IT now remains to formulate more clearly the difference between the
forms of thought of primitive man and those of civilized man, regardless
of their racial descent.
Even a superficial observation demonstrates that groups of man belonging
to distinct social strata do not behave in the same manner. The Russian
peasant does not re-act to his sense-experiences in the same way as does
the native Australian; and entirely different from theirs are the
re-actions of the educated Chinaman and of the educated American. In all
these cases the form of re-action may depend to a slight extent upon
hereditary individual and racial ability, but it will to a much greater
extent be determined by the habitual re-actions of the society to which
the individual in question belongs.
It seems necessary, therefore, as a last step in our discussion, to
define and explain the mental re-actions which distinguish primitive man
and civilized man of all races.
We must confine this discussion to a very few examples of fundamental
psychological facts.
One of the most striking features in the thoughts of primitive people is
the peculiar manner in which concepts that appear to us alike and
related are separated and rearranged. According to our views, the
constituting elements of the heavens and of the weather are all
inanimate objects; but to the mind of primitive man they appear to
belong to the organic world. The dividing-line between man and animal is
not sharply drawn. What seem to us conditions of an object—like health
and sickness—are considered by him as independent realities. In short,
the whole classification of experience among mankind living in different
forms of society follows entirely distinct lines.
I have illustrated the necessity of classification in a previous
chapter, when speaking of the relation of language and cultural
development (p. 143). Incidentally I have also pointed out that the
principles of classification which are found in different languages do
not by any means agree.
The behavior of primitive man makes it perfectly clear that all these
linguistic classes have never risen into consciousness, and that
consequently their origin must be sought, not in rational, but in
entirely unconscious, processes of the mind. They must be due to a
grouping of sense-impressions and of concepts which is not in any sense
of the term voluntary, but which develops from entirely different
psychological causes. It is a characteristic of linguistic
classifications that they never rise into consciousness; while other
classifications, although the same unconscious origin prevails, often do
rise into consciousness. It seems very plausible, for instance, that the
fundamental religious notions, like the idea of will-power immanent in
inanimate objects, or the anthropomorphic character of animals, are in
their origin just as little conscious as the fundamental ideas of
language. While, however, the use of language is so automatic that the
opportunity never arises for the fundamental notions to emerge into
consciousness, this happens very frequently in all phenomena relating to
religion.
These observations may be applied equally well to other groups of
concepts.
The primary object of these researches is the determination of the
fundamental categories under which phenomena are classified by man in
various stages of culture. Differences of this kind appear very clearly
in the domain of certain simple sense-perceptions. For instance, it has
been observed that colors are classified according to their similarities
in quite distinct groups, without any accompanying difference in the
ability to differentiate shades of color. What we call green and blue
are often combined under some such term as “gall-like color”; or yellow
and green are combined into one concept, which may be named
“young-leaves color.” The importance of the fact that in thought and in
speech these color-names convey the impression of quite different groups
of sensations can hardly be overrated.
Another group of categories that offer a field of fruitful investigation
are those of object and attribute. The concepts of primitive man make it
quite clear that the classes of ideas which we consider as attributes
are often considered as independent objects. The best-known case of this
kind, one to which I have referred incidentally before, is that of
sickness. While we consider sickness as a condition of an organism, it
is believed by primitive man, and even by many members of our own
society, to be an object which may enter the body, and which may be
removed. This is exemplified by the numerous cases in which a disease is
extracted from the body by sucking or by other processes, in the belief
that it may be thrown into people, or that it may be enclosed in wood in
order to prevent its return. Other qualities are treated in the same
way. Thus the conditions of hunger, exhaustion, and similar bodily
feelings, are considered by certain primitive tribes as independent
objects which affect the body. Even life is believed to be a material
object that may become separated from the body. The luminosity of the
sun is considered as an object that the Sun himself may put on or lay
aside.
I have indicated before that the concept of anthropomorphism seems to be
one of the important categories underlying primitive thought. It would
seem that the power of motion of the self, and the power of motion of an
object, have led to the inclusion of man and movable objects in the same
category, with the consequent imputation of human qualities to the
moving objective world.
While in many cases we can see with a fair degree of clearness the
fundamental concepts underlying these categories, in other cases these
are not by any means clear. Thus the concept of incest groups—those
groups in which intermarriage is strictly forbidden—is omnipresent; but
no satisfactory explanation has so far been given for the tendency to
combine certain degrees of blood-relationship under this viewpoint.
Another fundamental difference between the mental life of primitive man
and that of civilized man lies in the fact that we have succeeded in
developing, by the application of conscious reasoning, better systems
from these crude, unconscious classifications of the sum total of our
knowledge, while primitive man has not done so. The first impression
gained from a study of the beliefs of primitive man is, that while the
perceptions of his senses are excellent, his power of logical
interpretation of perceptions seems to be deficient. I think it can be
shown that the reason for this fact is not founded on any fundamental
peculiarity of the mind of primitive man, but lies, rather, in the
character of the traditional ideas by means of which each new perception
is interpreted; in other words, in the character of the traditional
ideas with which each new perception associates itself. In our own
community a mass of observations and of thoughts is transmitted to the
child. These thoughts are the result of careful observation and
speculation of our present and of past generations; but they are
transmitted to most individuals as traditional matter, much the same as
folk-lore. The child associates new perceptions with this whole mass of
traditional material, and interprets his observations by its means. I
believe it is a mistake to assume that the interpretation made by each
civilized individual is a complete logical process. We associate a
phenomenon with a number of known facts, the interpretations of which
are assumed as known, and we are satisfied with the reduction of a new
fact to these previously known facts. For instance, if the average
individual hears of the explosion of a previously unknown chemical, he
is satisfied to reason that certain materials are known to have the
property of exploding under proper conditions, and that consequently the
unknown substance has the same quality. On the whole, I do not think
that we should try to argue still further, and really try to give a full
explanation of the causes of the explosion.
The difference in the mode of thought of primitive man and that of
civilized man seems to consist largely in the difference of character of
the traditional material with which the new perception associates
itself. The instruction given to the child of primitive man is not based
on centuries of experimentation, but consists of the crude experience of
generations. When a new experience enters the mind of primitive man, the
same process which we observe among civilized man brings about an
entirely different series of associations, and therefore results in a
different type of explanation. A sudden explosion will associate itself
in his mind, perhaps, with tales which he has heard in regard to the
mythical history of the world, and consequently will be accompanied by
superstitious fear. When we recognize that neither among civilized men
nor among primitive men the average individual carries to completion the
attempt at causal explanation of phenomena, but carries it only so far
as to amalgamate it with other previously known facts, we recognize that
the result of the whole process depends entirely upon the character of
the traditional material. Herein lies the immense importance of
folk-lore in determining the mode of thought. Herein lies particularly
the enormous influence of current philosophic opinion upon the masses of
the people, and herein lies the influence of the dominant scientific
theory upon the character of scientific work.
It would be vain to try to understand the development of modern science
without an intelligent understanding of modern philosophy; it would be
vain to try to understand the history of mediæval science without a
knowledge of mediæval theology; and so it is vain to try to understand
primitive science without an intelligent knowledge of primitive
mythology. “Mythology,” “theology,” and “philosophy” are different terms
for the same influences which shape the current of human thought, and
which determine the character of the attempts of man to explain the
phenomena of nature. To primitive man,—who has been taught to consider
the heavenly orbs as animate beings; who sees in every animal a being
more powerful than man; to whom the mountains, trees, and stones are
endowed with life,—explanations of phenomena will suggest themselves
entirely different from those to which we are accustomed, since we base
our conclusions upon the existence of matter and force as bringing about
the observed results. If we should not consider it possible to explain
the whole range of phenomena as the result of matter and force alone,
all our explanations of natural phenomena would take a different aspect.
In scientific inquiries we should always be clear in our own minds of
the fact that we always embody a number of hypotheses and theories in
our explanations, and that we do not carry the analysis of any given
phenomenon to completion. In fact, if we were to do so, progress would
hardly be possible, because every phenomenon would require an endless
amount of time for thorough treatment. We are only too apt, however, to
forget entirely the general, and for most of us purely traditional,
theoretical basis which is the foundation of our reasoning, and to
assume that the result of our reasoning is absolute truth. In this we
commit the same error that is committed, and has been committed, by all
the less civilized peoples. They are more easily satisfied than we are
at the present time; but they also assume as true the traditional
element which enters into their explanations, and therefore accept as
absolute truth the conclusions based on it. It is evident that the fewer
the number of traditional elements that enter into our reasoning, and
the clearer we endeavor to be in regard to the hypothetical part of our
reasoning, the more logical will be our conclusions. There is an
undoubted tendency in the advance of civilization to eliminate
traditional elements, and to gain a clearer and clearer insight into the
hypothetical basis of our reasoning. It is therefore not surprising,
that, with the advance of civilization, reasoning becomes more and more
logical, not because each individual carries out his thought in a more
logical manner, but because the traditional material which is handed
down to each individual has been thought out and worked out more
thoroughly and more carefully. While in primitive civilization the
traditional material is doubted and examined by only a very few
individuals, the number of thinkers who try to free themselves from the
fetters of tradition increases as civilization advances.
An example illustrating this progress and at the same time the slowness
of this progress is found in the relations between individuals belonging
to different tribes. There are a number of primitive hordes to whom
every stranger not a member of the horde is an enemy, and where it is
right to damage the enemy to the best of one’s power and ability, and if
possible to kill him. This custom is founded largely on the idea of the
solidarity of the horde, and of the feeling that it is the duty of every
member of the horde to destroy all possible enemies. Therefore every
person not a member of the horde must be considered as belonging to a
class entirely distinct from the members of the horde, and is treated
accordingly. We can trace the gradual broadening of the feeling of
fellowship during the advance of civilization. The feeling of fellowship
in the horde expands to the feeling of unity of the tribe, to a
recognition of bonds established by a neighborhood of habitat, and
further on to the feeling of fellowship among members of nations. This
seems to be the limit of the ethical concept of fellowship of man which
we have reached at the present time. When we analyze the strong feeling
of nationality which is so potent at the present time, we recognize that
it consists largely in the idea of the pre-eminence of that community
whose member we happen to be,—in the pre-eminent value of its language,
of its customs, and of its traditions, and in the belief that it is
right to preserve its peculiarities and to impose them upon the rest of
the world. The feeling of nationality as here expressed, and the feeling
of solidarity of the horde, are of the same order, although modified by
the gradual expansion of the idea of fellowship; but the ethical point
of view which makes it justifiable at the present time to increase the
well-being of one nation at the cost of another, the tendency to value
one’s own civilization as higher than that of the whole rest of mankind,
are the same as those which prompt the actions of primitive man, who
considers every stranger as an enemy, and who is not satisfied until the
enemy is killed. It is somewhat difficult for us to recognize that the
value which we attribute to our own civilization is due to the fact that
we participate in this civilization, and that it has been controlling
all our actions since the time of our birth; but it is certainly
conceivable that there may be other civilizations, based perhaps on
different traditions and on a different equilibrium of emotion and
reason, which are of no less value than ours, although it may be
impossible for us to appreciate their values without having grown up
under their influence. The general theory of valuation of human
activities, as developed by anthropological research, teaches us a
higher tolerance than the one which we now profess.
After we have thus seen that a large number of traditional elements
enter into the reasoning of primitive man and of civilized man as well,
we are better prepared to understand some of the more special typical
differences in the thought of primitive man and of civilized man.
A trait of primitive life that early attracted the attention of
investigators is the occurrence of close associations between mental
activities that appear to us as entirely disparate. In primitive life,
religion and science; music, poetry, and dance; myth and history;
fashion and ethics,—appear inextricably interwoven. We may express this
general observation also by saying that primitive man views each action
not only as adapted to its main object, each thought related to its main
end, as we should perceive them, but that he associates them with other
ideas, often of a religious or at least of a symbolic nature. Thus he
gives them a higher significance than they seem to us to deserve. Every
taboo is an example of such associations of apparently trifling actions
with ideas that are so sacred that a deviation from the customary mode
of performance creates the strongest emotions of abhorrence. The
interpretation of ornaments as charms, the symbolism of decorative art,
are other examples of association of ideas that, on the whole, are
foreign to our mode of thought.
In order to make clear the point of view from which these phenomena seem
to fall into an orderly array, we will investigate whether all vestiges
of similar forms of thought have disappeared from our civilization. In
our intense life, which is devoted to activities requiring the full
application of our reasoning-powers and a repression of the emotional
life, we have become accustomed to a cold, matter-of-fact view of our
actions, of the incentives that lead to them, and of their consequences.
It is not necessary, however, to go far afield to find a state of mind
which is open to other aspects of life. If those among us who move in
the midst of the current of our quickly pulsing life do not look beyond
their rational motives and aims, others who stand by in quiet
contemplation recognize in it the reflection of an ideal world that they
have built up in their own consciousness. To the artist the outer world
is a symbol of the beauty that he feels; to the fervent religious mind
it is a symbol of the transcendental truth which gives form to his
thought. Instrumental music that one enjoys as a work of purely musical
art calls forth in the mind of another a group of definite concepts that
are connected with the musical themes and their treatment only by the
similarity of the emotional states they evoke. In fact, the different
manner in which individuals re-act to the same stimulus, and the variety
of associations elicited by the same sense-impression in different
individuals, are so self-evident that they hardly call for special
remarks.
Most important for the purpose of our investigation is the fact that
there are certain stimuli to which all of us who live in the same
society re-act in the same way without being able to express the reasons
for our actions. A good example of what I refer to are breaches of
social etiquette. A mode of behavior that does not conform to the
customary manners, but differs from them in a striking way, creates, on
the whole, unpleasant emotions; and it requires a determined effort on
our part to make it clear to ourselves that such behavior does not
conflict with moral standards. Among those who are not trained in
courageous and rigid thought, the confusion between traditional
etiquette—so-called good manners—and moral conduct is habitual. In
certain lines of conduct the association between traditional etiquette
and ethical feeling is so close, that even a vigorous thinker can hardly
emancipate himself from it. This is true, for instance, of acts that may
be considered breaches of modesty. The most cursory review of the
history of costume shows that what was considered modest at one time has
been immodest at other times. The custom of habitually covering parts of
the body has at all times led to the strong feeling that exposure of
such parts is immodest. This feeling of propriety is so erratic, that a
costume that is appropriate on one occasion may be considered
opprobrious on other occasions; as, for instance, a low-cut evening
dress in a street-car during business hours. What kind of exposure is
felt as immodest depends always upon fashion. It is quite evident that
fashion is not dictated by modesty, but that the historical development
of costume is determined by a variety of causes. Nevertheless fashions
are typically associated with the feeling of modesty, so that an
unwonted exposure excites the unpleasant feelings of impropriety. There
is no conscious reasoning why the one form is proper, the other
improper; but the feeling is aroused directly by the contrast with the
customary. Every one will feel instinctively the strong resistance that
he would have to overcome, even in a different society, if he were
required to perform an action that we are accustomed to consider as
immodest, and the feelings that would be excited in his mind if he were
thrown into a society in which the standards of modesty differed from
our own.
Even setting aside the strong emotions of modesty, we find a variety of
reasons which make certain styles of dress appear improper. To appear in
the fashion of our forefathers of two centuries ago would be entirely
out of the question, and would expose one to ridicule. To see a man wear
a hat in company indoors nettles us: it is considered rude. To wear a
hat in church or at a funeral would cause more vigorous resentment, on
account of the greater emotional value of the feelings concerned. A
certain tilt of the hat, although it may be very comfortable to the
wearer, would stamp him at once as an uneducated brute. Other novelties
in costume may hurt our æsthetic feelings, no matter how bad the taste
of the prevailing fashions may be.
Another example will make clear what I mean. When we consider our table
manners, it will readily be recognized that most of them are purely
traditional, and cannot be given any adequate explanation. To smack
one’s lips is considered bad style, and may excite feelings of disgust;
while among the Indians it would be considered bad taste not to smack
one’s lips when invited to dinner, because it would suggest that the
guest does not enjoy his meal. Both for the Indian and for ourselves the
constant performance of these actions which constitute good table
manners make it practically impossible to act otherwise. An attempt to
act differently would not only be difficult on account of the lack of
adjustment of muscular motions, but also on account of the strong
emotional resistance that we should have to overcome. The emotional
displeasure is also released when we see others act contrary to custom.
To eat with people having table manners different from our own excites
feelings of displeasure which may rise to such an intensity as to cause
qualmishness. Here, also, explanations are often given which are
probably based solely on attempts to explain the existing manners, but
which do not represent their historical development. We often hear that
it is improper to eat with a knife because it might cut the mouth; but I
doubt very much if this consideration has anything to do with the
development of the custom, for the older type of sharp steel forks might
as easily hurt the mouth as the blade of the knife.
It may be well to exemplify the characteristics of our opposition to
unwonted actions by a few additional examples, which will help to clear
up the mental processes that lead us to formulate the reasons for our
conservatism.
One of the cases in which the development of such alleged reasons for
behavior is best traced is that of the taboo. Although we ourselves have
hardly any definite taboos, to an outsider our failure to use certain
animals for food might easily appear from this point of view. Supposing
an individual accustomed to eating dogs should inquire among us for the
reason why we do not eat dogs, we could only reply that it is not
customary; and he would be justified in saying that dogs are tabooed
among us, just as much as we are justified in speaking of taboos among
primitive people. If we were hard pressed for reasons, we should
probably base our aversion to eating dogs or horses on the seeming
impropriety of eating animals that live with us as our friends. On the
other hand, we are not accustomed to eat caterpillars, and we should
probably decline to eat them from feelings of disgust. Cannibalism is so
much abhorred, that we find it difficult to convince ourselves that it
belongs to the same class of aversions as those mentioned before. The
fundamental concept of the sacredness of human life, and the fact that
most animals will not eat others of the same species, set off
cannibalism as a custom by itself, considered as one of the most
horrible aberrations of human nature. In these three groups of
aversions, disgust is probably the first feeling present in our minds,
by which we re-act against the suggestion of partaking of these kinds of
food. We account for our disgust by a variety of reasons, according to
the groups of ideas with which the suggested act is associated in our
minds. In the first case there is no special association, and we are
satisfied with the simple statement of disgust. In the second case the
most important reason seems to be an emotional one, although we may feel
inclined, when questioned regarding the reasons of our dislike, to bring
forward also habits of the animals in question that seem to justify our
aversion. In the third case the immorality of cannibalism would stand
forth as the one sufficient reason.
Other examples are the numerous customs that had originally a religious
or semi-religious aspect, and which are continued and explained by more
or less certain utilitarian theories. Such are the whole group of
customs relating to marriages in the incest group. While the extent of
the incest group has undergone material changes, the abhorrence of
marriages inside the existing group is the same as ever; but instead of
religious laws, ethical considerations, often explained by utilitarian
concepts, are given as the reason for our feelings. People affected with
loathsome diseases were once shunned because they were believed to be
stricken by God, while at present the same avoidance is due to the fear
of contagion. The disuse into which profanity has fallen in English was
first due to religious re-action, but has come to be simply a question
of good manners.
For another example we need go back only a short period in history. It
is not so many years ago that dissension from accepted religious tenets
was believed to be a crime. The intolerance of diverging religious views
and the energy of persecution for heresy can be understood only when we
recognize the violent feelings of outraged ethical principles that were
aroused by this deviation from the customary line of thought. There was
no question as to the logical validity of the new idea. The mind was
directly agitated by the opposition to an habitual form of thought which
was so deeply rooted in each individual that it had come to be an
integral part of his mental life.
It is important to note that in all the cases mentioned the
rationalistic explanation of the opposition to a change is based on that
group of concepts with which the excited emotions are intimately
connected. In the case of costume, reasons are adduced why the new style
is improper; in the case of heresy, proof is given that the new doctrine
is an attack against eternal truth; and so with all the others.
I think, however, that a close introspective analysis shows these
reasons to be only attempts to interpret our feelings of displeasure;
that our opposition is not by any means dictated by conscious reasoning,
but primarily by the emotional effect of the new idea which creates a
dissonance with the habitual.
In all these cases the custom is obeyed so often and so regularly that
the habitual act becomes automatic; that is to say, its performance is
ordinarily not combined with any degree of consciousness. Consequently
the emotional value of these actions is also very slight. It is
remarkable, however, that the more automatic an action, the more
difficult it is to perform the opposite action, that it requires a very
strong effort to do so, and that ordinarily the opposite action is
accompanied by strong feelings of displeasure. It may also be observed
that to see the unusual action performed by another person excites the
strongest attention, and causes feelings of displeasure. Thus it happens
that when an infraction of the customary occurs, all the groups of ideas
with which the action is associated are brought into consciousness. A
dish of dog’s meat would bring up all the ideas of companionship; a
cannibal feast, all the social principles that have become our second
nature. The more automatic any series of activities or a certain form of
thought has become, the greater is the conscious effort required for
breaking away from the old habit of acting and thinking, and the greater
also the displeasure, or at least the surprise, produced by an
innovation. The antagonism against it is a reflex action accompanied by
emotions not due to conscious speculation. When we become conscious of
this emotional re-action, we endeavor to interpret it by a process of
reasoning. This reason must necessarily be based on the ideas which rise
into consciousness as soon as a break in the established custom occurs;
in other words, our rationalistic explanation will depend upon the
character of the associated ideas.
It is therefore of great importance to know whence the associated ideas
are derived, particularly in how far we may assume that these
associations are stable. It is not quite easy to give definite examples
of changes of such associations in our civilization, because, on the
whole, the rationalistic tendencies of our times have eliminated many of
the lines of association, even where the emotional effect remains; so
that the change, on the whole, is one from existing associations to loss
of associations.
We may sum up these observations by saying, that, while each habit is
the result of historical causes, it may in course of time associate
itself with different ideas. As soon as we become conscious of an
association between a habit and a certain group of ideas, we are led to
explain the habit by its present associations, which probably differ
from the associations prevailing at the time when the habit was
established.
We will now turn to a consideration of analogous phenomena in primitive
life. Here the dislike of that which deviates from the custom of the
land is even more strongly marked than in our civilization. If it is not
the custom to sleep in a house with feet turned towards the fire, a
violation of this custom is dreaded and avoided. If in a certain society
members of the same clan do not intermarry, the most deep-seated
abhorrence against such unions will arise. It is not necessary to
multiply examples, for it is a well-known fact that the more primitive a
people, the more it is bound by customs regulating the conduct of daily
life in all its details. I think we are justified in concluding from our
own experience, that as among ourselves, so among primitive tribes, the
resistance to a deviation from firmly established customs is due to an
emotional re-action, not to conscious reasoning. This does not preclude
the possibility that the first special act, which became in course of
time customary, may have been due to a conscious mental process; but it
seems to me likely that many customs came into being without any
conscious activity. Their development must have been of the same kind as
that of the categories which are reflected in the morphology of
languages, and which can never have been known to the speakers of these
languages. For instance, if we accept Cunow’s theory of the origin of
Australian social systems,[8] we may very well say that originally each
generation kept by themselves, and therefore marriages between members
of two succeeding generations were impossible, because only marriageable
men and women of one generation came into contact. Later on, when the
succeeding generations were not so diverse in age, and their social
separation ceased, the custom had been established, and did not lapse
with the changed conditions.
There are a number of cases in which it is at least conceivable that the
older customs of a people, under a new surrounding, develop into taboos.
I think, for instance, that it is very likely that the Eskimo taboo
forbidding the use of caribou and of seal on the same day may be due to
the alternating inland and coast life of the people. When they hunt
inland, they have no seals, and consequently can eat only caribou. When
they hunt on the coast, they have no caribou, and consequently can eat
only seal. The simple fact that in one season only caribou can be eaten,
and that in another season only seal can be eaten, may have easily led
to a resistance to a change of this custom; so that from the fact that
for a long period the two kinds of meat could not be eaten at the same
time, the law developed that the two kinds of meat must not be eaten at
the same time. I think it is also likely that the fish taboo of some of
our Southwestern tribes may be due to the fact that the tribes lived for
a long time in a region where no fish was available, and that the
impossibility of obtaining fish developed into the custom of not eating
fish. These hypothetical cases make it clear that the unconscious origin
of customs is quite conceivable, although of course not necessary. It
seems, however, certain that even when there has been a conscious
reasoning that led to the establishment of a custom, it soon ceased to
be conscious, and instead we find a direct emotional resistance to an
infraction of the custom.
Other actions which are considered proper or improper are continued
solely through the force of habit; and no reasons are assigned for their
occurrence, although the re-action against an infringement of the custom
may be strong. If among the Indians of Vancouver Island it is bad form
for a young woman of nobility to open her mouth wide and to eat fast, a
deviation from this custom would also be deeply felt, but in this case
as an impropriety which would seriously damage the social standing of
the culprit. The same group of feelings are concerned when a member of
the nobility, even in Europe, marries below his or her station. In
other, more trifling cases, the overstepping of the boundaries of custom
merely exposes the offender to ridicule, on account of the impropriety
of the act. All these cases belong psychologically to the same group of
emotional re-actions against breaks with established automatic habits.
It might seem that in primitive society opportunity could hardly be
given to bring into consciousness the strong emotional resistance
against infractions of customs, because they are rigidly adhered to.
There is one feature of social life, however, that tends to keep the
conservative attachment to customary actions before the minds of the
people. This is the education of the young. The child in whom the
habitual behavior of his surroundings has not yet developed will acquire
much of it by unconscious imitation. In many cases, however, it will act
in a way different from the customary manner, and will be corrected by
its elders. Any one familiar with primitive life will know that the
children are constantly exhorted to follow the example of their elders,
and every collection of carefully recorded traditions contains numerous
references to advice given by parents to children, impressing them with
the duty to observe the customs of the tribe. The greater the emotional
value of a custom, the stronger will be the desire to inculcate it in
the minds of the young. Thus ample opportunity is given to bring the
resistance against infractions into consciousness.
I believe that these conditions exert a very strong influence upon the
development and conservation of customs; for, as soon as the breach of
custom is raised into consciousness, occasions must arise when people,
either led by children’s questions or following their own bent to
speculation, find themselves confronted with the fact that certain ideas
exist for which they cannot give any explanation except that they are
there. The desire to understand one’s own feelings and actions, and to
get a clear insight into the secrets of the world, manifests itself at a
very early time, and it is therefore not surprising that man in all
stages of culture begins to speculate on the motives of his own actions.
As I have explained before, there can be no conscious motive for many of
these, and for this reason the tendency develops to discover the motives
that may determine our customary behavior. This is the reason why, in
all stages of culture, customary actions are made the subject of
secondary explanations that have nothing to do with their historical
origin, but which are inferences based upon the general knowledge
possessed by the people. I think the existence of such secondary
interpretations of customary actions is one of the most important
anthropological phenomena, and we have seen that it is hardly less
common in our own society than in more primitive societies. It is a
common observation that we desire or act first, and then try to justify
our desires and our actions. When, on account of our early bringing-up,
we act with a certain political party, most of us are not prompted by a
clear conviction of the justice of the principles of our party, but we
do so because we have been taught to respect it as the right party to
which to belong. Then only do we justify our standpoint by trying to
convince ourselves that these principles are the correct ones. Without
reasoning of this kind, the stability and geographical distribution of
political parties as well as of church denominations would be entirely
unintelligible. A candid examination of our own minds convinces us that
the average man, in by far the majority of cases, does not determine his
actions by reasoning, but that he first acts, and then justifies or
explains his acts by such secondary considerations as are current among
us.
We have discussed so far only the class of actions in which a break with
the customary brings into consciousness the emotional value of the
action in question, and releases a strong resistance to change, which is
secondarily explained by certain reasons that forbid a change. We have
seen that the traditional material with which man operates determines
the particular type of explanatory idea that associates itself with the
emotional state of mind. Primitive man generally bases these
explanations of his customs on concepts that are intimately related to
his general views of the constitution of the world. Some mythological
idea may be considered the basis of a custom or of the avoidance of
certain actions, or the custom may be given a symbolic significance, or
it may merely be connected with the fear of ill luck. Evidently this
last class of explanations is identical with those of many superstitions
that linger among us.
The essential result of this inquiry is the conclusion that the origin
of customs of primitive man must not be looked for in rational
processes. Most investigators who have tried to clear up the history of
customs and taboos express the view that their origin lies in
speculations on the relations between man and nature; that to primitive
man the world is filled with agencies of superhuman power, which may
harm man at the slightest provocation, and that attempts to avoid
conflict with these powers dictate the innumerable superstitious
regulations. The impression is given that the habits and opinions of
primitive man had been formed by conscious reasoning. It seems evident,
however, that this whole line of thought would remain consistent if it
is assumed that the processes were all subconscious.
Even granting this, I believe that these theories need extension,
because it would seem that many cases of this kind may have arisen
without any kind of reasoning, conscious or subconscious; for instance,
cases in which a custom became established by the general conditions of
life, and came into consciousness as soon as these conditions changed. I
do not doubt at all that there are cases in which customs originated by
more or less conscious reasoning; but I am just as certain that others
originated without, and that our theories should cover both points.
The study of primitive life exhibits a large number of associations of a
different type, which are not so easily explained. Certain patterns of
associated ideas may be recognized in all types of culture.
Sombre colors and depressed feelings are closely connected in our minds,
although not in those of peoples of foreign culture. Noise seems
inappropriate in a place of sadness, although among primitive people the
loud wail of the mourner is the natural expression of grief. Decorative
art serves to please the eye, yet a design like the cross has retained
its symbolic significance.
On the whole, such associations between groups of ideas apparently
unrelated are rare in civilized life. That they once existed is shown by
historical evidence as well as by survivals in which the old ideas have
perished, although the outer form remains. In primitive culture these
associations occur in great numbers. In discussing them we may begin
with examples that have their analogues in our own civilization, and
which therefore are readily intelligible to us.
The most extended domain of such customs is that of ritual. Accompanying
important actions we find numerous stated ritual forms which are
constantly applied, although their original significance has been lost
entirely. Many of them are so old that their origin must be looked for
in antiquity or even in prehistoric times. In our day the domain of
ritual is restricted, but in primitive culture it pervades the whole
life. Not a single action of any importance can be performed that is not
accompanied by proscribed rites of more or less elaborate form. It has
been proved in many cases that rites are more stable than their
explanations; that they symbolize different ideas among different people
and at different times. The diversity of rites is so great, and their
occurrence so universal, that here the greatest possible variety of
associations is found.
It seems to my mind that we may apply this point of view to many of the
most fundamental and inexplicable traits of primitive life, and that
when considered as associations between heterogeneous thoughts and
activities, their rise and history become more readily intelligible.
In our modern society the consideration of cosmic phenomena is
constantly associated with the efforts to give adequate explanations for
them, based on the principle of causality. In primitive society the
consideration of the same phenomena leads to a number of typical
associations which differ from our own, but which occur with remarkable
regularity among tribes living in the most remote parts of the world. An
excellent instance of this kind is the regular association of
observations relating to cosmic phenomena with purely human happenings;
in other words, the occurrence of nature myths. It seems to my mind that
the characteristic trait of nature myths is the association between the
observed cosmic events and what might be called a novelistic plot based
on the form of social life with which people are familiar. The plot as
such might as well develop among the peoples themselves; but its
association with the heavenly bodies, the thunder-storm, or the wind,
makes it a nature myth. One distinction between folk-tale and nature
myth lies solely in the association of the latter with cosmic phenomena.
This association does not naturally develop in modern society. If it is
still found every now and then, it is based on the survival of the
traditional nature myth. In primitive society, on the other hand, it is
found constantly. The investigation of the reason for this association
is an attractive problem, the solution of which can only in part be
surmised.
A number of other examples will demonstrate that the kind of association
here referred to is quite common in primitive life. An excellent
instance is furnished by certain characteristics of primitive decorative
art. With us almost the sole object of decorative art is æsthetic. We
wish to beautify the objects that are decorated. We recognize a certain
appropriateness of decorative motives in accordance with the uses to
which objects are to be put, and the emotional effect of the decorative
motive. In primitive life the conditions are quite different. Extended
investigations on decorative art in all continents have proved that
practically everywhere the decorative design is associated with a
certain symbolic significance. There is hardly a case known where a
primitive tribe cannot give some sort of explanation for the designs in
use. In some cases the symbolic significance may be exceedingly weak,
but ordinarily it is highly developed. The triangular and quadrangular
designs of our Plains Indians, for instance, almost always convey
definite symbolic meanings. They may be records of warlike deeds, they
may be prayers, or they may in some way convey other ideas relating to
the supernatural. It would almost seem that among primitive tribes
decorative art for its own sake does not exist. The only analogies in
modern decorative art are such as the use of the flag, of the cross, or
of emblems of secret societies, for decorative purposes; but their
frequency is insignificant as compared to the general symbolic
tendencies of primitive art. Thus it will be seen that we have here
again a type of association in primitive society quite different from
the type of association found among ourselves. Among primitive people
the æsthetic motive is combined with the symbolic, while in modern life
the æsthetic motive is either quite independent or associated with
utilitarian ideas.
On the North Pacific coast of America the animal design, which is found
in many other parts of the world, has associated itself firmly with the
totemic idea, and has led to an unparalleled application of animal
motives. This may also have helped to preserve the realistic character
of this art. Among the Sioux the high valuation of military prowess, and
the habit of exploiting deeds of war before the tribe, have been the
causes that led the men to associate the decoration on their garments
with events of war; so that among them a military symbolism has
developed, while the women of the same tribe explain the same design in
an entirely different manner (Wissler). It seems to me that in this last
case we have no particular difficulty in following the line of thought
that leads to the association between forms of decoration and military
ideas, although in general our minds require a much more conscious
effort than that of primitive man. The very fact of the well-nigh
universal occurrence of decorative symbolism shows that this association
must establish itself automatically and without conscious reasoning.
In both mythology and art the tendency to give rationalistic
explanations for the peculiar associations that have developed may be
observed in those cases in which styles of art or myths are borrowed.
The fact that decorative art among primitive people is almost everywhere
symbolic does not preclude the possibility of designs, and even of the
whole style, of one region, being borrowed from the people of another
region. This has been the case, for instance, among the tribes of our
Northwestern Plains, who have borrowed much of their art from their more
southern neighbors; but they have not adopted at the same time its
symbolical interpretations, but invented interpretations of their own. I
imagine that this is the outcome of a mental process which set in when
the designs were found pleasing, and, according to the general character
of primitive thought, a symbolic interpretation was expected. This was
then secondarily invented in accordance with the ideas current among the
tribe.
The same observation may be made in primitive mythology. The same kind
of tales are current over enormous areas, but the mythological use to
which they are put is locally quite different. Thus an ordinary
adventure relating to the exploits of some animal may sometimes be made
use of to explain some of its peculiar characteristics. At other times
it may be made use of to explain certain customs, or even the origin of
certain constellations in the sky. There is not the slightest doubt in
my mind that the tale as such is older than its mythological
significance. The characteristic feature of the development of the
nature myth is, first, that the tale has associated itself with attempts
to explain cosmic conditions (this has been referred to before); and,
secondly, that when primitive man became conscious of the cosmic
problem, he ransacked the entire field of his knowledge until he
happened to find something that could be fitted to the problem in
question, giving an explanation satisfactory to his mind. While the
classification of concepts, the types of association, and the resistance
to change of automatic acts, developed unconsciously, many of the
secondary explanations are due to conscious reasoning.
I will give still another example of a form of association
characteristic of primitive society. In modern society, social
organization, including the grouping of families, is essentially based
on blood-relationship and on the social functions performed by each
individual. Except in so far as the Church concerns itself with birth,
marriage, and death, there is no connection between social organization
and religious belief. These conditions are quite different in primitive
society, where we find an inextricable association of ideas and customs
relating to society and to religion. As in art form tends to associate
itself with ideas entirely foreign to it, so the social unit tends to
associate itself with various impressions of nature, particularly with
the divisions of the animal world. This form of association seems to me
the fundamental trait of totemism as found among many American tribes,
as well as in Australia, Melanesia, and in Africa. I have described
before its characteristic trait, which consists in a peculiar connection
that is believed to exist between a certain class of objects, generally
animals, and a certain social group. Further analysis shows very clearly
that one of the underlying ideas of totemism is the existence of
definite groups of man that are not allowed to intermarry, and that the
limitations of these groups are determined by considerations of
blood-relationship. The religious ideas found in totemism refer to the
personal relation of man to certain classes of supernatural powers, and
the typical trait of totemism is the association of certain kinds of
supernatural power with certain social groups. This granted, the
establishment of association with the supernatural world becomes at
least intelligible. That such feelings are not by any means improbable,
or even rare, is sufficiently shown by the exclusiveness of the European
high nobility, or by the national emotions in their pronounced form. It
is not at all difficult to understand how an overbearing enthusiasm of
self-appreciation of a community may become a powerful emotion or a
passion, which, on account of the lack of rational explanation of the
world, will tend to associate the members of the community with all that
is good and powerful. Psychologically, therefore, we may compare
totemism with those familiar forms of society in which certain social
classes claim privileges by the grace of God, or where the patron saint
of a community favors its members with his protection. It will be
recognized that we have here again a type of association in primitive
society which has completely changed with the development of
civilization.
However these associations may have been brought about, there is no
doubt that they do exist, and that, psychologically considered, they are
of the same character as those previously discussed, and that the
rationalizing mind of man soon lost the historic thread, and
reinterpreted the established customs in conformity with the general
trend of thought of his culture. We are therefore justified in
concluding that these customs must also be studied by the pragmatic
method, because their present associations are not likely to be
original, but rather secondary.
It is perhaps venturesome to discuss at the present moment the origin of
these types of association; yet it may be admissible to dwell on a few
of the most generalized facts which seem to characterize primitive
culture as compared to civilization. From our point of view, the
striking features of primitive culture are the great number of
associations of entirely heterogeneous groups of phenomena, such as
natural phenomena and individual emotion, social groupings and religious
concepts, decorative art and symbolic interpretation. These tend to
disappear with the approach to our present civilization, although a
careful analysis reveals the persistence of many, and the tendency of
each automatic action to establish its own associations according to the
mental relations in which it regularly occurs. One of the great changes
that has taken place may perhaps best be expressed by saying that in
primitive culture the impressions of the outer world are associated
intimately with subjective impressions, which they call forth regularly,
but which are determined largely by the social surroundings of the
individual. Gradually it is recognized that these connections are more
uncertain than others that remain the same for all mankind, and in all
forms of social surroundings; and thus sets in the gradual elimination
of one subjective association after another, which culminates in the
scientific method of the present day. We may express this also by saying
that when we have our attention directed to a certain concept which has
a whole fringe of incident concepts related to it, we at once associate
it with that group which is represented by the category of causality.
When the same concept appears in the mind of primitive man, it
associates itself with those concepts related to it by emotional states.
If this is true, then the associations of the primitive mind are
heterogeneous, and ours homogeneous and consistent only from our own
point of view. To the mind of primitive man, only his own associations
can be rational. Ours must appear to him just as heterogeneous as his to
us, because the bond between the phenomena of the world, as it appears
after the elimination of their emotional associations, which is being
established with increasing knowledge, does not exist for _him_, while
we can no longer feel the subjective associations that govern his mind.
This peculiarity of association is also another expression of the
conservatism of primitive culture and the changeability of many features
of our civilization. We tried to show that the resistance to change is
largely due to emotional sources, and that in primitive culture
emotional associations are the prevailing type: hence resistance against
the new. In our civilization, on the other hand, many actions are
performed merely as means to a rational end. They do not enter
sufficiently deeply into our minds to establish connections which would
give them emotional values: hence our readiness to change. We recognize,
however, that we cannot remodel, without serious emotional resistance,
any of the fundamental lines of thought and action which are determined
by our early education, and which form the subconscious basis of all our
activities. This is evinced by the attitude of civilized communities
towards religion, politics, art, and the fundamental concepts of
science.
In the average individual among primitive tribes, reasoning cannot
overcome this emotional resistance, and it therefore requires a
destruction of the existing emotional associations by more powerful
means to bring about a change. This may be effected by some event which
stirs up the mind of the people to its depths, or by economic and
political changes against which resistance is impossible. In
civilization there is a constant readiness to modify those activities
that have no emotional value. This is true not only of activities
designed to meet practical ends, but also of others that have lost their
associations, and that have become subject to fashion. There remain,
however, others which are retained with great tenacity, and which hold
their own against reasoning, because their strength lies in their
emotional values. The history of the progress of science yields example
after example of the power of resistance belonging to old ideas, even
after increasing knowledge of the world has undermined the ground on
which they were erected. Their overthrow is not brought about until a
new generation has arisen, to whom the old is no longer dear and near.
Besides this, there are a thousand activities and modes of thought that
constitute our daily life,—of which we are not conscious at all until we
come into contact with other types of life, or until we are prevented
from acting according to our custom,—that cannot in any way be claimed
to be more reasonable than others, and to which, nevertheless, we cling.
These, it would seem, are hardly less numerous in civilized than in
primitive culture, because they constitute the whole series of
well-established habits according to which the necessary actions of
ordinary every-day life are performed, and which are learned less by
instruction than by imitation.
We may also express these conclusions in another form. While in the
logical processes of the mind we find a decided tendency, with the
development of civilization, to eliminate traditional elements, no such
marked decrease in the force of traditional elements can be found in our
activities. These are controlled by custom almost as much among
ourselves as they are among primitive man. We have seen why this must be
the case. The mental processes which enter into the development of
judgments are based largely upon associations with previous judgments.
This process of association is the same among primitive men as among
civilized men, and the difference consists largely in the modification
of the traditional material with which our new perceptions amalgamate.
In the case of activities, the conditions are somewhat different. Here
tradition manifests itself in an action performed by the individual. The
more frequently this action is repeated, the more firmly it will become
established, and the less will be the conscious equivalent accompanying
the action; so that customary actions which are of very frequent
repetition become entirely unconscious. Hand in hand with this decrease
of consciousness goes an increase in the emotional value of the omission
of such activities, and still more of the performance of actions
contrary to custom. A greater will-power is required to inhibit an
action which has become well established; and combined with this effort
of the will-power are feelings of intense displeasure.
Thus an important change from primitive culture to civilization seems to
consist in the gradual elimination of what might be called the social
associations of sense-impressions and of activities, for which
intellectual associations are gradually substituted. This process is
accompanied by a loss of conservatism, which, however, does not extend
over the field of habitual activities that do not come into
consciousness, and only to a slight extent over those generalizations
which are the foundation of all knowledge imparted in the course of
education.
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Footnote 8:
Some Australian tribes are divided into four exogamic groups. The laws
of exogamy demand that a member of the first group must marry a member
of the second group, and a member of the third group one of the fourth
group. CUNOW explains these customs by showing that when custom
provides that a man in a tribe that is divided into two exogamic
units, and in which only members of the same generation are allowed to
intermarry, conditions like those found in Australia will naturally
develop, if each group has a name, and one set of names are used for
the first, third, fifth, generations, and another set of names for the
second, fourth, sixth, generations, etc. If we should designate the
two tribal divisions by the letters A and B, the generations by 1 and
2, the names of the four divisions would be A1, A2, B1, B2; and in
marriages in which is placed first the sex that determines the group
to which the offspring belongs, we find that—
A1 must marry B1, and his children are A2
B1 " " A1, " " " " B2
A2 " " B2, " " " " A1
B2 " " A2, " " " " B1
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