THE NORTHERN ADVANCE.
General Kuroki and his staff arrived at Pyng-yang on March 21st, and
began to prepare for the advance. Four problems had first to be solved.
At what point were the Russians likely to offer serious resistance?
Along what road must the Japanese march? How were three divisions to be
supplied with food and ammunition? Was it possible to transport heavy
artillery to the Yalu? Without precise information as to the enemy’s
plans the first question could not be answered. It was known, of
course, that the Russians had an entrenched position North of the Yalu,
but of their strength beyond Pyng-yang General Kuroki was ignorant.
Spies reported that the enemy had not bridged the river, but were able
to cross the ice West of Wiju by means of planks and straw. There was,
consequently, nothing to prevent the Russians from appearing in force
South of the Yalu before the Japanese army could be concentrated at a
point near the river.
General Kuroki had to take precautions against this contingency.
Reconnaissances showed that the Cossacks were hovering about the river
which flows through Anju, but whether with artillery and infantry
could not be ascertained. Uncertain of what lay behind this cavalry
screen, General Kuroki prepared to fight in the course of his advance
on the river.
Anju accordingly became the next objective. The Second Division had
landed at the mouth of the Tai-tong river on March 16th, and before the
21st the greater part of the Twelfth Division had marched from Seoul to
Ping-yang. The advance was begun a few days later, and was made in this
order. The three divisions formed a line about thirty miles north of
Ping-yang, stretching from Syunchong on the East through Sukchon on the
main road and onward towards the coast. On the right, near Syunchong,
was the Twelfth Division: in the centre, at Sukchon, was the Guards
Division, and on the left was the Second Division.
As the troops moved rapidly Northward their difficulties increased.
Despite the labours of an army of sappers the roads were in a terrible
state. The surface, frozen to a depth of twelve inches, began to melt,
and man and horse plunged through morass and quagmire. At Pyng-yang it
was comparatively easy to feed three divisions because of the river,
but the task grew heavier with every mile, for transport trains that
were intended to cover six ri a day could often march only two ri.
Native coolies were engaged in tens of thousands, yet even these did
not suffice, and the army must have suffered serious privations had it
not been that Korea, unlike Manchuria, produces large quantities of
rice and that the people were willing to sell.
At Anju it was apparent that the Russians did not intend to oppose the
advance South of the Yalu. General Kuroki accordingly halted to collect
supplies at that place and to complete his plans. Assuming that no
battle would be fought until the Yalu was reached, the army must march
seven days and each division must have twenty-one days supplies of food
and ammunition. It was calculated that at least four weeks’ stores
must be collected at Anju before the advance could begin. Fortunately
it was possible now to send ships from Chinampo to the mouth of the
river Tching-chien, so that Anju was provisioned more quickly than the
Japanese had anticipated.
From Anju General Kuroki had choice of two roads. He might march
along the Mandarin road that runs direct to Wiju, or he might take
the Eastern road which passes through Yunsan and reaches the Yalu
at Chosan. Natives declared that field guns and wheeled transport
could not move along the Eastern road, whereas if the Mandarin road
was repaired in certain places the passage of guns and carts was
practicable. In one respect, at least, there was no uncertainty. No
sooner would the army begin to march along one road than it would
regret that it had not chosen the other. But there were considerations
more important than those of ease. It was imperative that the force
should be on the same road that the main body of the enemy would select
if by any chance the Russians made up their minds to come South of
the Yalu. As far as that river the Mandarin road was undoubtedly the
better, but beyond the Yalu the Eastern road was good and would be more
convenient in the event of the Japanese having to turn the intrenched
position at Chiu-lien-cheng or to march directly on Liao-yang. To
divide the army and send it by both roads would facilitate transport,
but in the face of a strong and enterprising foe this would be
dangerous tactics, for there were no lateral communications or
cross-roads.
The Japanese Staff decided to make use of both roads. A mixed brigade
was sent by the Eastern route through Yunsan, while the main body of
two and a half divisions advanced along the Mandarin road. Once more
arose the serious question of supplying with food and ammunition this
great force on the march. The stores accumulated at Anju would not
suffice, as they could not be sent forward quickly enough. It was
necessary to discover another sea base further North. To make wide
reconnaisances was not easy, seeing that the enemy’s cavalry were still
South of the Yalu. But the Japanese had two strong incentives. Besides
the question of food was that of the heavy artillery. At Chinampo were
two batteries of 5-inch howitzers that must be carried to the Yalu
with speed and secrecy. To transport them by the main road, even if
practicable, would be to disclose their presence to the Russians, who
were confident that nothing heavier than field guns could be brought to
the Yalu.
Volunteers were not wanting to undertake this dangerous enterprise.
Officers of the navy and army put off in small boats under cover of
night, and searched every mile of the coast and of the tracks leading
therefrom. The peninsula of South-West of Charenkwan was deemed the
best place, and General Kuroki decided to send a force sufficient to
cover the landing of guns and supplies at Richao. A large number of men
would be needed should the Russians discover the secret and descend
into the peninsula. But again rose the problem of feeding a detached
body of troops, whose sea communications were dependent on the weather
and on the absence of a Russian squadron. After careful calculation
General Kuroki came to the conclusion that he could not send more than
two regiments of cavalry and one regiment of infantry. This force
accordingly marched North and came to Chonju on March 28th. General
Michtchenko four days earlier had received a message reproaching him
for having allowed Pyng-yang to be occupied by a single company of
Japanese infantry, and commanding him to do something to check the
rapid advance of the enemy. He accordingly went South with six hundred
Cossacks, and encountered the Japanese detached force under the walls
of Chonju.
The Russians attacked Chonju from three sides, and were opposed at
first by only a few soldiers who had been left to hold the town.
Hearing shots some cavalry of the Guard that had ridden North returned
with all speed, and messengers were despatched to warn the main body.
Hard pressed, and almost surrounded, the Japanese held a position South
of Chonju, until reinforced by infantry from main detachment, who
arrived breathless after a race of three miles. Seizing elevations on
the East and South-east the infantry opened fire, and drove back the
Cossacks, who fell back upon Charenkwan.
This little victory secured for the Japanese a fresh landing place.
Roads, however, must be made before howitzers and carts could be
moved inland. This was a work of tremendous difficulty, for the whole
country-side was a fathomless bog. Yet the engineers of the Second
Division were equal to the task, despite the fact that for twenty
days they had been making every foot of the road along which the
division marched from Chinampo. From Richao, where the howitzers were
put on shore, to the main road at Charenkwan is a distance of fifteen
miles--fifteen miles of rice fields and morass. Pine trees were cut
from the hills and sunk in the mire until a foundation could be secured
for branches and brush wood, which in turn were covered with earth. In
nine days a path was made from the sea, and the pioneers of the Second
Division had the satisfaction of knowing that if heavy artillery failed
the Japanese as it did in the Chinese War it would not be for the same
reason.