THE INCENDIARY AT WORK
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE GERMAN NAVY
No one in England felt in the least uneasy about the German navy.
Nothing but contempt was entertained for the “Emperor’s toy.” It was
compared to a crow, which had adorned itself with a parrot’s feathers;
and everywhere proofs were adduced of the superiority of the English
fleet, alike as regards quantity and quality. Such were the views held
in well-informed circles. But none the less was the German Navy, even
when still very small, held up as a terrible instrument of war. Already
in the first years of the new century the following argument was
frequently to be met with in England, whence it was transmitted to the
whole world: Germany, and more especially the German Emperor, is
planning to attack and destroy the British fleet, after which it is
intended to send across the North Sea an army, that shall land on the
holy coasts of Great Britain and reduce the liberty-loving Britons to
slavery. It will suffice if we mention these absurd stories; it is not
necessary to refute them here in detail, but we must lay stress on the
fact that they were never believed for a moment by a single serious
politician or naval expert in Great Britain. Such stories were invented
and circulated, simply because they were considered to be politically
useful. In this way the German Empire could be conveniently represented
as the Power which was carefully preparing for an aggressive war, and
which was bent on disturbing the peace of Europe. Being past masters in
the art of organising such campaigns of slander, the English knew that
the most idiotic lie will be believed, if only it be repeated often
enough and in the proper tone of virtuous indignation. And this is what
did, in fact, happen. The real motives underlying British policy since
1902 all find their expression in the motto: _Germaniam esse delendam_;
and these motives were skilfully concealed behind the humbug relating to
the German navy. It is evident that the British Government did not
desire such motives, dictated by mere vulgar jealousy of German industry
and German maritime trade, to be recognised as the real basis of its
policy. Therefore it was sought to conceal, wherever possible, these
motives behind a veil. The German navy proved an admirable “veil.”
Whoever takes the trouble to compare the number and the size of the
warships then existing in either country, will at once admit this.
After King Edward had succeeded, by means of the entente cordiale with
France, in bringing about the great change of front in England’s foreign
policy; and whilst he was consistently and perseveringly pursuing his
work along the lines laid down; the British Admiralty, on the other
hand, commenced taking steps with a view to modifying the conditions of
national defence, so as to adapt them to the requirements of the new
political situation. A thorough reorganisation of the Navy began in
1905; not only was the fleet’s readiness for war largely increased, but
above all was its distribution over the various seas completely
rearranged. As soon as France had become England’s faithful vassal, it
was no longer necessary that the Mediterranean should remain the center
of gravity of British naval policy. This center of gravity was now
transferred to the North Sea. The Russian fleet had been destroyed at
Tsushima; the strong British squadron hitherto maintained in Chinese
waters was henceforth superfluous, and was consequently recalled to the
English coast. A considerable number of cruisers, which had been
stationed in different parts of the world, were likewise ordered home.
In short, in the course of a few years, nearly the whole of the British
fleet was concentrated in front of the eastern shores of Great Britain.
Ample measures had been taken in Great Britain itself in view of this
concentration. New harbors and dockyards were constructed, new naval
stations called into being, all along the North Sea-coast; it was
something entirely new in British history, for the British naval front
had always extended from the South East to the South West—along the
shores of the Channel in the direction of the Atlantic. Of course, this
truly epoch-making redistribution of the British fleet had only one
object: namely, the safeguarding of the British Isles. The entire fleet
must be concentrated in order to prevent its destruction by the German
navy, and in order to defend Great Britain against invasion. A movement
in favor of compulsory service in the army accompanied the
reorganisation and redistribution of the navy. The movement in question
was organised by Lord Roberts; the fleet, it was urged, could not be
absolutely relied upon to prevent a German landing—and such landings
were planned, and would take place in a moment when none expected them.
Lord Roberts commenced his agitation in 1905, and threw the whole weight
of his authority—which in England was great—into the balance. In Germany
his “invasion speeches” were taken seriously, and people really thought
that this cunning old fox believed what he said. To-day, after
documentary proofs of the Anglo-Belgian negotiations have been brought
to light, these credulous Germans will perhaps understand that Lord
Roberts’s propaganda was a well-organised “fake”—seeing that Lord
Roberts could not possibly tell the truth as to his real motives. In
reality, he and his supporters did undoubtedly wish the army to be
increased by means of compulsory service in view of an invasion. But the
invasion of which they were thinking was a British invasion of Belgium!
The author of the present book has defended this thesis for the last
eight years; the documents found in Brussels, and the operations of the
war themselves, confirm it entirely. The projected invasion was not the
least of the causes which prompted the British Admiralty to concentrate
almost the entire fleet in the North Sea; for that fleet was necessary,
if troops were to be transported safely to Belgium. Lord Roberts did not
succeed with his programme of compulsory service; but British Ministers
of War, and notably the “pro-German idealist” Haldane, were able none
the less, with the already existing means at their disposal, to prepare
the invasion of Belgium in such a way as to excite general
surprise—especially in Germany.
King Edward and his Ministers wished, if possible, to prevent a further
increase of the German navy; they wished to save expenses for their own
country, and to be able—as was later on frequently said in England—to
undertake without any risk the destruction of every European fleet.
Solely with this aim in view did a new epoch in the annals of British
warship-building begin—in the year 1905. This epoch is known as the
“Dreadnought era,” from the name of the first battleship of that type.
The leading men in Germany, however, realised the importance of the
hour. They understood that it was not only the future of the German navy
as such which was at stake, but that the question was wider still:
namely, the question of the possibility, for Germany, to pursue
henceforth, whether in Europe or beyond the seas, a policy which should
not be dependent on England’s good will or displeasure. It is possible
that the German Reichstag, and a large section of German public opinion,
did not see so far ahead; but it was sufficient that they understood the
welfare of the navy to be involved. The result was, that Germany at once
proceeded, on the basis of the already existing Naval Law, to construct
Dreadnoughts; and that the work of widening-up and deepening the canal
between the Baltic and the North Sea, as well as all other canals,
harbors, etc., was immediately begun. The naval and political decisions
taken, in Germany, in 1905 and 1906, were of the highest importance; and
their consequences have made themselves—and will continue to make
themselves—felt far beyond naval circles. England’s attempt to “outdo”
Germany by the invention of Dreadnoughts, had failed. For some years
still it was believed, in England, that the Germans would not overcome
the technical difficulties entailed by the construction of the new type
of warship; but this illusion was destroyed in 1908.
If we consider the above-discussed attempt to “outbuild” the German navy
in the light of England’s general policy, we shall see that the former
was entirely consistent with all British historical traditions. The
German Empire had never done England any harm, it pursued no hostile
aims, it had not intrigued against British interests, it had not
endeavored to engineer an anti-British coalition. The German Empire had,
on the contrary, invariably acted in pure self-defence, whether from a
political or from an economic point of view. History has never known a
policy more peaceful than that pursued by German statesmen. The German
fleet could not possibly, either in its conception or in its
development, constitute a danger for Great Britain. None the less
Germany was a great Continental Power, her trade and industry
flourished, she claimed the right of protecting her national production,
she tried to build herself a fleet: therefore must she be destroyed. How
monstrous the English lies about the “German danger on the sea” were, is
proved—but this is merely _en passant_—by the fact that in August 1914,
after fifteen years’ activity, the German fleet, viewed as a whole, was
not even half as strong as the British.