IN the preceding chapters we have discussed the biological conditions of
various races and of different social groups, in so far as they form the
basis of mental activity. We must now turn our attention to the
psychological characteristics of mankind under the varying conditions of
race and environment.
When we consider our problem from a purely psychological point of view,
we have to follow out the same lines of thought which we pursued in our
discussion of the anatomical problem. We must try to enumerate clearly
the typical differences between the human mind and the animal mind,
which must serve as the background of our discussions. In the treatment
of the psychic differences between civilized man and primitive man, we
must distinguish the two problems of differences in cultural state of
members of the same race, and differences in characteristics of
different races; in other words, the problems of environmental
influences and of influences of heredity.
For the purposes of our investigation, we do not need to enter deeply
into a discussion of the first-named problem, the differences between
the minds of the animal and of man. The differences are so striking that
little or no diversity of opinion exists. The two outer traits in which
the distinction between the minds of animal and of man finds expression
are the existence of organized articulate language in man, and the use
of utensils of varied application. Both of these are common to the whole
of mankind. No tribe has ever been found that does not possess a
well-organized language; no community that does not know the use of
instruments for breaking, cutting, or drilling, the use of fire and of
weapons with which to defend themselves and to obtain the means of
living. Although means of communication by sound exist in animals, and
although even lower animals seem to have means of bringing about
co-operation between different individuals, we do not know of any case
of true articulate language from which the student can extract abstract
principles of classification of ideas. It may also be that higher apes
employ now and then limbs of trees or stones for defence, but the use of
complex utensils is not found in any representative of the animal
series. Only in the case of habitations do we find an approach to more
complex activities, which, however, remain absolutely stable in each
species,—as we say, instinctive,—and bear no evidence of any individual
freedom of use, which constitutes the primary character of human
inventions. The origin of the instinctive activities of animals which
lead to the construction of complex mechanical devices is still a hidden
secret; but the relation of the individual of the species to these
activities differs from that of man to his inventions in the complete
lack of freedom of control.
We are accustomed to say that the essential characteristic of the mental
processes of man is the power of reasoning. While animals as well as man
may perform actions suited to an end, based on memory of the results of
previous actions, and suitable selection of actions fitting a certain
purpose, we have no evidence whatever that would show that the abstract
concepts accompanying the action can be isolated by animals, while all
groups of man, from the most primitive to the most highly developed,
possess this faculty.
These few remarks on the common mental traits of man will suffice. When
we turn to a consideration of the racial and social characteristics of
the human mind, we find ourselves confronted by a peculiar difficulty.
In all our thoughts we think in terms of our own social environment. But
the activities of the human mind exhibit an infinite variety of form
among the peoples of the world. In order to understand these clearly,
the student must endeavor to divest himself entirely of opinions and
emotions based upon the peculiar social environment into which he is
born. He must adapt his own mind, so far as feasible, to that of the
people whom he is studying. The more successful he is in freeing himself
from the bias based on the group of ideas that constitute the
civilization in which he lives, the more successful he will be in
interpreting the beliefs and actions of man. He must follow lines of
thought that are new to him. He must participate in new emotions, and
understand how, under unwonted conditions, both lead to actions.
Beliefs, customs, and the response of the individual to the events of
daily life, give us ample opportunity to observe the manifestations of
the mind of man under varying conditions.
Apparently the thoughts and actions of civilized man, and those found in
more primitive forms of society, prove, that, in various groups of
mankind, the mind responds quite differently when exposed to the same
conditions. Lack of logical connection in its conclusions, lack of
control of will, are apparently two of its fundamental characteristics
in primitive society. In the formation of opinions, belief takes the
place of logical demonstration. The emotional value of opinions is
great, and consequently they quickly lead to action. The will appears
unbalanced, there being a readiness to yield to strong emotions and a
stubborn resistance in trifling matters.
Unfortunately the descriptions of the state of mind of primitive people,
such as are given by most travellers, are too superficial to be used for
psychological investigation. Very few travellers understand the language
of the people they visit; and how is it possible to judge a tribe solely
by the descriptions of interpreters, or by observations of disconnected
actions the incentive of which remains unknown? But even when the
language of the people is known to the visitor, he is generally an
unappreciative listener to their tales. The missionary has his strong
bias against the religious ideas and customs of primitive people, and
the trader has no interest in their beliefs and in their barbarous arts.
The observers who seriously tried to enter into the inner life of a
people, the Cushings, Callaways, and Greys, are few in number, and may
be counted on one’s fingers. Nevertheless the bulk of the argument is
always based on the statements of hasty and superficial observers.
Numerous attempts have been made to describe the peculiar psychological
characteristics of primitive man. Among these I would mention those of
Klemm, Carus, De Gobineau, Nott and Gliddon, Waitz, Spencer, and Tylor.
Their investigations are of merit as descriptions of the characteristics
of primitive people, but we cannot claim for any of them that they
describe the psychological characters of races independent of their
social surroundings. Klemm and Wuttke designate the civilized races as
active, all others as passive, and assume that all elements and
beginnings of civilization found among primitive people—in America or on
the islands of the Pacific Ocean—were due to an early contact with
civilization. Carus divides mankind into “peoples of the day, night and
dawn.” De Gobineau calls the yellow race the male element, the black
race the female element, and calls only the whites the noble and gifted
race. Nott and Gliddon ascribe animal instincts only to the lower races,
while they declare that the white race has a higher instinct which
incites and directs its development.
The belief in the higher hereditary powers of the white race has gained
a new life with the modern doctrine of the prerogatives of the
master-mind, which have found their boldest expression in Nietzsche’s
writings.
All such views are generalizations which either do not sufficiently take
into account the social conditions of races, and thus confound cause and
effect, or were dictated by scientific or humanitarian bias, by the
desire to justify the institution of slavery, or to give the greatest
freedom to the most highly gifted.
Tylor and Spencer, who give an ingenious analysis of the mental life of
primitive man, do not assume that these are racial characteristics,
although the evolutionary standpoint of Spencer’s work often seems to
convey this impression.
Quite distinct from these is Waitz’s point of view. He says, “According
to the current opinion the stage of culture of a people or of an
individual is largely or exclusively a product of his faculty. We
maintain that the reverse is at least just as true. The faculty of man
does not designate anything but how much and what he is able to achieve
in the immediate future and depends upon the stages of culture through
which he has passed and the one he has reached.”
The views of these investigators show that in the domain of psychology a
confusion prevails still greater than in anatomy, as to the
characteristics of primitive races, and that no clear distinction is
drawn between the racial and the social problem. In other words, the
evidence is based partly on the supposed mental characteristics of
races, no matter what their stage of culture; partly on those of tribes
and peoples on different levels of civilization, no matter whether they
belong to the same race or to distinct races. Still these two problems
are entirely distinct. The former is a problem of heredity; the latter,
a problem of environment.
Thus we recognize that there are two possible explanations of the
different manifestations of the mind of man. It may be that the minds of
different races show differences of organization; that is to say, the
laws of mental activity may not be the same for all minds. But it may
also be that the organization of mind is practically identical among all
races of man; that mental activity follows the same laws everywhere, but
that its manifestations depend upon the character of individual
experience that is subjected to the action of these laws.
It is quite evident that the activities of the human mind depend upon
these two elements. The organization of the mind may be defined as the
group of laws which determine the modes of thought and of action,
irrespective of the subject-matter of mental activity. Subject to such
laws are the manner of discrimination between perceptions, the manner in
which perceptions associate themselves with previous perceptions, the
manner in which a stimulus leads to action, and the emotions produced by
stimuli. These laws determine to a great extent the manifestations of
the mind. In these we recognize hereditary causes.
But, on the other hand, the influence of individual experience can
easily be shown to be very great. The bulk of the experience of man is
gained from oft-repeated impressions. It is one of the fundamental laws
of psychology that the repetition of mental processes increases the
facility with which these processes are performed, and decreases the
degree of consciousness that accompanies them. This law expresses the
well-known phenomena of habit. When a certain perception is frequently
associated with another previous perception, the one will habitually
call forth the other. When a certain stimulus frequently results in a
certain action, it will tend to call forth habitually the same action.
If a stimulus has often produced a certain emotion, it will tend to
reproduce it every time. These belong to the group of environmental
causes.
The explanation of the activity of the mind of man, therefore, requires
the discussion of two distinct problems. The first bears upon the
question of unity or diversity of organization of the mind, while the
second bears upon the diversity produced by the variety of contents of
the mind as found in the various social and geographical environments.
The task of the investigator consists largely in separating these two
causes, and in attributing to each its proper share in the development
of the peculiarities of the mind.
We will first devote our attention to the question, Do differences exist
in the organization of the human mind? Since Waitz’s thorough discussion
of the question of the unity of the human species, there can be no doubt
that in the main the mental characteristics of man are the same all over
the world; but the question remains open, whether there is a sufficient
difference in grade to allow us to assume that the present races of man
may be considered as standing on different stages of the evolutionary
series, whether we are justified in ascribing to civilized man a higher
place in organization than to primitive man.
The chief difficulty encountered in the solution of this problem has
been pointed out before. It is the uncertainty as to which of the
characteristics of primitive man are causes of the low stage of culture,
and which are caused by it; or which of the psychological
characteristics are hereditary, and would not be wiped out by the
effects of civilization. The fundamental difficulty of collecting
satisfactory observations lies in the fact that no large groups of
primitive man are brought nowadays into conditions of real equality with
whites. The gap between our society and theirs always remains open, and
for this reason their minds cannot be expected to work in the same
manner as ours. The same phenomenon which led us to the conclusion that
primitive races of our times are not given an opportunity to develop
their abilities, prevents us from judging their innate faculty.
It seems advantageous to direct our attention first of all to this
difficulty. If it can be shown that certain mental traits are common to
all members of mankind that are on a primitive stage of civilization, no
matter what their racial affinities may be, the conclusion will gain
much in strength, that these traits are primarily social, or based on
physical characteristics due to social environment.
I will select a few only among the mental characteristics of primitive
man which will illustrate our point,—inhibition of impulses, power of
attention, power of original thought.
We will first discuss the question, in how far primitive man is capable
of inhibiting impulses (Spencer).
It is an impression obtained by many travellers, and also based upon
experiences gained in our own country, that primitive man of all races,
and the less educated of our own race, have in common a lack of control
of emotions, that they give way more readily to an impulse than
civilized man and the highly educated. I believe that this conception is
based largely upon the neglect to consider the occasions on which a
strong control of impulses is demanded in various forms of society.
Most of the proofs for this alleged peculiarity are based on the
fickleness and uncertainty of the disposition of primitive man, and on
the strength of his passions aroused by seemingly trifling causes. I
will say right here that the traveller or student measures the
fickleness of the people by the importance which he attributes to the
actions or purposes in which they do not persevere, and he weighs the
impulse for outbursts of passion by his standard. Let me give an
example. A traveller desirous of reaching his goal as soon as possible
engages men to start on a journey at a certain time. To him time is
exceedingly valuable. But what is time to primitive man, who does not
feel the compulsion of completing a definite work at a definite time?
While the traveller is fuming and raging over the delay, his men keep up
their merry chatter and laughter, and cannot be induced to exert
themselves except to please their master. Would not they be right in
stigmatizing many a traveller for his impulsiveness and lack of control
when irritated by a trifling cause like loss of time? Instead of this,
the traveller complains of the fickleness of the natives, who quickly
lose interest in the objects which the traveller has at heart.
The proper way to compare the fickleness of the savage and that of the
white is to compare their behavior in undertakings which are equally
important to each. More generally speaking, when we want to give a true
estimate of the power of primitive man to control impulses, we must not
compare the control required on certain occasions among ourselves with
the control exerted by primitive man on the same occasions. If, for
instance, our social etiquette forbids the expression of feelings of
personal discomfort and of anxiety, we must remember that personal
etiquette among primitive men may not require any inhibition of the same
kind. We must rather look for those occasions on which inhibition is
required by the customs of primitive man. Such are, for instance, the
numerous cases of taboo,—that is, of prohibitions of the use of certain
foods, or of the performance of certain kinds of work,—which sometimes
require a considerable amount of self-control. When an Eskimo community
is on the point of starvation, and their religious proscriptions forbid
them to make use of the seals that are basking on the ice, the amount of
self-control of the whole community which restrains them from killing
these seals is certainly very great. Other examples that suggest
themselves are the perseverance of primitive man in the manufacture of
his utensils and weapons; his readiness to undergo privations and
hardships which promise to fulfil his desires,—as the Indian youth’s
willingness to fast in the mountains, awaiting the appearance of his
guardian spirit; or his bravery and endurance exhibited in order to gain
admittance to the ranks of the men of his tribe; or, again, the
often-described power of endurance exhibited by Indian captives who
undergo torture at the hands of their enemies.
It has also been claimed that lack of control is exhibited by primitive
man in his outbursts of passion occasioned by slight provocations. I
think that in this case also the difference in attitude of civilized man
and of primitive man disappears if we give due weight to the social
conditions in which the individual lives.
What would a primitive man say to the noble passion which preceded and
accompanied the war of the Rebellion? Would not the rights of slaves
seem to him a most irrelevant question? On the other hand, we have ample
proof that his passions are just as much controlled as ours, only in
different directions. The numerous customs and restrictions regulating
the relations of the sexes may serve as an example. The difference in
impulsiveness may be fully explained by the different weight of motives
in both cases. In short, perseverance and control of impulses are
demanded of primitive man as well as of civilized man, but on different
occasions. If they are not demanded as often, the cause must be looked
for, not in the inherent inability to produce them, but in the social
status which does not demand them to the same extent.
Spencer mentions as a particular case of this lack of control the
improvidence of primitive man. I believe it would be more proper to say,
instead of improvidence, optimism. “Why should I not be as successful
to-morrow as I was to-day?” is the underlying feeling of primitive man.
This feeling is, I think, no less powerful in civilized man. What builds
up business activity but the belief in the stability of existing
conditions? Why do the poor not hesitate to found families without being
able to lay in store beforehand? We must not forget that starvation
among most primitive people is an exceptional case, the same as
financial crises among civilized people; and that for times of need,
such as occur regularly, provision is always made. Our social status is
more stable, so far as the acquiring of the barest necessities of life
is concerned, so that exceptional conditions do not prevail often; but
nobody would maintain that the majority of civilized men are always
prepared to meet emergencies. We may recognize a difference in the
degree of improvidence caused by the difference of social status, but
not a specific difference between lower and higher types of man.
Related to the lack of power of inhibition is another trait which has
been ascribed to primitive man of all races,—his inability of
concentration when any demand is made upon the more complex faculties of
the intellect. I will mention an example which seems to make clear the
error committed in this assumption. In his description of the natives of
the west coast of Vancouver Island, Sproat says, “The native mind, to an
educated man, seems generally to be asleep.... On his attention being
fully aroused, he often shows much quickness in reply and ingenuity in
argument. But a short conversation wearies him, particularly if
questions are asked that require efforts of thought or memory on his
part. The mind of the savage then appears to rock to and fro out of mere
weakness.” Spencer, who quotes this passage, adds a number of others
corroborating this point. I happen to know through personal contact the
tribes mentioned by Sproat. The questions put by the traveller seem
mostly trifling to the Indian, and he naturally soon tires of a
conversation carried on in a foreign language, and one in which he finds
nothing to interest him. As a matter of fact, the interest of those
natives can easily be raised to a high pitch, and I have often been the
one who was wearied out first. Neither does the management of their
intricate system of exchange prove mental inertness in matters which
concern the natives. Without mnemonic aids, they plan the systematic
distribution of their property in such a manner as to increase their
wealth and social position. These plans require great foresight and
constant application.
Finally I wish to refer to a trait of the mental life of primitive man
of all races which has often been adduced as the primary reason why
certain races cannot rise to higher levels of culture; namely, their
lack of originality. It is said that the conservatism of primitive man
is so strong, that the individual never deviates from the traditional
customs and beliefs (Spencer). While there is certainly truth in this
statement in so far as more customs are binding than in civilized
society, at least in its most highly developed types, originality is a
trait which is by no means lacking in the life of primitive people. I
will call to mind the great frequency of the appearance of prophets
among newly converted tribes as well as among pagan tribes. Among the
latter we learn quite frequently of new dogmas which have been
introduced by such individuals. It is true that these may often be
traced to the influence of the ideas of neighboring tribes, but they are
modified by the individuality of the person, and grafted upon the
current beliefs of the people. It is a well-known fact that myths and
beliefs have been disseminated, and undergo changes in the process of
dissemination (Boas). Undoubtedly this has often been accomplished by
the independent thought of individuals, as may be observed in the
increasing complexity of esoteric doctrines intrusted to the care of a
priesthood. I believe one of the best examples of such independent
thought is furnished by the history of the ghost-dance ceremonies in
North America (Mooney). The doctrines of the ghost-dance prophets were
new, but based on the ideas of their own people, their neighbors, and
the teachings of missionaries. The notion of future life of an Indian
tribe of Vancouver Island has undergone a change in this manner, in so
far as the idea of the return of the dead in children of their own
family has arisen. The same independent attitude may be observed in the
replies of the Nicaraguan Indians to the questions regarding their
religion as were put to them by Bobadilla, and which were reported by
Oviedo.
It seems to my mind that the mental attitude of individuals who thus
develop the beliefs of a tribe is exactly that of the civilized
philosopher. The student of the history of philosophy is well aware how
strongly the mind of even the greatest genius is influenced by the
current thought of his time. This has been well expressed by a German
writer (Lehmann), who says, “The character of a system of philosophy is,
just like that of any other literary work, determined first of all by
the personality of its originator. Every true philosophy reflects the
life of the philosopher, as well as every true poem that of the poet.
Secondly, it bears the general marks of the period to which it belongs;
and the more powerful the ideas which it proclaims, the more strongly it
will be permeated by the currents of thought which fluctuate in the life
of the period. Thirdly, it is influenced by the particular bent of
philosophical thought of the period.”
If such is the case among the greatest minds of all times, why should we
wonder that the thinker in primitive society is strongly influenced by
the current thought of his time? Unconscious and conscious imitation are
factors influencing civilized society, not less than primitive society,
as has been shown by G. Tarde, who has proved that primitive man, and
civilized man as well, imitates not such actions only as are useful, and
for the imitation of which logical causes may be given, but also others
for the adoption or preservation of which no logical reason can be
assigned.
I think these considerations illustrate that the differences between
civilized man and primitive man are in many cases more apparent than
real; that the social conditions, on account of their peculiar
characteristics, easily convey the impression that the mind of primitive
man acts in a way quite different from ours, while in reality the
fundamental traits of the mind are the same.
This does not mean that no differences exist or can be found, only that
the method of investigation must be different. It does not seem probable
that the minds of races which show variations in their anatomical
structure should act in exactly the same manner. Differences of
structure must be accompanied by differences of function, physiological
as well as psychological; and, as we found clear evidence of difference
in structure between the races, so we must anticipate that differences
in mental characteristics will be found. Thus, a smaller size or lesser
number of nervous elements would probably entail loss of mental energy,
and paucity of connections in the central nervous system would produce
sluggishness of the mind. As stated before, it seems probable that some
slight differences of this character will be found between the white and
the negro, for instance, but they have not yet been proved. As all
structural differences are quantitative, we must expect to find mental
differences to be of the same description; and as we found the
variations in structure to overlap, so that many forms are common to
individuals of all races, so we may expect that many individuals will
not differ in regard to their faculty, while a statistical inquiry
embracing whole races would reveal certain differences. Furthermore, as
certain anatomical traits are found to be hereditary in certain
families, and hence in tribes, and perhaps even in peoples, in the same
manner mental traits characterize certain families, and may prevail
among tribes. It seems, however, an impossible undertaking to separate
in a satisfactory manner the social and the hereditary features.
Galton’s attempt to establish the laws of hereditary genius, and later
endeavors in the same direction, point out a way of treatment for these
questions which will prove useful in so far as it opens a method of
determining the influence of heredity upon mental qualities.
After we have thus found that the alleged specific differences between
civilized and primitive man, so far as they are inferred from complex
psychic responses, can be reduced to the same fundamental psychical
forms, we have the right to decline as unprofitable a discussion of the
hereditary mental traits of various branches of the white race. Much has
been said of the hereditary characteristics of the Jews, of the Gypsies,
of the French and Irish, but I do not see that the external and social
causes which have moulded the character of members of these people have
ever been eliminated satisfactorily; and, moreover, I do not see how
this can be accomplished. A number of external factors that influence
body and mind may easily be named,—climate, nutrition, occupation,—but
as soon as we enter into a consideration of social factors and mental
conditions, we are unable to tell definitely what is cause and what is
effect. An apparently excellent discussion of external influences upon
the character of a people has been given by A. Wernich in his
description of the character of the Japanese. He finds some of their
peculiarities caused by the lack of vigor of the muscular and alimentary
systems, which in their turn are due to improper nutrition; while he
recognizes as hereditary other physiological traits which influence the
mind. And still, how weak appear his conclusions, after the energy and
endurance exhibited by the Japanese in their modern development and in
their conflict with Russia!
Effects of malnutrition continued through many generations might be
expected to affect the mental life of the Bushmen and the Lapps
(Virchow); and still, after the experience just quoted, we may well
hesitate before we express any definite conclusions.
It would seem, therefore, that we have no right to explain difference in
mental attitude of different groups of people, particularly of closely
related ones, as due to hereditary causes, until we have been able to
prove that physiological and the correlated psychological traits are
hereditary, regardless of social and natural environment.
A beginning in work of this kind has been made in the experimental
investigations of school-children in regard to simple mental activities
and simple physiological processes; in the work of the Cambridge
Scientific Expedition to Torres Strait (Rivers), in which the first
systematic attempt has been made to study the simple psychical
re-actions of primitive people; and in the investigations carried on
systematically by Dr. Woodworth on the primitive people exhibited at the
World’s Fair of St. Louis. Up to this time the results are, on the
whole, not favorable to the theory of the occurrence of very fundamental
differences between different races.
One additional point of our inquiry into the organic basis of mental
activity remains to be investigated; namely, the question, Has the
organic basis for the faculty of man been improved by civilization, and
particularly may that of primitive races be improved by this agency? We
must consider both the anatomical and the psychological aspects of this
question. I have already pointed out that civilization causes anatomical
changes of the same description as those accompanying the domestication
of animals. It is likely that changes of mental character go hand in
hand with them. The observed anatomical changes are, however, limited to
this group of phenomena. We cannot prove that any progressive changes of
the human organism have taken place; and particularly no advance in the
size or complexity of the structure of the central nervous system,
caused by the cumulative effects of civilization, can be proved.
The difficulty of proving a progress of faculty is still greater. It
seems to me that the probable effect of civilization upon an evolution
of human faculty has been much overestimated. The psychical changes
which are the immediate consequence of domestication or civilization may
be considerable. They are changes due to the influence of environment.
It is doubtful, however, if any progressive changes, or such as are
transmitted by heredity, have taken place. The number of generations
subjected to this influence seems altogether too small. For large
portions of Europe we cannot assume more than forty or fifty
generations; and even this number is probably considerably too high,
inasmuch as in the middle ages the bulk of the population lived on very
low stages of civilization.
Besides this, the tendency of human multiplication is such, that the
most highly cultured families tend to disappear, while others which have
been less subjected to the influences regulating the life of the most
cultured class take their place. Therefore it is much less likely that
advance is hereditary than that it is transmitted by means of education.
In illustrating the improving effects of civilization through
transmission, much weight is generally laid upon cases of relapse of
individuals belonging to primitive races who have been educated. These
relapses are interpreted as proofs of the inability of the child of a
lower race to adapt itself to our high civilization, even if the best
advantages are given to it. It is true that a considerable number of
such cases are on record. Among these I will mention Darwin’s Fuegian,
who lived in England for a few years and returned to his home, where he
fell back into the ways of his primitive countrymen; and the West
Australian girl who was married to a white man, but suddenly fled to the
bush after killing her husband, and resumed life with the natives. Cases
of this kind are true, but not one of them has been described with
sufficient detail. The social and mental conditions of the individual
have never been subjected to a searching analysis. I should judge that
even in extreme cases, notwithstanding their better education, their
social position was always one of isolation, while the ties of
consanguinity formed a connecting link with their uncivilized brethren.
The power with which society holds us and does not give us a chance to
step out of its limits cannot have acted as strongly upon them as upon
us. On the other hand, the station obtained by many negroes in our
civilization seems to me to have just as much weight as the few cases of
relapse which have been collected with much care and diligence. I should
place side by side with them the cases of white men who live alone among
native tribes, and who sink almost invariably to a semi-barbarous
position, and the members of well-to-do families who prefer unbounded
freedom to the fetters of society, and flee to the wilderness, where
many lead a life in no way superior to that of primitive man.
In the study of the behavior of members of foreign races educated in
European society, we should also bear in mind the influence of habits of
thought, feeling, and action acquired in early childhood, and of which
no recollection is retained. If S. Freud is right in assuming that these
forgotten incidents remain a living force throughout life,—the more
potent, the more thoroughly they are forgotten,—we should have to
conclude that many of the small traits of individuals which we
ordinarily believe to be inherited are acquired by the influence of the
individuals among whom the child spends the first five years of its
life. All observations on the force of habit and the intensity of
resistance to changes of habit are in favor of this theory.
Our brief consideration of some of the mental activities of man in
civilized and in primitive society has led us to the conclusion that
these functions of the human mind are common to the whole of humanity.
It may be well to state here, that, according to our present method of
considering biological and psychological phenomena, we must assume that
these have developed from lower conditions existing at a previous time,
and that at one time there certainly must have been races and tribes in
which the properties here described were not at all, or only slightly,
developed; but it is also true that among the present races of man, no
matter how primitive they may be in comparison with ourselves, these
faculties are highly developed.
It is not impossible that the degree of development of these functions
may differ somewhat among different types of man; but I do not believe
that we are able at the present time to form a just valuation of the
hereditary mental powers of the different races. A comparison of their
languages, customs, and activities suggests that their faculties may be
unequally developed; but the differences are not sufficient to justify
us to ascribe materially lower stages to some peoples, and higher stages
to others. The conclusions reached from these considerations are
therefore, on the whole, negative. We are not inclined to consider the
mental organization of different races of man as differing in
fundamental points. Although, therefore, the distribution of faculty
among the races of man is far from being known, we can say this much:
the average faculty of the white race is found to the same degree in a
large proportion of individuals of all other races, and, although it is
probable that some of these races may not produce as large a proportion
of great men as our own race, there is no reason to suppose that they
are unable to reach the level of civilization represented by the bulk of
our own people.
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