EDWARD VII PREPARES THE HUMILIATION AND DESTRUCTION OF GERMANY
1905–1908
The first European crisis engendered by the new British policy broke out
in 1905. On account of her geographical situation on the shores of the
Atlantic and the Mediterranean, with her Northern coast bordering the
Straits of Gibraltar, Morocco is a country of much importance; England
wished her now obedient vassal France to take possession of it. Spain,
it is true, was to receive a strip of territory as hinterland to Ceuta,
while Tangier was to remain “international.” It was forbidden, in the
interests of England, to fortify the coast near the Straits of
Gibraltar. With these reservations Morocco was handed over by Great
Britain to France. Germany was intentionally ignored, and the convention
of 1904 was not even brought officially to the knowledge of the German
Government. The latter waited a whole year, but when the French
Government commenced taking steps with a view to placing Morocco under
its protectorate, Germany protested; the final result of her protest was
the resignation of M. Delcassé. The policy of this statesman had been to
refuse systematically all German demands, even at the risk of war. He
was convinced that Germany would retreat the moment she knew that Great
Britain had decided to stand by France and to back up the latter
energetically. The attitude of the Premier, M. Maurice Rouvier, and the
declaration made by the Ministers of War and Marine to the effect that
France was unprepared for war, brought about the departure of M.
Delcassé quicker than England had expected it. The “inner” history of
the crisis of 1905 is not yet fully known; but the course taken by
events shows sufficiently clearly that the London Cabinet subsequently
took the reins into its own hands. The attitude of the French
Government, which had at first been conciliatory, changed within a very
short time, and became either dilatory or hostile; and when the German
Government made the great mistake of proposing an international
conference to settle the Moroccan question, Germany found herself alone
in front of an overwhelming hostile majority. Here is not the place to
discuss the aims which our Moroccan policy set itself in those days. The
basis of Prince Bülow’s policy was invariably the open door, the
principles of which he and his successors always consistently upheld.
The German Government was further of opinion that war should not be
waged on account of Morocco, unless a question of national honor were
involved. Prince Bülow believed this to be no longer the case after the
departure of M. Delcassé. On the other hand, the public and secret
agreements between France and England aimed at creating a condition of
affairs, the inevitable result of which could not but be the destruction
alike of the open door, of the integrity of Morocco, and of the
sovereignty of the Sultan. To speak, under these circumstances, of the
open door, was to maintain a fiction in which no one could believe. The
fact that the German Government consistently kept up this fiction,
necessarily awakened in England and France the impression that Germany
only wished to “save her face” in the eyes of the world, and that she
would on no account wage war. This was certainly the weakest spot in the
armor of German diplomacy, at a moment when the latter was face to face
with very resolute adversaries. For Great Britain was resolved to prove
to the world that she and her new ally France were in absolute
opposition to the German Empire; she wished further to prove that a war
could only be prevented by a German retreat. All the demands of the
German representatives at the Algeciras Conference were rejected, and
not a single Power was to be found to back up Germany energetically.
German’s isolation was so complete, that she was thankful to
Austria-Hungary when the latter’s representatives declared themselves
ready, in one particularly knotty question, to build a bridge over which
the Germans could effect an honorable retreat. The Algeciras Act, a very
voluminous document, was from beginning to end a complete farce. Those
who knew the conditions did not for a moment doubt that it could never
be put into practice. The secret agreements between France and England
were alone sufficient to deprive the Act of all value. As a matter of
fact it was never enforced, and France never allowed herself for one
minute to be influenced—much less bound—by it. To a certain extent did
the Conference keep up appearances, as far as Germany was concerned; but
in reality the whole thing was a failure from beginning to end. The new
European policy of England had stood its first test. In 1905 it was
clear to all the nations of Europe, with the exception of the Germans,
that henceforth international politics would be dominated by the
Anglo-German rivalry.
Before and during the Algeciras Conference, preparations were going on
in view of an Anglo-Russian understanding. Russia had been vanquished in
the Far East, and British diplomacy drew the logical conclusion from her
defeat. The idea found active and enthusiastic supporters in France, who
were also anxious to create a Triple Alliance directed against Germany.
A number of opportunities for working together were furnished by the
Algeciras Conference. On the other hand, Germany experienced a
disagreeable surprise on seeing Russia, who had apparently entirely
forgotten the invaluable services rendered her by Germany in her hour of
need, combat all the latter’s demands at the Conference. Italy had
already entered previously to the Conference into certain obligations
towards France and England; she had, in return, been granted by these
Powers a right of priority in Tripoli. The Italians were also to be
found at Algeciras among Germany’s adversaries; the same was the case
with nearly all the smaller European States, and with the United States
of America. This was a phenomenon, the importance of which completely
overshadowed that of the Moroccan question taken by itself. With
extraordinary skill, rapidity, and energy, England’s statesmen had
understood how suddenly to represent the German Empire as the disturber
of European peace, as a danger to France, and as jealous of Great
Britain.
A short time before England herself had been quite isolated, and she had
only recently emerged from out of the grave crisis of the Boer War, and
from out of the not less grave crisis in the Far East; and yet, already
in 1905, King Edward and his advisers had been able to come to an
understanding with France and Russia. They had further succeeded in
loosening the ties which bound Italy to the Triple Alliance; and, quite
apart from the question of a participation of Italy in a war, they had
managed to induce her to place, at the Algeciras Conference, her
diplomacy at the service of Germany’s adversaries. Up till a few years
previously, Germany had been on excellent terms with Spain. England
spoke a few words behind the scenes, Spain was promised a piece of
Morocco and was henceforth to be counted likewise among Germany’s
opponents. British diplomacy had succeeded, during the Venezuela affair,
in creating in the United States such intense bitterness against
Germany, that the Americans, albeit the Morocco question did not concern
them in the least, could not wax sufficiently indignant at the spectacle
of German “illegalities” and “attempts to disturb the peace of the
world.”
In the following year, 1906, the understanding between England and
Russia was effectively concluded. In 1907 it was sealed by the agreement
concerning Persia and Central Asia. The co-operation of the two Powers
in Oriental questions immediately commenced. The Russian defeats at
Tsushima and Mukden had produced the consequences desired by British
statesmen. Incapable henceforth of continuing her policy of expansion in
the Far East, bereft of nearly her entire fleet, weakened at home by the
revolution, Russia now judged it to her interest to be on friendly terms
with the very Power to whose systematic intrigues and icy-cold
calculations all the misfortunes of the Empire of the Czars were due.
The Anglo-Russian Convention put an end to the anxiety hitherto felt in
London concerning the possibility of a Russian advance on India by way
of Central Asia. Persia was divided into spheres of interest, between
which a neutral sphere was created, and in this way peace was also
assured here. England did, in fact, relinquish many of her hopes and
ambitions in Persia, for the sake of arriving at an understanding—deemed
to be of priceless value—with Russia. During the years which followed
the war with Japan, British and French diplomacy were equally active in
their efforts to turn Russia’s attention towards the Balkans and
Constantinople. The object was to create friction and dissension between
Russia and Germany, and between Russia and Austria-Hungary. England
intended that here also Russia should fight her battles for her—this
time in conjunction with the Balkan peoples—just as she had fought them
in the Far East.
King Edward and his Ministers attached particular importance to the
friendship of the smaller States, and England’s “wooing” was done
skilfully and systematically. Frequent journeys consolidated the
personal ties of friendship uniting rulers and statesmen, and England
was always able to promise either real or apparent advantages. With
Greece and Italy the old relations of guardian to ward were resumed, as
also with Spain. King Edward succeeded in placing a British Princess on
the Spanish throne. The reconstruction of the Spanish fleet was
entrusted to English builders, and a Spanish loan was floated in London
in order to cover expenses.
England and France concluded with Spain a so-called Status Quo Agreement
concerning the Mediterranean, whereas nothing is known in regard to the
conventions signed about the same time with Italy. It is, however,
certain that they were likewise directed against Germany. In the North
of Europe, British policy had been able to register a great success:
namely, the division of the hitherto united Scandinavian monarchy into
the two kingdoms of Sweden and Norway. These two large countries, united
under Swedish leadership, lived on friendly terms with the German
Empire. This could not be allowed. With the help of all the means at her
disposal for use in such cases, England set to work; the result being
that the old Norwegian jealousy was rekindled, and a separation became
inevitable. A Danish Prince with an English wife ascended the Norwegian
throne, and ever since then Norway has stood under English influence.
Everything was done with a view to inducing Denmark to come over to
England’s side. In 1905 a British fleet visited Esbjerg, and afterwards
passed through the Skagerrack and Kattegat. It was during the time of
the political tension caused by the Morocco difficulty, and the world
had just learnt, through the so-called revelations of M. Delcassé, the
plans of the British Government with regard to a landing in Jutland. The
Danish royal family at that time would doubtless have been inclined to
draw the sword in a war against Germany; but not the Danish nation—with
the exception of some fanatics. At any rate, when the English fleet paid
its visit to Esbjerg, a representative of the Danish Government took the
opportunity of declaring that the latter’s programme consisted in a
single word: neutrality. He was thereby referring alike to the English
crimes of 1800 and 1807, and to the war of 1864 with its consequences.
We would observe, by the way, that Denmark was already in 1905 of great
strategical importance to the English, on account of the question of the
passage of the fleet, in time of war, through the Sound and the Great
Belt. Ever since 1900 the English press had been full of articles
concerning the passage through these waters in time of war; and every
effort was made to persuade the Danish nation that, in the event of such
a war, its place must be at the side of England. The journey of the
English fleet through the Skagerrack and the Kattegat to the Baltic in
1905, was undertaken for reasons which cast a very clear light on the
thoughts and intentions of British statesmen. During the Moroccan crisis
the British Admiralty announced, quite suddenly, that the North Sea
Squadron would go to the Baltic for the purpose of practising there. In
the press comments on the matter, we find the view expressed that the
Germans considered the Baltic as a closed sea belonging to Germany, and
that they considered the growing strength of their navy to give them the
right to claim it. But England wished to show the whole world that she
did not recognise such a claim, and that she was determined to let the
British fleet perform its practises in every sea which it should please
the Admiralty to select. So far the press. The voyage of the British
fleet was therefore nothing else but a threat—and a wholly unjustifiable
one. Neither the German Government nor the German people had ever
entertained so foolish a thought as that of regarding the Baltic as a
closed sea. In our days a sea can only be shut from outside; and to
close the Baltic in times of peace to the fleet of another nation would
be a silly and meaningless act, even if the German navy were capable of
enforcing such an order. The journey of the British fleet, which was
extended so as to include visits to a number of German Baltic ports,
was, as we have said, nothing but a well calculated and demonstrative
threat. It was destined to prove to all the Northern States that, if it
pleased the British fleet to penetrate into the Baltic and to visit
German ports there, nothing could stop it; the German navy would be but
an insignificant hindrance in time of war. Therefore, o ye Northern
States, do not venture to stand by Germany, or it will be the worse for
you!
In 1905 and 1906 England concluded definite agreements with Belgium in
case an European war should break out. The agreements were completed by
other conventions between France and Belgium, and between France and
England. Belgium, as is well known, was a neutral State. Already at this
time England knew that, in the event of a war between France and
Germany, the former, relying on the strength of the line of fortresses
on the Franco-German frontier, would march through Belgium with a view
to invading Prussia. But England had a poor opinion of French
organisation, and of the French army as a whole, and judged it necessary
to take steps in the matter herself. In the military conventions with
Belgium, an Anglo-Franco-Belgian plan of campaign against Germany was
worked out in all its details. England desired to land an expeditionary
corps, and wished under all circumstances to make Antwerp a basis of
supplies: all this has been proved by documentary evidence already
published. When we analyse these events it appears incontestable that,
quite apart from purely military considerations, England intended, by
means of her co-operation with Belgium, to lay hands on Antwerp. English
policy, as usual, was playing a double game. According to the way in
which events shaped themselves, the British expeditionary troops could
either march directly against Germany, or they could remain on Belgian
soil, and occupy Antwerp or other towns on the coast. In this way,
Belgium would have developed from a simple outer fortification into
England’s Continental basis of operations, and England would have
opened, by virtue of her own power, the mouth of the Scheldt at
Holland’s expense. Belgium would have become a second Portugal, and
England would have had the free use of all her harbors, etc. The
military conventions drawn up by England with Belgium in 1905–06 pursued
very ambitious aims—political, naval, and military. It was at this time
that Belgium forfeited her neutrality and became the obedient ally of
England, and also of England’s chief servant France.
The British Government endeavored to go still farther, and to form a
great anti-German union of the neutral States. With this aim in view,
every effort was made in order to bring about an alliance between
Holland and Belgium. The plan was frustrated by Holland’s refusal. Both
in peace and war the Dutch Government has maintained the same strict and
honorable neutrality, however difficult it may have been at times to
persist in such an attitude. By the formation of a Union of the Neutral
States, Great Britain would have created a union of vassals, which would
have appeared on the scene as soon as the war against Germany had broken
out. The existence of such a plan is likewise proved by documentary
evidence, discovered since the outbreak of hostilities. All this goes to
show how extensive were the preparations made, in view either of holding
the German Empire in check by inspiring it with fear—or else, if need
be, of waging the war so that it must result in the total destruction of
Germany alike as a trading Power, a political Continental Power, and a
maritime Power.