power to remove them, and depend_ (as the remarker proposes) _on
our own_ "strength and watchfulness[32]" _to prevent the mischiefs
that may attend it, seems neither safe nor prudent_. Happy as we now
are, under the best of kings, and in the prospect of a succession
promising every felicity a nation was ever blessed with; happy too in
the wisdom and vigour of every part of the administration; we cannot,
we ought not to promise ourselves the uninterrupted continuance of
those blessings. The safety of a considerable part of the state, and
the interest of the whole, are not to be trusted to the wisdom and
vigour of _future administrations_; when a security is to be had
more effectual, more constant, and much less expensive. They, who
can be moved by the apprehension of dangers so remote, as that of
the future independence of our colonies (a point I shall hereafter
consider) seem scarcely consistent with themselves, when they
suppose we may rely on the wisdom and vigour of an administration
for their safety.--I should indeed think it less material whether
Canada were ceded to us or not, if I had in view only the security
of _possession_ in our colonies. I entirely agree with the remarker,
that we are in North America "a far greater continental as well
as naval power;" and that only cowardice or ignorance can subject
our colonies there to a French conquest. But for the same reason I
disagree with him widely upon another point.
[3. _The blood and treasure spent in the American wars, not spent
in the cause of the colonies alone._]
I do not think, that our "blood and treasure has been expended," as
he intimates, "_in the cause of the colonies_," and that we are
"making conquests for _them_[33];" yet I believe this is too common
an error. I do not say, they are altogether unconcerned in the event.
The inhabitants of them are, in common with the other subjects of
Great Britain, anxious for the glory of her crown, the extent of
her power and commerce, the welfare and future repose of the whole
British people. They could not therefore but take a large share in
the affronts offered to Britain; and have been animated with a truly
British spirit to exert themselves beyond their strength, and against
their evident interest. Yet so unfortunate have they been, that their
virtue has made against them; for upon no better foundation than this
have they been supposed the authors of a war, carried on for their
advantage only. It is a great mistake to imagine, that the American
country in question between Great Britain and France is claimed as
the property of any _individuals or public body in America_; or that
the possession of it by Great Britain is likely, in any lucrative
view, to redound at all to the advantage of any person there.
On the other hand, the bulk of the inhabitants of North America
are _land-owners_, whose lands are inferior in value to those of
Britain, only by the want of an equal number of people. It is true,
the accession of the large territory claimed before the war began
(especially if that be secured by the possession of Canada) will
tend to the increase of the British subjects faster, than if they
had been confined within the mountains: yet the increase within the
mountains only would evidently make the comparative population equal
to that of Great Britain much sooner than it can be expected, when
our people are spread over a country six times as large. I think this
is the only point of light in which this question is to be viewed,
and is the only one in which any of the colonies are concerned.--No
colony, no possessor of lands in any colony, therefore wishes for
conquests, or can be benefitted by them, otherwise than as they may
be a means of _securing peace on their borders_. No considerable
advantage has resulted to the colonies by the conquests of this
war, or can result from confirming them by the peace, but what they
must enjoy in common with the rest of the British people; with this
evident drawback from their share of these advantages, that they will
necessarily lessen, or at least prevent the increase of the value of
what makes the principal part of their private property [their land].
A people, spread through the whole tract of country on this side
the Mississippi, and secured by Canada in our hands, would probably
for some centuries find employment in agriculture, and thereby free
us at home effectually from our fears of American manufactures.
Unprejudiced men well know, that all the penal and prohibitory
laws that ever were thought on will not be sufficient to prevent
manufactures in a country, whose inhabitants surpass the number that
can subsist by the husbandry of it. That this will be the case in
America soon, if our people remain confined within the mountains, and
almost as soon should it be unsafe for them to live beyond, though
the country be ceded to us, no man acquainted with political and
commercial history can doubt. Manufactures are founded in poverty:
it is the multitude of poor without land in a country, and who must
work for others at low wages or starve, that enables undertakers to
carry on a manufacture, and afford it cheap enough to prevent the
importation of the same kind from abroad, and to bear the expence of
its own exportation.--But no man, who can have a piece of land of
his own, sufficient by his labour to subsist his family in plenty,
is poor enough to be a manufacturer, and work for a master. Hence,
while there is land enough in America for our people, there can never
be manufactures to any amount or value. It is a striking observation
of a very _able pen_[34], that the natural livelihood of the thin
inhabitants of a forest country is hunting; that of a greater number,
pasturage: that of a middling population, agriculture; and that of
the greatest, manufactures; which last must subsist the bulk of the
people in a full country, or they must be subsisted by charity, or
perish. The extended population, therefore, that is most advantageous
to Great Britain, will be best effected, because only effectually
secured, by our possession of Canada.
So far as the _being_ of our present colonies in North America is
concerned, I think indeed with the remarker, that the French there
are not _"an enemy to be apprehended[35];"_--but the expression is
too vague to be applicable to the present, or indeed to any other
case. Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, unequal as they are to this nation
in power and numbers of people, are enemies to be still apprehended;
and the Highlanders of Scotland have been so for many ages, by the
greatest princes of Scotland and Britain. The wild Irish were able
to give a great deal of disturbance even to Queen Elizabeth, and
cost her more blood and treasure than her war with Spain. Canada, in
the hands of France, has always stinted the growth of our colonies,
in the course of this war, and indeed before it, has disturbed
and vexed even the best and strongest of them; has found means to
murder thousands of their people, and unsettle a great part of their
country. Much more able will it be to starve the growth of an infant
settlement. Canada has also found means to make this nation spend two
or three millions a year in America; and a people, how small soever,
that in their present situation, can do this as often as we have a
war with them, is, methinks, "an enemy to be apprehended."
Our North American colonies are to be considered as the _frontier
of the British empire_ on that side. The frontier of any dominion
being attacked, it becomes not merely "the cause" of the people
immediately attacked (the inhabitants of that frontier) but properly
"the cause" of the whole body. Where the frontier people owe and
pay obedience, there they have a right to look for protection:
no political proposition is better established than this. It is
therefore invidious, to represent the "blood and treasure" spent in
this war, as spent in "the cause of the colonies" only; and that they
are "absurd and ungrateful," if they think we have done nothing,
unless we "make conquests for them," and reduce Canada to gratify
their "vain ambition," &c. It will not be a conquest for _them_,
nor gratify any vain ambition of theirs. It will be a conquest for
the _whole_; and all our people will, in the increase of trade, and
the ease of taxes, find the advantage of it. Should we be obliged
at any time, to make a war for the protection of our commerce, and
to secure the exportation of our manufactures, would it be fair to
represent such a war, merely as blood and treasure spent in the
cause of the weavers of Yorkshire, Norwich, or the West; the cutlers
of Sheffield, or the button-makers of Birmingham? I hope it will
appear before I end these sheets, that if ever there was a national
war, this is truly such a one: a war in which the interest of the
whole nation is directly and fundamentally concerned. Those, who
would be thought deeply skilled in human nature, affect to discover
self-interested views every where at the bottom of the fairest, the
most generous conduct. Suspicions and charges of this kind meet
with ready reception and belief in the minds even of the multitude,
and therefore less acuteness and address, than the remarker is
possessed of, would be sufficient to persuade the nation generally,
that all the zeal and spirit, manifested and exerted by the colonies
in this war, was only in "their own cause," to "make conquests for
themselves," to engage us to make more for them, to gratify their own
"vain ambition."
But should they now humbly address the mother-country in the terms
and the sentiments of the remarker; return her their grateful
acknowledgments for the blood and treasure she had spent in "their
cause;" confess that enough had not been done "for them;" allow that
"English forts, raised in proper passes, will, with the wisdom and
vigour of her administration," be a sufficient future protection;
express their desires that their people may be confined within
the mountains, lest [if] they are suffered to spread and extend
themselves in the fertile and pleasant country on the other side,
they should "increase infinitely from all causes," "live wholly
on their own labour" and become independent; beg therefore that
the French may be suffered to remain in possession of Canada, as
their neighbourhood may be useful to prevent our increase, and the
removing them may "in its consequences be even dangerous[36]:"--I
say, should such an address from the colonies make its appearance
here (though, according to the remarker, it would be a most just
and reasonable one) would it not, might it not with more justice
be answered:--We understand you, gentlemen, perfectly well: you
have only your own interest in view: you want to have the people
confined within your present limits, that in a few years the lands
you are possessed of may increase tenfold in value! you want to
reduce the price of labour, by increasing numbers on the same
territory, that you may be able to set up manufactures and vie with
your mother-country! you would have your people kept in a body,
that you may be more able to dispute the commands of the crown, and
obtain an independency. You would have the French left in Canada, to
exercise your military virtue, and make you a warlike people, that
you may have more confidence to embark in schemes of disobedience,
and greater ability to support them! You have tasted too, the sweets
of TWO OR THREE MILLIONS sterling per annum spent among you by our
fleets and forces, and you are unwilling to be without a pretence
for kindling up another war, and thereby occasioning a repetition of
the same delightful doses! But, gentlemen, allow us to understand
_our_ interest a little likewise: we shall remove the French from
Canada, that you may live in peace, and we be no more drained by your
quarrels. You shall have land enough to cultivate, that you may have
neither necessity nor inclination to go into manufactures; and we
will manufacture for you, and govern you.
A reader of the Remarks may be apt to say, if this writer would
have us restore Canada, on principles of moderation, how can we,
consistent with those principles, retain Guadaloupe, which he
represents of so much greater value!--I will endeavour to explain
this, because by doing it I shall have an opportunity of showing the
truth and good sense of the answer to the interested application I
have just supposed: The author then is only apparently and not really
inconsistent with himself. If we can obtain the credit of moderation
by restoring Canada, it is well: but we should, however, restore it
at _all events_; because it would not only be of no use to us; but
"the possession of it (in his opinion) may in its consequences be
dangerous[37]." As how? Why, plainly, (at length it comes out) if the
French are not left there to check the growth of our colonies, "they
will extend themselves almost without bounds into the inland parts,
and increase infinitely from all causes; becoming a numerous, hardy,
independent people; possessed of a strong country, communicating
little or not at all with England, living wholly on their own labour,
and in process of time knowing little and enquiring little about the
mother-country." In short, according to this writer, our present
colonies are large enough and numerous enough; and the French ought
to be left in North America to prevent their increase, lest they
become not only useless, but dangerous to Britain. I agree with the
Gentleman, that with Canada in our possession, our people in America
will increase amazingly. I know, that their common rate of increase,
where they are not molested by the enemy, is doubling their numbers
every twenty-five years, by natural generation only; exclusive of the
accession of foreigners[38]. I think this increase continuing would
probably, in a century more, make the number of British subjects on
that side the water more numerous than they now are on this; But,
[4. _Not necessary that the American colonies should_ cease being
useful to the _mother-country_. _Their_ preference _over the
West-Indian colonies stated_.]
_I am far from entertaining on that account, any fears of their
becoming either useless or dangerous to us; and I look on those fears
to be merely imaginary, and without any probable foundation._--The
remarker is reserved in giving his reasons; as in his opinion this
"is not a fit subject for discussion."--I shall give mine, because
I conceive it a subject necessary to be discussed; and the rather,
as those fears, how groundless and chimerical soever, may, by
possessing the multitude, possibly induce the ablest ministry to
conform to them against their own judgment; and thereby prevent the
assuring to the British name and nation a stability and permanency,
that no man acquainted with history durst have hoped for, till our
American possessions opened the pleasing prospect. The remarker
thinks, that our people in America, "finding no check from Canada,
would extend themselves almost without bounds into the inland parts,
and increase infinitely from all causes." The very reason he assigns
for their so extending, and which is indeed the true one (their
being "invited to it by the pleasantness, fertility, and plenty of
the country,") may satisfy us, that this extension will continue to
proceed, as long as there remains any pleasant fertile country within
their reach. And if we even suppose them confined by the waters
of the Mississippi westward, and by those of St. Laurence and the
lakes to the northward; yet still we shall leave them room enough
to increase, even in the manner of settling now practised there,
till they amount to perhaps a hundred millions of souls. This must
take some centuries to fulfil: and in the _mean time_, this nation
must necessarily supply them with the manufactures they consume;
because the new settlers will be employed in agriculture; and the
new settlements will so continually draw off the spare hands from
the old, that our present colonies will not, during the period we
have mentioned, find themselves in a condition to manufacture, even
for their own inhabitants, to any considerable degree, much less for
those who are settling behind them.
Thus our trade must, till that country becomes as fully peopled as
England (that is for centuries to come) be continually increasing,
and with it our naval power; because the ocean is between us
and them, and our ships and seamen must increase as that trade
increases.--The human body and the political differ in this;
that the first is limited by nature to a certain stature, which,
when attained, it cannot ordinarily exceed: the other, by better
government and more prudent police, as well as by change of manners
and other circumstances, often takes fresh starts of growth, after
being long at a stand; and may add tenfold to the dimensions it
had for ages been confined to. The mother, being of full stature,
is in a few years equalled by a growing daughter: but in the case
of a mother-country and her colonies, it is quite different. The
growth of the children tends to increase the growth of the mother,
and so the difference and superiority is longer preserved. Were the
inhabitants of this island limited to their present number by any
thing in nature, or by unchangeable circumstances, the equality
of population between the two countries might indeed sooner come
to pass: but sure experience, in those parts of the island where
manufactures have been introduced, teaches us; that people increase
and multiply in proportion as the means and facility of gaining a
livelihood increase; and that this island, if they could be employed,
is capable of supporting ten times its present number of people. In
proportion, therefore, as the demand increases for the manufactures
of Britain, by the increase of people in her colonies, the number
of her people at home will increase; and with them, the strength as
well as the wealth of the nation. For satisfaction in this point, let
the reader compare in his mind the number and force of our present
fleets, with our fleet in Queen Elizabeth's time[39], before we had
colonies. Let him compare the ancient, with the present state of our
towns on or near our western coast (Manchester, Liverpool, Kendal,
Lancaster, Glasgow, and the countries round them) that trade with
any manufacture for our colonies (not to mention Leeds, Halifax,
Sheffield, and Birmingham,) and consider what a difference there is
in the numbers of people, buildings, rents, and the value of land
and of the produce of land; even if he goes back no farther than is
within man's memory. Let him compare those countries with others on
the same island, where manufactures have not yet extended themselves;
observe the present difference, and reflect how much greater our
strength may be (if numbers give strength) when our manufacturers
shall occupy every part of the island where they can possibly be
subsisted.
But, say the objectors, "there is a _certain distance from the
sea_, in America, beyond which the expence of carriage will put a
stop to the sale and consumption of your manufactures; and this,
with the difficulty of making returns for them, will oblige the
inhabitants to manufacture for themselves; of course, if you suffer
your people to extend their settlements beyond that distance, your
people become useless to you:" and this distance is limited by some
to two hundred miles, by others to the Apalachian mountains.--Not
to insist on a very plain truth, that no part of a dominion, from
whence a government may on occasion draw supplies and aids both of
men and money (though at too great a distance to be supplied with
manufactures from some other part) is therefore to be deemed useless
to the whole; I shall endeavour to show, that these imaginary limits
of utility, even in point of commerce, are much too narrow. The
inland parts of the continent of Europe are farther from the sea,
than the limits of settlement proposed for America. Germany is full
of tradesmen and artificers of all kinds, and the governments there
are not all of them always favourable to the commerce of Britain; yet
it is a well-known fact, that our manufactures find their way even
into the heart of Germany. Ask the great manufacturers and merchants
of the Leeds, Sheffield, Birmingham, Manchester, and Norwich
goods; and they will tell you, that some of them send their riders
frequently through France or Spain, and Italy, up to Vienna, and back
through the middle and northern parts of Germany, to show samples of
their wares, and collect orders, which they receive by almost every
mail, to a vast amount. Whatever charges arise on the carriage of
goods are added to the value, and all paid by the consumer. If these
nations, over whom we have no government, over whose consumption
we can have no influence, but what arises from the cheapness and
goodness of our wares, whose trade, manufactures, or commercial
connections are not subject to the control of our laws, as those of
our colonies certainly are in some degree; I say, if these nations
purchase and consume such quantities of our goods, notwithstanding
the remoteness of their situation from the sea; how much less likely
is it, that the settlers in America, who must for ages be employed
in agriculture chiefly, should make cheaper for themselves the goods
our manufacturers at present supply them with: even if we suppose the
carriage five, six, or seven hundred miles from the sea as difficult
and expensive, as the like distance into Germany: whereas in the
latter, the natural distances are frequently doubled by political
obstructions; I mean the intermixed territories and clashing
interests of princes[40]. But when we consider, that the inland
parts of America are penetrated by great navigable rivers; that
there are a number of great lakes, communicating with each other,
with those rivers, and with the sea, very small portages here and
there excepted[41]; that the sea-coasts (if one may be allowed the
expression) of those lakes only amount at least to two thousand seven
hundred miles, exclusive of the rivers running into them (many of
which are navigable to a great extent for boats and canoes, through
vast tracts of country); how little likely is it that the expence on
the carriage of our goods into those countries should prevent the
use of them. If the poor Indians in those remote parts are now able
to pay for the linen, woollen, and iron wares they are at present
furnished with by the French and English traders (though Indians have
nothing but what they get by hunting, and the goods are loaded with
all the impositions fraud and knavery can contrive to inhance their
value) will not industrious English farmers, hereafter settled in
those countries, be much better able to pay for what shall be brought
them in the way of fair commerce?