IN the last chapter I tried to show that the principal characteristics
of the mind of primitive man occur among primitive tribes of all races,
and that therefore the inference must not be drawn that these traits of
the mind are racial characteristics. This negative conclusion, which is
based entirely on the consideration of a few selected points that occur
with great regularity in the description of primitive tribes, does not
give us, however, proof positive of the lack of all correlation between
mental life and racial descent, and we must direct our attention to
those cases in which an immediate relationship between the two may be
and has been claimed.
This has occurred particularly in regard to language and racial types.
Indeed, the opinion is still held by some investigators that linguistic
relationships and racial relationships are in a way interchangeable
terms. An example illustrating this point of view may be seen in the
long-continued discussions of the home of the “Aryan race,” in which the
blond northwest European type is identified with the ancient people
among whom the Indo-European or Aryan languages developed.
If it could be shown that distinct languages belong to distinct racial
types, and that these languages exhibit different levels of development
or indicate different types of thought, we should have gained a sound
basis which would allow us to discuss the genius of each people as
reflected in its language. If, furthermore, we could show that certain
cultural types belong to certain races and are foreign to the genius of
others, our conclusions would be founded on much firmer ground.
Thus we are led to a consideration of the all-important question whether
types, languages, and cultures are so intimately connected that each
human race is characterized by a certain combination of physical type,
language, and culture.
It is obvious, that, if this correlation should exist in a strict sense,
attempts to classify mankind from any one of the three points of view
would necessarily lead to the same results; in other words, each point
of view could be used independently or in combination with the other
ones, to study the relations between the different groups of mankind. As
a matter of fact, attempts of this kind have often been made. A number
of classifications of the races of man are based wholly on anatomical
characteristics, yet often combined with geographical considerations;
others are based on the discussion of a combination of anatomical and
cultural traits which are considered as characteristic of certain groups
of mankind; while still others are based primarily on the study of the
languages spoken by people representing a certain anatomical type.
The attempts that have thus been made have led to entirely different
results (Topinard). Blumenbach, one of the first scientists who
attempted to classify mankind, distinguished five races,—the Caucasian,
Mongolian, Ethiopian, American, and Malay. It is fairly clear that this
classification is based as much on geographical as on anatomical
considerations, although the description of each race is primarily an
anatomical one. Cuvier distinguished three races,—the white, yellow, and
black. Huxley proceeded more strictly on a biological basis. He combined
part of the Mongolian and American races of Blumenbach into one,
assigned part of the South Asiatic peoples to the Australian type, and
subdivided the European race into a dark and a light division. The
numerical preponderance of the European types evidently led him to make
finer distinctions in this race, which he divided into the xanthochroic
or blond, and melanochroic or dark races. It would be easy to make
subdivisions of equal value in other races. Still clearer is the
influence of cultural points of view in classifications like those of
Gobineau and of Klemm, the latter of whom distinguished the active and
passive races according to the cultural achievements of the various
types of man.
The most typical attempt to classify mankind from a consideration of
both anatomical and linguistic points of view is that of Friedrich
Müller, who takes as the basis of his primary divisions the form of
hair, while all the minor divisions are based on linguistic
considerations.
An attempt to correlate the numerous classifications that have been
proposed shows clearly a condition of utter confusion and contradiction;
so that we are led to the conclusion that type, language, and type of
culture, may not be closely and permanently connected. We must therefore
consider the actual development of these various traits among the
existing races.
At the present period we may observe many cases in which a complete
change of language and culture takes place without a corresponding
change in physical type. This is true, for instance, among the North
American negroes, a people by descent largely African; in culture and
language, however, essentially European. While it is true that certain
survivals of African culture and language are found among our American
negroes, their culture is essentially that of the uneducated classes of
the people among whom they live, and their language is on the whole
identical with that of their neighbors,—English, French, Spanish, and
Portuguese, according to the prevalent language in various parts of the
continent. It might be objected that the transportation of the African
race to America was an artificial one, and that in earlier times
extended migrations and transplantations of this kind have not taken
place.
The history of mediæval Europe, however, demonstrates that extended
changes in language and culture have taken place many times without
corresponding changes in blood.
Recent investigations of the physical types of Europe have shown with
great clearness that the distribution of types has remained the same for
a long period. Without considering details, it may be said that an
Alpine type can easily be distinguished from a North European type on
the one hand, and a South European type on the other (Ripley). The
Alpine type appears fairly uniform over a large territory, no matter
what language may be spoken and what national culture may prevail in the
particular district. The Central European Frenchmen, Germans, Italians,
and Slavs are so nearly of the same type, that we may safely assume a
considerable degree of blood-relationship, notwithstanding their
linguistic differences.
Instances of similar kind, in which we find permanence of blood with
far-reaching modifications of language and culture, are found in other
parts of the world. As an example may be mentioned the Veddah of Ceylon,
a people fundamentally different in type from the neighboring
Singhalese, whose language they seem to have adopted, and from whom they
have also evidently borrowed a number of cultural traits (Sarasin).
Still other examples are the Japanese of the northern part of Japan, who
are undoubtedly, to a considerable extent, Ainu in blood (Bälz); and the
Yukaghir of Siberia, who, while retaining to a great extent the old
blood, have been assimilated in culture and language by the neighboring
Tungus (Jochelson).
While it is therefore evident that in many cases a people, without
undergoing a considerable change in type by mixture, has changed
completely its language and culture, still other cases may be adduced in
which it can be shown that a people has retained its language while
undergoing material changes in blood and culture, or in both. As an
example of this may be mentioned the Magyar of Europe, who have retained
their old language, but have become mixed with people speaking
Indo-European languages, and who have, to all intents and purposes,
adopted European culture.
Similar conditions must have prevailed among the Athapascans, one of the
great linguistic families of North America. The great body of people
speaking languages belonging to this linguistic stock live in the
northwestern part of America, while other dialects are spoken by small
tribes in California, and still others by a large body of people in
Arizona and New Mexico.[3] The relationship between all these dialects
is so close that they must be considered as branches of one large group,
and it must be assumed that all of them have sprung from a language once
spoken over a continuous area. At the present time the people speaking
these languages differ fundamentally in type, the inhabitants of the
Mackenzie River region being quite different from the tribes of
California, and these, again, differing from the tribes of New Mexico
(Boas). The forms of culture in these different regions are also quite
distinct: the culture of the California Athapascans resembles that of
other Californian tribes, while the culture of the Athapascans of New
Mexico and Arizona is influenced by that of other peoples of that area
(Goddard). It seems most plausible to assume in this case that branches
of this stock migrated from one part of this large area to another,
where they intermingled with the neighboring people, and thus changed
their physical characteristics, while at the same time they retained
their speech. Without historical evidence, this process cannot, of
course, be proved.
These two phenomena,—retention of type with change of language, and
retention of language with change of type,—apparently opposed to each
other, are still very closely related, and in many cases go hand in
hand. An example of this is, for instance, the distribution of the Arabs
along the north coast of Africa. On the whole, the Arab element has
retained its language; but at the same time intermarriages with the
native races were common, so that the descendants of the Arabs have
often retained their old language, and have changed their type. On the
other hand, the natives have to a certain extent given up their own
languages, but have continued to intermarry among themselves, and have
thus preserved their type. So far as any change of this kind is
connected with intermixture, both types of changes must always occur at
the same time, and will be classed as a change of type or a change of
language, as our attention is directed to the one people or the other,
or, in some cases, as the one or the other change is more pronounced.
Cases of complete assimilation without any mixture of the people
involved seem to be rare, if not entirely absent.
Cases of permanence of type and language and of change of culture are
much more numerous. As a matter of fact, the whole historical
development of Europe, from prehistoric times on, is one endless series
of examples of this process, which seems to be much easier, since
assimilation of cultures occurs everywhere without actual blood-mixture,
as an effect of imitation. Proof of diffusion of cultural elements may
be found in every single cultural area which covers a district in which
many languages are spoken. In North America, California offers a good
example of this kind; for here many languages are spoken, and there is a
certain degree of differentiation of type, but at the same time a
considerable uniformity of culture prevails (Kroeber). Another case in
point is the coast of New Guinea, where, notwithstanding strong local
differentiations, a certain fairly characteristic type of culture
prevails, which goes hand in hand with a strong differentiation of
languages. Among more highly civilized peoples, the whole area which is
under the influence of Chinese culture might be given as an example.
These considerations make it fairly clear that, at least at the
present time, anatomical type, language, and culture have not
necessarily the same fates; that a people may remain constant in type
and language, and change in culture; that it may remain constant in
type, but change in language; or that it may remain constant in
language, and change in type and culture. It is obvious, therefore,
that attempts to classify mankind, based on the present distribution
of type, language, and culture, must lead to different results,
according to the point of view taken; that a classification based
primarily on type alone will lead to a system which represents more or
less accurately the blood-relationships of the people, which do not
need to coincide with their cultural relationships; and that in the
same way classifications based on language and culture do not need at
all to coincide with a biological classification.
If this be true, then a problem like the Aryan problem, to which I
referred before, really does not exist, because the problem is primarily
a linguistic one, relating to the history of the Aryan languages; and
the assumption that a certain definite people whose members have always
been related by blood must have been the carriers of this language
throughout history, and the other assumption, that a certain cultural
type must have always belonged to this people,—are purely arbitrary
ones, and not in accord with the observed facts.
Nevertheless it must be granted that in a theoretical consideration of
the history of the types of mankind, of languages, and of cultures, we
are led back to the assumption of early conditions, during which each
type was much more isolated from the rest of mankind than it is at the
present time. For this reason the culture and the language belonging to
a single type must have been much more sharply separated from those of
other types than we find them to be at the present period. It is true
that such a condition has nowhere been observed; but the knowledge of
historical developments almost compels us to assume its existence at a
very early period in the development of mankind. If this is true, the
question would arise, whether an isolated group at an early period was
necessarily characterized by a single type, a single language, and a
single culture, or whether in such a group different types, different
languages, and different cultures may have been represented.
The historical development of mankind would afford a simpler and clearer
picture if we were justified in assuming that in primitive communities
the three phenomena had been intimately associated. No proof, however,
of such an assumption, can be given. On the contrary, the present
distribution of languages, as compared with the distribution of types,
makes it plausible that even at the earliest times the biological units
may have been wider than the linguistic units, and presumably also wider
than the cultural units. I believe it may be safely said that all over
the world the biological unit—disregarding minute local differences—is
much larger than the linguistic unit; in other words, that groups of men
who are so closely related in bodily appearance that we must consider
them as representatives of the same variety of mankind, embrace a much
larger number of individuals than the number of men speaking languages
which we know to be genetically related. Examples of this kind may be
given from many parts of the world. Thus, the European race—including
under this term roughly all those individuals who are without hesitation
classed by us as members of the white race—would include peoples
speaking Indo-European, Basque, and Ural-Altaic languages. West African
negroes would represent individuals of a certain negro type, but
speaking the most diverse languages; and the same would be true, among
Asiatic types, of Siberians; among American types, of part of the
Californian Indians.
So far as our historical evidence goes, there is no reason to believe
that the number of distinct languages has at any time been less than it
is now. On the contrary, all our evidence goes to show that the number
of apparently unrelated languages was much greater in earlier times than
at present. On the other hand, the number of types that have presumably
become extinct seems to be rather small, so that there is no reason to
suppose that at an early period there should have been a nearer
correspondence between the number of distinct linguistic and anatomical
types; and we are thus led to the conclusion that presumably at an early
time each human type may have existed in a number of small isolated
groups, each of which may have possessed a language and culture of its
own.
Incidentally we may remark here, that, from this point of view, the
great diversity of languages found in many remote mountain areas should
not be explained as the result of a gradual pressing-back of remnants of
tribes into inaccessible districts, but appears rather as a survival of
an older general condition of mankind, when every continent was
inhabited by smaller groups of people speaking distinct languages. The
present conditions would have developed through the gradual extinction
of many of the old stocks and their absorption or extinction by others,
which thus came to occupy a more extended territory.
However this may be, the probabilities are decidedly in favor of the
assumption that there is no necessity to assume that originally each
language and culture were confined to a single type, or that each type
and culture were confined to one language; in short, that there has been
at any time a close correlation between these three phenomena.
The assumption that type, language, and culture were originally closely
correlated would entail the further assumption that these three traits
developed approximately at the same period, and that they developed
conjointly for a considerable length of time. This assumption does not
seem by any means plausible. The fundamental types of man which are
represented in the negroid race and in the mongoloid race must have been
differentiated long before the formation of those forms of speech that
are now recognized in the linguistic families of the world. I think that
even the differentiation of the more important subdivisions of the great
races antedates the formation of the existing linguistic families. At
any rate, the biological differentiation and the formation of speech
were, at this early period, subject to the same causes that are acting
upon them now, and our whole experience shows that these causes may
bring about great changes in language much more rapidly than in the
human body. In this consideration lies the principal reason for the
theory of lack of correlation of type and language, even during the
period of formation of types and of linguistic families.[4]
What is true of language is obviously even more true of culture. In
other words, if a certain type of man migrated over a considerable area
before its language assumed the form which can now be traced in related
linguistic groups, and before its culture assumed the definite type the
further development of which can now be recognized, there would be no
possibility of ever discovering a correlation of type, language, and
culture, even if it had ever existed; but it is quite possible that such
correlation has really never occurred.
It is quite conceivable that a certain racial type may have scattered
over a considerable area during a formative period of speech, and that
the languages which developed among the various groups of this racial
type came to be so different that it is now impossible to prove them to
be genetically related. In the same way, new developments of culture may
have taken place which are so entirely disconnected with older types
that the older genetic relationships, even if they existed, can no
longer be discovered.
If we adopt this point of view, and thus eliminate the hypothetical
assumption of correlation between primitive type, primitive language,
and primitive culture, we recognize that any attempt at classification
which includes more than one of these traits cannot be consistent.
It may be added that the general term “culture,” which has been used
here, may be subdivided from a considerable number of points of view;
and different results again might be expected when we consider the
inventions, the types of social organization, or beliefs, as leading
points of view in our classification.
After we have thus shown that language, culture, and type cannot be
considered as constantly associated, and after we have recognized that
the same type of man has developed distinct languages, the question
still remains open, whether the languages developed by any one stock
bear marks of superiority or inferiority. It has been claimed, for
instance, that the highly developed inflected languages of Europe are
much superior to the cumbersome agglutinative or polysynthetic languages
of northern Asia and of America (Gabelentz). We have also been told that
lack of phonetic discrimination, lack of power of abstraction, are
characteristics of primitive languages. It is important to show whether
these traits are really associated with any languages of primitive man.
In a way this consideration leads us back to the study of alleged mental
characteristics of distinct human types.
The view of the lack of phonetic differentiation is based on the fact
that certain sounds of primitive languages are interpreted by the
European sometimes as one of our familiar sounds, sometimes as another;
they have been called alternating sounds. A better knowledge of
phonetics has shown in all these cases, however, that the sounds are
quite definite, but that owing to the manner of their production they
are intermediate between sounds familiar to us. Thus an _m_ produced by
a very weak closing of the lips, and with half-open nose, sounds to our
ear a little like _m_, a little like _b_, and a little like _w_; and
according to slight accidental changes, it is sometimes heard as one of
these sounds, sometimes as another, without, however, being in reality
more variable than our _m_. Cases of this kind are quite numerous, but
it would be a misinterpretation to adduce them as proof of lack of
definiteness of the sound of primitive languages (Boas). In fact, it
would seem that limitation in the number of sounds is necessary in each
language in order to make possible rapid communication. If the number of
sounds that are used in any particular language were unlimited, the
accuracy with which the movements of the complicated mechanism required
for producing the sounds are performed, would presumably be lacking; and
consequently rapidity and accuracy of pronunciation, and with them the
possibility of accurate interpretation of the sounds heard, would be
difficult or even impossible. On the other hand, limitation of the
number of sounds brings it about that the movements required in the
production of each become automatic; that the association between the
sound heard and the muscular movements, and that between the auditory
impression and the muscular sensation of the articulation, become firmly
fixed. Thus it would seem that limited phonetic resources are necessary
for easy communication.
The second point that is often brought up to characterize primitive
languages is the lack of power of classification and abstraction. Here,
again, we are easily misled by our habit of using the classifications of
our own language, and considering these, therefore, as the most natural
ones, and by overlooking the principles of classification used in the
languages of primitive people.
It may be well to make clear to our minds what constitutes the elements
of all languages. It is a fundamental and common trait of articulate
speech that the groups of sounds which are uttered serve to convey
ideas, and each group of sounds has a fixed meaning. Languages differ
not only in the character of their constituent phonetic elements and
sound clusters, but also in the groups of ideas that find expression in
fixed phonetic groups.
The total number of possible combinations of phonetic elements is also
unlimited, but only a limited number are used to express ideas. This
implies that the total number of ideas that are expressed by distinct
phonetic groups is limited in number. We will call these phonetic groups
“word-stems.”
Since the total range of personal experience which language serves to
express is infinitely varied, and its whole scope must be expressed by a
limited number of word-stems, it is obvious that an extended
classification of experiences must underlie all articulate speech.
This coincides with a fundamental trait of human thought. In our actual
experience no two sense-impressions or emotional states are identical.
Nevertheless we classify them, according to their similarities, in wider
or narrower groups, the limits of which may be determined from a variety
of points of view. Notwithstanding their individual differences, we
recognize in our experiences common elements, and consider them as
related or even as the same, provided a sufficient number of
characteristic traits belong to them in common. Thus the limitation of
the number of phonetic groups expressing distinct ideas is an expression
of the psychological fact that many different individual experiences
appear to us as representatives of the same category of thought.
As an instance we may mention the color terms of different languages.
Although the number of shades of color that may be distinguished is very
great, only a small number are designated by special terms. The number
of these terms has considerably increased in recent times. In many
primitive languages the groupings of yellow, green, and blue do not
agree with ours. Often yellow and the yellowish-greens are combined in
one group; green and blue, in another. The typical feature which occurs
everywhere is the use of one term for a large group of similar
sensations.
This trait of human thought and speech may be compared in a certain
manner to the limitation of the whole series of possible articulating
movements by selection of a limited number of habitual movements. If the
whole mass of concepts, with all their variants, were expressed in
language by entirely heterogeneous and unrelated sound-complexes or
word-stems, a condition would arise in which closely related ideas would
not show their relationship by the corresponding relationship of their
sound-symbols, and an infinitely large number of distinct word-stems
would be required for expression. If this were the case, the association
between an idea and its representative word-stem would not become
sufficiently stable to be reproduced automatically without reflection at
any given moment. In the same way as the automatic and rapid use of
articulations has brought it about that a limited number of
articulations only, each with limited variability, and a limited number
of sound-clusters, have been selected from the infinitely large range of
possible articulations and clusters of articulations, so the infinitely
large number of ideas have been reduced by classification to a lesser
number, which by constant use have established firm associations, and
which can be used automatically.
It seems important at this point of our considerations to emphasize the
fact that the groups of ideas expressed by specific word-stems show very
material differences in different languages, and do not conform by any
means to the same principles of classification. To take the example of
English, we find that the idea of “water” is expressed in a great
variety of forms: one term serves to express water as a liquid; another
one, water in the form of a large expanse (lake); others, water as
running in a large body or in a small body (river and brook); still
other terms express water in the form of rain, dew, wave, and foam. It
is perfectly conceivable that this variety of ideas, each of which is
expressed by a single independent term in English, might be expressed in
other languages by derivations from the same term.
Another example of the same kind, the words for “snow” in Eskimo, may be
given. Here we find one word expressing “snow on the ground;” another
one, “falling snow;” a third one, “drifting snow;” a fourth one, “a
snowdrift.”
In the same language the seal in different conditions is expressed by a
variety of terms. One word is the general term for “seal;” another one
signifies the “seal basking in the sun;” a third one, a “seal floating
on a piece of ice;” not to mention the many names for the seals of
different ages and for male and female.
As an example of the manner in which terms that we express by
independent words are grouped together under one concept, the Dakota
language may be selected. The terms “to kick,” “to tie in bundles,” “to
bite,” “to be near to,” “to pound,” are all derived from the common
element meaning “to grip,” which holds them together, while we use
distinct words for expressing the various ideas.
It seems fairly evident that the selection of such simple terms must to
a certain extent depend upon the chief interests of a people; and where
it is necessary to distinguish a certain phenomenon in many aspects,
which in the life of the people play each an entirely independent rôle,
many independent words may develop, while in other cases modifications
of a single term may suffice.
Thus it happens that each language, from the point of view of another
language, may be arbitrary in its classifications; that what appears as
a single simple idea in one language may be characterized by a series of
distinct word-stems in another.
The tendency of a language to express a complex idea by a single term
has been styled “holophrasis” (Powell), and it appears therefore that
every language may be holophrastic from the point of view of another
language. Holophrasis can hardly be taken as a fundamental
characteristic of primitive languages.
We have seen before that some kind of classification of expression must
be found in every language. This classification of ideas into groups,
each of which is expressed by an independent word-stem, makes it
necessary that concepts which are not readily rendered by a single stem
should be expressed by combinations or by modifications of the
elementary stems in accordance with the elementary ideas to which the
particular idea is reduced.
This classification, and the necessity of expressing certain experiences
by means of other related ones,—which, by limiting one another, define
the special idea to be expressed,—entail the presence of certain formal
elements which determine the relations of the single word-stems. If each
idea could be expressed by a single word-stem, languages without form
would be possible. Since, however, ideas must be expressed by being
reduced to a number of related ideas, the kinds of relation become
important elements in articulate speech; and it follows that all
languages must contain formal elements, and that their number must be
the greater, the less the number of elementary word-stems that define
special ideas. In a language which commands a very large, fixed
vocabulary, the number of formal elements may become quite small.
After we have thus seen that all languages require and contain certain
classifications and formal elements, we will turn to a consideration of
the relation between language and thought. It has been claimed that the
conciseness and clearness of thought of a people depend to a great
extent upon their language. The ease with which in our modern European
languages we express wide abstract ideas by a single term, and the
facility with which wide generalizations are cast into the frame of a
simple sentence, have been claimed to be one of the fundamental
conditions of the clearness of our concepts, the logical force of our
thought, and the precision with which we eliminate in our thoughts
irrelevant details. Apparently this view has much in its favor. When we
compare modern English with some of those Indian languages which are
most concrete in their formative expression, the contrast is striking.
When we say, “The eye is the organ of sight,” the Indian may not be able
to form the expression “the eye,” but may have to define that the eye of
a person or of an animal is meant. Neither may the Indian be able to
generalize readily the abstract idea of an eye as the representative of
the whole class of objects, but may have to specialize by an expression
like “this eye here.” Neither may he be able to express by a single term
the idea of “organ,” but may have to specify it by an expression like
“instrument of seeing,” so that the whole sentence might assume a form
like “an indefinite person’s eye is his means of seeing.” Still it will
be recognized that in this more specific form the general idea may be
well expressed. It seems very questionable in how far the restriction of
the use of certain grammatical forms can really be conceived as a
hindrance in the formulation of generalized ideas. It seems much more
likely that the lack of these forms is due to the lack of their need.
Primitive man, when conversing with his fellow-man, is not in the habit
of discussing abstract ideas. His interests centre around the
occupations of his daily life; and where philosophic problems are
touched upon, they appear either in relation to definite individuals or
in the more or less anthropomorphic forms of religious beliefs.
Discourses on qualities without connection with the object to which the
qualities belong, or of activities or states disconnected from the idea
of the actor or the subject being in a certain state, will hardly occur
in primitive speech. Thus the Indian will not speak of goodness as such,
although he may very well speak of the goodness of a person. He will not
speak of a state of bliss apart from the person who is in such a state.
He will not refer to the power of seeing without designating an
individual who has such power. Thus it happens that in languages in
which the idea of possession is expressed by elements subordinated to
nouns, all abstract terms appear always with possessive elements. It is,
however, perfectly conceivable that an Indian trained in philosophic
thought would proceed to free the underlying nominal forms from the
possessive elements, and thus reach abstract forms strictly
corresponding to the abstract forms of our modern languages. I have made
this experiment, for instance, in one of the languages of Vancouver
Island, in which no abstract term ever occurs without its possessive
elements. After some discussion, I found it perfectly easy to develop
the idea of the abstract term in the mind of the Indian, who stated that
the word without a possessive pronoun gives good sense, although it is
not used idiomatically. I succeeded, for instance, in this manner, in
isolating the terms for “love” and “pity,” which ordinarily occur only
in possessive forms, like “his love for him” or “my pity for you.” That
this view is correct, may also be observed in languages in which
possessive elements appear as independent forms; as, for instance, in
the Siouan languages. In these, pure abstract terms are quite common.
There is also evidence that other specializing elements, which are so
characteristic of many Indian languages, may be dispensed with when, for
one reason or another, it seems desirable to generalize a term. To use
an example of a western language,[5] the idea “to be seated” is almost
always expressed with an inseparable suffix expressing the place in
which a person is seated, as “seated on the floor of the house, on the
ground, on the beach, on a pile of things,” or “on a round thing,” etc.
When, however, for some reason, the idea of the state of sitting is to
be emphasized, a form may be used which expresses simply “being in a
sitting posture.” In this case, also, the device for generalized
expression is present; but the opportunity for its application arises
seldom, or perhaps never. I think what is true in these cases is true of
the structure of every single language. The fact that generalized forms
of expression are not used, does not prove inability to form them, but
it merely proves that the mode of life of the people is such that they
are not required; that they would, however, develop just as soon as
needed.
This point of view is also corroborated by a study of the numeral
systems of primitive languages. As is well known, many languages exist
in which the numerals do not exceed two or three. It has been inferred
from this that the people speaking these languages are not capable of
forming the concept of higher numbers. I think this interpretation of
the existing conditions is quite erroneous. People like the South
American Indians (among whom these defective numeral systems are found),
or like the Eskimo (whose old system of numbers probably did not exceed
ten), are presumably not in need of higher numerical expressions,
because there are not many objects that they have to count. On the other
hand, just as soon as these same people find themselves in contact with
civilization, and when they acquire standards of value that have to be
counted, they adopt with perfect ease higher numerals from other
languages, and develop a more or less perfect system of counting. This
does not mean that every individual who in the course of his life has
never made use of higher numerals would acquire more complex systems
readily; but the tribe as a whole seems always to be capable of
adjusting itself to the needs of counting. It must be borne in mind that
counting does not become necessary until objects are considered in such
generalized form that their individualities are entirely lost sight of.
For this reason it is possible that even a person who owns a herd of
domesticated animals may know them by name and by their characteristics,
without ever desiring to count them. Members of a war expedition may be
known by name, and may not be counted. In short, there is no proof that
the lack of the use of numerals is in any way connected with the
inability to form the concepts of higher numbers when needed.
If we want to form a correct judgment of the influence that language
exerts over thought, we ought to bear in mind that our European
languages, as found at the present time, have been moulded to a great
extent by the abstract thought of philosophers. Terms like “essence” and
“existence,” many of which are now commonly used, are by origin
artificial devices for expressing the results of abstract thought. In
this way they would resemble the artificial, unidiomatic abstract terms
that may be formed in primitive languages.
Thus it would seem that the obstacles to generalized thought inherent in
the form of a language are of minor importance only, and that presumably
language alone would not prevent a people from advancing to more
generalized forms of thinking, if the general state of their culture
should require expression of such thought; that under these conditions,
the language would be moulded rather by the cultural state. It does not
seem likely, therefore, that there is any direct relation between the
culture of a tribe and the language they speak, except in so far as the
form of the language will be moulded by the state of culture, but not in
so far as a certain state of culture is conditioned by morphological
traits of the language.
Thus we have found that language does not furnish the much-looked-for
means of discovering differences in the mental status of different
races.
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Footnote 3:
See map in Handbook of American Indians (Bulletin 30 of the Bureau of
American Ethnology), part i (1907).
Footnote 4:
This must not be understood to mean that every primitive language is
in a constant state of rapid modification. There are many evidences of
a great permanence of languages. When, however, owing to certain outer
or inner causes, changes set in, they are apt to bring about a
thorough modification of the form of speech.
Footnote 5:
The Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island.
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