about a transaction and its circumstances, of which both of them
are totally ignorant and innocent, I think it incumbent upon me to
declare (for the prevention of farther mischief, as far as such a
declaration may contribute to prevent it) that I alone am the person,
who obtained and transmitted to Boston the letters in question.
Mr. W. could not communicate them, because they were never in his
possession; and for the same reason they could not be taken from him
by Mr. T. They were not of the nature of _private_ letters between
friends. They were written by public officers to persons in public
stations, on public affairs, and intended to procure public measures;
they were therefore handed to other public persons, who might be
influenced by them to produce those measures. Their tendency was to
incense the mother-country against her colonies, and, by the steps
recommended, to widen the breach, which they effected. The chief
caution expressed with regard to privacy was, to keep their contents
from the colony agents, who, the writers apprehended, might return
them, or copies of them, to America. That apprehension was, it seems,
well founded, for the first agent who laid his hands on them thought
it his duty to transmit them to his constituents[130].
_Craven Street, Dec. 25, 1773._
B. FRANKLIN,
_Agent for the House of Representatives
of the Massachusett's Bay_.
FOOTNOTES:
[126] Governor Hutchinson, lieutenant-governor Andrew Oliver,
Charles Paxton, Esq. Nathaniel Rogers, Esq. and Mr. G. Roome,
having sent from Boston certain representations and informations
to Thomas Whately, Esq. member of parliament, private secretary to
Mr. George Grenville (the father of the stamp act) when in office,
and afterwards one of the lords of trade; these letters were, by a
particular channel, conveyed back to Boston. The assembly of the
province were so much exasperated, that they returned home attested
copies of the letters, accompanied with a petition and remonstrance,
for the removal of governor Hutchinson, and lieutenant-governor
Andrew Oliver, from their posts. The council of the province
likewise, on their part, entered into thirteen resolves, in tendency
and import similar to the petition of the assembly; five of which
resolves were unanimous, and only one of them had so many as three
dissentients. In consequence of the assembly's petition, the above
proceedings and examination took place.
Dr. Franklin having naturally a large share in these transactions,
made still larger by the impolitic and indecent persecution of his
character, I have exhibited the whole more at length, than I should
otherwise have thought proper. B. V.
[127] The editor has taken this examination from Mr. Mauduit's copy
of the Letters of Governor Hutchinson, &c. second edition, 1774,
p. 17. He has Mr. Mauduit's authority for supposing it faithfully
represented. B. V.
[128] The privy council accordingly met on the 29th of January,
1774, when Mr. Dunning and Mr. John Lee appeared as counsel for
the assembly, and Mr. Wedderburn as counsel for the governor and
lieutenant governor. Mr. Wedderburn was very long in his answer,
which chiefly related to the mode of obtaining and sending away Mr.
Whately's letters; and spoke of Dr. Franklin in terms of abuse, which
never escape from one gentleman towards another. In the event, the
committee of the privy council made a report, in which was expressed
the following opinion: "The lords of the committee do agree humbly
to report, as their opinion to your majesty, that the petition is
founded upon resolutions formed on false and erroneous allegations;
and is groundless, vexatious, and scandalous, and calculated only
for the seditious purposes of keeping up a spirit of clamour and
discontent in the said province. And the lords of the committee do
further humbly report to your majesty, that nothing has been laid
before them which does or can, in their opinion, in any manner, or
in any degree, impeach the honour, integrity, or conduct of the said
governor or lieutenant-governor; and their lordships are humbly of
opinion, that the said petition ought to be dismissed."
Feb. 7th, 1774. "His majesty, taking the said report into
consideration, was pleased, with the advice of his privy-council, to
approve thereof; and to order, that the said petition of the house of
representatives of the province of Massachusett's Bay be dismissed
the board--as groundless, vexatious, and scandalous; and calculated
only for the seditious purpose of keeping up a spirit of clamour and
discontent in the said province."--A former petition against governor
Bernard met with a dismission couched in similar terms. B. V.
[129] Some letters had passed in the public prints between Mr. Thomas
Whately's brother and Mr. John Temple, concerning the manner in which
the letters of Governor Hutchinson &c. had escaped from among the
papers of Mr. Thomas Whately, at this time deceased.
The one gentleman wished to avoid the charge of having given them,
the other of having taken them. At length the dispute became so
personal and pointed, that Mr. Temple thought it necessary to call
the brother into the field. The letter of provocation appeared in
the morning, and the parties met in the afternoon. Dr. Franklin, was
not then in town; it was after some interval that he received the
intelligence. What had passed he could not foresee; he endeavoured to
prevent what still might follow. B. V.
[130] It was in consequence of this letter that Mr. Wedderburn
ventured to make the most odious personal applications. Mr. Mauduit
has prudently omitted part of them in his account of the proceedings
before the privy-council. They are given here altogether however (as
well as they could be collected) to mark the politics of the times,
and the nature of the censures passed in England upon Dr. Franklin's
character.
"The letters could not have come to Dr. Franklin," said Mr.
Wedderburn, "by fair means. The writers did not give them to him, nor
yet did the deceased correspondent, who, from our intimacy, would
otherwise have told me of it: nothing then will acquit Dr. Franklin
of the charge of obtaining them by fraudulent or corrupt means, for
the most malignant of purposes; unless he stole them, from the person
who stole them. This argument is irrefragable."----
"I hope, my lords, you will mark [and brand] the man, for the honour
of this country, of Europe, and of mankind. Private correspondence
has hitherto been held sacred in times of the greatest party
rage, not only in politics but religion."--"He has forfeited all
the respect of societies and of men. Into what companies will he
hereafter go with an unembarassed face, or the honest intrepidity of
virtue. Men will watch him with a jealous eye, they will hide their
papers from him, and lock up their escrutoires. He will henceforth
esteem it a libel to be called a _man of letters, homo_ trium[131]
_literarum_!
"But he not only took away the letters from one brother, but kept
himself concealed till he nearly occasioned the murder of the other.
It is impossible to read his account, expressive of the coolest and
most deliberate malice, without horror." [_Here he read the letter
above, Dr. Franklin being all the time present._]--Amidst these
tragical events, of one person nearly murdered, of another answerable
for the issue, of a worthy governor hurt in his dearest interests,
the fate of America in suspense; here is a man, who, with the utmost
insensibility of remorse, stands up and avows himself the author of
all. I can compare it only to Zanga in Dr. Young's _Revenge_.[132]
"Know then 'twas----I:
I forged the letter, I disposed the picture;
I hated, I despised, and I destroy.
"I ask, my lords, whether the revengeful temper, attributed by poetic
fiction only to the bloody African, is not surpassed by the coolness
and apathy of the wily American?"
These pleadings for a time worked great effect: the lords
assented, the town was convinced, Dr. Franklin was disgraced[133],
and Mr. Wedderburn seemed in the road for every kind of
advancement.--Unfortunately for Mr. Wedderburn, the events of the
war did not correspond with his systems. Unfortunately too for his
"irrefragable argument," Dr. Franklin afterwards took an oath in
chancery[134], that at the time that he transmitted the letters he
was ignorant of the party to whom they had been addressed, having
himself received them from a third person, and for the express
purpose of their being conveyed to America. Unfortunately also for
Mr. Wedderburn's "worthy governor," that governor himself, _before_
the arrival of Dr Franklin's packet in Boston, sent over one of
Dr. Franklin's own "private" letters to England, expressing some
little coyness indeed upon the occasion, but desiring secrecy, lest
he should be prevented procuring _more_ useful intelligence from
the same source[135]. Whether Mr. Wedderburn in his speech intended
to draw a particular case and portraiture, for the purpose only of
injuring Dr. Franklin, or meant that his language and epithets should
apply generally to all, whether friends or foes, whose practice
should be found similar to it, is a matter that must be left to be
adjusted between governor Hutchinson and Mr. Wedderburn.
But to return to Dr. Franklin. It was not singular perhaps, that,
as a man of honour, he should surrender his name to public scrutiny
in order to prevent mischief to others, and yet not betray his
coadjutor (even to the present moment) to relieve his own fame from
the severest obloquy; but perhaps it belonged to few besides Dr.
Franklin, to possess mildness and magnanimity enough to refrain from
intemperate expressions and measures against Mr. Wedderburn and his
supporters, after all that had passed. B. V.
[131] i. e. Fur (or _thief_).
[132] Act Vth.
[133] He was dismissed from his place in the post-office.
[134] A copy of the proceedings in chancery has been in my
possession, but being at present mislaid I speak only from memory
here.
[135] See the Remembrancer for the year 1776, part 2d. p. 61 col.
1st, and 2d.
_Rules for reducing a Great Empire to a small one, presented to a
late Minister, when he entered upon his Administration._[136]
An ancient sage valued himself upon this, that though he could
not fiddle, he knew how to make a great city of a little one. The
science, that I, a modern, simpleton, am about to communicate, is the
very reverse.
I address myself to all ministers, who have the management of
extensive dominions, which, from their very greatness, are become
troublesome to govern--because the multiplicity of their affairs
leaves no time for fiddling.
I. In the first place, gentlemen, you are to consider, that a great
empire, like a great cake, is most easily diminished at the edges.
Turn your attention therefore first to your _remotest_ provinces;
that, as you get rid of them, the next may follow in order.
II. That the possibility of this separation may always exist,
take special care the provinces are _never incorporated with the
mother-country_; that they do not enjoy the same common rights, the
same privileges in commerce, and that they are governed by severer
laws, all of your enacting, without allowing them any share in the
choice of the legislators. By carefully making and preserving such
distinctions, you will (to keep to my simile of the cake) act like a
wise gingerbread-baker; who, to facilitate a division, cuts his dough
half through in those places, where, when baked, he would have it
broken to pieces.
III. Those remote provinces have perhaps been acquired, purchased, or
conquered, at the sole expence of the settlers or their ancestors,
without the aid of the mother-country. If this should happen to
increase her strength, by their growing numbers, ready to join in her
wars; her commerce, by their growing demand for her manufactures; or
her naval power, by greater employment for her ships and seamen, they
may probably suppose some merit in this, and that it entitles them
to some favour: you are therefore to _forget it all, or resent it_,
as if they had done you injury. If they happen to be zealous whigs,
friends of liberty, nurtured in revolution principles; remember
all that to their prejudice, and contrive to punish it: for such
principles, after a revolution is thoroughly established, are of no
more use; they are even odious and abominable.
IV. However peaceably your colonies have submitted to your
government, shown their affection to your interests, and patiently
borne their grievances, you are to suppose them _always inclined
to revolt_, and treat them accordingly. Quarter troops among them,
who, by their insolence, may provoke the rising of mobs, and by their
bullets and bayonets suppress them. By this means, like the husband
who uses his wife ill from suspicion, you may in time convert your
suspicions into realities.
V. Remote provinces must have governors and judges, to represent
the royal person and execute every where the delegated parts of his
office and authority. You, ministers, know, that much of the strength
of government depends on the opinion of the people, and much of that
opinion on the _choice of rulers_ placed immediately over them. If
you send them wise and good men for governors, who study the interest
of the colonists, and advance their prosperity; they will think their
king wise and good, and that he wishes the welfare of his subjects.
If you send them learned and upright men for judges, they will think
him a lover of justice. This may attach your provinces more to his
government. You are therefore to be careful who you recommend for
those offices.--If you can find prodigals, who have ruined their
fortunes, broken gamesters or stock-jobbers, these may do well as
governors, for they will probably be rapacious, and provoke the
people by their extortions. Wrangling proctors and pettyfogging
lawyers too are not amiss, for they will be for ever disputing and
quarrelling with their little parliaments. If withal they should be
ignorant, wrong-headed and insolent, so much the better. Attorneys
clerks and Newgate solicitors will do for chief justices, especially
if they hold their places during your pleasure:--and all will
contribute to impress those ideas of your government, that are
proper for a people you would wish to renounce it.
VI. To confirm these impressions, and strike them deeper,
whenever the injured come to the capital with complaints of
mal-administration, oppression, or injustice, _punish such suitors_
with long delay, enormous expence, and a final judgment in favour
of the oppressor. This will have an admirable effect every way.
The trouble of future complaints will be prevented, and governors
and judges will be encouraged to farther acts of oppression and
injustice, and thence the people may become more disaffected, and at
length desperate.
VII. When such governors have crammed their coffers, and made
themselves so odious to the people, that they can no longer remain
among them with safety to their persons, _recal and reward_ them with
pensions. You may make them baronets too, if that respectable order
should not think fit to resent it. All will contribute to encourage
new governors in the same practice, and make the supreme government
detestable.
VIII. If, when you are engaged in war, your colonies should vie in
liberal aids of men and money against the common enemy upon your
simple requisition, and give far beyond their abilities,--reflect,
that a penny, taken from them by your power, is more honourable to
you, than a pound presented by their benevolence; _despise therefore
their voluntary grants_, and resolve to harass them with _novel
taxes_.--They will probably complain to your parliament, that they
are taxed by a body in which they have no representative, and that
this is contrary to common right. They will petition for redress. Let
the parliament flout their claims, reject their petitions, refuse
even to suffer the reading of them, and treat the petitioners with
the utmost contempt. Nothing can have a better effect in producing
the alienation proposed; for though many can forgive injuries, none
ever forgave contempt.
IX. In laying these taxes, _never regard the heavy burthens_ those
remote people already undergo, in defending their own frontiers,
supporting their own provincial government, making new roads,
building bridges, churches, and other public edifices, which in
old countries have been done to your hands, by your ancestors, but
which occasion constant calls and demands on the purses of a new
people.--Forget the restraint you lay on their trade for your own
benefit, and the advantage a monopoly of this trade gives your
exacting merchants. Think nothing of the wealth those merchants and
your manufacturers acquire by the colony commerce, their increased
ability thereby to pay taxes at home, their accumulating, in the
price of their commodities, most of those taxes, and so levying them
from their consuming customers: all this, and the employment and
support of thousands of your poor by the colonists, you are entirely
to forget. But remember to make your arbitrary tax more grievous to
your provinces, by public declarations, importing, that your power of
taxing them has _no limits_, so that when you take from them without
their consent a shilling in the pound, you have a clear right to the
other nineteen. This will probably weaken every idea of security
in their property, and convince them, that under such a government
they have nothing they can call their own; which can scarce fail of
producing the happiest consequences!
X. Possibly indeed some of them might still comfort themselves and
say, "though we have no property, we have yet something left that
is valuable, we have constitutional _liberty, both of person and of
conscience_. This king, these lords, and these commons, who it seems
are too remote from us to know us and feel for us, cannot take from
us our habeas corpus right, or our right of trial by a jury of our
neighbours: they cannot deprive us of the exercise of our religion,
alter our ecclesiastical constitution, and compel us to be papists,
if they please, or Mahometans." To annihilate this comfort, begin by
laws to perplex their commerce with infinite regulations, impossible
to be remembered and observed: ordain seizures of their property for
every failure, take away the trial of such property by jury, and give
it to arbitrary judges of your own appointing, and of the lowest
characters in the country, whose salaries and emoluments are to arise
out of the duties or condemnations, and whose appointments are during
pleasure. Then let there be a formal declaration of both houses, that
opposition to your edicts is treason, and that persons suspected of
treason in the provinces may, according to some obsolete law, be
seized and sent to the metropolis of the empire for trial; and pass
an act, that those there charged with certain other offences shall
be sent away in chains from their friends and country, to be tried
in the same manner for felony. Then erect a new court of inquisition
among them, accompanied by an armed force, with instructions to
transport all such suspected persons, to be ruined by the expence,
if they bring over evidences to prove their innocence, or be found
guilty and hanged, if they cannot afford it. And lest the people
should think you cannot possibly go any farther, pass another solemn
declaratory act, "that king, lords, and commons had, have, and of
right ought to have, full power and authority to make statutes of
sufficient force and validity to bind the unrepresented provinces _in
all cases whatsoever_." This will include spiritual with temporal,
and taken together must operate wonderfully to your purpose, by
convincing them, that they are at present under a power, something
like that spoken of in the Scriptures, which can not only kill their
bodies, but damn their souls to all eternity, by compelling them, if
it pleases, to worship the devil.
XI. To make your taxes more odious, and more likely to procure
resistance, send from the capital a _board of officers_ to
superintend the collection, _composed of the most indiscreet_,
ill-bred, and insolent you can find. Let these have large salaries
out of the extorted revenue, and live in open grating luxury upon
the sweat and blood of the industrious, whom they are to worry
continually with groundless and expensive prosecutions, before the
above-mentioned arbitrary revenue-judges; all at the cost of the
party prosecuted, though acquitted, because the king is to pay no
costs. Let these men, by your order, be exempted from all the common
taxes and burthens of the province, though they and their property
are protected by its laws. If any revenue officers are suspected of
the least tenderness for the people, discard them. If others are
justly complained of, protect and reward them. If any of the under
officers behave so as to provoke the people to drub them, promote
those to better offices: this will encourage others to procure for
themselves such profitable drubbings, by multiplying and enlarging
such provocations, and all will work towards the end you aim at.
XII. Another way to make your tax odious is, to _misapply the
produce of it_. If it was originally appropriated for the defence
of the provinces, and the better support of government, and
the administration of justice, where it may be necessary; then
apply none of it to that defence, but bestow it, where it is not
necessary, in augmenting salaries or pensions to every governor,
who has distinguished himself by his enmity to the people, and by
calumniating them to their sovereign. This will make them pay it more
unwillingly, and be more apt to quarrel with those that collect it,
and those that imposed it, who will quarrel again with them, and all
shall contribute to your own purpose, of making them weary of your
government.
XIII. If the people of any province have been accustomed to _support
their own governors and judges_ to satisfaction, you are to
apprehend, that such governors and judges may be thereby influenced
to treat the people kindly, and to do them justice. This is another
reason for applying part of that revenue in larger salaries to such
governors and judges, given, as their commissions are, during _your_
pleasure only, forbidding them to take any salaries from their
provinces; that thus the people may no longer hope any kindness from
their governors, or (in crown cases) any justice from their judges.
And as the money, thus misapplied in one province, is extorted from
all, probably all will resent the misapplication.
XIV. If the parliaments of your provinces should dare to claim
rights, or complain of your administration, order them to be harassed
with _repeated dissolutions_. If the same men are continually
returned by new elections, adjourn their meetings to some country
village, where they cannot be accommodated, and there keep them
during pleasure; for this, you know, is your prerogative, and an
excellent one it is, as you may manage it, to promote discontents
among the people, diminish their respect, and increase their
disaffection.
XV. Convert the brave honest officers of your _navy_ into pimping
tide-waiters and colony officers of the _customs_. Let those, who
in time of war fought gallantly in defence of the commerce of their
countrymen, in peace be taught to prey upon it. Let them learn
to be corrupted by great and real smugglers; but (to show their
diligence) scour with armed boats every bay, harbour, river, creek,
cove or nook, throughout the coast of your colonies; stop and detain
every coaster, every wood-boat, every fisherman, tumble their
cargoes and even their ballast inside out, and upside down; and if
a pennyworth of pins is found un-entered, let the whole be seized
and confiscated. Thus shall the trade of your colonists suffer more
from their friends in time of peace, than it did from their enemies
in war. Then let these boats' crews land upon every farm in their
way, rob their orchards, steal their pigs and poultry, and insult
the inhabitants. If the injured and exasperated farmers, unable to
procure other justice, should attack the aggressors, drub them, and
burn their boats, you are to call this _high treason and rebellion_,
order fleets and armies into their country, and threaten to carry
all the offenders three thousand miles to be hanged, drawn, and
quartered.--O! this will work admirably!