as waged by the North, avowed his enthusiastic appreciation of the lustre
reflected upon the new Government, by its able administration, in the
assertion that "Mr. Jefferson Davis had created a nation."
But the admiration of Europe was to prove a mere sentiment, unaccompanied
by any practical demonstration of sympathy. In view of the course so
persistently adhered to by the great powers of Europe, it is curious to
note the purely sentimental and personal character of their professed
sympathy for the South. The earliest expression of foreign opinion
indicated a reluctant recognition of the valor and devotion of a people,
from whom they had not expected the exhibition of such qualities. When, by
the protraction of the struggle, the brilliant feats of arms executed by
the Southern armies, the indomitable resolution of the South, and its
evident purpose to encounter every possible sacrifice for sake of
independence, there was no longer ground for misapprehension, they still
disregarded all the precedents and principles which had governed their
course respecting new nationalities.
Applauding the valor of the Southern soldiery, the heroism, endurance, and
self-denial of a people whom they repeatedly declared to have already
established their invincibility; rapturous in their panegyrics upon the
genius, zeal, and Christian virtues of the Confederate leaders; they never
interposed their boasted potentiality in behalf of justice, right, and
humanity. English writers were eloquent in acknowledgment of the
additional distinction conferred upon Anglo-Saxon statesmanship and
literature by Davis; diligent in tracing the honorable English lineage of
Lee, and establishing the consanguinity of Jackson; but English statesmen
persistently disregarded those elevated considerations of humanity and
philanthropy, which they have so much vaunted as prompting their
intercourse with nations. Confessing a new enlightenment from the
expositions of Mr. Davis, and from diligent inquiry into the nature of the
Federal Government, Europe soon avowed its convictions in favor of the
legal and constitutional right of secession asserted by the South. It
declared that it but awaited the exhibition of that earnestness of
purpose, and that capacity for resistance, which should establish the
"force and consistency" which are the requisite conditions of recognized
nationality.
The London _Times_, while the army of McClellan was still investing
Richmond, used language which the North and the South accepted as
significant and prophetic. Said the _Times_:
"It can not be doubted that we are approaching a time when a more
important question even than that of an offer of mediation may have to
be considered by England and France. _The Southern Confederacy has
constituted itself a nation for nearly a year and a half._ During that
time the attachment of the people to the now Government has been
indubitably shown; immense armies have been raised; the greatest
sacrifices have been endured; the persistence of the South in the war,
through a long series of battles--some victories, some defeats--has
shown the 'force and consistency' which are looked upon as tests of
nationality. Wherever the Government is unmolested, the laws are
administered regularly as in time of peace; and wherever the Federals
have penetrated, they are received with an animosity which they
resent, as at New Orleans, by a military rule of intolerable
brutality. The vision of a Union party in the South has been
dispelled, as the Northerners themselves are compelled, with
bitterness and mortification, to admit.
"All these circumstances point but to one conclusion: Either this war
must be brought to an end, or the time will at last come when the
South may claim its own recognition by foreign nations as an
independent power. The precedents of the American colonies, of the
Spanish colonies, of Belgium, and of Tuscany, and of Naples the other
day, forbid us to question this right when asserted by the Confederate
States. It is our duty _to anticipate_ this possible event, and it may
be wise, as well as generous, for statesmen on this side of the ocean
to approach the American Government in a friendly spirit, with the
offer of their good offices, at this great crisis of its fortunes."
If such a statement of the question was just and truthful, when a numerous
and confident army, under a leader of proven skill, was engaged in close
siege of the capital of the Confederacy, how much more unanswerable were
its conclusions when McClellan was defeated? What were the evidences of
"force and consistency" demanded after the combined armies of McClellan
and Pope were hurled back upon the Potomac; after Bragg had forced Buell
to the Ohio; and when Fredericksburg had crowned six months of success
with a victory that inevitably imposed a defensive attitude upon the North
during the entire winter?
When Chancellorsville inflicted a defeat, the most decisive and
humiliating of the war, upon the North, there was indeed no longer even a
pretext, by which could be disguised the evident purpose of England not to
interfere in behalf of a cause with which she had no sympathy, whatever
her constrained respect for its champions and defenders. The loss of
Vicksburg and Gettysburg in the ensuing summer, so productive of distrust
in Europe of the Confederate cause, was quickly followed by developments
which dispelled nearly all remaining hope of that recognition which it was
equally the right of the Confederacy to hope, and the duty of Europe to
render.
The attitude of the Confederate Government, in its relations with European
governments, was ever one of imposing dignity. President Davis contented
himself with calm and statesman-like presentation of the claims of the
cause which he represented. His unanswerable exposition of the position of
the Confederacy, and lucid discussions of international jurisprudence,
never took the semblance of supplication, and were accompanied by
dignified remonstrance, even, only when it became evident that the
Confederacy was excluded from the benefits of that policy which the laws
of nations and every precedent demanded. Hope of foreign assistance
unquestionably constituted a large share of that confidence of success
which, until the later stages of the war, continued to animate the South.
Her people hoped for foreign aid in some shape, because they were
confident of their ability to demonstrate their _right_ to it; and they
_expected_ it only when they _had_ demonstrated that right. But never was
there any abatement or relaxation of effort by the Confederate Government
because of this just right and expectation. In the midst of the most
cheering events, and when recognition appeared certain, President Davis
declared his conviction of the necessity of such effort as should secure
independence without aid from any quarter. In his address to the
Mississippi Legislature, December, 1862, from which we have already
quoted, he said:
"In the course of this war our eyes have been often turned abroad. We
have expected sometimes recognition and sometimes intervention at the
hands of foreign nations, and we had a right to expect it. Never
before, in the history of the world, had a people so long a time
maintained their ground, and showed themselves capable of maintaining
their national existence, without securing the recognition of
commercial nations. I know not why this has been so, but this I say,
'Put not your trust in princes,' and rest not your hopes on foreign
nations. This war is ours; we must fight it out ourselves; and I feel
some pride in knowing that, so far, we have done it without the
good-will of any body."
It seems, indeed, difficult to explain the course of Europe, especially of
England and France, in the American war, upon any hypothesis consistent
with either courage, humanity, or the usages of nations. Delay, caution,
and attendance upon results were becoming in the beginning; but, after the
defeat of McClellan upon the Chickahominy, and, still more, at the close
of operations in 1862, they were no longer exacted by moral obligation or
international comity. Having all the attributes of an independent power--a
power at war with a neighbor, assailed by its armies, blockaded by its
fleets, as had been numerous other independent powers--there was nothing
whatever anomalous in the situation of the Confederate States forbidding
the practice of plain justice towards them. Recognition was not only
warranted by the facts of the case, but by immemorial usage in Europe,
especially by the apposite precedent of the separation of Belgium from
Holland. The existence of slavery in the South, even though sanctioned by
law and the religious convictions of her people, is an altogether
insufficient explanation of a policy which has exposed the European great
powers to the suspicion of having been actuated by the most unworthy
motives.
Especially does the course of England seem indefensible towards a people,
with whom the war developed so much of common instinct, so many appeals of
sympathy and evidences of identity with herself--a people whose ancestors
were the uncompromising enemies of regicides, and had maintained their
loyalty to the crown of England in spite of the power and threats of
Cromwell, whose Puritan dominion New England acknowledged.
The injustice of England did not end with her refusal of recognition. In
the beginning she promptly proclaimed "strict neutrality," and her Premier
declared the Confederates "belligerents." This phrase, apparently a just
concession of the declared independence of the South, was gratefully
acknowledged by a struggling people, and evoked the fierce indignation of
the North. It was, however, designedly ambiguous, and to be interpreted,
philologically and practically, as the prospects of the controversy or the
wishes of the Palmerston cabinet might dictate. The English cabinet did
not necessarily mean a recognition of a divided sovereignty, justifying
suspension of relations with both sections, until the question of
sovereignty should be settled. The phrase "belligerents" was subsequently
declared to mean, merely, that the "two sections were at war"--a fact
which the participants felt to have already had ocular demonstration.
Meanwhile, relations between London and Washington were not interrupted,
and commercial intercourse continued as before. But England not only
ignored the South, and denied the Confederate commissioners a formal and
official audience--her vessels respected the Federal blockade, while
Confederate vessels were warned from her coasts. Such is only a limited
statement of features which made "English neutrality" the broadest farce
and severest irony of the age.[58]
Early in 1863, or late in 1862, the Emperor Napoleon proposed to England
to join France and other powers in a joint mediation, to suggest an
armistice and a conference. This humane proposition England refused,
declining to take any step which might aid pacification, and thus did both
North and South finally comprehend what was meant by the "duty and policy"
of that power, which had so industriously propagated American dissensions
for her own aggrandizement. An editorial in the Richmond _Enquirer_,
written, probably, by John Mitchel, pithily described the motives of
England in the remark: "In short, the North is not yet bankrupt enough,
the South not yet desolated enough, to suit the 'policy' of England."
France saved her reputation, upon the score of humanity and justice, by
evincing at least a right disposition, though it is difficult to reconcile
her continued dalliance upon England, respecting the American question,
with that bold policy, which usually characterizes the great master of
European diplomacy. France had, however, less of interest and of
expectation than England, from the dissolution of the Union; less motive
for desiring its downfall, and the exhaustion of both combatants.
Such, however, was the policy, adhered to by England and France, in
defiance of legal and moral obligation, and to the mortal injury of the
South, in her brave and defiant struggle with that power, which history
may yet declare, the "great powers" of Europe dared not defy.
An interesting phase of the war, in the beginning of 1863, was the
culmination of the policy of the Federal Government respecting the subject
of slavery. A brief space will suffice to exhibit a record of violated
pledges, of constitutional infractions, and abuse of power by the Federal
Government, altogether unexampled in a war to be hereafter noted for its
arbitrary measures.
In the early stages of the war the North assumed, as the justification of
coercive measures, not only the purpose of preserving the Union, but the
relief of a "loyal party" in the South, who were oppressed by a violent
minority having "command of the situation." Of this theory of the war, as
waged by the North, the conversation of President Lincoln with a Kentucky
member of Congress, in the presence of Senator Crittenden, was
sufficiently declaratory:
"'Mr. Mallory, this war, so far as I have any thing to do with it, is
carried on on the idea that there is a Union sentiment in those
States, which, set free from the control now held over it by the
presence of the Confederate or rebel power, will be sufficient to
replace those States in the Union. If I am mistaken in this, if there
is no such sentiment there, if the people of those States are
determined with unanimity, or with a feeling approaching unanimity,
that their States shall not be members of this Confederacy, it is
beyond the power of the people of the other States to force them to
remain in the Union; and,' said he, 'in that contingency--in the
contingency that there is not that sentiment there--THIS WAR IS NOT
ONLY AN ERROR, IT IS A CRIME.'"
Mr. Lincoln was probably not a very close student of the philosophy of
history, or he would hardly have thus emphatically committed himself to a
pledge, which, if observed, would have inevitably ended the war in a few
weeks. The teachings of history were valueless, without their unvarying
testimony to the potency of the sword of the common enemy in healing the
divisions of an invaded country. It would be difficult, too, to imagine
what he would have deemed that approximation to unity in the South, which
would render a further prosecution of the war a crime. A faction of "Union
men," truculent, treacherous, and insidious, in their hostility to the
Confederate Government, unquestionably existed in the South during the
entire progress of the war, but they were few in numbers, and their
recognized leaders were, with hardly a single exception, men of abandoned
character, notoriously without influence, save with their ignorant and
unpatriotic followers. But this pretense of a Union party in the South,
which the North, at first, declared a majority, was conveniently
abandoned, when other pretexts were sought. In the face of evidence not to
be denied, of the profound and sincere purpose of separation, entertained
by more than seven-eighths of the citizens of the seceded States, the
Northern conscience easily overcame its scruples as to a war which the
Northern President had, by anticipation, pronounced a "Crime."
Palpable violations of vows were, indeed, marked characteristics of the
conduct of the war as justified by the facile and pliant conscience of the
North. The paramount purpose of coercion was to maintain the authority and
dignity of the Constitution, assailed by "rebels in arms." No theory was
avowed contemplating any other termination of the war, than a simple
restoration of the "Union under the Constitution." The assertions of the
Northern press, and the resolutions of mass meetings were re-affirmed by
the most solemn enactments of the Federal Congress, and public
declarations of Mr. Lincoln, that the North sought merely to save the
Union, with the form and spirit of the Constitution unimpaired. In view of
subsequent events, it is almost incredible that in Mr. Lincoln's first
inaugural address should be found this passage:
"I declare that I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to
interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it
exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no
inclination to do so.... The right of each State to order and control
its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment
exclusively, is essential to the balance of power on which the
perfection and endurance of our political fabric depended."
Then, after the defeat at Bull Run, Congress passed the following
resolution, which was signed by Mr. Lincoln as President:
"_Resolved_, That this war is not waged upon our part with any purpose
of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established
institutions of these States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy
of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union, with all the dignity,
equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired; that, as soon
as these objects are accomplished, the war ought to cease."
As if to give every possible form of assurance of the legitimate and
constitutional objects of the war, and leaving no room for doubt in the
mind of posterity, of complete and unredeemed perfidy, the Federal
authorities were at especial pains to declare their policy to foreign
governments.
Mr. Seward, as Mr. Lincoln's Secretary of State, in his instructions to
Mr. Dayton, Minister to France, says:
"The condition of slavery in the several States will remain just the
same, whether it (the rebellion) succeed or fail. There is not even a
pretext for the complaint that the disaffected States are to be
conquered by the United States, if the revolution fail; for the rights
of the States, and the condition of every human being in them, will
remain subject to exactly the same laws and form of administration,
whether the revolution shall succeed or whether it shall fail."
There was little room to doubt the purpose of the North to emancipate the
slaves of the South, if at any period of the war such action could be
advantageously taken. Mr. Lincoln always manifested great timidity and
reluctance in approaching the subject, and it was observable that, at
critical moments of the war, he courted the sympathy of the Democratic
party, which was opposed to the policy of emancipation, so importunately
urged upon him by the radical wing of the Republican party.
General McClellan had, with noble firmness, refused to countenance the
revolutionary designs of the radical faction, and his removal from command
after his repulse at Richmond was the palpable and decisive triumph of the
emancipation policy in the sympathies of Mr. Lincoln. Restored to command,
in order that he might save Washington from capture, no other officer
being deemed to have the requisite ability and confidence of the army, he
retained his position but a few weeks after that object was accomplished.
By successive steps, Mr. Lincoln was finally brought to issue a
preliminary proclamation of emancipation, in September, 1862, which went
into effect January 1, 1863. After the battle of Antietam, no farther
necessity for concealment was deemed necessary, and to the design of
subjugation was now added the proclaimed purpose to destroy the organic
existence of the States and two thousand millions of Southern capital.
Emancipation was justified by the Federal administration as a "military
necessity"--a wretched explanation from those who had boasted their
ability to "exterminate the South" in a few months. Since the war, a claim
of philanthropy, as the motive of emancipation, has been falsely asserted.
Reckless of the fate of the slave, the North sought only vengeance against
his master. In the sequel, each step of despotism becoming easier than its
predecessor, malice against the master has been still the motive which
instigated the enfranchisement of his former slave.
The New-Year's proclamation of Mr. Lincoln, reaching the Confederacy at
the most auspicious period of its fortunes, was received with evidences of
just indignation, and of a more stern purpose in the conduct of the war.
President Davis thus referred to the subject in his message to Congress:
"The public journals of the North have been received, containing a
proclamation, dated on the first day of the present month, signed by
the President of the United States, in which he orders and declares
all slaves within ten of the States of the Confederacy to be free,
except such as are found within certain districts now occupied in part
by the armed forces of the enemy. We may well leave it to the
instincts of that common humanity which a beneficent Creator has
implanted in the breasts of our fellow-men of all countries to pass
judgment on a measure by which several millions of human beings of an
inferior race--peaceful and contented laborers in their sphere--are
doomed to extermination, while, at the same time, they are encouraged
to a general assassination of their masters by the insidious
recommendation 'to abstain from violence unless in necessary
self-defense.' Our own detestation of those who have attempted the
most execrable measure recorded in the history of guilty man, is
tempered by profound contempt for the impotent rage which it
discloses. So far as regards the action of this Government on such
criminals as may attempt its execution, I confine myself to informing
you that I shall--unless in your wisdom you deem some other course
more expedient--deliver to the several State authorities all
commissioned officers of the United States that may hereafter be
captured by our forces, in any of the States embraced in the
proclamation, that they may be dealt with in accordance with the laws
of those States providing for the punishment of criminals engaged in
exciting servile insurrection. The enlisted soldiers I shall continue
to treat as unwilling instruments in the commission of these crimes,
and shall direct their discharge and return to their homes on the
proper and usual parole."
Mr. Davis urged upon the people the evidence, given by this measure, of
the utterly ruthless and unscrupulous character of the war waged upon the
South, and counseled the resolution of "absolute and total separation of
these States from the United States." The eloquent appeals of Mr. Davis
were sustained by the united press of the Confederacy, and by unmistakable
indications of a thoroughly aroused popular indignation.
The results of military operations, in the winter months of 1863, were of
a character altogether favorable and re-assuring to the Confederates.
Movements on a large scale were prevented by the heavy rains and extreme
rigor of the season, though there were many incidents evincing activity
and enterprise on both sides. Early in January occurred the recapture of
Galveston, Texas, by General Magruder. This exploit, marked by a display
of energy, daring, and skill, was a handsome vindication of a most
meritorious officer, who, for some months previous, had suffered unmerited
censure. General Magruder had commanded a portion of the Army of Northern
Virginia, in the assault upon McClellan, at Malvern Hill. The partial
failure of the attack secured the Federal retreat, and the public,
impatient at the check sustained at a moment of so much promise, visited
an unwarranted censure upon Magruder. President Davis acknowledged, in a
most flattering letter to his former classmate, the brilliant achievement
of his command at Galveston.
After the battle of Murfreesboro', the more important operations, in the
West, were enacted in the State of Mississippi. The successful defense of
Vicksburg, in the summer of 1862, effectually closed the Mississippi to
the Federal fleets. To reduce this stronghold became an object of prime
importance to the Federal Government, the North-western States being
especially interested in securing the unobstructed navigation of the great
river. The Confederate Government, equally apprized of the value of
Vicksburg, concentrated forces for its defense, and made the maintenance
of that position one of the leading features of its designs in the West.
A second attempt, under the auspices of General Sherman, was made against
Vicksburg, in December, 1862. The signal failure attending this expedition
brought upon Sherman a degree of reproach, at the North, in singular
contrast with the applause which he received twelve months later. A few
weeks later, the third attempt against Vicksburg was undertaken by
General Grant, who sought to turn the Confederate defenses, through the
smaller rivers connecting the Yazoo and Mississippi. This attempt was
doomed to a failure no less decided and humiliating than that of its
predecessor. On the 14th of March the Confederate batteries at Port
Hudson, the lower defense of the Mississippi, repulsed the fleet of
Farragut, who sought, by passing the batteries, to coöperate with Porter's
fleet above.
These repeated failures of the Federal demonstrations against the
Confederate strongholds on the Mississippi, were accepted as auspicious
indications of continued successful defense in a vital quarter of the
Confederacy. The loss of Arkansas Post, with a garrison of three thousand
men, somewhat diminished the ardor of the congratulations experienced by
the South from the successes on the Mississippi, and General Beauregard's
signal defeat of the Federal fleet at Charleston.
At the opening of spring, there was wanting no indication of the gigantic
struggle which was to make memorable the third year of the war. By common
consent it was declared that this, if not the last, would, at least, be
the decisive year of the struggle. An imperative necessity impelled the
Federal administration to the most powerful efforts. Without brilliant and
decided military results, the party in opposition to the war would
inevitably gain possession of a sufficient number of States, to enable
them to enter the next Presidential contest with fair prospects of
success. The approaching expiration of the terms of service of large
numbers of his veteran troops, also impelled the enemy to early activity.
On the part of the Confederates, there was apparently nothing left undone
which could increase the chances of success. This period is remarkable in
the history of the war, not less for its auspicious signs for the
Confederacy, than for the union and coöperation every-where observable. It
was equally a period encouraging hope and inviting effort to wring from
the reluctant North confession of final defeat, and to inflict a just
punishment upon an enemy, who had but lately proclaimed his purpose to use
even the slaves of the South for the subjugation of her citizens.
Extraordinary activity was displayed, during the winter and spring, in
strengthening the army and adding to its efficiency, by the execution of
the recent legislation of Congress recommended by President Davis. The
utmost exertions of the Government were, of course, insufficient to
strengthen the armies to the point of equality with the enormous array
presented by the enemy on every theatre of operations. Yet the Government,
the people, and the army, with calmness and confidence, awaited the issue,
in the conviction that every preparation had been made which the resources
of the country admitted.
Early in April, President Davis, in compliance with a request of Congress,
addressed an eloquent invocation to the country, in behalf of the duties
of patriotism at so critical a moment of the struggle. Stating his
concurrence in the views of Congress, he declared his confidence in the
patriotic disposition of the people to carry into effect the measures
devised for the deliverance of the country.
"Alone, unaided," said he, "we have met and overthrown the most formidable
combinations of naval and military armaments that the lust of conquest
ever gathered together for the conquest of a free people. We began this
struggle without a single gun afloat, while the resources of our enemy
enabled them to gather fleets which, according to their official list,
published in August last, consisted of four hundred and thirty-seven
vessels, measuring eight hundred and forty thousand and eighty-six tons,
and carrying three thousand and twenty-six guns.... To oppose invading
forces composed of levies which have already exceeded thirteen hundred
thousand men, we had no resources but the unconquerable valor of a people
determined to be free."
Mr. Davis alluded encouragingly to the immediate prospects of the war:
"Your devotion and patriotism have triumphed over all these obstacles,
and calling into existence the munitions of war, the clothing and the
subsistence, which have enabled our soldiers to illustrate their valor
on numerous battle-fields, and to inflict crushing defeats on
successive armies, each of which our arrogant foe fondly imagined to
be invincible.
"The contrast between our past and present condition is well
calculated to inspire full confidence in the triumph of our arms. At
no previous period of the war have our forces been so numerous, so
well organized, and so thoroughly disciplined, armed, and equipped, as
at present. The season of high water, on which our enemies relied to
enable their fleet of gunboats to penetrate into our country and
devastate our homes, is fast passing away; yet our strongholds on the
Mississippi still bid defiance to the foe, and months of costly
preparation for their reduction have been spent in vain. Disaster has
been the result of their every effort to turn or storm Vicksburg and
Port Hudson, as well as every attack on our batteries on the Red
River, the Tallahatchie, and other navigable streams."
In this address President Davis did not fail to rebuke that tendency to
excessive confidence from which relaxed exertion is ever apt to follow.
Albeit he has been so freely charged with entertaining excessive
confidence himself, and encouraging others to share his over-sanguine and
exaggerated hopes, he yet never lost an opportunity of rebuking it as a
dangerous error.
The most important feature of the address is the earnest and admonitory
appeal, for immediate exertion, to obviate the difficulty of obtaining
supplies for the army, already becoming a question of alarming concern.
Mr. Davis even then avowed his conviction that, in such a contest as the
war had then become, the question of food was the "one danger which the
Government of your choice regards with apprehension." Earnestly appealing
to the "never-failing patriotism" of the land, he said: "Your country,
therefore, appeals to you to lay aside all thought of gain, and to devote
yourselves to securing your liberties, without which these gains would be
valueless."
Reminding the country of embarrassments, already encountered, he indicated
the only method of avoiding similar difficulties in future:
"Let your fields be devoted exclusively to the production of corn,
oats, beans, peas, potatoes, and other food for man and beast. Let
corn be sowed broadcast, for fodder, in immediate proximity to
railroads, rivers and canals; and let all your efforts be directed to
the prompt supply of these articles in the districts where our armies
are operating. You will then add greatly to their efficiency, and
furnish the means without which it is impossible to make those prompt
and active movements which have hitherto stricken terror into our
enemies and secured our most brilliant triumphs."
Those who witnessed the operation of causes which eventually brought the
country to the verge of starvation, and made Lee's army--whose proud array
of "tattered uniforms and bright muskets" had never yet yielded to the
onset of the enemy--the _victim of famine_, can attest the fidelity of
this graphic and prophetic sketch:
"It is known that the supply of meat throughout the country is
sufficient for the support of all; but the distances are so great, the
condition of the roads has been so bad during the five months of
winter weather, through which we have just passed, and the attempt of
groveling speculators to forestall the market, and make money out of
the life-blood of our defenders, have so much influenced the
withdrawal from sale of the surplus in hands of the producers, that
the Government has been unable to gather full supplies.
"The Secretary of War has prepared a plan, which is appended to this
address, by the aid of which, or some similar means to be adopted by
yourselves, you can assist the officers of the Government in the
purchase of the corn, the bacon, the pork, and the beef known to exist
in large quantities in different parts of the country. Even if the
surplus be less than believed, is it not a bitter and humiliating
reflection that those who remain at home, secure from hardship, and
protected from danger, should be in the enjoyment of abundance, and
that their slaves also should have a full supply of food, while their
sons, brothers, husbands, and fathers are stinted in the rations upon
which their health and efficiency depend?"
The concluding paragraph of this address, so remarkable for its eloquence,
and for its frank and powerful statement of the condition and necessities
of the Confederacy, in one of the most thrilling moments of its fate, is
as follows:
"Entertaining no fear that you will either misconstrue the motives of
this address, or fail to respond to the call of patriotism, I have
placed the facts fully and frankly before you. Let us all unite in the
performance of our duty, each in his sphere; and with concerted,
persistent, and well directed effort, there seems little reason to
doubt that, under the blessings of Him to whom we look for guidance,
and who has been to us our shield and strength, we shall maintain the
sovereignty and independence of the Confederate States, and transmit
to our posterity the heritage bequeathed to us by our fathers."
Late in March, General Lee intimated his convictions, to the Government,
of an early resumption of active movements by the enemy. The disparity
between the main armies in Virginia was even greater than in previous
campaigns. General Hooker, the Federal commander, had, under his immediate
direction, more than one hundred thousand men, while General Lee--in
consequence of the necessary withdrawal of Longstreet, with two divisions,
to meet a threatened movement by the enemy from the south of James River,
and to secure the supplies of an abundant section, open to Federal
incursions--had less than fifty thousand.[59] But Lee manifested his
characteristic confidence and self-possession in the presence of the
perilous crisis. Having adequately represented the situation to his
Government, he was aware of the cordial coöperation, to the extent of its
ability, which had been extended. During the suspension of active
hostilities, his every wish for the increased efficiency of his command
was promptly fulfilled, and at the opening of the campaign he lacked no
element of readiness, save _numbers_, that which the country could not
supply, and of the absence of which, Lee, therefore, _never complained_.
In every other element of efficiency, the army of Northern Virginia was
never in better condition, than when it eagerly awaited the advance of
Hooker across the Rappahannock.
The battle of Chancellorsville is memorable as the most decisive triumph
of the Army of Northern Virginia, and from the mournful incident of the
extinction of that noble life which was identified with its highest glory.
The culmination of Lee's superb strategy, the most splendid illustration
of his master-genius, was sadly emphasized by the irreparable loss of
Stonewall Jackson.
Commemorating, by a letter of special thanks to the army, a victory which
baffled the most perilous and boastful attempt yet made upon the
Confederate capital, President Davis shared the grief of a stricken
country for the loss of one of its most illustrious champions. In that
procession of mourners which followed, through the streets of Richmond,
the bier of the fallen hero, there was not one who felt anguish more acute
than that of the chief who had so honored and sustained Jackson when
living.[60]