DELENDA GERMANIA
THE BEGINNING OF KING EDWARD’S REIGN
When King Edward ascended the throne of England, he at once took
decisive steps to bring the Boer War to an end. He likewise without
delay set about drawing the consequences which arose from the Fashoda
incident, and from the Anglo-French colonial agreement of 1899. He had
evidently first of all carefully prepared the way, in the course of
discussions with French and English diplomatists. In May 1903 King
Edward went to Paris, and soon afterwards President Loubet, accompanied
by M. Delcassé, returned the visit in London. In the autumn of the same
year a treaty of arbitration was concluded between the two countries;
and on April 8th 1904, the celebrated Anglo-French convention was
published. This convention formed the basis of the _Entente Cordiale_,
which has existed since 1905. The understanding between France and
England was an event of the highest importance in the history of the
world, for it marked the first great step taken on the road leading up
to the war of 1914, which England so carefully organised and prepared
and set in motion.
The convention of 1904 put an end, once and for all, to all the colonial
quarrels between England and France. The work of liquidation, begun in
1899, was finished five years later. Bismarck had understood, by a
skilful handling of African colonial problems, how to prevent a
rapprochement between the two Western Powers; especially had he
understood the art of keeping the Egyptian question—that chief bone of
contention—alive. Fourteen years after Bismarck’s departure, the last
seeds of dissension sowed by this policy of his were dug up and
destroyed. With the exception of a few unimportant reservations, France
renounced all her claims to intervene in Egyptian matters. England
promised, partly in public, and partly in secret, agreements, to assist
her French friends in obtaining Morocco. There is no need to go here
into details. The most important point was the fact of the union of the
two Western Powers. Two months only had passed since the outbreak of the
Russo-Japanese War, when the Anglo-French Convention was published;
England hereby showed the world that not only Japan, but also an
European Power, was at her disposal—and this European Power was none
other than the Ally of Japan’s adversary.
British statesmanship had not succeeded in reducing the German Empire to
the position of England’s humble servant. Consequently was Germany
henceforth England’s enemy; with the support, and sometimes under the
leadership, of King Edward, the British Government was from this time
forth to have recourse to all those methods of which experience had
shown the value, and which we have encountered in the course of our
historical survey in the present book. Already some years before the
Anglo-French Convention, English influence could be observed at work in
shaping the relations between France and Germany. French distrust of
Germany, due to the alleged desire of conquest and oppression of the
German Government, constantly increased; the co-operation of French and
English in the Mediterranean, with the aim of detaching Italy from the
Triple Alliance, grew ever more and more active. Since 1903 the English
hand was busy all over the political chessboard—especially in the Near
East. Public opinion in Great Britain had already attained to such a
pitch of hostility that, in the autumn of 1904, after Russia’s Baltic
fleet had sailed for the Far East, important English newspapers publicly
declared that the moment had now come for placing Germany in front of
the alternative of either ceasing the construction of her fleet, or of
having the latter destroyed by British warships. In Germany such
articles were not taken seriously; it was said that they were the work
of loud-mouthed jingoes, and without any importance. As a matter of
fact, such an ultimatum to Germany was, at that time, under serious
consideration in London.
The British Government had well chosen the time for the Anglo-French
Convention. While Japan was fighting England’s battles against Russia in
the Far East, King Edward and his statesmen extended the hand of
friendship to France—the ally of the same Russia whom Japan was fighting
by England’s order. France found herself before that date in an
uncomfortable position. She could not help her ally, and she did not
even venture to send warships in any considerable number to the Far
East. On the one hand, France feared for her East Asiatic colonial
possessions; on the other, she feared Russia’s displeasure at the
absence of all assistance from her ally. In addition to this, there was
the risk of France finding herself isolated with regard to Germany.
Under these circumstances England appeared as a savior, and as a prop to
lean on. At the same time French diplomacy, always very skilful, seized
the opportunity in order to prepare the way for a future rapprochement
between Russia and England. The idea of such a rapprochement had already
been entertained by Sir Edward Grey in 1903. From the beginning, Sir
Edward Grey had been an opponent of Chamberlain’s policy of alliances.
Thus did the efforts of French diplomacy meet with a favorable reception
in London; to British statesmen a rapprochement with Russia now appeared
just as desirable as the rapprochement with France had appeared after
Fashoda. A weakened Russia was a very welcome friend indeed.