with regard to their employing the provincial forces as _regulars_,
rather than as _rangers_; and showing the secret reason why that
province is at present without a _militia-law_, notwithstanding the
several bills which have been lately passed by the assembly for that
purpose.
12. An account of sundry sums of money paid by the province for his
majesty's service, _since the commencement of the present troubles in
America_.
13. An extract from an original letter of Mr. Logan, containing,
among other things, his opinion of the proprietary right to the
government of the three Delaware counties; and which serves to
account for the particular favour shown that government from time to
time.
FOOTNOTE:
[16] This is the title of an octavo volume, consisting of nearly
five hundred pages closely printed. It was written, as mentioned in
the preceding note, while Dr. Franklin was in England as agent for
the province of Pensylvania, to further the ends of his mission, by
removing the unfavourable impressions which had taken place to the
prejudice of the Pensylvanians: and "it must be confessed," as a
reviewer of the work observes, "they had in our author a most zealous
and able advocate. His sentiments are manly, liberal, and spirited;
his style close, nervous, and rhetorical. By a forcible display of
the oppressions his clients have sustained, he inclines us to pity
their condition; by an enumeration of their virtues he endeavours to
remove the idea, which many have entertained, of their unimportance,
and, abstracted from their consideration in a political light, they
claim our regard by reason of their own personal merits." Interesting
however as the controversy between the governors and the assembly
of Pensylvania may have been at the time, it is too little so now
to justify the insertion of so voluminous an account of it in the
present collection, and we shall content ourselves therefore with
extracting the dedication, preface, and contents. It is singular,
that neither the editor of Dr. Franklin's works, whom we have
designated by the letters B. V.; nor Dr. Stuber, the continuator of
his life, should have mentioned this publication. The work is indeed
anonymous, but it is so well known to have been Dr. Franklin's, that
in the common library catalogue of the British Museum it is ranked
under his name. _Editor._
_The Interest of Great Britain considered, with Regard to her
Colonies, and the Acquisitions of Canada and Guadaloupe[17]._
I have perused with no small pleasure the Letter addressed to Two
Great Men, and the Remarks on that letter. It is not merely from
the beauty, the force and perspicuity of expression, or the general
elegance of manner conspicuous in both pamphlets, that my pleasure
chiefly arises; it is rather from this, that I have lived to see
subjects of the greatest importance to this nation publicly discussed
without party views, or party heat, with decency and politeness, and
with no other warmth, than what a zeal for the honour and happiness
of our king and country may inspire; and this by writers, whose
understanding (however they may differ from each other) appears not
unequal to their candour and the uprightness of their intention.
But, as great abilities have not always the best information, there
are, I apprehend, in the Remarks, some opinions not well founded,
and some mistakes of so important a nature, as to render a few
observations on them necessary for the better information of the
public.
The author of the Letter, who must be every way best able to support
his own sentiments, will, I hope, excuse me, if I seem officiously
to interfere; when he considers, that the spirit of patriotism, like
other qualities good and bad, is catching; and that his long silence
since the Remarks appeared has made us despair of seeing the subject
farther discussed by his masterly hand. The ingenious and candid
remarker, too, who must have been misled himself before he employed
his skill and address to mislead others, will certainly, since he
declares he _aims at no seduction_[18], be disposed to excuse even
the weakest effort to prevent it.
And surely, if the general opinions that possess the minds of the
people may possibly be of consequence in public affairs, it must be
fit to set those opinions right. If there is danger, as the remarker
supposes, that "extravagant expectations" may embarrass "a virtuous
and able ministry," and "render the negotiation for peace a work of
infinite difficulty[19];" there is no less danger that expectations
too low, through want of proper information, may have a contrary
effect, may make even a virtuous and able ministry less anxious,
and less attentive to the obtaining points, in which the honour and
interest of the nation are essentially concerned; and the people less
hearty in supporting such a ministry and its measures.
The people of this nation are indeed respectable, not for their
numbers only, but for their understanding and their public spirit:
they manifest the first, by their universal approbation of the
late prudent and vigorous measures, and the confidence they so
justly repose in a wise and good prince, and an honest and able
administration; the latter they have demonstrated by the immense
supplies granted in parliament unanimously, and paid through the
whole kingdom with chearfulness. And since to this spirit and
these supplies our "victories and successes[20]" have in great
measure been owing, is it quite right, is it generous to say, with
the remarker, that the people "had no share in acquiring them?"
The mere mob he cannot mean, even where he speaks of the madness
of the people; for the madness of the mob must be too feeble and
impotent, armed as the government of this country at present is, to
"overrule[21]," even in the slightest instances, the virtue "and
moderation" of a firm and steady ministry.
While the war continues, its final event is quite uncertain. The
victorious of this year may be the vanquished of the next. It may
therefore be too early to say, what advantages we ought absolutely
to insist on, and make the _sine quibus non_ of a peace. If the
necessity of our affairs should oblige us to accept of terms less
advantageous than our present successes seem to promise us; an
intelligent people, as ours is, must see that necessity, and will
acquiesce. But as a peace, when it is made, may be made hastily; and
as the unhappy continuance of the war affords us time to consider,
among several advantages gained or to be gained, which of them may
be most for our interest to retain, if some and not all may possibly
be retained; I do not blame the public disquisition of these points,
as premature or useless. Light often arises from a collision of
opinions, as fire from flint and steel; and if we can obtain the
benefit of the _light_, without danger from the _heat_ sometimes
produced by controversy, why should we discourage it?
Supposing then, that heaven may still continue to bless his majesty's
arms, and that the event of this just war may put it in our power
to retain some of our conquests at the making of a peace; let us
consider,
[1. _The security of a dominion, a justifiable and prudent ground
upon which to demand cessions from an enemy._]
_Whether we are_ to confine ourselves to those possessions only
_that were "the objects for which we began the war[22]."_ This the
remarker seems to think right, when the question relates to "_Canada,
properly so called_; it having never been mentioned as one of those
objects, in any of our memorials or declarations, or in any national
or public act whatsoever." But the gentleman himself will probably
agree, that if the cession of Canada would be a real advantage to
us; we may demand it under his second head, as an "_indemnification_
for the charges incurred" in recovering our just rights; otherwise,
according to his own principles, the demand of Guadaloupe can have no
foundation.--That "our claims before the war were large enough for
possession and for security too[23]," though it seems a clear point
with the ingenious remarker, is, I own, not so with me. I am rather
of the contrary opinion, and shall presently give my reasons.
But first let me observe, that we did not make those claims
because they were large enough for security, but because we could
rightfully claim no more. Advantages gained in the course of this
war may increase the extent of our rights. Our claims before
the war contained _some_ security; but that is no reason why we
should neglect acquiring _more_, when the demand of more is become
reasonable. It may be reasonable in the case of America, to ask for
the security recommended by the author of the Letter[24], though it
would be preposterous to do it in many other cases. His proposed
demand is founded on the little value of Canada to the French;
the right we have to ask, and the power we may have to insist on
an indemnification for our expences; the difficulty the French
themselves will be under of restraining their restless subjects in
America from encroaching on our limits and disturbing our trade; and
the difficulty on our parts of preventing encroachments, that may
possibly exist many years without coming to our knowledge.
But the remarker "does not see why the arguments, employed concerning
a security for a peaceable behaviour in Canada, would not be equally
cogent for calling for the same security in Europe[25]." On a
little farther reflection, he must I think be sensible, that the
circumstances of the two cases are widely different.--_Here_ we are
separated by the best and clearest of boundaries, the ocean, and we
have people in or near every part of our territory. Any attempt to
encroach upon us, by building a fort even in the obscurest corner of
these islands, must therefore be known and prevented immediately.
The aggressors also must be known, and the nation they belong to
would be accountable for their aggression. In America it is quite
otherwise. A vast wilderness, thinly or scarce at all peopled,
conceals with ease the march of troops and workmen. Important passes
may be seized within our limits, and forts built in a month, at a
small expence, that may cost us an age, and a million, to remove.
Dear experience has taught this. But what is still _worse_, the wide
extended forests between our settlements and theirs, are inhabited
by barbarous tribes of savages, that delight in war, and take pride
in murder; subjects properly neither of the French nor English,
but strongly attached to the former by the art and indefatigable
industry of priests, similarity of superstitions, and frequent family
alliances. These are easily, and have been continually, instigated
to fall upon and massacre our planters, even in times of full peace
between the two crowns; to the certain diminution of our people and
the contraction of our settlements[26]. And though it is known they
are supplied by the French, and carry their prisoners to them, we
can, by complaining, obtain no redress; as the governors of Canada
have a ready excuse, that the Indians are an independent people, over
whom they have no power, and for whose actions they are therefore not
accountable. Surely circumstances so widely different may reasonably
authorise different demands of security in America, from such as are
usual or necessary in Europe.
The remarker however thinks, that our real dependance for keeping
"France or any other nation true to her engagements, must not be in
demanding securities which no nation whilst _independent_ can give;
but on our own strength and our own vigilance[27]." No nation that
has carried on a war with disadvantage, and is unable to continue
it, can be said, under such circumstances, to be _independent_;
and while either side thinks itself in a condition to demand an
indemnification, there is no man in his senses, but will, cæteris
paribus, prefer an indemnification, that is a cheaper and more
effectual security than any other he can think of. Nations in this
situation demand and cede countries by almost every treaty of peace
that is made. The French part of the island of St. Christophers was
added to Great Britain in circumstances altogether similar to those
in which a few months may probably place the country of Canada.
Farther security has always been deemed a motive with a conqueror to
be less moderate; and even the _vanquished_ insist upon security as a
reason for demanding what they acknowledge they could not otherwise
properly ask. The security of the frontier of France _on the side
of the Netherlands_ was always considered in the negotiation, that
began at Gertrudenburgh, and ended with that war. For the same
reason they demanded and had Cape Breton. But a war, concluded to
the advantage of France, has always added something to the power,
either of France, or the house of Bourbon. Even that of 1733, which
she commenced with declarations of her having no ambitious views,
and which finished by a treaty, at which the ministers of France
repeatedly declared, that she desired nothing for herself, in effect
gained for her Lorrain, an indemnification ten times the value of
all her North American possessions. In short, security and quiet of
princes and states have ever been deemed sufficient reasons, when
supported by power, for disposing of rights; and such disposition
has never been looked on as want of moderation. It has always been
the foundation of the most general treaties. The security of Germany
was the argument for yielding considerable possessions there to the
Swedes: and the security of Europe divided the Spanish monarchy by
the partition-treaty, made between powers who had no other right
to dispose of any part of it. There can be no cession that is not
supposed at least, to increase the power of the party to whom it is
made. It is enough that he has a right to ask it, and that he does
it not merely to serve the purposes of a dangerous ambition.
Canada, in the hands of Britain, will endanger the kingdom of
France as little as any other cession; and from its situation and
circumstances cannot be hurtful to any other state. Rather, if
peace be an advantage, this cession may be such to all Europe. The
present war teaches us, that disputes arising in America may be an
occasion of embroiling nations; who have no concerns there. If the
French remain in Canada and Louisiana, fix the boundaries as you
will between us and them, we must border on each other for more
than fifteen hundred miles. The people that inhabit the frontiers
are generally the refuse of both nations, often of the worst morals
and the least discretion; remote from the eye, the prudence, and
the restraint of government. Injuries are therefore frequently, in
some part or other of so long a frontier, committed on both sides,
resentment provoked, the colonies first engaged, and then the mother
countries. And two great nations can scarce be at war in Europe,
but some other prince or state thinks it a convenient opportunity
to revive some ancient claim, seize some advantage, obtain some
territory, or enlarge some power at the expence of a neighbour. The
flames of war, once kindled, often spread far and wide, and the
mischief is infinite. Happy it proved to both nations, that the
Dutch were prevailed on finally to cede the New Netherlands (now
the province of New York) to us at the peace of 1674; a peace that
has ever since continued between us, but must have been frequently
disturbed, if they had retained the possession of that country,
bordering several hundred miles on our colonies of Pensylvania
westward, Connecticut and the Massachusetts eastward. Nor is it
to be wondered at, that people of different language, religion,
and manners, should in those remote parts engage in frequent
quarrels; when we find, that even the people of our _own colonies_
have frequently been so exasperated against _each other_, in their
disputes about boundaries, as to proceed to open violence and
bloodshed.
[2. _Erecting forts in the back settlements, almost in no instance
a sufficient security against the Indians and the French; but the
possession of Canada implies every security, and ought to be had,
while in our power._]
But the remarker thinks _we shall be_ sufficiently _secure in
America, if we "raise English forts at such passes as may at once
make us respectable to the French and to the Indian nations[28]."_
The security desirable in America may be considered as of three
kinds. 1. A security of possession, that the French shall not drive
us out of the country. 2. A security of our planters from the inroads
of savages, and the murders committed by them. 3. A security that
the British nation shall not be obliged, on every new war, to repeat
the immense expence occasioned by this, to defend its possessions in
America. Forts, in the most important passes, may, I acknowledge,
be of use to obtain the _first_ kind of security: but as those
situations are far advanced beyond the inhabitants, the expence of
maintaining and supplying the garrisons will be very great even in
time of full peace, and immense on every interruption of it; as it is
easy for skulking-parties of the enemy, in such long roads through
the woods, to intercept and cut off our convoys, unless guarded
continually by great bodies of men.--The _second_ kind of security
will not be obtained by such forts, unless they were connected by
a wall like that of China, from one end of our settlements to the
other. If the Indians, when at war, marched like the Europeans,
with great armies, heavy cannon, baggage, and carriages; the passes
through which alone such armies could penetrate our country, or
receive their supplies, being secured, all might be sufficiently
secure; but the case is widely different. They go to war, as they
call it, in small parties; from fifty men down to five. Their hunting
life has made them acquainted with the whole country, and scarce any
part of it is impracticable to such a party. They can travel through
the woods even by night, and know how to conceal their tracks. They
pass easily between your forts undiscovered; and privately approach
the settlements of your frontier inhabitants. They need no convoys
of provisions to follow them; for whether they are shifting from
place to place in the woods, or lying in wait for an opportunity to
strike a blow, every thicket and every stream furnishes so small
a number with sufficient subsistence. When they have surprised
separately, and murdered and scalped a dozen families, they are gone
with inconceivable expedition through unknown ways; and it is very
rare that pursuers have any chance of coming up with them[29]. In
short, long experience has taught our planters, that they cannot
rely upon forts as a security against Indians: the inhabitants of
Hackney might as well rely upon the tower of London, to secure them
against highwaymen and housebreakers.--As to the _third_ kind of
security, that we shall not, in a few years, have all we have now
done, to do over again in America, and be obliged to employ the same
number of troops, and ships, at the same immense expence, to defend
our possessions there, while we are in proportion weakened here: such
forts I think, cannot prevent this. During a peace, it is not to be
doubted the French, who are adroit at fortifying, will likewise erect
forts in the most advantageous places of the country we leave them;
which will make it more difficult than ever to be reduced in case of
another war. We know by the experience of this war, how extremely
difficult it is to march an army through the American woods, with its
necessary cannon and stores, sufficient to reduce a very slight fort.
The accounts at the treasury will tell you, what amazing sums we have
necessarily spent in the expeditions against two very trifling forts,
Duquesne, and Crown Point. While the French retain their influence
over the Indians, they can easily keep our long extended frontier
in continual alarm, by a very few of those people; and with a small
number of regulars and militia, in such a country, we find they can
keep an army of ours in full employ for several years. We therefore
shall not need to be told by our colonies, that if we leave Canada,
however circumscribed, to the French, "we have done nothing[30];" we
shall soon be made sensible _ourselves_ of this truth, and to our
cost.
I would not be understood to deny, that even if we subdue and
retain Canada, some _few forts_ may be of use to secure the goods
of the traders, and protect the commerce, in case of any sudden
misunderstanding with any tribe of Indians: but these forts will be
best under the care of the colonies interested in the Indian trade,
and garrisoned by their provincial forces, and at their own expence.
Their own interest will then induce the American governments to
take care of such forts in proportion to their importance, and see
that the officers keep their corps full, and mind their duty. But
any troops of ours placed there, and accountable here, would, in
such remote and obscure places, and at so great a distance from the
eye and inspection of superiors, soon become of little consequence,
even though the French were left in possession of Canada. If the
four independent companies, maintained by the crown in New York
more than forty years, at a great expence, consisted, for most part
of the time, of faggots chiefly; if their officers enjoyed their
places as sinecures, and were only, as a writer[31] of that country
styles them, a kind of military monks; if this was the state of
troops posted in a populous country, where the imposition could
not be so well concealed; what may we expect will be the case of
those, that shall be posted two, three, or four hundred miles from
the inhabitants, in such obscure and remote places as Crown Point,
Oswego, Duquesne, or Niagara? they would scarce be even faggots; they
would dwindle to mere names upon paper, and appear no where but upon
the muster-rolls.
Now _all the kinds_ of security we have mentioned are obtained
by subduing and _retaining_ Canada. Our present possessions in
America are secured; our planters will no longer be massacred by the
Indians, who, depending absolutely on us for what are now become the
necessaries of life to them (guns, powder, hatchets, knives, and
clothing) and having no other Europeans near, that can either supply
them, or instigate them against us; there is no doubt of their being
always disposed, if we treat them with common justice, to live in
perpetual peace with us. And with regard to France, she cannot, in
case of another war, put us to the immense expence of defending that
long extended frontier; we shall then, as it were, have our backs
against a wall in America; the sea coast will be easily protected by
our superior naval power: and here "our own watchfulness and our own
strength" will be properly, and cannot but be successfully employed.
In this situation, the force, now employed in that part of the world,
may be spared for any other service here or elsewhere; so that both
the offensive and defensive strength of the British empire, on the
whole, will be greatly increased.