I HAVE pointed out before that some of the older authors, like Gobineau,
Klemm, Carus, Nott and Gliddon, assume characteristic mental differences
between the races of man; and these have been revived by the growth of
modern nationalism, with its exaggerated self-admiration of the Teutonic
race, its Pan-slavism, and similar symptoms developing in other parts of
the world; but these views are not supported by the results of unbiassed
research.
There remains, however, one point of view to be considered, which might
furnish a basis for investigation. The variety of forms in which the
fundamental ideas occur were early correlated with general impressions
regarding the degrees of civilization, and attention was directed to the
recurrence of similar forms the world over, which appear to present an
increasing degree of complexity of culture. This led anthropologists to
the conclusion that the types of human culture represent an evolutionary
series; that the primitive tribes of our times represent an older stage
of cultural development, through which the more advanced types passed in
earlier periods. If this is true, and if, furthermore, it could be shown
that the single tribes develop independently, we might well say that
those races must be less favorably developed in which earlier types of
culture are found with great frequency, later developments rarely. I
have referred to this possibility at another place (p. 125). For this
reason the theory of a uniform development of human civilization must be
considered in our investigation of the relation between racial types and
cultural progress. The investigations of Tylor and Bachofen, Morgan and
Spencer, fixed the attention upon the data of anthropology as
illustrating the gradual development and rise of civilization. The
development of this side of anthropology was stimulated by the work of
Darwin and his successors, and its fundamental ideas can be understood
only as an application of the theory of biological evolution to mental
phenomena. The conception that the manifestations of ethnic life
represent a series, which from simple beginnings has progressed to the
complex type of modern civilization, has been the underlying thought of
this aspect of anthropological science.
The arguments in support of the theory that the development of
civilization has followed a similar course everywhere, and that among
primitive tribes we may still recognize the stages through which our own
civilization has passed, are largely based on the similarities of types
of culture found in distinct races the world over, but also on the
occurrence of peculiar customs in our own civilization, which can be
understood only as survivals (Tylor) of older customs, that had a deeper
significance at an earlier time, and which are still found in full vigor
among primitive people.
It is necessary to point out at least a few of the aspects of this
general problem, in order to make clear the significance of the
evolutionary theory of human civilization.
The social organization of primitive tribes shows similar traits in many
different parts of the world. Instead of counting descent in the way we
do, many tribes consider the child as a member only of its mother’s
family, and count blood-relationship only in the maternal line, so that
cousins on the mother’s side are considered as near relatives, while
cousins on the father’s side are considered as only distantly related;
other tribes have a strict paternal organization, so that the child
belongs only to the father’s family, not to the mother’s; while still
others follow the same principles as we adhere to, reckoning
relationship in both directions. Connected with these customs is the
selection of the domicile of the newly married couple, who sometimes
reside with the wife’s tribe or family, sometimes with the man’s tribe
or family. When the couple take up their residence with the social group
to which the wife belongs, it is often found that the man is treated as
a stranger until his first child is born. These phenomena have been made
the subject of thorough studies, and the observation has been made that
apparently the customs of residence and of descent are closely
associated (Tylor). As a result of these inquiries, the conclusion has
been drawn that everywhere maternal institutions precede paternal
institutions, and that the social organization of mankind was such that
originally perhaps no distinct family organization existed; that later
on maternal institutions developed, which in turn were followed by
paternal institutions, and again by the system of counting
blood-relationship equally in maternal and paternal lines.
Similar results were obtained by the study of human inventions. It has
been noted before that apes and monkeys sometimes use stones for
defence, and in a way the artificial shelters of animals indicate the
beginnings of invention. In this sense we may seek for the origin of
implements and utensils among animals. In the earliest times when human
remains appear on the surface of the earth, we find man using simple
stone implements which are formed by rough chipping, but the
multiplicity of forms of implements increases gradually. Since many
implements may have been made of perishable materials, we are not able
to tell whether at a very early time the implements and utensils used
were really confined to the few stone objects that may now be recovered;
but certainly the implements were few, and, comparatively speaking,
simple. From this time on, the uses of fire, and of tools for cutting
and striking, for scraping and perforating, have increased in number and
complexity, and a gradual development may be traced from the simple
tools of primitive man to the complex machinery of our times. The
inventive genius of all races and of unnumbered individuals has
contributed to the state of industrial perfection in which we find
ourselves. On the whole, inventions once made have been kept with great
tenacity, and, owing to incessant additions, the available resources of
mankind have constantly been increased and multiplied.
An excellent example of the general theory of evolution of civilization
is found in the theory of evolution of agriculture and of the
domestication of animals as outlined by Otis T. Mason, W J McGee, and
Hahn. They point out how, in the earliest beginnings of social life,
animals, plants, and man lived together in a definite surrounding, and
how, owing to the conditions of life, certain plants multiplied to the
exclusion of others, and how certain animals were suffered in the
neighborhood of the human camp. Through this condition of mutual
sufferance and promotion of mutual interests, if I may use this term, a
closer association between plants, animals, and man developed, which
ultimately led to the beginnings of agriculture and to the actual
domestication of animals.
Researches on art have led to similar results. Investigators have
endeavored to show, that, since the cave-dwellers of France drew the
outlines of the reindeer and mammoth on bone and antler, man has tried
to reproduce in pictographic design the animals of the region in which
he lived. In the artistic productions of many people, designs have been
found which are readily associated with pictographic presentations,
which, however, have lost their realism of form, and have become more
and more conventional; so that in many cases a purely decorative motive
has been interpreted as developed from a realistic pictograph gradually
breaking up under the stress of æsthetic motives. The islands of the
Pacific Ocean, New Guinea, South America, Central America, prehistoric
Europe, have furnished examples for this line of development (see March,
Haddon, Von den Steinen, Holmes), which therefore was recognized as one
of the important tendencies of the evolution of human decorative art,
which was described as beginning with realism, and as leading through
symbolic conventionalism to purely æsthetic motives.
Religion has furnished another example of typical evolution in human
thought. At an early time man began to think and ponder about the
phenomena of nature. Everything appeared to him in an anthropomorphic
form of thought; and thus the first primitive concepts regarding the
world came into being, in which the stone, the mountain, the heavenly
orbs, were viewed as animate anthropomorphic beings endowed with
will-power, and willing to help man or threatening to endanger him. The
observation of the activities of man’s own body and of his mind led to
the formulation of the idea of a soul independent of the body; and with
increasing knowledge and with increasing philosophic thought, religion
and science grew out of these simple beginnings.
The sameness of all these phenomena in different parts of the world has
been considered as proof not only of the fundamental unity of the mind
of all the races of man, but also of the truth of the theory of
evolution of civilization; and thus a grand structure has been reared,
in which we see our present civilization as the necessary outcome of the
activities of all the races of man that have risen in one grand
procession, from the simplest beginnings of culture, through periods of
barbarism, to the stage of civilization that they now occupy. The march
has not been equally rapid; for some are still lagging behind, while
others have forged forward, and occupy the first places in the general
advance.
It seems desirable to understand more clearly what this theory of
parallelism of cultural development implies. It seems to mean that
different groups of mankind started at a very early time from a general
condition of lack of culture; and, owing to the unity of the human mind
and the consequent similar response to outer and inner stimuli, they
have developed everywhere approximately along the same lines, making
similar inventions and developing similar customs and beliefs. It also
seems to involve a certain correlation between industrial development
and social development, and therefore a definite sequence of inventions
as well as of forms of organization and of belief.
In the absence of historical data in regard to the earliest history of
primitive man the world over, we have only three sources of historical
proof of this assumption,—the evidence contained in the earliest history
of the civilized people of the Old World, survivals in modern
civilization, and archæology. The last-named is the only method by means
of which we can approach the problem in regard to people that have no
history.
While it is certainly true that analogues can be found between the types
of culture represented by primitive people and those conditions which
prevailed among the ancestors of the present civilized peoples at the
dawn of history, and that these analogues are supported by the evidence
furnished by survivals, the evidence of archæology does not support the
complete generalization. The theory of parallel development, if it is to
have any significance, would require that among all branches of mankind
the steps of invention should have followed, at least approximately, in
the same order, and that no important gaps should be found. The facts,
so far as known at the present time, are entirely contrary to this view.
We find, for instance, large areas of the world inhabited by people well
advanced in the arts of life, but who have never made the discovery of
pottery, one of the essential steps in the advance of civilization.
Pottery is not found in the extreme southern parts of Africa, in
Australia, in northeastern Siberia,[6] in the whole northwestern part of
North America, and in the extreme south of South America. According to
what has been said before (p. 169), it would seem as if Old-World
pottery covers about the same territory as the other characteristic
traits referred to before, while in America its centre lies in the area
of more advanced culture in the middle part of the continent. Thus it
happens that the well-advanced tribes of Northwest America have no
pottery, and its presence or absence seems to be due more to
geographical location than to general cultural causes.
The same may be said in regard to the use of metals. The invention of
metallurgy, which marks so important an advance of European
civilization, does not appear associated with analogous levels of
development in other parts of the world. Similar remarks may be made in
regard to the development of agriculture and of the domestication of
animals. People whom in a general way we ought to class as on the same
level of culture may some possess the art of agriculture, others may
have domesticated animals, while still others may rely upon the bounty
of the sea or upon the natural vegetable products of their home.[7] As
soon as we begin to investigate the industrial achievements of different
types belonging to different races, parallelism of industrial
development does not seem to exist in any degree of detail. Only one
general trait of industrial development remains; namely, the constant
addition of new elements to the older stock of knowledge and an
increasing refinement of methods and of results, setting aside periods
of temporary regression.
Thus it does not seem to be certain that every people in an advanced
stage of civilization must have passed through all the stages of
development, which we may gather by an investigation of all the types of
culture which occur all over the world.
A still more serious objection is based on another observation. The
validity of the general sameness of the evolution of mankind is based on
the assumption that the same cultural features must always have
developed from the same causes, and that all variations are only minor
details of the grand uniform type of evolution. In other words, its
logical basis is the assumption that the same ethnical phenomena are
always due to the same causes. Thus the inference in regard to the
sequence of maternal and paternal institutions, to which I referred
before, is based on the generalization that because in a few cases
paternal families have developed from maternal ones, therefore all
paternal families have developed in the same way. If we do not make the
assumption that the same phenomena have everywhere developed in the same
way, then we may just as well conclude that paternal families have in
some cases arisen from maternal institutions, in other cases in other
ways.
In the same way it is inferred that because many conceptions of the
future life have evidently developed from dreams and hallucinations, all
notions of this character have had the same origin. This is true only if
it can be shown that no other causes could possibly lead to the same
ideas.
To give another example. It has been claimed that among the Indians of
Arizona, pottery developed from basketry, and it has been inferred that
all pottery must therefore be later in the cultural development of
mankind than basketry. Evidently this conclusion cannot be defended, for
pottery may develop in other ways.
As a matter of fact, quite a number of cases can be given in which
convergent evolution, beginning from distinct beginnings, has led to the
same results. I have referred before to the instance of primitive art,
and have mentioned the theory that geometrical form develops from
realistic representations, which lead through symbolic conventionalism
to purely æsthetic motives. We may remark here that a great diversity of
objects might in this way have given rise to the same decorative
motives, so that the survival of the same decorative motive would not
lead back to the same realistic origin; but more important than this, we
may point out that geometrical motives of the same type have developed
from the tendency of the artist to play with his technique as the
virtuoso plays on his instrument; that the expert basket-weaver, by
varying the arrangement of her weave, was led to the development of
geometrical designs of the same form as those that were developed in
other places from realistic representations. We may even go a step
farther, and recognize that geometrical forms developed from the
technique suggested animal forms, which later on were modified so as to
assume realistic forms; so that in the case of decorative art the same
forms may just as well stand at the beginning of a series of development
as at the end (Von den Steinen).
Another example may not be amiss. The use of masks is found among a
great number of peoples. The origin of the custom is by no means clear
in all cases, but a few typical forms of their use may easily be
distinguished. They are intended to deceive spirits as to the identity
of the wearer, and may thus protect him against attack; or the mask may
represent a spirit which is personified by the wearer, who in this way
frightens away supernatural enemies. Still other masks are
commemorative, the wearer personifying a deceased friend. Masks are also
used in theatrical performances illustrating mythological incidents
(Andree). While it is not at all necessary to assume that these
explanations given by the wearer of masks represent the actual
historical development of the custom, the explanations themselves
suggest the improbability of a single origin of the custom.
I will give another example. Primitive tribes are very often divided
into a definite number of subdivisions. There is little doubt that this
form of social organization has arisen independently over and over
again. The conclusion is justified that the psychical conditions of man
favor the existence of such an organization of society, but it does not
follow that it has developed everywhere in the same manner. Dr.
Washington Matthews has shown that the groups of the Navaho have arisen
by the association of independent elements. Captain Bourke has pointed
out that similar occurrences have given rise to the Apache groups, and
Dr. Fewkes has reached the same conclusion in regard to some of the
Pueblo tribes. On the other hand, we have proof that such groups may
originate by division. Such events have taken place among the Indians of
the North Pacific coast (Boas). Other divisions of tribes seem to have
had an entirely different origin; as, for instance, the frequent twofold
exogamic division of tribes, which may, perhaps, be adequately explained
by the application of the laws of exogamy in a small community. Thus it
would seem that a variety of causes has led to results which appear
identical to all intents and purposes.
The principal obstacle in the way of progress on these lines seems to my
mind to be founded on the lack of comparability of the data with which
we are dealing. Attention has been directed essentially to the
similarity of ethnic phenomena, while the individual variations were
disregarded. As soon as we turn our attention in this direction, we
notice that the sameness of ethnic phenomena is more superficial than
complete, more apparent than real. The unexpected similarities have
attracted our attention to such an extent that we have disregarded
differences; while in the study of the physical traits of distinct
social groups, the reverse mental attitude manifests itself. The
similarity of the main features of the human form being self-evident,
our attention is directed to the minute differences of structure.
Instances of such lack of comparability can easily be given. When we
speak of the idea of life after death as one of the ideas which develop
in human society as a psychological necessity, we are dealing with a
most complex group of data. One people believes that the soul continues
to exist in the form that the person had at the time of death, without
any possibility of change; another one believes that the soul will be
reborn in a child of the same family; a third one believes that the
souls will enter the bodies of animals; and still others believe that
the shadows continue our human pursuits, waiting to be led back to our
world in a distant future. The emotional and rationalistic elements
which enter into these various concepts are entirely distinct; and we
can readily perceive how the various forms of the idea of a future life
may have come into existence by psychological processes that are not at
all comparable. If I may be allowed to speculate on this question, I
might imagine that in one case the similarities between children and
their deceased relatives, in other cases the memory of the deceased as
he lived during the last days of his life, in still other cases the
longing for the beloved child or parent, and again the fear of
death,—may all have contributed to the development of the idea of life
after death, the one here, the other there.
Another instance will corroborate this point of view. One of the
striking forms of social organization which occurs in many regions wide
apart is what we call “totemism,”—a form of society in which certain
social groups consider themselves as related in a supernatural way to a
certain species of animals or to a certain class of objects. I believe
this is the generally accepted definition of “totemism;” but I am
convinced that in this form the phenomenon is not a single psychological
problem, but embraces the most diverse psychological elements. In some
cases the people believe themselves to be descendants of the animal
whose protection they enjoy. In other cases an animal or some other
object may have appeared to an ancestor of the social group, and may
have promised to become his protector, and the friendship between the
animal and the ancestor was then transmitted to his descendants. In
still other cases a certain social group in a tribe may have the power
of securing by magical means and with great ease a certain kind of
animal or of increasing its numbers, and the supernatural relation may
be established in this way. It will be recognized that here again the
anthropological phenomena which are in outward appearances alike are,
psychologically speaking, entirely distinct, and that consequently
psychological laws covering all of them cannot be deduced from them
(Goldenweiser).
Another example may not be amiss. In a general review of moral standards
we observe that with increasing civilization a gradual change in the
valuation of actions takes place. Among primitive man, human life has
little value, and is sacrificed on the slightest provocation. The social
group among whose members any altruistic obligations are binding is
exceedingly small; and outside of the group any action that may result
in personal gain is not only permitted, but even approved; and from this
starting-point we find an ever-increasing valuation of human life and an
extension of the size of the group among whose members altruistic
obligations are binding. The modern relations of nations show that this
evolution has not yet reached its final stage. It might seem, therefore,
that a study of the social conscience in relation to crimes like murder
might be of psychological value, and lead to important results, clearing
up the origin of ethical values; but I think here the same objections
may be raised as before; namely, the lack of comparable motives. The
person who slays an enemy in revenge for wrongs done, a youth who kills
his father before he gets decrepit in order to enable him to continue a
vigorous life in the world to come, a father who kills his child as a
sacrifice for the welfare of his people, act from such entirely
different motives, that psychologically a comparison of their activities
does not seem permissible. It would seem much more proper to compare the
murder of an enemy in revenge with destruction of his property for the
same purpose, or to compare the sacrifice of a child on behalf of the
tribe with any other action performed on account of strong altruistic
motives, than to base our comparison on the common concept of murder
(Westermarck).
These few data may suffice to show that the same ethnic phenomenon may
develop from different sources; and we may infer that the simpler the
observed fact, the more likely it is that it may have developed from one
source here, from another there.
When we base our study on these observations, it appears that serious
objections may be made against the assumption of the occurrence of a
general sequence of cultural stages among all the races of man; that
rather we recognize a peculiar tendency of diverse customs and beliefs
to converge towards similar forms. In order to interpret correctly these
similarities in form, it is necessary to investigate their historical
development; and only when the historical development in different areas
is the same, will it be admissible to consider the phenomena in question
as equivalent. From this point of view the facts of cultural contact
assume a new importance (see p. 166).
An important theoretical consideration has also shaken our faith in the
correctness of the evolutionary theory as a whole. It is one of the
essential traits of this theory that, in general, civilization has
developed from simple forms to complex forms, and that extended fields
of human culture have developed under more or less rationalistic
impulses. Of late years we are beginning to recognize that human culture
does not always develop from the simple to the complex, but that in many
aspects two tendencies intercross,—one from the complex to the simple,
the other from the simple to the complex. It is obvious that the history
of industrial development is almost throughout that of increasing
complexity. On the other hand, human activities that do not depend upon
reasoning do not show a similar type of evolution.
It is perhaps easiest to make this clear by the example of language,
which in many respects is one of the most important evidences of the
history of human development. Primitive languages are, on the whole,
complex. Minute differences in point of view are given expression by
means of grammatical forms; and the grammatical categories of Latin, and
still more so those of modern English, seem crude when compared to the
complexity of psychological or logical forms which primitive languages
recognize, but which in our speech are disregarded entirely. On the
whole, the development of languages seems to be such, that the nicer
distinctions are eliminated, and that it begins with complex and ends
with simpler forms, although it must be acknowledged that opposite
tendencies are not by any means absent (Boas).
Similar observations may be made on the art of primitive man. In music
as well as in decorative design we find a complexity of rhythmic
structure which is unequalled in the popular art of our day. In music,
particularly, this complexity is so great, that the art of a skilled
virtuoso is taxed in the attempt to imitate it (Stumpf). If once it is
recognized that simplicity is not always a proof of antiquity, it will
readily be seen that the theory of the evolution of civilization rests
to a certain extent on a logical error. The classification of the data
of anthropology in accordance with their simplicity has been
reinterpreted as an historical sequence, without an adequate attempt to
prove that the simpler antedates the more complex.
We are thus led to the conclusion that the assumption of a uniform
development of culture among all the different races of man and among
all tribal units is true in a limited sense only. We may recognize a
certain modification of mental activities with modifications of form of
culture; but the assumption that the same forms must necessarily develop
in every independent social unit can hardly be maintained. Thus the
question with which we began our consideration—namely, whether the
representatives of different races can be proved to have developed each
independently, in such a way that the representatives of some races
stand on low levels of culture, while others stand on high levels of
culture—may be answered in the negative. If we should make the attempt
to arrange the different types of man in accordance with their
industrial advancement, we should find representatives of the most
diverse races—such as the Bushman of South Africa, the Veddah of Ceylon,
the Australian, and the Indian of Terra del Fuego—on the same lowest
level. We should also find representatives of different races on more
advanced levels, like the negroes of Central Africa, the Indians of the
Southwestern pueblos, and the Polynesians; and in our present period we
may find representatives of the most diverse races taking part in the
highest types of civilization. Thus it will be seen that there is no
close relation between race and culture.
-----
Footnote 6:
In a few localities in this district pottery is found, perhaps due to
a late local introduction.
Footnote 7:
The cultural conditions of Melanesia Northwest America, and of some of
the nomadic tribes of Africa, might thus be compared.
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