XVI. If you are told of _discontents_ in your colonies, never

believe that they are general, or that you have given occasion for

them; therefore do not think of applying any remedy, or of changing

any offensive measure. Redress no grievance, lest they should be

encouraged to demand the redress of some other grievance. Grant no

request, that is just and reasonable, lest they should make another,

that is unreasonable. Take all your informations of the state of

the colonies from your governors and officers in enmity with them.

Encourage and reward these leasing-makers, secrete their lying

accusations, lest they should be confuted, but act upon them as the

clearest evidence; and believe nothing you hear from the friends

of the people. Suppose all _their_ complaints to be invented and

promoted by a few factious demagogues, whom if you could catch and

hang, all would be quiet. Catch and hang a few of them accordingly,

and the blood of the martyrs shall work miracles in favour of your

purpose[137].

XVII. If you see _rival nations_ rejoicing at the prospect of your

disunion with your provinces, and endeavouring to promote it, if

they translate, publish and applaud all the complaints of your

discontented colonists, at the same time privately stimulating you to

severer measures, let not that alarm or offend you. Why should it?

since you all mean the same thing?

XVIII. If any colony should _at their own charge erect a fortress_,

to secure their _port_ against the fleets of a foreign enemy, get

your governor to betray that fortress into your hands. Never think

of paying what it cost the country, for that would look, at least,

like some regard for justice; but turn it into a citadel, to awe

the inhabitants and curb their commerce. If they should have lodged

in such fortress the very arms they bought and used to aid you in

your conquests, seize them all; it will provoke like ingratitude

added to robbery. One admirable effect of these operations will be,

to discourage every other colony from erecting such defences, and

so their and your enemies may more easily invade them, to the great

disgrace of your government, and of course the furtherance of your

project.

XIX. Send armies into their country, under pretence of protecting the

inhabitants; but, instead of garrisoning the forts on their frontiers

with those troops, to prevent incursions, demolish those forts, and

order the troops into the heart of the country, that the savages may

be encouraged to attack the frontiers[138], and that the troops may

be protected by the inhabitants: this will seem to proceed from your

_ill-will or your ignorance_, and contribute farther to produce

and strengthen an opinion among them, that you are no longer fit to

govern them[139].

XX. Lastly, invest the _general of your army in the provinces_ with

great and unconstitutional powers, and free him from the controul of

even your own civil governors. Let him have troops enow under his

command, with all the fortresses in his possession, and who knows but

(like some provincial generals in the Roman empire, and encouraged

by the universal discontent you have produced) he may take it into

his head to set up for himself? If he should, and you have carefully

practised these few excellent rules of mine, take my word for it,

all the provinces will immediately join him--and you will that day

(if you have not done it sooner) get rid of the trouble of governing

them, and all the plagues attending their commerce and connection

from thenceforth and for ever.

FOOTNOTES:

[136] These rules first appeared in a London newspaper about the

beginning of the year 1774, and have several times since been

introduced into our public prints.--The minister alluded to is

supposed to be the Earl of Hillsborough.

"The causes and motions of seditions (says Lord Bacon) are,

innovation in religion, taxes, alteration of laws and customs,

breaking of privileges, general oppression, advancement of unworthy

persons, strangers, dearths, disbanded soldiers, factions grown

desperate, and whatsoever in offending people joineth and knitteth

them in a common cause." B. V.

[137] One of the American writers affirms, "That there has not been

a single instance in which _they_ have complained, without being

rebuked, or in which they have been complained _against_, without

being punished."--A fundamental mistake in the minister occasioned

this. Every individual in New England (the peccant country) was held

a coward or a knave, and the disorders, which spread abroad there,

were treated as the result of the _too great lenity_ of Britain! By

the aid of this short and benevolent rule, judgment was ever wisely

predetermined, to the shutting out redress on the one hand, and

inforcing every rigour of punishment on the other. B. V.

[138] I am not versed in Indian affairs, but I find, that in April,

1773, the assembled chiefs of the western nations told one of our

Indian agents, "that they remembered their father, the king of Great

Britain's message, delivered to them last fall, of demolishing

Fort Pittsburg (on the Ohio) and removing the soldiers with their

sharp-edged weapons out of the country:--this gave them great

pleasure, as it was a strong proof of his paternal kindness towards

them." (See Considerations on the Agreement with Mr. T. Walpole for

Lands upon the Ohio, p. 9). This is general history: I attempt no

application of facts, personally invidious. B. V.

[139] As the reader may be inclined to divide his belief between

the wisdom of ministry and the candor and veracity of Dr. Franklin,

I shall inform him that two contrary objections may be made to the

truth of this representation. The first is, that the conduct of Great

Britain is made _too_ absurd for possibility, and the second, that

it is not made absurd _enough_ for fact. If we consider that this

piece does not include the measures subsequent to 1773, the latter

difficulty is easily set aside. The former I can only solve by the

many instances in history, where the infatuation of individuals has

brought the heaviest calamities upon nations. B. V.

_State of America on Dr. Franklin's Arrival there._

_Philadelphia, May 16, 1775._

DEAR FRIEND[140],

You will have heard before this reaches you, of a march stolen by the

regulars into the country by night, and of their _expedition_ back

again. They retreated 20 miles in [6] hours.

The governor had called the assembly to propose Lord North's pacific

plan, but, before the time of their meeting, began cutting of

throats.--You know it was said he carried the sword in one hand, and

the olive branch in the other; and it seems he chose to give them a

taste of the sword first.

He is doubling his fortifications at Boston, and hopes to secure

his troops till succour arrives. The place indeed is naturally so

defensible, that I think them in no danger.

All America is exasperated by his conduct, and more firmly united

than ever. The breach between the two countries is grown wider, and

in danger of becoming irreparable.

I had a passage of six weeks, the weather constantly so moderate that

a London wherry might have accompanied us all the way. I got home

in the evening, and the next morning was unanimously chosen by the

assembly a delegate to the congress, now sitting.

In coming over, I made a valuable philosophical discovery, which I

shall communicate to you when I can get a little time. At present am

extremely hurried.

* * * * *

Yours most affectionately,

B. FRANKLIN.

FOOTNOTES:

[140] I run much risque in the publication of the three following

letters[141]; but I think they contain such valuable facts, and

show so well the nature of Dr. Franklin's temper, that I ought to

encounter some difficulty, rather than suffer them to be lost. B. V.

[141] The other two letters will be found in the order of their

dates, July 7, and Oct. 3, 1775. _Editor._

_Proposed Vindication and Offer from Congress to Parliament, in

1775[142]._

Forasmuch as the enemies of America, in the parliament of Great

Britain, to render us odious to the nation, and give an ill

impression of us in the minds of other European powers, have

represented us as unjust and ungrateful in the highest degree;

asserting on every occasion, that the colonies were settled at the

expence of Britain; that they were, at the expence of the same,

protected in their infancy; that they now ungratefully and unjustly

refuse to contribute to their own protection, and the common defence

of the nation; that they aim at independence; that they intend an

abolition of the navigation acts; and that they are fraudulent in

their commercial dealings, and purpose to cheat their creditors in

Britain, by avoiding the payment of their just debts:--

[And] as, by frequent repetition, these groundless assertions and

malicious calumnies may, if not contradicted and refuted, obtain

farther credit, and be injurious throughout Europe to the reputation

and interest of the confederate colonies, it seems proper and

necessary to examine them in our own just vindication.

With regard to the first, _that the colonies were_ settled _at

the expence of Britain_, it is a known fact, that none of the

twelve united colonies were settled, or even discovered, at the

expence of England. Henry the VIIth indeed granted a commission to

Sebastian Cabot, a Venetian, and his sons, to sail into the western

seas for the discovery of new countries; but it was to be "_suis_

eorum propriis sumptibus et expensis," at their _own_ costs and

charges[143]. They discovered, but soon slighted and neglected, these

northern territories; which were, after more than a hundred years

dereliction, purchased of the natives, and settled at the charge

and by the labour of private men and bodies of men, our ancestors,

who came over hither for that purpose. But our adversaries have

never been able to produce any record, that ever the _parliament_ or

government of England was at the smallest expence on these accounts:

on the contrary, there exists on the journals of parliament a

solemn declaration in 1642, (only twenty-two years after the first

settlement of the Massachusetts, when, if such expence had ever been

incurred, some of the members must have known and remembered it)

"That these colonies had been planted and established _without any

expence to the state_.[144]" _New-York_ is the only colony in the

founding of which England can pretend to have been at any expence,

and that was only the charge of a small armament to take it from the

Dutch, who planted it. But to retain this colony at peace, another at

that time, full as valuable, planted by private countrymen of _ours_,

was given up by the crown to the Dutch in exchange, viz. Surinam, now

a wealthy sugar-colony in Guiana, and which, but for that cession,

might still have remained in our possession. Of late, indeed, Britain

has been at some expence in planting two colonies, _Georgia_[145]

and _Nova Scotia_; but those are not in our confederacy; and the

expence she has been at in their name, has chiefly been in grants of

sums unnecessarily large, by way of salaries to officers sent from

England, and in jobs to friends, whereby dependants might be provided

for; those excessive grants not being requisite to the welfare and

good government of the colonies; which good government (as experience

in many instances of other colonies has taught us) may be much more

frugally, and full as effectually provided for, and supported.

With regard to the second assertion, _that these colonies were_

protected _in their infant state by England_, it is a notorious fact,

that in none of the many wars with the Indian natives, sustained

by our infant settlements for a century after our first arrival,

were ever any troops or forces of any kind sent from England to

assist us; nor were any forts built at her expence to secure our

sea-ports from foreign invaders; nor any ships of war sent to protect

our trade, till many years after our first settlement, when our

commerce became an object of revenue, or of advantage to British

merchants, and then it was thought necessary to have a frigate in

some of our ports, during peace, to give weight to the authority of

custom-house officers, who were to restrain that commerce for the

benefit of England. Our own arms, with our poverty, and the care of

a kind providence, were all this time our only protection, while

we were neglected by the English government; which either thought

us not worth its care, or, having no good will to some of us, on

account of our different sentiments in religion and politics, was

indifferent what became of us. On the other hand, the colonies have

not been wanting to do what they could in every war for annoying the

enemies of Britain. They formerly assisted her in the conquest of

Nova Scotia. In the war before last they took Louisbourg, and put

it into her hands. She made her peace with that strong fortress, by

restoring it to France, greatly to their detriment. In the last war,

it is true, Britain sent a fleet and army, who acted with an equal

army of ours, in the reduction of Canada; and perhaps thereby did

more for us, than we in the preceding wars had done for her. Let it

be remembered however, that she rejected the plan we formed in the

congress at Albany, in 1754, for our own defence, by an union of the

colonies; an union she was jealous of, and therefore chose to send

her own forces; otherwise her aid to protect us was not wanted. And

from our first settlement to that time, her military operations in

our favour were small, compared with the advantages she drew from

her exclusive commerce with us. We are however willing to give full

weight to this obligation; and as we are daily growing stronger, and

our assistance to her becomes of more importance, we should with

pleasure embrace the first opportunity of showing our gratitude, by

returning the favour in kind. But when Britain values herself as

affording us protection, we desire it may be considered, that we

have followed _her_ in all _her_ wars, and joined with her at our

own expence against all she thought fit to quarrel with. This she

has required of us, and would never permit us to keep peace with any

power she declared her enemy, though by separate treaties we might

well have done it. Under such circumstances, when, at her instance,

we made nations our enemies, whom we might otherwise have retained

our friends; we submit it to the common sense of mankind, whether

her protection of us in these wars was not our _just due_, and to

be claimed of _right_, instead of being received as a _favour_?

And whether, when all the parts of an empire exert themselves to

the utmost in their common defence, and in annoying the common

enemy, it is not as well the _parts_ that protect the _whole_, as

the _whole_ that protects the _parts_? The protection then has

been proportionably mutual. And whenever the time shall come, that

our abilities may as far exceed hers, as hers have exceeded ours,

we hope we shall be reasonable enough to rest satisfied with her

proportionable exertions, and not think we do too much for a part of

the empire, when that part does as much as it can for the whole.

The charge against us, _that we refuse to_ contribute _to our own

protection_, appears from the above to be groundless: but we farther

declare it to be absolutely false; for it is well known, that we ever

held it as our duty to grant aids to the crown, upon requisition,

towards carrying on its wars; which duty we have cheerfully complied

with, to the utmost of our abilities; insomuch that frequent and

grateful acknowledgments thereof by king and parliament appear

on their records[146]. But as Britain has enjoyed a most gainful

monopoly of our commerce, the same, with our maintaining the dignity

of the king's representative in each colony, and all our own separate

establishments of government, civil and military, has ever hitherto

been deemed an equivalent for such aids, as might otherwise be

expected from us in time of peace. And we hereby declare, that on a

reconciliation with Britain, we shall _not only_ continue _to grant

aids in time of war_, as aforesaid; but, whenever she shall think fit

to abolish her monopoly, and give us the same privileges of trade as

Scotland received at the union, and allow us a free commerce with

all the rest of the world, we shall willingly agree (and we doubt

not it will be ratified by our constituents) to _give and pay_ into

the sinking fund [100,000_l._] sterling per annum for the term of one

hundred years, which, duly, faithfully, and inviolably applied to

that purpose, is demonstrably more than sufficient to extinguish _all

her present national_ debt, since it will in that time amount, at

legal British interest, to more than 230,000,000_l._[147]

But if Britain does not think fit to accept this proposition, we,

in order to remove her groundless jealousies, _that we aim at

independence, and an abolition of the navigation act_, (which hath

in truth never been our intention) and to avoid all future disputes

about the right of making that and other acts for regulating our

commerce, do hereby declare ourselves ready and willing to enter

into a _covenant with Britain_, that she shall fully possess,

enjoy, and exercise that right, for an hundred years to come, the

same being _bonâ fide_ used for the common benefit; and in case of

such agreement, that every assembly be advised by us, to confirm it

solemnly, by laws of their own, which, once made, cannot be repealed

without the assent of the crown.

The last charge, _that we are dishonest traders, and aim at

defrauding our creditors in Britain_, is sufficiently and

authentically refuted by the solemn declarations of the British

merchants to parliament, (both at the time of the stamp-act and in

the last session) who bore ample testimony to the general good faith

and fair dealing of the Americans, and declared their confidence in

our integrity, for which we refer to their petitions on the journals

of the house of commons. And we presume we may safely call on the

body of the British tradesmen, who have had experience of both, to

say, whether they have not received much more punctual payment from

us than they generally have from the members of their own two houses

of parliament.

On the whole of the above it appears, that the charge of

_ingratitude_ towards the mother country, brought with so much

confidence against the colonies, is totally without foundation; and

that there is much more reason for retorting that charge on Britain,

who not only never contributes any aid, nor affords, by an exclusive

commerce, any advantages to Saxony, _her_ mother country; but no

longer since than in the last war, without the least provocation,

subsidized the king of Prussia while he ravaged that _mother

country_, and carried fire and sword into its capital, the fine city

of Dresden. An example we hope no provocation will induce us to

imitate.

FOOTNOTES:

[142] The following paper was drawn up in a committee of congress,

June 25, 1775, but does not appear on their minutes, a severe act of

parliament, which arrived about that time, having determined them not

to give the sum proposed in it.--[It was first printed in the Public

Advertiser for July 18, 1777. B. V.]

[143] See the Commission in the Appendix to Pownall's Administration

of the Colonies. Edit. 1775.

[144] "Veneris, 10 March, 1642. Whereas the plantations in New

England have, by the blessing of the Almighty, had good and

prosperous success, _without any public charge to this state_, and

are now likely to prove very happy for the propagation of the gospel

in those parts, and very beneficial and commodious to this kingdom

and nation: the commons, now assembled in parliament, &c. &c. &c."

See Governor Hutchinson's History. B. V.

[145] Georgia has since acceded, July, 1775.

[146] Supposed to allude to certain passages in the Journals of the

house of commons on the 4th of April, 1748, 28th January, 1756, 3d

February, 1756, 16th and 19th of May, 1757, 1st of June, 1758, 26th

and 30th of April, 1759, 26th and 31st of March, and 28th of April,

1760, 9th and 20th January, 1761, 22d and 26th January, 1762, and

14th and 17th March, 1763. B. V.

[147] See Dr. Price's Appeal on the National Debt. B. V.

_Reprobation of Mr. Strahan's parliamentary Conduct._[148]

_Philadelphia, July 5, 1775._

MR. STRAHAN,

You are a member of that parliament, and have formed part of that

majority, which has condemned my native country to destruction.

You have begun to burn our towns, and to destroy their inhabitants!

Look at your hands!--they are stained with the blood of your

relations and your acquaintances.

You and I were long friends; you are at present my enemy, and I am

yours.

B. FRANKLIN.

FOOTNOTE:

[148] This letter appeared, shortly after the period of its date,

in most of the public papers. We extract it from the Gentleman's

Magazine. _Editor._

_Conciliation hopeless from the Conduct of Great Britain to

America._

_Philadelphia, July 7, 1775._

DEAR FRIEND[149],

* * * * *

The congress met at a time when all minds were so exasperated by the

perfidy of general Gage, and his attack on the country people, that

propositions of attempting an accomodation were not much relished;

and it has been with difficulty that we have carried another

humble petition to the crown, to give Britain one more chance, one

opportunity more of recovering the friendship of the colonies;

which however I think she has not sense enough to embrace, and so I

conclude she has lost them for ever.

She has begun to burn our sea-port towns; secure, I suppose, that we

shall never be able to return the outrage in kind. She may doubtless

destroy them all; but if she wishes to recover our commerce, are

these the probable means? She must certainly be distracted; for no

tradesman out of Bedlam ever thought of encreasing the number of his

customers by knocking them [on] the head; or of enabling them to pay

their debts by burning their houses.

If she wishes to have us subjects and that we should submit to her as

our compound sovereign, she is now giving us such miserable specimens

of her government, that we shall ever detest and avoid it, as a

complication of robbery, murder, famine, fire and pestilence.

You will have heard, before this reaches you, of the treacherous

conduct * * * to the remaining people in Boston, in detaining their

goods, after stipulating to let them go out with their effects, on

pretence that merchants' goods were not effects; the defeat of a

great body of his troops by the country people at Lexington; some

other small advantages gained in skirmishes with their troops; and

the action at Bunker's-hill, in which they were twice repulsed, and

the third time gained a dear victory. Enough has happened, one would

think, to convince your ministers, that the Americans will fight, and

that this is a harder nut to crack than they imagined.

We have not yet applied to any foreign power for assistance, nor

offered our commerce for their friendship. Perhaps we never may: yet

it is natural to think of it, if we are pressed.

We have now an army on the establishment which still holds yours

besieged.

My time was never more fully employed. In the morning at six, I am

at the committee of safety, appointed by the assembly to put the

province in a state of defence; which committee holds till near nine,

when I am at the congress, and that sits till after four in the

afternoon. Both these bodies proceed with the greatest unanimity,

and their meetings are well attended. It will scarce be credited in

Britain, that men can be as diligent with us from zeal for the public

good, as with you for thousands per annum. Such is the difference

between uncorrupted new states, and corrupted old ones.

Great frugality and great industry are now become fashionable here:

gentlemen, who used to entertain with two or three courses, pride

themselves now in treating with simple beef and pudding. By these

means, and the stoppage of our consumptive trade with Britain, we

shall be better able to pay our voluntary taxes for the support of

our troops. Our savings in the article of trade amount to near five

million sterling per annum.

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