TRADE OF THE PHILIPPINES

_Official letter from the Marques de Montesclaros, [53] viceroy of

Peru, directed to his Majesty, in regard to changing to España the

trade between Mexico and Filipinas._

In behalf of the consulate [54] and corporation of the merchants

of Sevilla, your Majesty was entreated to have the trade between

Nueva España and Philipinas suppressed, and to order that it should

be carried on only from those kingdoms [i.e., España and Portugal]

with the said islands. Your Majesty upon hearing those merchants, was

pleased to order me to make investigation and give my opinion in the

matter. For that purpose you despatched your decree of September 1,

610, and I received it by these last mails.

The arguments which, it seems, were presented to your Majesty by the

said letter and an enclosed memorial, for this purpose, are reduced

to the exaggeration of the general and individual inconveniences

and losses with which the voyage is attended at present in the route

that is followed; and that those inconveniences and losses would all

cease, and great and recognized blessings to the universal benefit of

your Majesty's kingdoms would result, if measures of the sort that

those merchants desire were to be taken. Although one might satisfy

the originator of the idea with less, we shall enlarge the reply to

greater length bearing in mind that the dimensions of this scheme are

not measured by his yard-rule; nor can the advantages resulting from

it compare with the hundred per cent of their profits. We especially

consider that we are talking with your Majesty through councilors

and ministers of such high standing, among whom any state argument,

however great, has its due consideration and place.

It is recognized, Sire, that the chief means of keeping these kingdoms

tranquil is to make them dependencies of España, in what pertains not

only to distributive and commutative justice, but also to whatever else

is necessary for the preservation of life, in the spiritual as well

as the temporal. But dependence of this sort, when viewed entirely and

only from the sovereigns' standpoint, is regulated by what is necessary

and requisite that the vassals of regions so distant may live in the

subjection, and render the obedience and loyalty that are due from

them. Although this argument, since it is the most substantial, when

it encounters the others most justly takes precedence of any other and

private advantage of the vassals themselves and the kingdom, it would

[not] be excusable to molest and vex the subjects with what is not

actually necessary, if the above purpose could be attained at less

cost and vexation to them. Accordingly, in the matter of restricting

the mutual trade of certain kingdoms, and directing that trade to

España alone, one must proceed with very great caution, and with

measures adapted only to what the attainment of the chief end demands,

in order that we may avoid as far as possible the harm that might

result; since, if this body saw itself so disunited that it could

not even avail itself of its own members, it might become desperate,

and the whole might fall into decay, as is usual with those in despair.

They are persuading your Majesty that the trade of these kingdoms

with España is decreasing. I, Sire, feel differently, and am persuaded

that never were the profits resulting from it greater; nor am I less

certain that such result must necessarily follow, in this manner.

It was known in the beginning that neither wine nor olive

oil was produced in Nueva España, but these were brought from

Castilla. Inspired by the example of the profits made by some

persons, all--especially the inhabitants of Andalucía--began to plant

vineyards and olive-orchards. He who had esteemed any kind of trade a

degradation twenty years before, now, with the incentive of sending

away his crops, shipped greater cargoes than would a whole fair of

merchants. Consequently, the ocean trade increased, in a short time,

from at most fifty or one hundred casks of wine and a few more jars

of olive-oil--carried by one or two vessels, unauthorized and without

register--to cargoes which fill thirty or forty vessels, that sail

annually in a trading fleet. The vessel in which this is received

is earthen, and of limited capacity; and what was slowly filling it

continued to increase. Now this vessel is full to the brim, but still

they obstinately continue to pour in more. Is it not evident that what

is more than enough to fill it must overflow, and be the same as lost?

Thus was the land conquered in Perú. True reports were published

concerning its so great abundance of wealth--that it was considered

easier and cheaper to arm men and shoe horses with silver than with

iron; and that for one quire of paper ten pesos of gold were paid,

for one cloth cloak one hundred pesos, and for one horse three or

four thousand pesos. At this report, various kinds of merchandise were

brought, and had a continual good outlet and sale; and they were taken

in the necessary quantity. Years passed, and the treasure--which was

too plentiful, because it was in possession of people who had no use

for it--came into the hands of those who finally saw it disseminated

through the world--and for this reason the share of each part is

less. The account that should be taken of reason and common sense is

forgotten, and men persuade themselves blindly that, since they get

a thousand for five hundred, with one million they must make two:

And as if they could expect the same profit from supplying necessity

and from adding to abundance, they multiply their trading-fleets and

double their investments. Is it not evident that if their shipments are

in excess, their profits must fall short, and that the ratio between

the two cannot be equal to what it was before? Let the records of the

customs duties belonging to your Majesty be examined, where those

who profit and those who lose pay on account of what they produce;

and they will tell how not only the commerce has not declined, but

also that rather, through its having increased so greatly, the danger

of losing the invested money results.

What their provinces can digest and assimilate, Sire, should be

exported to the Indias, and a limit should be set to the hope of

their increase, and endeavor should be made to preserve them in the

extremely flourishing condition which they reached; and if efforts

pass those limits, then, instead of causing the Indias to increase,

it will be a greater blow, whereby they will slip back more quickly

along the coast of decline.

Coming then to the particular matter, the question is one of

suppressing the commerce now carried on with the Philipinas Islands by

way of the South Sea. This may be advantageous to España in two ways:

in making the kingdom of Méjico absolutely dependent on España's

aid, without leaving it any other recourse: and in increasing the

proportions of their present trade by adding to that kingdom [_i.e._,

España] that commerce from those islands by way of the Ocean Sea,

[55] to which it is desired to direct the trade-route.

In the first place, it will be considered that Nueva-España passed

many years without any communication with the Philipinas, and that

the same will happen now if that commerce be taken away, although

at the outset there may be some ill-feeling among them; and that

the prevention of a thing so temporary, and in one province only,

ought not to over-balance what is of so different an importance, as

that España (the seat of your Majesty's monarchy) should have plenty

of money. For all that México sends to Manila will go to España,

and should have an outlet for its merchandise, since from that must

be supplied what Nueva-España now receives from the islands.

In order that Nueva-España may preserve itself if this trade be

suppressed, the years while it lived without that trade have no

consequence; for it would be a mistake to compare a period when that

kingdom was in so early an infancy [56] that the royal incomes therein

scarcely amounted to thirty or forty thousand ducados, and when in the

whole kingdom the amount of outside capital employed did not surpass

two hundred thousand, with what El Cerro [57] now alone produces,

where one reckons the product by millions and takes no account of

the tens and hundreds. From all this one may infer that whoever sits

down to a meal, however plentiful, when he sees it growing less would

doubtless have sufficient strength to call out and plead his hunger;

and much more when we baptise business with the name of diet.

But this has not much force, since it is not intended to suppress,

but only to change the mode of this supply. In order to see whether

it be feasible, one should consider, that, barring certain articles

of adornment and luxury, the chief exports from España to Méjico are

wine, oil, and linen, and from the Philipinas woven and raw silk.

The former products, in whatever quantity needed, must always be

bought from España. There is no other region that can supply them,

nor does Méjico itself produce them; therefore its enforced dependence

on España follows. However, in what pertains to linen, Méjico may

supply itself in part by using the cloth that the Indians make from

cotton. The rest (namely, silks supplied by Manila) may be obtained in

great abundance, without begging it from anyone, by only encouraging

the industry in any of Méjico's provinces. These are very suitable

for it, especially the province of Misteca, [58] where it could be

cultivated and woven admirably.

Admitting the above, my opinion is that, allowing that Nueva-España

could be maintained, although with difficulty, without trade with

the Philipinas, it must be by means that would prove harmful to those

islands alone--which would lose this aid without any resultant good

to España; since they would not ask for those products of España

which they at present demand, or increase those which they are now

exporting because of the increase of money [in Nueva España]. And we

have already stated that Nueva-España is incapable of consuming more

wine and oil than it now uses.

But if all this should cease, and España should have to supply the

above-mentioned necessities because of shutting the door to the trade

in the Philipinas, the bulk of silk stuffs would have to be brought

from Francia and Flandes, to whom España always gives her treasures

in exchange for this merchandise. For Constantinopla is so far from

Italia, and so little do gold and silver suit that route--or else

the French and the rebels [59] are so skilful in getting this product

away from us, that one may doubt whether they do not take it all with

them. According to this, he who is not suspicious enough to believe

that the merchants of Sevilla alone consider as enemies prejudicial

to your Majesty's crown those who do not trade much with them, should

be astonished that they direct and regulate the reform so that the

Chinese cannot avail themselves of the silver of Nueva España. For

it is a fact that the Chinese do us no other harm than to keep the

silver; and that the merchants do not consider that by that other

road all tends to come into the hands of him who exerts himself with

it in order to attempt and compass to acquire what remains.

Let us examine, then, what interest would accrue to España in

the other point, the appropriation to itself of the trade with

the Philipinas. The consulate says that España will be enriched

with the exportation, to Manda [60] and Xapon, of its products and

other merchandise that will go to those islands, where they also

desire so ardently to have an abundance of what is brought from there

[España?] and from China; and this will easily prevent the loss of the

great quantities of silver that pass by this road from Nueva España.

To the first, sufficient answer is made with what experience, that

great teacher in such matters, has taught us to the contrary--to me,

at least, during the time while I governed in México. For, since

your Majesty was pleased to order me in a decree, dated December 17,

604, to give my opinion as to whether export duties would better be

levied on the merchandise sent to the Philipinas from the port of

Acapulco--since all the other merchandise sent thence, to Guatimala

and Perú, pays two and one-half per cent--and that in order to do this

I should investigate the quality and nature of the said merchandise,

I made special efforts to ascertain these facts. After examining the

registers of several years I found that, even if the duty should be

collected from the Philipinas exports as from the others, it would not

amount to two hundred pesos of eight reals each year; for all those

goods were articles of luxury, and in very small quantity. I sent

your Majesty an official report of this in my letter of February 17,

606. On August 19 of the same year, I received a reply, ordering me to

make no change so long as the trade did not increase to such an extent

that I thought it inadvisable; and in such case to advise your Majesty

of it confidentially. Consequently, since there will be no greater

exportation from Nueva España of like commodities from that kingdom

[_i.e._, España]--where there are no others, and whence only these

would be sent--the same thing would result. [61] One errs in saying

that those goods are desired in Manila and Xapon, since cloth stuffs

(the only thing lacking to them) besides being a merchandise of so

great value that he who would export them so far to the Philipinas

would lose them--are not used, because of the heat; and in Xapon,

where the cold might make them sought, they cost very little, for

the natives clothe themselves with the taffetans of that country, and

use cotton quilts. Consequently, I have also answered what was alleged

concerning the increase of the duties that would accrue to your Majesty

from the export duties in España and the import duties at Manila.

The other argument namely, that España would be filled with products

from China and Xapon--may be conceded to them; but it remains for

them to show us the utilty that would accrue to them, after the goods

had been obtained. For I, on the contrary, regard them as a very

great harm, since with those goods would cease the present industry

[in España] of the raising of silk, its weaving and trade; and all

this would be exchanged for what is so much poorer and of so little

durability. It is a fact that even now we are experiencing that,

and are discovering here the harm caused by even the small quantity

of silk of this class [_i.e._, the Chinese silk]; it comes mixed with

that of España, in almost all the velvets and taffetans brought from

España, for in but two days' time they become useless.

That by this means would be prevented the exportation of silver from

Nueva-España, is an opinion that one might value and thank them for,

if they were not trying to withdraw the silver from another and more

important region, where the harm would be greater. But, supposing

that what now goes from México will be sent later from Castilla and

Andalucía, it seems that the only utility will be found in the less

occasion [for buying Chinese goods] that each of those provinces would

have, so that the export of silver would be in smaller quantity. That

is to be regulated by the wealth of each province, and by their

facilities for diverting it. All the silver that Nueva-España obtains

now comes from its own provinces, or is brought from the provinces of

Perú. The bulk of it is used in the trade with España, some in that

with the Philipinas, and very little in the retail trade of its own

cities and towns; for although Nueva-España has intercourse with Perú,

it never uses more than the products of the country for that. What is

sent to the islands goes by way of Acapulco, which is the only port

in all the South Sea where this despatch is made or can be made. That

España would have more silver if it retained within its bounds what

it receives, seems to be undeniable, since therein is gathered the

silver of México, Perú, and all the Indias. But the gates by which

that silver issues [from España]--now it is known whether there are

any--are, to speak correctly, as many as there are seaports and sterile

districts, with the usual and accustomed communication between them.

Accepting this as true--on which is based assertions of those who

say that less silver will be sent to Manila from a kingdom where

conditions are such [_i.e._, España] than México [now] gives--I,

at least, no matter how long may be the argument, do not comprehend

so obscure a secret; on the contrary, I am persuaded that España

will be no poorer thereby. For, if this mouth be stopped, España

must be drained, by those that remain (as is done today), of all of

this article that other kingdoms are offering it, as in a flood. But

with equal certainty, I understand that incomparably more money will

go to the Philipinas by this road than now goes by the other. And to

assert that this loss will cease because, with the increase of trade

with Xapon, the merchandise which must go to España will come from

that country, is a statement without foundation. For if this argument

were worth anything, it must have the same force, in preventing what

is today carried from México; since trade with Xapon from Manila is

open and permitted to all who wish it.

The consulate is trying also to strengthen its proposition with the

improvements that it pretends to find in the voyage, if it were to be

made by the cape of Buena-Esperanza. But, discussing that point by what

I have been able to learn of it, I find that the emperor and king our

sovereign, of glorious memory, your Majesty's grandfather, having been

persuaded that the discovery and conquest of the Spice Islands--the

name then given to those islands today included in the name of

Philipinas or Malucas--pertained to the crown of Castilla, inasmuch

as they were within the line drawn by his Holiness, Alexander VI, for

the division of the world, ardently desired, and made extraordinary

efforts, so that his vassals might make that voyage without touching

at the ports and lands of the kingdom of Portugal. For that purpose

he made an agreement with Fernando de Magallanes to discover [such

a route]. The latter discovered and gave name to the strait in

this region at the south. Although by the result [of Magallanes's

expedition] one could recognize the great difficulty and danger of

the voyage, his Majesty would not desist from the undertaking. On the

contrary, he immediately sent, in the year 25, two other fleets by

that way while, at the same time, he sent a ship under command of an

intelligent man to find a new entrance by the coast of Labrador and

the Bacallaos. [62] Following up the attempt, he ordered Don Fernando

Cortés, conqueror of Nueva-España, to attempt this expedition from

Nueva-España. He would not have ceased like means until attaining it,

had not he made that contract or agreement concerning those islands

with the king of Portugal in the year 29. [63] That put an end to

the enterprise until afterward, when Don Antonio de Mendoza, viceroy

of Nueva-España, took up again the same search in the year 42, and

continued to persevere in it, so that it was realized during the

latter years of the governorship and life of Don Luis de Velasco,

who succeeded the said Don Antonio in that office.

I would, Sire, narrate in minute detail to your Majesty these labors,

and those of many others, who lost their lives and possessions at

various times to see the accomplishment of so important a matter,

if I were not afraid of making a history of this letter--in order to

entreat you that, since God our Lord ordained that a good desired

by so many should be enjoyed with so great quietness in these most

fortunate days of your Majesty, you will not permit the glory of

this happiness to be disturbed and obscured; for the motives and

efforts of so suspicious a people embarrass it. They, in order to

gain their own private interests, try to cover them with this cloak

of convenience and conservation of so superior authority. And although

it appears that a great part of the former injuries are lacking today,

since the kingdom of Portugal (although by light of a separate crown)

is under the universal domain of your Majesty, still, the zeal and

affection that your Majesty has always felt in greater proportion

for the inhabitants of Castilla ought not on that account to cease;

since there is also no cessation of the rancor and hostility with

which the Portuguese, in all the Indias where they rule, withhold the

friendly intercourse that they owed to the Castilians as the vassals

of the same sovereign.

I am quite persuaded that there is little difference between these two

routes as regards the weather and dangers of the sea. For, although the

Nueva-España vessels consume not longer than sixty days, and sometimes

less, the return voyage is of longer duration, and the whirlwinds and

gales more continuous. And although I believe that voyages made by

way of the cape of Buena Esperanza take more than the three months

that the prior and consuls assert (especially since the vessels

have to stop at one or two way-stations), yet, in regard to this,

I estimate the two routes as equal. But in point of certain security,

the advantage lies greatly with the voyages made by way of the South

Sea, as it is at all times so free from enemies. No further proof is

necessary regarding this statement than the fact that not a single

vessel going to and fro between Acapulco and Cavite and the port of

Manila has been captured; [64] while very many vessels take that other

route, which are so heavily armed that, in comparison with the first,

one may consider them as more than fortresses. The warning that the

Dutch make use of this route [_i.e._, through the Strait of Magellan]

cannot force me to believe the contrary; and by it without so many

advantages as those enjoyed by your Majesty's ships they have made

themselves almost complete masters of all the Spice Islands, for they

had no other routes from which to select this one. I assert from

the prudence with which the Dutch consider what is of advantage to

them, that if they could enjoy so great convenience as Nueva-España

possesses, they would not take the risk of running by the coast and

ports of your Majesty as they do today by the open sea, where they

might meet one who would resist their progress. An excellent proof of

this truth is their so-oft repeated effort to find a passage through

the strait of Anian. [65] For they consider it more conducive to the

peace of their voyage to experience rough and unknown seas, than to

be liable to the sudden surprises to which those that are milder and

more traversed are liable. The mastery that I know them to exercise in

those districts, is to enter for pillage and barter, as they usually

do, even in the very kingdoms of your Majesty which are nearest to

the defense and power of your fleets And if, in addition, the Dutch

have any trading-posts, established and manned with soldiers, it is

not necessary that España should trouble itself to dislodge them,

but the governor of the Philipinas, and the soldiers and ships of

Malaca and of the viceroy of India, should attempt it; and it will

be easy to drive them out at once. In truth, however, (that I may

always discuss a similar case), our design must be more difficult to

attain than theirs; for they content themselves with going where they

are received, and of receiving what they are given, without caring

much whether others enter that district, while your Majesty desires,

as is right, to be absolute and sole ruler, and to shut the gate to

all who do not enter under the name and title of vassals.

As to the difficulty and delay of sending aid to the islands, although

it is understood that the enemy is attempting some entrance in the

islands, I can easily comprehend that it would be easier to build a

fleet in España, and that it would be despatched much more quickly

than from these provinces. But I have always considered that, in this

regard, Sire, he who has so extensive a monarchy as your Majesty,

must see that each part of it have all the force necessary for

its sole defense, without being dependent for so costly and remote

reenforcement, as would necessarily be the case did your Majesty send

it from the the ports of that kingdom. Consequently, I presume that,

if the islands should find themselves in a like necessity, either

they would have to resist an attack with their presidios and walls,

or (to extend the hope farther) that they would not have need for

more aid than what they could secure from Malaca with the galleons

of that crown. The aid that is not so pressingly needed, and which,

it seems, must necessarily come from España--such as infantry for the

presidios--is sent there with some difficulty, because of the long

distance overland from Veracruz to the port of Acapulco, in a land

so open that the companies necessarily lose some men. But it would

prove more costly should your Majesty, in order to avoid this, have to

form a fleet on occasions when it would be necessary. However, I have

thought that an effort might be made, some time, to send the soldiers

who must go to the islands in the trading fleet or galleons sailing to

Puertobelo; [66] and to advise the president [of the Audiencia there],

somewhat earlier, to have small boats provided to take the soldiers

by river from Chagre to Cruces. Since from that point to Panama it is

only five leguas overland, the men might be taken there easily and at

little expense. The viceroy of Peru, having been notified beforehand,

should, without any expense to your Majesty, have a vessel at Panamá,

where the soldiers could embark and go to Acapulco. There they could

change ships for those in the Philipinas line. By this method some

of the greatest inconveniences could be avoided.

And lastly, as the concluding argument of this discourse, I remind your

Majesty that since the Philipinas Islands are surrounded by enemies so

powerful as are Xapon and China--one because of its strength and valor,

and the other because of its incredible multitude of inhabitants--with

only the seven hundred Spaniards that the islands had, during

my government of Nueva España, who could bear arms (a number now

increased somewhat by the presidios of Terrenate and Thidore), they

are preserved solely for this reason, that by their means the trade

of those countries is opened to your Majesty's kingdoms. Thus said

the emperor of Xapon, when he was advised to conquer Manila. The

Chinese king wrote the same words to Don Pedro de Acuña, when the

latter suspected that the insurrection made in those islands by the

Chinese king's vassals had been made by his orders. And it must be

considered seriously that if the trade be carried on by way of the cape

of Buena Esperanza, it would be quite possible that the Chinese--who,

in order to go to Manila, have to sail, both in the open and among

islands, with some risk and danger because of the smallness of their

craft--after seeing that the Spanish ships had to make a way-station

at Malaca or Xava, would go from the river of Canton, which is the

gateway from which the Chinese ships set out, coasting from land to

land along their own country, and would change the bulk of their

trade to Portuguese ports, and thus deserting Manila. If they did

this, the principal support and defense of Manila would fail, and

its enemies would change their opinion, since they would no longer

enjoy the benefits that now attract them.

For all the above, Sire, my opinion is that, if the matter were in its

beginnings, from no other part could this trade be directed than from

Nueva España; for it is nearer the islands, and is the region from

which less silver can go. And should this cease, without doubt that

kingdom would be greatly weakened, and the Philipinas destroyed--and

none of this to España's advantage. On the contrary it would be

to España's greater loss, since that country would be filled with

merchandise of little value, at double the money that would be derived

from its sale. The dependence of all the other kingdoms, which is now

sure and not uncertain, would possibly be endangered by venturing upon

the execution of this plan; and your Majesty would also be obliged,

in order to make the sea safe in this route, to have two war vessels

to accompany every trading vessel, notwithstanding the extraordinary

cost which this would involve.

The other things mentioned in the memorial, namely, [_original

MS. broken_; the appointment(?)] of officials, soldiers, and

sailors now engaged in this despatch do not seem of such nature

that they oblige me to answer them in detail. It is certain that

the viceroys appoint very suitable persons, and will always do so,

since they rely on their honor; and the commander does not care

to overload the vessels, since he is not interested in the freight

charges. Consequently, when the auditor of Manila obliges them to

load much cargo in Cabite, they usually unload and leave goods on

the shoals that they meet, whence arise innumerable complaints and

suits. The pilots and sailors are examined in what is necessary for

them, and the soldiers are sufficient for a navigation route of so

great safety. If it is true that the latter are lazy and vagabonds,

few times have I seen men enlisted in any region who are not such,

or who do not desire to be such. Although there may be things to

correct in all matters, there are other reforms less costly and easier.

Your Majesty might wish to have these arguments in briefer form;

but, although I have omitted some things, the matter is of so great

moment that I have not been able to pass over anything that I judge

essential for your proper decision in this matter.

May God preserve your Majesty as Christendom has need. Los Reyes,

April 12, 1612.

The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898 — Volume 17 of 55 1609-1616 Explorations by Early Navigators, Descriptions of the Islands and Their Peoples, Their History and Records of the Catholic Missions, as Related in Contemporaneous Books and Manuscripts, Showing the Political, Economic, Commercial and Religious Conditions of Those Islands from Their Earliest Relations with European Nations to the Close of the Nineteenth Century · 第 92 / 113 题