of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and to
affirm that that which is false is true. These two
affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to
one another as being and not-being; for there is nothing
positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of
falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).
We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when we
confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason
and abstractions with realities. As for the fourth objection, I
am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium
described (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,
a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from
him) would die of hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether such
an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; I
answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should
be considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider
children, fools, madmen, &c.
It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this
doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered
from what has been said. The doctrine is good,
1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the
decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so
much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and
more understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely
tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest
happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of
God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid
us. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true
estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God
with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as
for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the
service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.
2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselves
with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which are not
in our power, and do not follow from our nature. For it shows
us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns
with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the
eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from
the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
right angles.
3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to
hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be
angry with any. Further, as it tells us that each should be
content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any
womanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by the
guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand,
as I will show in Part III.
4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the
commonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and
led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do
whatsoever things are best.
I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this
note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a
close. I think I have therein explained the nature and
properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and,
considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient
clearness. I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many
excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary
to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.
END OF PART II
End of Project Gutenberg's The Ethics [Part II], by Benedict de Spinoza