THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN AND THE JAPANESE LEADERS.
A glance at the map will show that the Russian defence lay within an
irregular triangle, of which Harbin is the apex, and Port Arthur and
Vladivostock are the angles at the base. The railway from Harbin to
Port Arthur passes through several towns, like Mukden, Liao-yang and
Hai-cheng, upon which the Russians could concentrate rapidly, but south
of Hai-cheng the line runs along the coast, and is open to flank attack
from the sea.
From Harbin to Vladivostock the line of defence may be said roughly to
traverse Kirwin and to sweep Eastward to the coast. On the land side
Vladivostock is defended by the difficult nature of the country and by
the river Toumen, which covers its approach from the South-west. So
isolated, however, is this fortress that its capture was an incident
that did not enter into the first phase of the campaign.
The base of the triangle from the mouth of the Yalu to the Toumen is
the strongest line of defence, and was the first to be assailed. The
Yalu forms a natural barrier along the north of Korea. Winding its
tortuous length between high and rugged mountains it receives as
affluents many torrents and impetuous streams. A few miles from the
point where its waters mingle with the ocean, the banks of the Yalu
descend into the plain. Upon this lower ground on the left of the
river is the town of Wiju, and on the right nearer to the bay stands
Antung. At Wiju you may cross the Yalu; it is the key to the barrier of
mountain and flood that divides the hermit kingdom from Manchuria.
To force the passage of the river by direct assault would have been
to risk disaster at the outset. It was necessary to make a diversion
in order to turn the position and compel the Russians to fall back
along the road to Liao-yang. Such a movement required great skill and
secrecy. In 1894 the Japanese effected a landing near the mouth of the
river and on the right bank, so as to envelop Antung and Wiju from the
North.
With a view to mislead the enemy General Kuroki made a demonstration in
front of Antung, where the Russians awaited attack, while he pushed his
flanking movement through the almost inaccessible mountains on the
East.
When the Japanese crossed the Yalu, their real difficulties began. The
country South of Mukden is a sea of mountains, and there was always in
the mind of General Kuroki’s staff the fear that General Kuropatkin
would detach a large force from the Peninsula and succeed in isolating
the Japanese army in Manchuria. To guard against that danger troops
were landed at Takushan, West of Antung, and formed a new _point
d’appui_, from which a strong flank was pushed steadily toward
the narrow peninsula. The purpose of this movement was not merely to
protect General Kuroki’s army, but to cover the army that was about to
land in the Liao-tung Peninsula. Here again the Russians were taken by
surprise. They expected a descent upon Nieuchang, on the West coast of
the Gulf, which seemed an ideal point from which to threaten Liao-yang
through Hai-cheng, to cut off Port Arthur, and to turn the position.
But again the Japanese adopted the strategy of the Chinese War, and
despite the report of its impregnable strength, forced a landing at
Kin-chou at the neck of the Kwanlung Peninsula.
From this point the Japanese plan of campaign, if it did not actually
miscarry, was at any rate tardy in development. It was not anticipated
that Port Arthur would be capable of prolonged defence. Recalling their
experience with the Chinese in 1884, the Japanese felt certain that the
fortress would be captured in a few weeks, and that General Nogi’s army
would move North into line with General Kuroki. Had they foreseen that
several months would be spent in difficult and costly siege operations,
they would have been content with investing Port Arthur, clearing
the peninsula, and joining their forces for an immediate attack on
Liao-yang.
The task of driving the Russians North was given to the Third Army,
with whose advent in the peninsula began the active campaign on land
under the direction of Field Marshal Oyama and the Head Quarter Staff.
The Liao-tung Peninsula was rapidly cleared, and the Russians were
driven back upon their main defences at Liao-yang, leaving Port Arthur
to its fate.
The men who were responsible for this plan of campaign were the members
of the Imperial and Headquarter Staffs. In the Marquis Yamagata, who
remained in Tokyo with the Emperor, was vested almost absolute power.
He is a man of remarkable character and ability, and is regarded as the
creator of the national army out of bands of feudal retainers. With him
was associated as Assistant Chief of the Staff, General Nagaoka, whose
acquaintance with Europe, and especially with France, made him an able
coadjutor. In the Minister for War--General Terauchi, himself a soldier
of repute and experience, the Imperial Staff had another invaluable
assistant.
The direction of operations in the field was vested in Field Marshal
the Marquis Oyama--a soldier of wide experience and attractive
personality, in whose character is a strange mixture of caution and
reckless daring. I have observed in the constitution of every Japanese
Staff a remarkable combination of character and experience. It will be
found almost invariably that the Commander is a man of mature years,
distinguished for caution--a soldier with no European training, and
speaking no language save Japanese--and that with him is associated
as Chief of the Staff a younger and more active man of more rapid
cerebration and greater daring--a soldier who has had experience in
Europe. This combination works admirably, the Commander acting as a
brake and the Chief of the Staff as a propeller.
General Kodama, Chief of Marquis Oyama’s staff, is a most interesting
personality, and is popularly regarded as the brain of the army. He
comes of a fighting race, having been born half a century ago in the
province of Choshu, one of the four great Daimiates that have given
an unbroken succession of warriors and rulers to Japan. The Marquis
Ito, the most famous of modern statesmen, Count Inouye, ablest of
administrators and diplomatists, and Field Marshal Yamagata are from
Choshu. Indeed, there is only one other clan that has the heritage of
power. If you are not of Satsuma you must be of Choshu. Hence the term
“Sat-Cho,” familiar in politics to denote the combination of these
great Daimiates. The province in which General Kodama was born played a
foremost part in the revolution that overthrew the Shogun and restored
the authority of the Mikado. His clansmen were the first to cast aside
armour and sword and spear, and to adopt the arms, discipline, and
tactics of Europe. Baron Kodama was sixteen years old when Japan began
to throw off her feudal chains, and the revolution swept him into the
forces arraigned against feudalism.
In 1871 feudalism was dead. Shogun and Daimios were driven into private
life and the Emperor was released from enforced seclusion at Kioto. But
the seeds of disaffection remained, and in 1874 rebellion broke out
in the province of Hizen, one of the Daimiates that had combined to
destroy the Shogun. Kodama was a captain, having received his company
twelve months before, and was sent with the Osaka division to Saga,
as adjutant. The rebellion was suppressed in ten days, yet it lasted
long enough to display the courage and determination of the young
soldier. With a bullet through each arm he continued to pursue the
rebels until help came and the rout was complete. On his return to the
capital he was promoted to the rank of major and received the thanks
of the Emperor. His services were in demand three years later when
civil war again ravaged the country. Major Kodama was with the Imperial
troops besieged in the castle of Kumamoto by the rebels of Satsuma.
The garrison suffered terrible privations and was relieved with great
difficulty. As soon as the siege was raised Kodama took the field once
more and fought several battles. In 1889 he was gazetted major-general
and in the following year was sent to Europe to study the military
systems of the western nations. During the war with China he held the
important appointment of Vice Minister of War. In 1900 he was appointed
Governor General of the Island of Formosa, a post which he retains
although in 1903 he was summoned to Tokyo to take the portfolio of Home
Secretary.
When Baron Kodama--he was raised to the peerage in 1895 with a step in
rank as lieutenant-general--became a member of the Cabinet there was
a universal cry for bold administration, and the hopes of reformers
centered on the soldier-statesman to whom they had given the name
“Minister of the Axe” because of his declaration that in politics as in
battle a sharp axe is better than a blunt knife.
The encroachments of Russia in Manchuria and Korea turned Kodama’s
energies and thoughts from politics to war, and in October of 1903,
when Major-General Tamura died, he left the Cabinet to discharge the
duties of assistant chief of the Head Quarter Staff, a post to which
he was called not only by the voice of the people but by his comrades
in arms. In this responsible and difficult position, the General has
given proof of foresight and perseverance that have distinguished him
throughout his career. He is a man of strong character and possesses in
no small degree the indefinable quality known as personal magnetism. As
a staff officer his clear head, his sound and ready judgment and his
mastery of detail have been of the highest service. He has the infinite
capacity for taking pains which Michael Angelo called genius. Night
and day he sits at his desk attending to the multitudinous details of
a great war, yet his door is never closed to a friend or even to the
stranger who has any claim upon his attention.
Captain Tanaka, the baron’s aide-de-camp, is a typical example of the
new school. His knowledge of England is not confined to the language;
it extends to our military history in its obscurest details, and his
spare moments are spent in translating into Japanese the tactical books
of our army.
General Fukushima, Director of Military Intelligence, is a
much-travelled soldier and speaks English. He journeyed alone through
Siberia in 1892, and brought back valuable reports that confirmed
the high opinion of his special talent. At that time he was only a
lieutenant-colonel, and his fame had not gone beyond a small official
circle. When he returned from Siberia he was appointed to the Staff and
was sent on a mission of investigation to China, Korea, and Russia.
During the Chinese war he commanded a regiment, and was afterwards
made Governor of Formosa, but resigned the post in consequence of some
difference of opinion on the subject of the pigtail of the nationalized
Chinese. Once more he took the road, and journeyed through India,
Persia, and Turkey, with eyes that saw everything, ears that heard
everything, and a memory that forgot nothing. In the Boxer troubles
General Fukushima was in command of the Japanese contingent that
took part in the Tientsin-Pekin operations, when the Japanese troops
distinguished themselves for reckless courage and perfect discipline.
The first general to take the field was General Kuroki. Born in the
province of Satsuma sixty-one years ago, Baron Kuroki springs from
the warrior class and was trained from infancy in the lessons of
endurance, courage, and chivalry. In the revolution he fought for
the Emperor against the Shogun, who had usurped all save the name
of Mikado. He received his company in 1871, and six years later, as
lieutenant-colonel, marched to the relief of Kumamoto Castle, where
General Kodama and the Imperial troops were besieged by rebellious
members of his own Satsuma clan. As soon as this civil war was over
he joined the Staff, and was promoted to the rank of major-general in
1885. In the early stages of the war with China, General Kuroki was
engaged in the work of mobilisation, but when the struggle developed he
was despatched to the front with the rank of lieutenant-general, and
commanded one of the divisions that took Wei-hai-wei after a desperate
resistance by the Chinese.
Like all brave leaders, General Kuroki is greatly beloved by his men.
General Fujii, Chief of the Staff of the First Army, is one of the most
able and popular officers in the army. He entered the service as a
cadet and is now only forty-three years of age. Leaving Germany, where
he was military _attaché_ for four years, he joined the Staff of
Field-Marshal Oyama during the Chinese War, and fought at Port Arthur
and Wei-hai-wei. After acting as instructor in the Staff College he
returned to Europe as _attaché_ in Vienna, and came back to Japan
to be chief instructor in the Staff College. Immediately before the war
he made an adventurous journey through Korea, and gained much knowledge
of the country that was of service to the army.
It was my good fortune to have the friendship of General Fujii and
to have profited greatly by his experience and counsel, of which
many indications may be found in this volume. He is a man of ready
sympathy and phenomenal powers of work. Full of resource and daring, he
possesses, in an astonishing measure, that concentration and detachment
of mind which is found only in men of the highest capacity. I recall
one example. During a battle General Fujii sent for me and laughingly
complained that I never ventured near him. I replied that I would
not dream of approaching him at so critical a time. “When you see me
smoking a cigar you may know that I am ready to talk with you on any
subject you like.” As the general was always smoking I had no scruples
in the future, though, lest the stock of cigars should fail, it was my
habit to present him with a few cigars before the fighting began.
When I look back and endeavour to form an estimate of the character
of those who direct the Japanese army, I am bound to confess that no
country in the world can boast of men more endowed by nature and better
equipped by training for the desperate service of war. Their energy and
industry are not less remarkable than their ability and devotion to
duty. When a man falls short of this high standard--and there have been
a few such men--he disappears and not a protest is heard. No one in
Japan would propose to make Field Marshals of their failures.