THE LANDING IN KOREA.
It was of supreme importance that Pyng-yang should be occupied
without delay. Once in the possession of that city the Japanese could
command three points for the landing of troops in Korea-Fusan, on the
South-East, Chemulpo on the West, twenty-six miles from the capital,
and Chinampo, whence Pyng-yang, forty miles distant, could be reached
by road and river. Moreover, it was desirable to avoid a contest, for
Ping-yang, as the Japanese found in 1894, is not easy to attack from
the South. But caution, as well as speed and secrecy, was necessary.
Though the diplomatic rupture was complete, hostilities had not begun,
and the command of the sea was undetermined.
Fusan was secure as long as the Japanese fleet controlled the Korean
Strait; as a port, it had many drawbacks. Facilities for landing were
poor. Only a few miles of railway had been laid, and the distance
from Seoul was two hundred and sixty-seven miles. Soun-chen, in the
Gulf of Tai-kang, between Fusan and Mokpo, was more convenient, and
arrangements were made to disembark troops at that port. Roads were
constructed, relay stations and supply depots were established, and it
was calculated that the capital could be reached by the first days of
April. Thus, while neglecting no preparation in the South, the Japanese
kept their eyes and hopes fixed on the Northern ports, and were ready
to seize the first opening.
The First Army was mobilised on February the 6th. Twenty-four hours
later some men of the Twelfth Division landed at Chemulpo and entered
Seoul without opposition. Transports arrived on the 8th, and landed
troops in the presence of two Russian warships. Next day, Admiral
Urui, who commanded the escorting squadron, carried out his orders
which were to destroy the Russian cruisers and to secure the landing
of the army at Chemulpo. The Varyag, a first-class cruiser, the
Korietz, a third-class cruiser, and the transport Sungari were sunk in
the harbour, and the port and capital of Korea were in the hands of
the Japanese. This swift and unexpected blow was followed by a naval
victory at Port Arthur, which advanced the campaign by one month.
In seven days Japan had won control of the Korean Gulf. Fusan was
no longer needed as a base, and the weary march of two hundred and
sixty miles from Soun-chen was avoided. Troops began to debark at
Chemulpo without let or hinderance save such as arose from the absence
of landing facilities. Small boats were few, and wharfage and shore
accommodation were wanting. The result was that transports were delayed
two or three days, and that part of the Fourteenth Regiment, which
reached the mouth of the Salee river on the 18th of February, did not
land until the 21st. One company of this regiment was already hurrying
towards Pyng-yang, conscious of the importance of the mission with
which it was entrusted. Landed at Chemulpo on the 6th, this company
advanced by forced marches and reached Pyng-yang not a moment too soon,
for the Russian cavalry were fifteen miles North, and on the 28th a
troop of Cossacks appeared at the North gate of the city. Here the
first shots on land were exchanged, and the Russians retired.
Pyng-yang is situated on the river Tai-tong, about sixty miles from the
coast, and is the capital of the province. Long before the Christian
era it was the seat of Government, and remained the centre of royal
authority until the tenth century, when the turbulence of the people
and repeated assaults by the Chinese drove the Court to Seoul. It is a
collection of mean and squalid houses, the number of which is estimated
at three hundred thousand. Beyond the ancient walls, which have
withstood many a savage raid, dwells a large and scattered population,
who cultivate the great plain that extends to the foot of the hill on
which the city is built. From a military point of view Pyng-yang is
of great importance. Standing on the Great Mandarin road, along which
tribute was borne to Pekin, it commands the approach to Seoul, which is
one hundred and seventy-six miles distant, to Gensan, an open port on
the north-east coast, and to Chinampo, twenty miles from the mouth of
the Tai-tong, the natural base of supplies where the Japanese landed
their stores during the Chinese War in 1894.
Had the Russians realised the importance that the Japanese attached to
the immediate and unopposed occupation of Pyng-yang they would surely
have made some effort to delay the advance of this small force. They
knew, of course, that it would give their enemy a strategic position
and would provide them with a base at Chinampo--a few days march from
the Yalu. But they did not forsee what use the Japanese would make of
the coast North of the Tai-tong River, and what a disastrous effect
this would have in their first encounter.
The duty assigned to General Kuroki’s army was to march North as
quickly as possible, to discover the enemy and to give him battle.
With Pyng-yang in his possession, the task was less difficult than it
had appeared at the beginning of February. But many obstacles had to
be overcome and many problems solved before the army could advance
with safety and a definite purpose. Having no certain knowledge of the
strength and intentions of the enemy, General Kuroki had to make plans
for every contingency. He was aware that the Russians were entrenched
on the North bank of the Yalu, yet he was by no means sure that they
would not oppose him somewhere South of the river.
General Michtchenko’s movements darkened the councils of the Japanese
who were disposed to ascribe to them an intelligent purpose. When the
Russian leader came to Syen-chen in a four-wheeled carriage he had
with him 2,500 Cossacks and one battery of Field Artillery. With this
force he occupied Anju, an important town on the Mandarin road, about
thirty miles North of Pyng-yang. His next step was to send Korean
spies to discover the movements of the enemy. Now the Korean looked
upon the Russian as an unwelcome guest who occupied his house, ate
his food, frightened away his women, and left him at the mercy of
agents and interpreters to whose dirty palms stuck the roubles paid in
compensation. His one ambition was to get rid of these visitors. Spies
accordingly returned with reports that the Japanese were coming in
great force from three directions. These stories had the effect they
were intended to produce, and the Cossacks retired North with artillery
and transport, destroying the telegraph wires and encouraging the
natives to use the poles for fuel.
The constitution of General Michtchenko’s force was another cause of
perplexity. It was not easy to understand why a cavalry brigade should
come as far South as Syen-chen into difficult mountainous country. If
the object was to delay the advance of the Japanese, the cavalry would
have been accompanied by a considerable force of infantry. On the other
hand, if the purpose was merely to discover as quickly as possible the
approach of the enemy, spies could have brought the information. Some
deep laid scheme must lie hidden behind this mysterious cavalry screen.
Thus argued the Japanese who were slow to admit so obvious a tactical
error on the part of their adversary. As a matter of fact, General
Michtchenko had no great scheme. He was simply committing an elementary
mistake which he emphasised by retiring along the main road where he
had no opportunity of using his cavalry to ascertain the strength and
direction of the Japanese advance.