the idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing
proposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has a
true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest
certainty. For to have a true idea is only another expression
for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one,
indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is
something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of
thinking--namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I
ask, can know that he understands anything, unless he do first
understand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of
a thing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what
can there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a
standard of truth? Even as light displays both itself and
darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.
I think I have thus sufficiently answered these
questions--namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false
idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a
true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea
(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark);
consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any
advantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comes
it that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can anyone be sure,
that he has ideas which agree with their objects? These
questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently
answered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea
is plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is
related to the latter as being is to not-being. The causes of
falsity I have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv.
with the note. From what is there stated, the difference
between a man who has true ideas, and a man who has only false
ideas, is made apparent. As for the last question--as to how a
man can be sure that he has ideas that agree with their objects,
I have just pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his
knowledge arises from the simple fact, that he has an idea which
corresponds with its object--in other words, that truth is its
own standard. We may add that our mind, in so far as it
perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God
(II. xi. Cor.); therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the
mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God.
XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as
contingent, but as necessary.
>>>>>Proof--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things
truly (II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in
themselves--that is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as
necessary. Q.E.D.
<<<<<Corollary I--Hence it follows, that it is only through our
imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the
future or the past, as contingent.
*****Note--How this way of looking at things arises, I will
briefly explain. We have shown above (II. xvii. and Cor.) that
the mind always regards things as present to itself, even though
they be not in existence, until some causes arise which exclude
their existence and presence. Further (II. xviii.), we showed
that, if the human body has once been affected by two external
bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards imagines one
of the said external bodies, will straightway remember the
other--that is, it will regard both as present to itself, unless
there arise causes which exclude their existence and presence.
Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from the fact that
we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than others, some
more quickly, some at equal speed. Thus, let us suppose that a
child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in the morning, Paul
at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that today he again
sees Peter in the morning. It is evident, from II. Prop.
xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he will
imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky, as
it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other words, he
will imagine a complete day, and, together with his imagination
of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he will
imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon--that is,
he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to a
future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening,
he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by imagining them
simultaneously with the imagination of a past time. If it
should at any time happen, that on some other evening the child
should see James instead of Simon, he will, on the following
morning, associate with his imagination of evening sometimes
Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for the child is
supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them, not
both together. His imagination will therefore waver; and, with
the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first one,
then the other--that is, he will imagine them in the future,
neither of them as certain, but both as contingent. This
wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination
be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in
relation to time past or time present: consequently, we may
imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time
present, past, or future.
<<<<<Corollary II--It is in the nature of reason to perceive
things under a certain form of eternity (sub quadam aeternitatis
specie).
>>>>>Proof--It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not
as contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.). Reason perceives
this necessity of things (II. xli.) truly--that is (I. Ax. vi.),
as it is in itself. But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is
the very necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it
is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of
eternity. We may add that the bases of reason are the notions
(II. xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which
(II. xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular
thing: which must therefore be conceived without any relation to
time, under a certain form of eternity.
XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing
actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite
essence of God.
>>>>>Proof--The idea of a particular thing actually existing
necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the
said thing (II. viii.). Now particular things cannot be
conceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they
have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the
attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas
must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the
attributes of those ideas--that is (I. vi.), the eternal and
infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.
*****Note--By existence I do not here mean duration--that is,
existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a
certain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of
existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they
follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal
necessity of God's nature (I. xvi.). I am speaking, I repeat,
of the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are
in God. For although each particular thing be conditioned by
another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force
whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from
the eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Cor.).
XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God
which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.
>>>>>Proof--The proof of the last proposition is universal; and
whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea
thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.),
will involve God's eternal and infinite essence. Wherefore,
that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence
of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the
whole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate.
Q.E.D.
XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal
and infinite essence of God.
>>>>>Proof--The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II.
xxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and
external bodies (II. xvi. Cor. i. and II. xvii.) as actually
existing; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate
knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.
*****Note--Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the
eternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God,
and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer
many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that
third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II.
xl., and of the excellence and use of which we shall have
occasion to speak in Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledge
of God as they have of general notions, because they are unable
to imagine God as they do bodies, and also because they have
associated the name God with images of things that they are in
the habit of seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing,
being, as they are, men, and continually affected by external
bodies. Many errors, in truth, can be traced to this head,
namely, that we do not apply names to things rightly. For
instance, when a man says that the lines drawn from the centre
of a circle to its circumference are not equal, he then, at all
events, assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle different
from that assigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make
mistakes in calculation, they have one set of figures in their
mind, and another on the paper. If we could see into their
minds, they do not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because
we think, that they have the same numbers in their mind as they
have on the paper. If this were not so, we should not believe
them to be in error, any more than I thought that a man was in
error, whom I lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had
flown into a neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me
sufficiently clear. Very many controversies have arisen from the
fact, that men do not rightly explain their meaning, or do not
rightly interpret the meaning of others. For, as a matter of
fact, as they flatly contradict themselves, they assume now one
side, now another, of the argument, so as to oppose the
opinions, which they consider mistaken and absurd in their
opponents.
XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the
mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has
also been determined by another cause, and this last by another
cause, and so on to infinity.
>>>>>Proof--The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II.
xi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I.
xvii. Cor. ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolute
faculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it
must be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by
another cause, and this last by another, &c. Q.E.D.
*****Note--In the same way it is proved, that there is in the
mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c.
Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either
entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms,
such as we are accustomed to put together from particular
things. Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same
relation to this or that idea, or this or that volition, as
"lapidity" to this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and
Paul. The cause which leads men to consider themselves free has
been set forth in the Appendix to Part I. But, before I proceed
further, I would here remark that, by the will to affirm and
decide, I mean the faculty, not the desire. I mean, I repeat,
the faculty, whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or
false, not the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turns
away from any given thing. After we have proved, that these
faculties of ours are general notions, which cannot be
distinguished from the particular instances on which they are
based, we must inquire whether volitions themselves are anything
besides the ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, whether
there is in the mind any affirmation or negation beyond that,
which the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves. On which
subject see the following proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest
the idea of pictures should suggest itself. For by ideas I do
not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye, or in
the midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought.
XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and
negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,
involves.
>>>>>Proof--There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive
or negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely,
this or that affirmation, and this or that negation. Now let us
conceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking
whereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a
triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation
involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without
the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the same
thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as
it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B. Further,
this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea
of a triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor
be conceived, without the idea of a triangle. Again, this idea
of a triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that
its three interior angles are equal to two right angles.
Wherefore, and vice versa, this idea of a triangle can neither be
nor be conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this
affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle,
and is nothing besides. What we have said of this volition
(inasmuch as we have selected it at random) may be said of any
other volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea. Q.E.D.
<<<<<Corollary--Will and understanding are one and the same.
>>>>>Proof--Will and understanding are nothing beyond the
individual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note). But a
particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same
(by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding are
one and the same. Q.E.D.
*****Note--We have thus removed the cause which is commonly
assigned for error. For we have shown above, that falsity
consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas
which are fragmentary and confused. Wherefore, a false idea,
inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we
say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he
has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain,
but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what
is false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause
his imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note). Thus, although
the man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never
say that he is certain. For by certainty we mean something
positive (II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.
However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully
explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and
I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced
against our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple,
I have thought it worth while to point out some of the
advantages, which follow therefrom. I say "some," for they will
be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth
part.
I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to make
an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of the
mind, and the images of things which we imagine. It is further
necessary that they should distinguish between idea and words,
whereby we signify things. These three--namely, images, words,
and ideas--are by many persons either entirely confused
together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,
and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely
necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for
philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life. Those
who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by
contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas
of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not
ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of
our will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate
pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not
see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an
affirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words with
ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think
that they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm,
or deny. This misconception will easily be laid aside by one,
who reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in
no wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore
clearly understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does
not consist in the image of anything, nor in words. The essence
of words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in
no wise involve the conception of thought.
These few words on this subject will suffice: I will therefore
pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised against
our doctrine. Of these, the first is advanced by those, who
think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, and
that therefore it is different therefrom. The reason for their
holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the
understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an
increase in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or
negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we
do not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their
faculty of understanding. The will is thus distinguished from
the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite.
Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us
especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment
before assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed
by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he
perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or
dissents.
For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not therefore
admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not deceived,
unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist.
Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience,
than that the will or faculty of assent is free and different
from the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may be objected
that one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality
than another; in other words, that we do not seem to need for
affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power than for
affirming, that what is false is true. We have, however, seen
that one idea has more reality or perfection than another, for
as objects are some more excellent than others, so also are the
ideas of them some more excellent than others; this also seems
to point to a difference between the understanding and the will.
Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from free
will, what will happen if the incentives to action are equally
balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass? Will he perish of
hunger and thirst? If I say that he would not, he would then
determine his own action, and would consequently possess the
faculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objections
might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence
everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the
task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as
possible.
To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a
wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding be
meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will
has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of
forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition
should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling:
for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an
infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot
affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by
the same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an
infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is an
infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,
that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,
consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be
urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive
them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of
perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have
already. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring
it about that we should understand an infinite number of other
entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater
understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that
which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.
We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby
we explain all particular volitions--in other words, that which
is common to all such volitions.
As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or
universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be
wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself
into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for
what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an
infinite number of individuals.
To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a free
power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that anyone
suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he does
not perceive the matter in question adequately. Suspension of
judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and not
free will. In order to illustrate the point, let us suppose a
boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing else. Inasmuch as
this imagination involves the existence of the horse (II. xvii.
Cor.), and the boy does not perceive anything which would
exclude the existence of the horse, he will necessarily regard
the horse as present: he will not be able to doubt of its
existence, although he be not certain thereof. We have daily
experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I do not
suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that, while he
is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his judgment
concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it about that
he should not dream those things, which he dreams that he sees;
yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we suspend
our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.
Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as actual
perception extends--that is, I grant that the mind's
imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.
xvii. note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of
perception, make any affirmation. For what is the perception of
a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings? If the
mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would
regard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons
for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless
the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which
precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind
perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is
inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the
existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on
the subject.
I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third objection,
namely, that the will is something universal which is predicated
of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is common to
all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate essence must,
therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the abstract, be
in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the same in all,
not in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea's
essence: for, in this respect, particular affirmations differ
one from the other, as much as do ideas. For instance, the
affirmation which involves the idea of a circle, differs from
that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much as the idea
of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.